

THE EXPULSION OF THE SPANIARDS FROM
MEXICO, 1827-1828-9

By

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INTRODUCTION

The Conflict between Creoles and Spaniards in the Early Nineteenth Century

The principal focus of discontent in early nineteenth century Mexico was to be found in the creole segment of society.¹ Historians of the independence movements have emphasized the creole's dissatisfaction with his minor role in the colonial government and Church. The creole was prone to make invidious comparisons between his own politically subordinate position and the advantageous position traditionally enjoyed by the European Spaniard.

The conflict dated back to the sixteenth century when:

The widening rift between the descendants of the conquerors [creoles] and Spanish officialdom was one of the most active ingredients in the nascent nationalism which split New Spain permanently into two factions, criollos and gachupines.²

Luis González Obregón has actually attributed the independence movement of the nineteenth century to the Spanish officials suppression of the encomiendas³ held by the creole descendants of the conquerors in the sixteenth century.⁴ The conflict did not cool in the seventeenth century as Thomas Gage bears witness:

This hatred is so great that I dare say nothing might be more advantageous than this to any other nation that would conquer America.⁵

Hugh M. Hamill, exploring the creole-Spaniard conflict in its late eighteenth century manifestation, decided that the most concise exposition of creole grievances and charges against the Spaniards were

to be found in two appeals drawn up by the creole-dominated cabildo (municipal council) of Mexico City for presentation to Charles III in 1771 and Charles IV in 1792.⁶ Hamill concludes from the fact that the two appeals are basically similar that little or no action had been taken to redress creole grievances during the intervening 21 years.⁷

Creole complaints against the Spaniards were many and varied. Perhaps the most disturbing fact for the creole was his awareness that the mere geographical location of his birth hampered his efforts at obtaining political or ecclesiastical office, even though he might be qualified by wealth and education. Important appointments were usually distributed in Spain and the recipient of royal favor was, more often than not, a Spaniard. The practice of granting offices to Spaniards was crown policy, adhered to throughout the colonial period, and the monarchy made no secret of the fact that it considered this to be the safest policy.

In the matter of officeholding, written law allegedly favored the creole of ability, particularly if his lineage included a conquistador or early colonist.⁸ In this, as in other colonial matters, Spanish law was no reflection of Spanish practice. The common belief in Europe that creoles were inferior to Europeans by virtue of their American birth provided the rationale for the superior positions acquired by Spaniards.

The appeals submitted to the crown by the cabildo of Mexico City in the late eighteenth century focused on officeholding as "the greatest and most enormous injustice."⁹ An example cited by the

regidores (council members) was the newly created tobacco monopoly (renta de tabaco) which was operated as a section of the royal treasury. Though it had been planned by a creole, only one-twentieth of the ranking officials of the monopoly were creoles.¹⁰

Creoles felt that the typical Spanish official was incapable of fulfilling his duties in America. They pointed to the expense of maintaining a foreigner and his entourage and bemoaned the fact that a newly appointed Spanish official soon filled the subordinate offices at his disposal with his hangers-on who had followed him to America. Qualified creoles who had waited patiently to fill a vacant position in Church or state were brusquely shunted aside by an unqualified Spaniard who came as the friend of a prelate or a government minister.

The crown moved slowly and too late to ameliorate creole dissatisfaction with their disproportionately small share of offices. A royal order of February 21, 1776, guaranteed that one-third of the canonships and benefices in Spain as well as in America would be reserved for creoles.¹¹ But in 1777 "all the prelates, archbishops, bishops, viceroys, presidents of audiencias (higher courts), and governors in the capital cities were [Spaniards] and . . . these were all royal appointments."¹² The creole actually acquired fewer high offices in the eighteenth century than his fellows had enjoyed in the sixteenth and seventeenth.¹³ The regular ecclesiastical orders, led by the Franciscans in 1618, had adopted a system of alternating a Spaniard with a creole in all benefices, but here too preference was being extended to Spaniards in the late eighteenth century.¹⁴

Hamill noted a further reason for creole dissatisfaction with the status quo:

The wealth which some gachupines were able to command, due to their high positions in the government and commerce as well as in mining and the operation of haciendas, was a cause of envy among those criollos who were less prosperous.¹⁵

Social position was denied the creole who possessed neither wealth nor an honorific position in society.

The creole's complaints and petitions to the crown produced no solid results in the colony.¹⁶ By 1808 little had changed with respect to officeholding: one bishopric had fallen to a creole but no other high office in either Church or state was held by an American. The Spaniards of New Spain were aware of creole discontent but they seem to have taken a light view of its importance.¹⁷ Archbishop Alonso Núñez de Haro obstructed a royal order of 1792 granting additional ecclesiastical posts to creoles.¹⁸ The Spaniards were obviously reacting from a position of strength within the state and the Church.

Moreover, the Spaniards of New Spain had their creole supporters, many of whom did not desert the Spanish cause even after independence. Hamill suggested, in light of the division which existed within the creole sector, that in discussions of social reality on the eve of independence, a distinction must be made between two basic creole types.¹⁹ The first type, the "European criollo" was drawn toward Spain. Hamill explains:

He was usually the son of a gachupín or closely related to some prominent peninsular family. He often enjoyed the distinctions of the nobility. He was, perhaps, sent to Spain for his education. His devotion to his king was traditional and the Divine

Right was uncritically accepted. Europe was the distant core of his universe and whatever culture existed in America was of little importance. The European criollo was apt to have commercial or financial connection with the mother country. The chances of his being rich were good . . . his vested interests in the economy were of such importance that he was unwilling to see a change of government which might jeopardize his material possessions.²⁰

The size of the "European creole" population is uncertain, but it must have been a small percentage in view of the fact that the majority of creoles were not well placed in society.

The creole majority, then, falls into Hamill's second type--the "American creole":

Unlike the European criollos, they were not usually rich. Since . . . the Mexican elite was based almost exclusively on wealth . . . American criollos did not belong to this aristocracy . . . it was characteristic of them to have been long associated with America. But if their forebears had been fortunate enough to form an entailed estate, succeeding generations were likely to have wasted the founder's wealth and position to which they were heir The Mayoralzgos . . . might remain in the hands of the eldest born, but the properties were inefficiently maintained Racial purity among the American criollos was not invariable A large portion of the criollo population was made up of petty municipal officials, artisans, night watchmen and unemployed . . . owners of ranchos, provincial shopkeepers, and little businessmen . . . some, who had no real estate at all, made their living by administering the haciendas of absentee landlords They were attracted by the law, the Church, education, and the military.²²

The poorest of the American creoles were known as "criollos de la plebe."

The Spaniard's presence was tolerated by the American creole only because the latter was powerless to alter the status quo. Political revolution did not represent the awful spectre to the American creole that it raised in the minds of the Spaniard or the European creole.

The creole was "the crux of the social and political organization of New Spain," according to Hamill.²³ Due to their location in the small villages and in the countryside, "a fact which stemmed from their holding the magistracies and curacies of lesser importance," the creoles held sway over the mestizos and Indians in the provinces. Should the Spaniard be removed from the scene, the creole would inherit the entire apparatus of control intact and without serious social disorganization.

The American creole--European creole division, which will be used throughout the study, should be understood as a cultural phenomenon. The American creole was culturally Mexican and his identity as such was a source of pride to him. His image of Spain and Spanish culture was largely negative. His counterpart, the European creole, consciously attempted to become culturally Spanish. He admired and approved of Spanish culture, as he understood it. Consequently, the European creole lacked faith in the future of a non-Spanish Mexico. In the 1820's he would see ruin for Mexico in the expulsion of the Spaniards. The American creole would see, in the act of expulsion, the salvation of Mexico--his Mexico.

The Three Guarantees Contained in the Plan of Iguala

On February 24, 1821, Agustín Iturbide made public his plan of Iguala which was directed to the "Mexicans," a term which included "the Europeans, Africans and Asiatics" who resided in Mexico.²⁴ The plan contained three principal articles or essential ideas, which were 1) the conservation of

the Apostolic Roman Catholic religion, without tolerance of any other,
 2) independence under the "moderate monarchical form of government, and
 3) union between Americans and Europeans.²⁵ These were the "three
 guarantees," which the officials and troops of Iturbide's army swore to
 uphold. The guarantees were represented by the three colors on the
 banner adopted for the cause: white, red, and green. Red symbolized
 the guarantee of union between Spaniards and Mexicans, or the third
 guarantee.²⁶

The guarantee of union was embodied in articles 13, 15, and 17
 of the plan of Iguala.²⁷ These three articles promised the Spaniard
 security in the ownership of property, permanence in his civil or
 military post and, finally, conservation of his military rank. The
 Spaniard could see in the plan of Iguala a guarantee of Mexican citizen-
 ship and, aside from the severing of formal ties with the peninsula, the
 continuity of institutions which offered him a secure future in Mexico.
 These were the guarantees which the Spaniard who supported Iturbide
 desired.²⁸ Spanish liberals supported Iturbide out of their belief in
 the virtue of independence while, on the contrary, the Spanish upper
 clergy gave his movement their support in order to remove the dangerous
 influence of the liberal government in Spain. The plan of Iguala en-
 countered the Spaniards divided into three camps: liberals, upper
 clergy, and supporters of the viceregal government. The revolutionary
 plan was designed to attract the first two of these groups away from
 their dependence upon the third, or the government. Iturbide's plan
 was attractive to the European creole and the Spaniard because of its

guarantees. The plan of Iguala was attractive to the American creole as a means of achieving independence.

Iturbide's plan may have been of his own design, but it is evident that he operated in accord with influential Spaniards and creoles.²⁹ Manuel Gómez Pedraza, a friend who never abandoned Iturbide, revealed the important role played by the Spanish general Pedro Celestino Negrete in the movement:

. . . when I was commissioned by [Iturbide] to arrange the capitulations, he told me with the accent of truth which never deceives: "tell Negrete that what I have done has been by his counsel or with his approbation": I shall never forget this remarkable message.³⁰

The conciliatory direction which the revolution took disarmed its opponents and united all those with interests to defend. The gradual transition prescribed by the plan from a colonial to an independent government was designed to avoid any taint of illegitimacy which might jeopardize titles to property or ancient privileges.³¹

The treaty of Córdoba, which resulted from the conference between Captain General Juan O'Donojú and Iturbide on August 24, 1821, was a reaffirmation of the plan of Iguala, with two basic changes. Should the ruling family refuse the proffered crown, the cortes would be free to select a monarch of its choice without being restricted to the Bourbon house. This alteration, noted Alamán, left the way open to Iturbide's ambition.³² The second modification in the plan of Iguala to appear in the treaty of Córdoba concerned the Spaniards. All "Europeans" who were opposed to Mexican independence were to be allowed to remain by articles 15 and 16.³³ Article 15 of the treaty declared also that Spaniards were to be allowed to leave the country with their

fortunes if they so desired. Article 16 required the "notoriously disaffected" among the military officials and public employees to depart within a time period to be set by the regency.³⁴ By the terms of article 17, O'Donojú agreed to employ his authority to arrange the capitulation and departure of the expeditionary troops located in the capital.³⁵

Each Spanish soldier was issued a document at the time and place of his capitulation which would serve him in the future as proof that he had surrendered in 1821. In 1828, following the passage of the first expulsion law, these documents were required of the former soldiers by the federal government as proof that they had not entered the country after 1821.³⁶

Numerous Spanish military officials were participants in the independence process in New Spain. For Spaniards of established position, the guarantee of union offered by Iturbide's movement provided the necessary assurances to allow them to support independence as a feasible solution to the problems posed for them by the Spanish constitutional government of 1821. Alamán summarized the Spaniard's role succinctly:

A Spanish [cleric] was the first to place in practice an effective means of achieving independence: a Spanish merchant is credited with having enabled Iturbide to seize the funds destined for Manila . . .; numerous Spanish chiefs and officials signed the acts and pronouncements of Iguala and Sultepec; a Spaniard convinced Iturbide to march to the bajío; a Spaniard proclaimed the independence of Guadalajara, caused it to be proclaimed in all the provinces of the north, and was the only one of the principal chiefs to receive an honorable wound . . .; a Spaniard opened the gates of Mexico without the loss of blood to the Army of the Three Guarantees; and, finally, a Spaniard loaned the necessary money to solemnize the triumphal entry into the capital . . .³⁷

The significant military engagements were often sustained by Spanish expeditionary units who had defected. It is probably correct that there were more expeditionaries in the ranks of the army of the three guarantees which besieged Mexico City than were in the city itself at the side of the government.

Untold numbers of Spaniards would remain in Mexico, anticipating personal security under the protection of the "third guarantee." Many of the expeditionary troops would remain, marry Mexican wives and begin raising families in towns and villages across Mexico. Their future seemed assured in a land where Spanish immigrants had made their way for three centuries. Expeditionaries who had joined the army of the three guarantees expected financial rewards and promotions in the new military establishment. The upper clergy anticipated greater freedom from the Church, protected from the reforms decreed by the Spanish cortes. The Spaniards in general must have anticipated favor and position under the new regime, although many who held posts under the viceregal government may have feared for their sinecures. Spanish liberals and masons, no doubt, hoped to secure the installation of a constitution similar to that of Spain. For the American creole, however, the achievement of independence was merely the first step in his conflict with the old order. The Spaniards who had played a leading role in the success of the Iturbidean movement would now be confronted with threats posed by the American creoles far more serious than those created by the Spanish cortes.

Notes

¹This theme received considerable attention in Jorge Juan y Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias secretas de América (2 vols.; Madrid, 1918), Chapter V. Their investigation was conducted in America in the 1740's.

²Lesley B. Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain (Berkeley, 1950), p. 145.

³Encomiendas were allotments of Indians granted, as a form of payment for services rendered, to the conquerors. Their descendants attempted to retain these grants but met with considerable resistance from the crown. See ibid.

⁴Luis González Obregón, Los precursores de la independencia mexicana en el siglo XVI, cited in ibid., p. 145.

⁵Thomas Gage, A New Survey of the West Indies (London, 1699), p. 20.

⁶"Representación humilde que hace la muy noble y leal ciudad de México en favor de sus naturales a su amado Soberano, el Señor Don Carlos IV, en 2 de mayo de 1792." Mariano Cuevas Collection, Colegio Máximo de Cristo Rey de la Provincia Mexicana de la Compañía de Jesús, San Angel, D.F. The 1771 version was published in J. E. Hernández Dávalos, Colección de documentos para la historia de la guerra de independencia de México de 1808 a 1821 (6 vols.; México, 1877-82), I. 436, cited in Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence (Gainesville, 1966), p. 225, note 2.

⁷Ibid., p. 31. In his chapter entitled "Spaniards and Mexicans," Hamill presents a thorough treatment of the creole-Spanish controversy.

⁸A provision to that effect was included in the Recopilación de leyes of 1681. See Richard Konetzke, "La condición legal de los criollos y las causas de la independencia," Estudios Americanos, II (1950), 31-54.

⁹"Representación humilde," p. 14, in Hernández y Dávalos, I, 453. Cited in Hamill, p. 22.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Konetzke, pp. 48-49.

¹²This complaint was contained in an appeal directed to the king by the Claustro (professors) of the university. Cited in Hamill, p. 25.

¹³Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁸Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), I, 58.

¹⁹Hamill, pp. 33-35.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 33-34. Hamill cited Manuel del Campo y Rivas as the European creole archetype.

²¹A Mayorazgo was an entailed estate in the form of a mine or hacienda.

²²Hamill, pp. 35-36.

²³Ibid., p. 43.

²⁴Alamán, V, 105.

²⁵Ibid., V, 113.

²⁶Ibid., V, 113-14.

²⁷Mariano Galván Rivera (ed.), Colección de órdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa y soberanos congresos generales de la Nación Mexicana (8 vols.; México, 1829-40), I, 7-8.

²⁸Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd. ed.; México, 1954), p. 36.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 28-9; Alamán, V, 70-73.

³⁰Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico, dedica a sus compatriotas: o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), pp. 16-17.

³¹Alamán, V, 120.

³²Ibid., V, 261; Cuevas, p. 74.

³³Galván Rivera, I, 9-10.

³⁴A decree of October 21, 1821 reiterated this provision. Galván Rivera, I, 18-19.

³⁵Alamán, V, 267.

³⁶A number pf these capitulaciones submitted by former expeditionaries in 1828, have been preserved in Mexico. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión.

³⁷Alamán, V, 333-34.

CHAPTER I

THE SPANIARDS OF MEXICO IN 1827

The Spaniards Remaining in 1827

An untold number of Spaniards fled Mexico following independence and during the empire of 1821-23. A second wave departed following the declaration of a republic in late 1823. In spite of the separation from Spain, however, a substantial number of Spaniards were resolved to remain in the republic. More than 6,000 were still present in December, 1827, when the first expulsion of Spaniards was legislated.¹ The purpose of the present chapter will be to examine the Spanish community of Mexico in 1827 in order to discover the economic and social position of the former colonial elite. Our analysis of the general expulsion movement in subsequent chapters may then be considered in light of the data presented here on the position of the Spaniard in Mexico on the eve of the first expulsion.

Spanish immigration to Mexico did not cease with the achievement of Mexican independence in 1821. While complete data on this immigration are lacking for both the colonial and post-independence periods, an examination of statistics for one region of Mexico may prove helpful. Lists preserved in the Ramo de expulsión were found to contain immigration data on 55 per cent of the Spaniards residing in Oaxaca in 1827.² While this state may not have been typical, since regional variations

are to be expected, the general pattern is nonetheless suggestive. For example, immigration was heaviest for a single year in 1812, the year of the Liberal Spanish Constitution. Immigration declined but did not halt between 1819-26. Santander appears to have been the most important single source of immigration to Oaxaca for most years between 1762-1826.

Government statistics on the arrival and attempted entry of Spaniards during the period 1826-27 are less than complete.³ Ministerial reports of 1827 and 1828 indicate that legal passports for entry were extended to somewhat more than 84 Spanish males while passports for departure were granted to 55 in 1826 alone. During the year 1827, at least 35 Spaniards were prevented from entering the republic after having arrived at the ports.

A report submitted to the congress by Minister of Relations Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros on December 31, 1827, indicated that ten Spaniards had been admitted with passports in 1827, while 207 had departed with passports during the same year.⁴ Of the 207 Spaniards departing in 1827, 113 were ecclesiastics and all but eleven of the latter were regular clergy. The departing Spaniards were accompanied by 186 family members and no less than 54 servants. These departures resulted from the intensification of anti-Spanish feeling and activities throughout 1827. Merchants were prominent among the departing Spaniards but the regular clergy constituted nearly half of those who chose to leave the republic legally in 1827.

The effects of the expulsion law of December 20, 1827, fell upon an estimated 6,015 Spaniards who were still residing in Mexico on that date.⁵ Their geographical distribution throughout the republic is shown in Table 4. More than one-fifth of the Spanish community resided in the Federal capital. The actual Spanish population of the Federal District was increasing throughout 1827 as a result of the intensification of persecution and legal sanctions in the states. Aside from the capital, some states had comparatively large Spanish populations. Particularly notable were the Spanish communities of Puebla, Oaxaca, and Yucatán, in that order. Puebla contained over 12 per cent of the Spanish population of Mexico while Oaxaca and Yucatán contained over 10 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. The comparatively small percentage of the national total residing in Veracruz (3.7 per cent) would seem to indicate that a considerable part of the Spanish mercantile colony of that important port had migrated to Havana since 1821.⁶

The total Spanish population of 6,015 constituted only 0.09 per cent of the estimated total Mexican population of 8,000,000 in 1827.⁷ The importance of the Spaniard in Mexican society clearly did not depend upon his numbers. Rather, his prominence in government posts, military positions, ecclesiastical sinecures, and commercial enterprises gave to him an importance which reflected his pre-independence status in a manner which could not have failed to attract the notice of American creoles. In the section which follows, the occupational distribution of the Mexican Spanish population in 1827 will be considered at some length.

Source: Lists of Spaniards submitted by the governor were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 9 and 10; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exps. 2 and 5; leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 1.

TABLE 1

SPANISH IMMIGRATION TO THE STATE OF OAXACA: 1762-1826

(Derived from the reports submitted to the Secretary of Relations in 1828 in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827)

Spanish Origin	1762-99	1800-11	1812	1813-18	1819-26	Date Unknown	Totals
1. Santander	14	4	7	12	9	9	55
2. Galicia	11	10	2	6	2	3	34
3. Andalucía	6	4	7	2	2	3	24
4. Granada	0	2	9	5	0	7	23
5. Castilla	8	2	9	0	0	4	23
6. Sevilla	0	0	8	0	0	9	17
7. Asturias	1	1	2	4	1	4	13
8. Viscaya	5	4	0	2	0	2	13
9. Cádiz	3	2	2	3	1	0	11
Other Origins	17	14	28	11	7	25	102
Totals	65	43	74	45	22	66	315

Note: By the author's calculation, there were 615 Spaniards in Oaxaca in 1827. When the 315 known origins are subtracted from the total Spaniards, 300 unknown origins result.

TABLE 2

SPANIARDS ENTERING, DEPARTING, OR DENIED ENTRY
INTO THE REPUBLIC, 1826-1827

	1826	April 26, 1826- December 20, 1827	1827
Spaniards entering with passports issued by the Federal Government	84 ^a	62 ^b	-
Spaniards departing with passports issued by the Federal Government	55 ^a	-	-
Spaniards detained in the ports of Mexico and forced to reembark	-	-	35 ^c

Note: Blank spaces indicate that data were unavailable.

^aMinisterio de Relaciones Interiores y Exteriores, Memoria del ministerio . . . 1827 (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1827), Cuadro Núm. 1.

^bMemoria del ministerio . . . 1828, Cuadro Núm. 2.

^cMemoria del ministerio . . . 1828, Cuadro Núm. 1.

TABLE 3

A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF RELATIONS
ON DECEMBER 31, 1827

(Manifesting the entry and departure of Spaniards from the republic during the present year, indicating also the members of their families, servants, their occupations and distinguishing those who pertained to the clergy, according to the passports issued by this secretariat.)

ENTRIES

<u>Months</u>	<u>Spaniards</u>	<u>Family Members</u>	<u>Occupations</u>
January	4	3	Commerce
February	0	5	"
March	1	1	"
April	0	0	"
May	0	0	"
June	0	1	"
July	4	0	Private
August	0	0	"
September	0	4	"
October	0	0	"
November	1	0	Commerce
December	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	"
Totals	10	17	

DEPARTURES

<u>Spaniards</u>	<u>Family Members</u>	<u>Servants</u>	<u>Occupations</u>	<u>Clergy</u>	
				<u>Regular</u>	<u>Secular</u>
12	3	1	Commerce	1	1
5	6	1	3 id. & 1 private	0	0
9	1	0	Commerce	2	0
4	0	0	3 commerce	0	0
6	1	1	1 commerce & 2 private	0	4
7	4	1	Commerce	2	1
4	1	1	3 commerce & 2 private	0	0
5	5	0	Commerce	2	0

TABLE 3 (cont.)

DEPARTURES					
<u>Spaniards</u>	<u>Family Members</u>	<u>Servants</u>	<u>Occupations</u>	<u>Clergy</u>	
				<u>Regular</u>	<u>Secular</u>
15	18	2	Id., 3 idem.	3	0
15	14	5	Id., 3 idem.	3	1
41	56	8	Idem. & 1 proprietor	34	2
<u>84</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>34</u>	Id., prop., capits., emps.	<u>55</u>	<u>2</u>
207	186	54		102	11

Notes: ^aOf the individual Spaniards or subjects of the Spanish government who appear to have entered the republic during the present year, in accordance with the faculty possessed by the government under articles 2 and 3 of the law of April 25, 1826, one has left and four are minor children, born in Habana: and the family members were limited to women and children under the precautions which have been considered convenient, the same as those who came earlier to join their families residing in the republic, a part of them being Mexicans in origin.

^bThe individuals covered in the statement of departures were only those who have obtained passports from the supreme government by means of this secretariat of relations.

México, December 31, 1827

Espinosa

Source: Ministerio de relaciones interiores y exteriores, Memoria del ministerio . . . 1828 (México, 1828), Cuadro Núm. 3.

TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTIMATED SPANISH
POPULATION OF MEXICO IN 1827

Political Divisions	Spaniards December, 1827	
	Number	Per Cent of Total
California, Terr. de.	-	-
Chiapas	69	1.15
Chihuahua	178	2.95
Coahuila y Tejas	39	0.65
Colima, Terr. de	8	0.13
Distrito Federal	1,337	22.23
Durango	240	3.99
Guanajuato	90	1.50
Jalisco	237	3.94
México	187	3.19
Michoacán	219	3.64
Nuevo León	83	1.38
Nuevo México, Terr. de	12	0.20
Oaxaca	615	10.24
Occidente (Sonora y Sinaloa)	248	4.12
Puebla	726	12.08
Querétaro	255	4.24
San Luis Potosí	286	4.75
Tabasco	77	1.30
Tamaulipas	127	2.11
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	15	0.25
Veracruz	221	3.67
Yucatán	454	7.55
Zacatecas	292	4.85
Totals	6,015	100.00

Sources: Lists submitted by the governors to the Minister of Relations in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827, found throughout the AGN:RE. The statistics resulting from the author's count of the names present in these lists can only be termed an "estimate" because of the uncertainty which he entertains concerning the presence of all the original lists in the AGN:RE. Legajos 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 contained numerous lists of Spaniards, all of which were used in the compilation of the above figures.

The Spaniards' Occupations in 1827

The expulsion movement of 1827 attacked an economically important segment of Mexican society. The Spaniards' occupational pursuits were by no means limited, though they were primarily commercial, military, and ecclesiastical.⁸ The Spaniards listed in the governors' reports to the ministry of relations were engaged in over 100 different occupations, and their social ranks ranged from bishop to beggar. The data contained in Table 5 represent the occupations of roughly 40 per cent of the minimum figure of 6,015 Spaniards who were still in Mexico in 1827. While the unavailability of evidence concerning the occupations of 60 per cent of the Spaniards is disturbing, some general patterns of employment are indicated by the available data. Fortunately, the charts for Spanish occupations in eight states are very nearly complete.⁹

In Tables 5-12 the numerical importance of occupational groupings has been shown by ranking them according to the number of Spaniards in each group or category. Table 5, which attempts to present the occupational picture for the roughly 40 per cent of Spaniards in the republic whose occupations are known, demonstrates that commerce attracted more than any other economic pursuit. The military ranked second and the Church third.

Relatively complete occupational data were available for eight states of the federation.¹⁰ In the northern states of Chihuahua and Durango, mining ranked second behind commercial occupations. Laborers and the unemployed ranked second in Jalisco and Nuevo León, while land owners and wheat farmers held second place in Tabasco and Oaxaca

TABLE 5

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS RESIDING IN
THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO IN 1827

(Derived from reports submitted by the governors of the states, territories and Federal District in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827.)

Commercial Occupations:

Comerciantes	662
Mercaderos	62
Dependientes de comercio	32
Tenderos	31
Pulperos	9
Panaderos	7
Traficantes	5
Carniceros	3
Tratantes	3
Vendedores	3
Importador	1
Estanquero de tabaco	1
Bodeguero	1
Sub-Total	<u>820</u>

Military Personnel:

Generales de división	2
Generales de brigada	3
Oficiales retirados	160
Sargentos retirados	61
Soldados retirados	247
Cirujanos militares retirados	3
Capellan militar	1
Sub-Total	<u>477</u>

Ecclesiastics:

Religiosos	309
Seculares	55
Legos	9
Sub-Total	<u>373</u>

Land Owners:

Laboradores	193
Mineros	89
Hacendados	50
Dueños de fincas urbanas	4
Dueños de fincas rurales	3

TABLE 5 (cont.)

Dueño de rancho de pesquicia dependiente	1
Dueño de engño de azúcar	1
Rico	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	343
Marine Occupations:	
Marineros	59
Pilotos	26
Contramaestres	13
Pescadores	4
Barqueros	3
Calafates	3
Navegantes	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	110
Professional Occupations:	
Empleados federales cesantes	23
Médicos	9
Escribientes	8
Cirujanos	4
Preceptores	4
Curanderos practicantes	2
Agrimensores	2
Administradores generales de rentas	2
Facultativo en medicina y cirugía	1
Procurador de la aduana	1
Tutor de menores	1
Empleado estatal cesado	1
Maestro de primeras letras	1
Director de primeras letras	1
Profesor	1
Catedrático	1
Contador de rentas federales	1
Recontador de rentas federales	1
Ministro federal cesado	1
Administrador de diezmos	1
Abogado	1
Boticario	1
Arquitecto	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	69
Servants:	
Sirvientes domésticos	32
Corredores	12
Sirvientes mineros	5
Sirvientes rurales	<u>4</u>

TABLE 5 (cont.)

Guardas federales cesados	3
Porteros	2
Criados	2
Sereno	1
Guarda de Almacén	1
Calafate	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	63
Industrial Occupations:	
Fabricantes de paños	6
Sastres	4
Carpinteros	4
Hortelanos	3
Tabaqueros	3
Dependientes de minas	2
Sigarreros	2
Zapateros	2
Herrero	1
Ferrero	1
Grabador	1
Fabricante de aguardiente	1
Tejedor	1
Curtidor	1
Carretero	1
Alambiquero	1
Estampador	1
Albañil	1
Refinador de azúcar	1
Plastero	1
Artesano	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	39
Labores	19
Agricultural Occupations:	
Administradores de haciendas	7
Dependientes de haciendas	3
Arrendatario	1
Dependiente rural	1
Partón de cerdos	1
Mayordomo	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	14

TABLE 5 (cont.)

Miscellaneous Occupations	
Barberos	4
Arrieros	2
Cosmero [sic.]	1
Dutilador [sic.]	1
Organito [sic.]	1
Ruador [sic.]	1
Utinero [sic.]	1
	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	11
Unemployed Persons:	
Vagos	28
Viandantes	18
Tornilleros	14
Miserables	5
Sin empleo	3
Dementes	3
Ancianos	2
Pordiosero	1
Mendigante	1
Demandante	1
Ynsolvente	1
Baldado	1
	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	78
Grand Total	2,416

Spaniards	6,015
Occupations	2,416
Unknown	3,599

Sources: Occupations were listed in reports from the governors to the federal government on the progress of enforcement of the federal expulsion law of December 20, 1827. AGN:RE, leg. 1, Vol. 4; leg. 2, Vols. 4, 5, 8; leg. 3, Vols. 7, 8; leg. 4, Vols. 7, 9; leg. 5, Vol. 11; leg. 6, Vol. 13; leg. 7, Vol. 16; leg. 8, Vols. 18, 19; leg. 9, Vol. 22; leg. 10, Vols. 20, 23; leg. 13, Vol. 28.

TABLE 6

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF CHIHUAHUA IN 1827

(Derived from lists submitted to the secretary of relations by the governor of Chihuahua following the passage of the law of December 20, 1827.)

Comerciantes	60
Mineros	28
Sirvientes	14
Eclesiásticos:	
Religiosos	13
Seculares	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	14
Laboradores	9
Hacendados	4
Empleados federales cesantes	3
Oficiales cesantes	2
Cirujanos militares cesantes	2
Sargento cesante	1
Capellán militar	1
Alquilote	1
Carpintero	1
Grand Total	140
<hr/>	
Spaniards	178
Occupations	140
Unknown	38

Source: Occupations were noted on lists of Spaniards expelled or excepted from the law. Lists of the expelled were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 1, 12 and 16. Lists of those excepted were found in expediente 1 only.

TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF JALISCO IN 1827

(Derived from lists submitted by the governor of Jalisco to the secretary of relations in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827.)

Commercial Occupations:	
Comerciantes	97
Dependientes de comercio	2
Importador	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	100
Laborers	23
Eclesiásticos religiosos	21
Military Personnel:	
Oficiales cesados	12
Sargentos retirados	1
Soldados retirados	<u>3</u>
Sub-Total	16
Professional Occupations:	
Empleados federales	5
Empleados federales cesados	4
Preceptores de escuela	2
Profesor	1
Ministro cesado*	1
Escribiente	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	14
Land Owners:	
Hacendados	8
Mineros	3
Dueño de fincas urbanas	1
Rico	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	13
Other Occupations:	
Corredores	2
Hortelano	1
Zereno	1
Sirviente	1
Guarda cesado	1
Plastero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	7

TABLE 7 (cont.)

<hr/>	
Unemployed Persons:	
Miserables	
Loco	3
Inútil	1
Ynsolvente	1
Sin oficio	1
	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	7
Grand Total	206
<hr/>	
Spaniards	
Occupations	224
Unknown	206
	18
<hr/>	

*Francisco de Paula Martínez.

Source: Occupations were noted in lists of Spaniards expelled and exempted from the law in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 12 and 17.

TABLE 8

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF NUEVO LEON IN 1827

(Derived from lists submitted by the governor to the secretary of relations following passage of the law of December 20, 1827.)

Commercial Occupations:	
Comerciantes	26
Dependientes de comercio	4
Mercadero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	31
Unemployed Persons:	
Tornilleros	15
Vago	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	16
Ecclesiastics:	
Regulares	5
Seculares	<u>3</u>
Sub-Total	8
Professional Occupations:	
Oficiales retirados	2
Administradores de haciendas	2
Administrador de diezmos	1
Escribiente	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	6
Servants:	
Sirvientes	3
Criados	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	5
Skilled Laborers:	
Barberos	2
Curanderos practicantes	2
Zapatero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	5
Laboradores	4
Retired Soldier	1
Grand Total	76

TABLE 8 (cont.)

Spaniards	83
Occupations	76
Unknown	7

Source: Occupations were found in lists of Spaniards excepted or expelled from Nuevo León in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 14; leg. 2, Vol. 5, exp. 53.

TABLE 9

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF OAXACA IN 1827

(Derived from lists submitted by the governor of the state to the secretary of relations in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827.)

Commercial Occupations:	
Comerciantes	161
Vendedores	2
Tratante	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	164
Laboradores	
	61
Military Personnel:	
Oficiales retirados	15
Sargentos retirados	2
Soldados retirados	9
Cirujano militar retirado	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	27
Ecclesiastics:	
Religiosos	22
Seculares	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	23
Professional Occupations:	
Empleados federales cesados	7
Agrimensor	1
Procurador de la aduana	1
Administrador de rentas	1
Médico	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	11
Other Occupations:	
Corredores	8
Mineros	5
Jornaleros	4
Herreros	2
Marineros	2
Sirviente	1
Estampador	1
Utinero [sic.]	1
Guarda de tabaco	1
Dueño de engño de azúcar	1

TABLE 9 (cont.)

Arriero	1
Albañil	1
Sastre	1
Refinador de azúcar	1
Castrero	1
Portero	1
Barbero	1
Zapatero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	34
Unemployed Persons:	
Viandantes	15
Tornilleros	10
Vagos	9
Demandante	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	35
Grand Total	355
<hr/>	
Spaniards	615
Occupations	355
Unknown	260

Source: Lists of Spaniards residing in the state were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 9 and 10; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exp. 5. A list of Spaniards who requested passports voluntarily in early 1829 was found in Correo de Federación, VII (March 8, 1829), 4. Lists of Spaniards given passports by the governor were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 9; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exps. 2 and 5. Lists of Spaniards excepted were found in leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 9; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exp. 5; leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 1.

TABLE 10
OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF QUERETARO IN 1827

(Derived from lists of Spaniards expelled or excepted from the law of December 20, 1827, submitted by the governor of the state to the secretary of relations.)

Comerciantes	103
Ecclesiastics	
Religiosos	43
Seculares	6
Legos	<u>6</u>
Sub-Total	55
Laboradores	37
Other Occupations	
Fabricantes de paños	6
Militares retirados	2
Vagos	2
Empleado cesado federal	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	11
Grand Total	205

Spaniards	245
Occupations	205
Unknown	40

Source: Lists of Spaniards expelled or excepted from the law who had lived in the state of Querétaro were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 29; and leg. 13, Vol. 28, exp. 1.

Source: Lists of Spaniards expelled from Tabasco were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 27. Lists of Spaniards excepted from the law were found in the same expediente.

TABLE II
OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF TABASCO IN 1827

(Derived from lists of Spaniards residing in and expelled from the state, submitted by the governor to the secretary of relations in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827.)

Commercial Occupations:	
Comerciantes	16
Mercaderos	8
Traficantes	1
Dependiente de comercio	1
Panadero	1
Bodeguero	1
Sub-Total	28
Land Owners:	
Hacendados	14
Laboradores	6
Dueño de rancho	1
Sub-Total	21
Other Occupations:	
Oficiales retirados	4
Ancianos	2
Pilotos	2
Galafate	1
Administrador General de Rentas	1
Dueño de fábrica de aguardiente	1
Facultativo en medicina y cirugía	1
Maestro de primeras letras	1
Contramaestre	1
Escribiente	1
Corte de palo triste	1
Dependiente de labor de caña	1
Sordo	1
Vago	1
Sub-Total	19
Grand Total	68

Spaniards	77
Occupations	68
Unknown	9

TABLE 12

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF YUCATAN IN 1827

(Derived from lists of Spaniards expelled or excepted from the law of December 20, 1827, submitted by the governor of the state to the secretary of relations.)

Commercial Occupations:

Comerciantes	116
Mercaderes	35
Tenderos	31
Dependientes de comercio	5
Traficantes	4
Panaderos	<u>4</u>
Sub-Total	195

Maritime Occupations:

Marineros	55
Pilotos	22
Contramaestres	12
Pescadores	4
Calafates	3
Navegantes	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	98

Military Personnel:

Oficiales retirados	15
Sargentos retirados	2
Soldados retirados	<u>11</u>
Sub-Total	28

Land Owners:

Labradores	15
Hacendados	<u>13</u>
Sub-Total	28

Skilled Craftsmen:

Sastres	3
Carpinteros	3
Tabaqueros	3
Sigarreros	2
Hortelanos	2
Dibujante	1
Tejedor	1
Curtidor	1

Source: Lists of Spaniards expelled and excepted from the law were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 25.

TABLE 12 (cont.)

Agrimensor	1
Carretero	1
Alambiquero	1
Arquitecto	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	20
Professional Occupations:	
Empleados federales cesados	4
Médicos	4
Catedráticos	3
Cirujanos	2
Preceptores de primeras letras	2
Abogado	1
Boticario	1
Contador de rentas (federal)	1
Recontador de rentas (federal)	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	19
Eclesiásticos:	
Seculares	13
Religiosos	<u>4</u>
Sub-Total	17
Other Occupations:	
Tornilleros	3
Tratantes [sic.]	2
Dutilador [sic.]	1
Guarda de almacén	1
Mozo de tienda	1
Portero	1
Mayordomo	1
Arriero	1
Sirviente	1
Organito [sic.]	1
Ruador [sic.]	1
Pordiosero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	15
Grand Total	420
Spaniards	449
Occupations	420
Unknown	29

respectively. In Querétaro ecclesiastics constituted the second largest group while in Yucatán maritime occupations were second in importance to merchandising. Third position was held by the military in Querétaro, Tabasco, Yucatán, and Oaxaca. In the case of Nuevo León, the occupations of all but seven Spaniards were noted in the lists. But the lists of Spaniards from Oaxaca only revealed roughly 60 per cent of their occupations.

Commercial occupations characterized the economic activity of a major segment of the Spanish community. In some cases, for example in Oaxaca, the overwhelming majority of the Spaniards were so engaged. In each of the eight states analyzed here commerce attracted between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the Spanish male population. The Church attracted from 4 per cent to 10 per cent of the Spanish population in those same states, excepting only Querétaro. The state of Querétaro provided a striking exception; 25 per cent were ecclesiastics, while in Tabasco there were no Spanish clergy.

The Spaniards were evident among the lower ranks as well as in the officer corps of the Mexican army in 1827. Among the Spaniards reported as active or suspended military personnel in 1827, approximately one-half were officers and one-half soldiers. The majority of the capitulados had apparently melted into the general civilian population. They increased the ranks of the unemployed, as well as the class of laborers and agricultural workers. In the eight states analyzed here, Spanish military men varied in number from a reported low of one in Chihuahua and Durango to a reported high of 28 in Yucatán

and 27 in Oaxaca. The state of Mexico and the Federal District undoubtedly contained more Spanish officials than other areas but the reports from these locations were incomplete in the Ramo de expulsión.

The weakness of the data for the republic as a whole (40 per cent of Spanish occupations) is overcome by the more complete data compiled for the eight diverse states. The pattern is similar in each region: Spaniards were usually to be found in positions of economic and social importance but seldom or never occupying political offices in 1827. Their condition was strikingly similar to that of the creoles in early 1821, if one momentarily overlooks the obvious fact that the Spaniards were a numerically insignificant minority in 1827. It would be highly desirable at this point to compare the occupational positions of creoles and Spaniards in order to locate foci of stress or competition. While data on the creole population are notably lacking for the post-independence period, useful information was located by the author for Durango. In the section which follows a comparison of the relative economic positions of Durangan Spaniards and creoles will be attempted and some conclusions concerning the position of the Spaniards in the Mexico of 1827 will be considered.

A Comparison of Spanish and Creole Occupations in Durango

Durango provides a fruitful area for analysis of the creole-gachupín dichotomy in its post-independence and pre-expulsion manifestation. Governor Santiago Vaca presented a report on the occupational distribution of the men of Durango, as of June 1, 1827, to the state congress

on September 5, 1827.¹¹ The report provides a breakdown of the occupations of Durangans without distinguishing between Spaniard and creole (Table 13). Data were derived from the Ramo de expulsión to reconstruct the occupational distribution of Durangan Spaniards¹² (Table 14). By utilizing these two sets of data, a comparison of Spaniard and creole in the microcosm which was Durango becomes possible (Tables 15-16).

The Spaniards constituted less than one-third of 1 per cent of the Durangan population in 1827. The ratio of creoles to peninsulares was roughly 311:1. The 240 Spaniards who resided in the state constituted a numerically insignificant minority. The true measure of their importance rested, not in their numbers, but in their position, wealth, family ties, education, and all the other attributes of membership in a dominant (or formerly dominant) ruling elite. The Spaniard's importance may be gaged by observing his participation in the occupations most respected and coveted in those days.

If a line were arbitrarily drawn on Table 15 between the categories dependientes rurales y de minas and artesanos y jornaleros, a division would result which may very well have approximated the contemporary view of society expressed in the terms, so frequently used in the 1820's, gente decente and el pueblo. The preserve of the gente decente, of course, would rest above the line. Although information does not allow for a better division than the imperfect one proposed, nevertheless a comparison of the relative positions of criollos and peninsulares may be made.

TABLE 13

POPULACION DE TODAS LAS PARTIDAS DEL ESTADO DE DURANGO

Distinción de clases	
Eclesiásticos seculares	113
Eclesiásticos regulares	443
Militares, incluso los cívicos	375
Empleados en rentas de la federación	24
Empleados del estado	34
Abogados	12
Escribanos	3
Médicos	2
Boticarios	5
Comerciantes	1,143
Artesanos y jornaleros	60,446
Sirvientes domésticos	12,967
Presos	139
Suma	75,706

Note: The actual population of Durango in June, 1827 was reported to be 149,421, including 74,115 women and children, according to the Memoria prepared by Governor Vaca.

Source: "Memoria de los ramos que son a cargo del Gobierno del Estado de Durango . . . leído ante el Segundo Congreso Constitucional . . . 5 de septiembre de 1827," AGN:RE, leg. 13, Vol. 29, exp. 28b, fol. 69.

TABLE 14
OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS IN THE STATE
OF DURANGO IN 1827

Comerciantes	57
Dependientes de Comercio	21
Mineros	31
Dependientes de minas	2
Labradores	32
Sirvientes	21
Eclesiásticos seculares	5
Eclesiásticos regulares	2
Empleados federales cesados	3
Empleados estatales cesados	1
Escribanos	3
Cirujanos	2
Director de primeras letras	1
Dependientes rurales	2
Guarda de la federación	1
Ferrero	1
Partón de cerdas	1
Barbero	1
Corredor	1
Sargento	1
Preso	1
Total	210

TABLE 14 (cont.)

Spaniards	240
Occupations	210
Unknown	30

Source: Lists of Spaniards residing in Durango, found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 3 and 5; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exp. 2; and an article in El Aquila Mexicana, VI (July 16, 1828), 3.

TABLE 15

A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE OCCUPATIONS OF CRIOLLOS
AND PENINSULARES IN DURANGO IN JUNE 1827

	Criollos	Peninsulares	Total	Per Cent of Total Male Population*
Eclesiásticos seculares	108	5	113	00.15
Eclesiásticos regulares	441	2	443	00.69
Militares, incluso los cívicos	374	1	375	00.50
Empleados en rentas de la federación	21	4	25	00.03
Empleados del estado	33	1	34	00.05
Mineros	-	31	31	00.04
Abogados	12	-	12	00.02
Escribanos	-	3	3	--
Médicos o cirujanos	-	2	2	--
Boticarios	5	-	5	00.01
Director de primeras letras	-	1	1	--
Comerciantes y sus dependientes	1,066	78	1,144	01.51

TABLE 15 (cont.)

	Criollos	Peninsulares	Total	Per Cent of Total Male Population*
Labradores	-	32	32	00.04
Dependientes rurales y de minas	-	4	4	-
Artesanos y jornaleros	60,409	4	60,413	79.71
Sirvientes domésticos	12,946	21	12,967	17.11
Presos	138	1	139	00.18
Sin empleo	-	20	20	00.03
Ocupaciones desconocidas	-	30	30	00.04
Sumas	75,553	240	75,793	100.00

*Rounded to the nearest one-hundredth of one per cent. Blank spaces indicate less than one-hundredth of one per cent.

Note: Our totals will now increase the state's population by 88 Spaniards, since their occupations were not listed in the governor's report. The new total male population would be 75,794 and the state total population estimate would rise to 149,519.

TABLE 16
THE OCCUPATIONS OF CRIOLLOS AND PENINSULARES
IN DURANGO IN 1827 SUMMARIZED

	Criollos	Peninsulares	Totals	Per Cent of Total
Ecclesiastics	549	7	556	00.84
Military Personnel	374	1	375	00.50
Government Employees	54	5	59	00.08
Lawyers	12	-	12	00.02
Scribes	-	3	3	-
Medical Practitioners	-	2	2	-
Druggists	5	-	5	-
School Master	-	1	1	-
Merchants & dependents	999	145	1,144	01.60
Artesans & laborers	60,409	4	60,413	79.71
Domestic servants	12,946	21	12,967	17.11
Prisoners	138	1	139	00.18
Unemployed	-	20	20	00.03
Occupations Unknown	-	30	30	00.04
Totals	75,553	240	75,793	100.00

Roughly 2.6 per cent of the criollos were to be found among the gente decente, while 68.3 per cent of the Spaniards had achieved that distribution. The following table illustrates the point:

	<u>Criollos</u>	<u>Peninsulares</u>
Gente decente (2.224)	2,060	164
Pueblo (73,569)	73,493	76

It should be noted that the number of peninsulares in the gente decente category may have been still higher since 30 Spaniards whose occupations were unknown have been relegated to the lower category, though they may have held positions according to their gente decente status.

In a majority of occupations the criollos enjoyed an impressive numerical advantage. Two noteworthy examples were the regular clergy, with two Spanish friars, and the military, with a single Spanish sargento. Governor Vaca's inclusion of the cívicos in the military figure may indicate that the urban militia, which in colonial times had been drawn primarily from the commercial sector, was recruited from the ranks of the gente decente, though some recognized artesanos were probably present in the ranks.

In six occupational categories the peninsulares enjoyed not only a majority but a monopoly of positions. Apparently, the only primary school in Durango was directed by a Spaniard. No one who has read Lucas Alamán¹³ or Lorenzo Zavala¹⁴ will be surprised to observe that the Spaniards were supervisors on haciendas and in the mines, or that they were scribes and medical practitioners. But the presence of 31

Spanish mine owners in a silver mining region without mention of a single miner in Governor Vaca's report demands explanation. Perhaps the governor included mineros among the comerciantes who constituted roughly 1.5 per cent of the Durangan male population. If indeed this was the case, any attempt to determine the number of creole miners will be frustrated. Could this also explain the absence of creole labradores¹⁵ (grain farmers) in the report? It seems highly unlikely that Governor Vaca could have overlooked mineros and labradores in Durango where they gave direction to the economy.

The fact that Durangan society utilized nearly 13,000 male domestic servants tends to indicate that Durango was indeed a traditional society. Had these been distributed evenly among the male members of the gente decente category, there would have been six for each employer! Some male domestics may have been employed by successful artisans. But wealthy Spanish and criollo families probably employed the great majority as personal servants, guards, coachmen, footmen, and messengers. It is probable from the testimony of Lucas Alamán, that Spanish domestics were attached to a number of Spanish households.¹⁶

Viewing the occupational data as a whole, one is impressed by the full height of the social pyramid in Durango. The gente decente, as defined above, consisted of approximately 3 per cent of Durangan society. A minimum of 68 per cent of the Spaniards of Durango was a part of that 3 per cent. While 17.1 per cent of Durangan males were domestic servants, only one-third of 1 per cent of Durangan men were peninsulares. Representing nearly 7.4 per cent of the gente decente, the Spaniards were more in evidence than their numbers might suggest.

Competition between peninsular and criollo gente decente in the economic sphere may have been more important than the charts would indicate at first glance. If figures for comerciantes were adjusted on the apparently sound assumption that Governor Vaca lumped hacendados, labradores, and mineros under that category, the following results would be noted:

	<u>Criollos</u>	<u>Peninsulares</u>
Merchants and their employees	999	145

Spaniards constituted 12.7 per cent of the redefined commercial sector. Apparently, this was the locus of competition in 1827 between creole and Spaniard in Durango. Table 16 illustrates the point more closely by simplifying the occupational picture.

The Spaniard was viewed as a threat and an obstacle to upward social mobility by the criollos of Durango in 1827. It would seem that the resentment of the creole gente decente and the frustrations of the criollos de la plebe who found themselves yet on the margin of or excluded from the gente decente, derived from the presence of the Spaniards. In this respect, Durango was no different from the other states of the Mexican federation. Provincial landlords and state officials in the federal entities worked to extricate their ecological power bases from the traditional authority of the Mexico City-Veracruz axis. This did not prevent their looking to this populous and more cosmopolitan region for profitable markets for provincial agricultural products. The Spaniard, whether he resided in the capital or in the provincial cities and towns, represented

for creole political elites an objectionable reminder of the colonial past and an enduring threat from the network of special interests which continued to characterize Mexico City.

Conclusions

Deprived of political office by 1827, the Spaniards retained, nevertheless, their economic importance in Mexico. Without them, the stagnation which already characterized the post independence Mexican economy would be accelerated.¹⁷ It was precisely the fact that the Spaniard was still an important, visible and comparatively prosperous beneficiary of the economy in an era of stagnation, that excited creole jealousy and hostility.¹⁸ The continued presence of a significant number of peninsulares within the gente decente sector of Mexican society, following the separation from Spain, was of greater importance for determining social tensions than the Spaniard's meager numbers would appear to warrant.

The contemporary designation of pulperos (peddlers of oil and vinegar), which was frequently applied to the Spaniards en masse is indicative of the source of their unpopularity. The decline of the mines and of the principal export enterprises by 1827 as well as the Spaniard's heavy export of specie contributed greatly to the economic difficulties of the time.¹⁹ The Spaniard provided a useful scapegoat for creole explanations of the cause of the nation's ills. The state of public opinion indicates that the American creoles accepted the "guilt" of the Spaniards in this matter and, consequently, foresaw a splendid economic future for Mexico, once free of the remaining peninsulares.

Empleomanía, the desire for public office, was also a factor in creole frustrations in 1827. The Spaniards continued to occupy positions stemming from the colonial regime. A number of these posts were no longer "functional." In the bureaucracy, as in commerce, the peninsulares were prominent occupants of numerous "inalienable" posts.

Viewed from this perspective, the Spaniard's position in 1827 would appear to have been tenuous at best. The difficult international questions confronting Mexico made the situation even more unpromising for the peninsulares. Mexico's dependence upon foreign loans and fluctuating customs receipts for her solvency; Spain's refusal to recognize the independence of her former colony and the interruption of customary lines of commerce which this entailed; British insistence upon free trade in her commercial negotiations with the young republic, all contributed to the complexity of the problems facing the American creoles as they sought to organize and regulate their nation. Each of these factors would play a role in the criollo decision that the Spaniard could not be tolerated in the Mexican republic.

Notes

¹See Table 4.

²See Table 1.

³See Table 2.

⁴See Table 3.

⁵See Table 4.

⁶Evidence for this migration may be found in the petitions of Spanish merchants, formerly resident in Veracruz, directed to the captain general of Cuba, Francisco Dionisio Vives. See José L. Franco, Documentos para la historia de México existentes en el Archivo Nacional de Cuba (Havana, 1961), pp. lxxvii-lxxix.

⁷The Mexican population in 1827 was generally said to be 8,000,000 by the popular press, though no attempt was made by the government to verify the figure.

⁸See Table 5.

⁹See Tables 6-12.

¹⁰Chihuahua, Durango, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Tabasco, and Yucatán.

¹¹"Memoria de los ramos que son á cargo del Gobierno del estado de Durango . . . leído antes el segundo congreso constitucional . . . 5 de setiembre de 1827," in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 13, Vol. 29, exp. 28b, fol. 69 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

¹²Lists of Spaniards residing in Durango were found in AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 3, 5; leg. 13, Vol. 29, exp. 28b, fol. 69; and in one issue of El Aquila Mexicana, VI (July 16, 1828), 3.

¹³Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), I, passim.

¹⁴On labradores and their importance see Robert C. West, The Mining Community in Northern New Spain: The Parral Mining District (Berkeley, 1949), p. 166.

¹⁵Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), I, 17.

¹⁶For an introduction to the Mexican economy of the 1820's see Robert A. Potash, El banco de ayfo de México. El fomento de la industria,

1821-1846 (Mexico, 1959), pp. 7-68; Luis Chávez Orozco, Historia de México (1808-1836) (México, 1947).

¹⁸ Lorenzo Zavala emphasized this point in his Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829. (Mexico, 1830), pp. 8-9.

¹⁹ H. G. Ward treated these matters in detail in his Mexico in 1827 (2nd ed., 2 vols.; London, 1829).

CHAPTER II

THE SPANIARDS AND THE ITURBIDEAN EMPIRE

In order to attack the historical questions raised by the expulsion of the Spaniards, it will be necessary to first survey the status of the Spaniard during the Iturbidean period, 1821-23. The Spaniards drifted into the opposition--first the merchants, then the military officers--for a number of complex reasons. The third guarantee had attracted the support of prominent Spaniards to the cause of independence. Iturbide had favored Spanish military officials and continued to do so following June, 1821. Their defection from the Iturbidean cause should be approached first through an inquiry into the role of the Scottish Rite lodges in early nineteenth century Mexico. As the economic interests of important sectors of the Spanish community came to be threatened by the empire, they tended to identify their interests with those of the escocés lodges. Ultimately, their fate would be shared by the Scottish party.

The Introduction of the Scottish Rite and Its Link with the Spaniards

The introduction of masonry into Mexico is clouded in mystery, due, in part, to the secret nature of the movement and, in part, to the existence of the Inquisition prior to independence. Frank Brandenburg, who claimed to have seen sources "unavailable to the

historian," found some evidence for the existence of masonry in Mexico from the mid-eighteenth century.¹ Felix Navarrete, a Catholic opponent of Mexican masonry, found no evidence for the existence of a regular lodge prior to 1806.² Navarrete supported the position of Dr. Richard E. Chism and José María Mateos, both of whom were Masons, in this matter.³ Brandenburg noted the "existence of 'Masonic groupings' during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries" who allegedly utilized "rituals adopted by Spanish lodges under original patents from Great Britain."⁴ Asserting that these informal lodges followed "Scottish or Ramsey rituals," Brandenburg concluded that:

. . . it was not until after Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808 that regular lodges began to mushroom in New Spain--first in Mexico City, Yucatán, and Veracruz, and later spreading into many regions. Some of these lodges followed Spanish rituals; others drew their patents from Cuba, France, New Orleans, and from lodges in the United States.⁵

All authorities seem to agree that the first formal lodge was founded in 1806 and met in a house owned by Regidor Luyando at No. 4, Calle de las Ratas (now Bolívar) in Mexico City.⁶ The origin of this lodge is obscure since so little is known concerning the transfer of masonry to Mexico. A brief look at the origins of Spanish masonry should throw light on its Mexican counterpart.

In 1801, the "Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite" was founded in Charleston, South Carolina. The new rite was a prototype of "French Templar Masonry, in combat for the Natural rights of Man against the so-called religious and political despotisms . . ."⁷ The Count de Grasse-Tilly, of French origin, was one of the founders of

the lodge. His brother, the Conde de Tilly, was a General in the Spanish army. Assisted by two other Spanish generals, the Conde de Tilly organized "Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite" lodges in Spain.⁸

Spain had already developed her own peculiar masonic institutions.⁹ Among the most interesting of these were the trincheras, or military masonic lodges. Mariano Tirada y Rojas, a Spanish historian of masonry, explained:

The organization of the military lodge differed . . . [It] was not called 'lodge,' but Trinchera; the chief was not called Venerable, but Gran Capitán; the Master of ceremonies, Ayudante; the Expert, Maestro de Armas or Preboste; and the Guarda-tempos, Escuchas. The writings which in the jargon of the lodges were called planchas, in the primitive military lodges were called salvas; the labors commenced not a medio día en punto, as they say in the lodges, but al toque de diana, and consequently, ended al toque de retreta.¹⁰

Whether these military lodges came to Spanish America is not certain.¹¹ Probably, they did come, brought by the Spanish officials who entered the colonies in large numbers during the wars of independence. This was an age of intense masonic activity, in harmony with the liberal movement which produced the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Liberal ideas were widely held among the officer corps which came to America with the expeditionary forces. But, as Brandenburg has warned, to demonstrate that an individual possessed ideas which were in harmony with the "landmarks" of masonry, is not to prove that he was a mason.¹²

The Cortes of Cádiz, which produced the Liberal Constitution of 1812, contained numerous representatives from the American colonies. It also provided a platform for Spanish masonry. Vicente de la Fuente declared that, in 1812:

. . . there was in Cádiz a lodge of the first and most important in Spain, not only because of its antiquity, but also due to the wealth of its members, the fact that most of the maritime chiefs of Spain belonged to it, and the influence of many other members, not only in local government but in the governments of populous areas throughout Spain. [The lodge's] importance reached its peak in the period 1809-12, during which time it was the center of Spanish masonry, in counterposition to the 'Oriente Afrancesado de Madrid.'¹³

Cádiz, as the agent for a large part of colonial commerce and shipping, was in a position to exercise a strong influence in America. The masonic lodges of Cádiz, according to Navarrete, were of the "Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite."¹⁴

Little is known about the introduction of masonry into the Spanish Colonies. Lorenzo Zavala, commenting on its origins in New Spain, said only that:

We have seen established from the beginning of independence a secret society, which was called "Ancient Scottish Rite," in which the generals Bravo, Negrete, Echavarri had joined, and many others who formed this party, which took the name of the rite to which their masonic sect pertained.¹⁵

Mateos, the founder of the Mexican National Rite in 1825, traced the origin of the Scottish lodges to 1813:

The Mexicans began to abandon their Lodges (1813) and to attach themselves to the division commanded by Gral. D. Nicolás Bravo, where the first purely Mexican Lodges of Scotland were formed; these were the nucleus of those which were later diffused throughout the Republic.¹⁶

It is clear that during the period 1821-27, if not earlier, Spaniards joined the Scottish Rite lodges and, consequently, the party of the same name. Whether these lodges were of the "Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite," as Navarrete contends, or of the Ramsay ritual, as Brandenburg insists, cannot be resolved here.¹⁷ The

origins of the *escocés* party, and the ties of the Spaniards with that party, stem from events in 1821. The achievement of national independence and, subsequently, the coronation of Iturbide in 1821 terminated Spanish control of affairs in New Spain, but Spanish influence was not to be destroyed so quickly.

The ideas of Liberal Spain and the Constitution of 1812 were present in the *escocés* lodges, brought by the Spaniards who immigrated to Mexico and by American deputies who returned from the Cortes of Cádiz in 1821-22. Lucas Alamán emphasized the impact of Lt. General Juan de O-Donojú, the Irish-born Captain General sent to New Spain by the Junta of Cádiz in 1821. O-Donojú was reputed to be:

. . . a person of great importance in masonry, and he was even credited with trying to form a new sect of masonry, in order to rival Riego, whose glories he viewed with envy and jealousy.¹⁸

Alamán attributed considerable influence on Mexican masonry to the Spaniards who came with O-Donojú:

. . . the persons who accompanied him were incorporated into the lodges already existent and formed other new ones, all under the Scottish Rite. Of these latter, one was called del sol, to which the periodical of the same name pertained, edited by D. Manuel Codorniu, a medical doctor who came with O-Donojú, whose object it was to sustain the plan of Iguala, and to propagate the liberal principles established in Spain . . .¹⁹

The periodical El Sol, the outspoken defender of the Spaniards in Mexico during the troubled 1820's, was the organ of an escocés lodge in Mexico City. The earliest Lancastrian schools for popular education in Mexico were dependent of the lodge del sol.²⁰ Alamán lamented that "From this time forward, the Franc-masons came to be a powerful force, which we will see in action in all subsequent events."²¹

The Escocés Opposition to the Iturbidean Empire

The return of the deputies sent to the Cortes of Cádiz and of Mexican military officials who had served in Spain, contributed to the strengthening of the escocés lodges.²² Alamán noted that those influential individuals aided greatly in "the establishment of the Scottish masons, who came to form almost the majority of the congress and were growing in the provinces and, above all, in the army."²³ Among the last to return was José Mariano de Michelena, who had been sent to serve in Spain following his involvement in the conspiracies of 1810, and who would, according to Alamán, play a vital role in the rapid spread of the escocés lodges during the reign of Iturbide.²⁴

The multiplication of the escocés lodges and the development of the ideas associated with the so-called "party of progress" owed much to the opposition felt by many European creoles and Spaniards to the erection of an American throne by Iturbide.²⁵ The escocés lodges recruited constitutional monarchists and republicans alike, provided that the social credentials of the latter were acceptable to the aristocratic membership. Opposition to Iturbide, first as president of the regency, then as Emperor, was instrumental in bringing about temporary cooperation between liberal Spaniards, republicans and old insurgents. Alamán explained the complex make-up of the opposition in this manner:

To those who sustained the plan of Iguala and liberal principles, had been added the Spaniards who could not think of emigrating and who saw no other salvation for themselves but in the complementation of the plan . . . what seems more strange, the republicans had joined because they thought chances remote that the

[monarchical] plan could be carried out and they feared the ambition of Iturbide as a more immediate danger . . . the old insurgents . . . hated him.²⁶

Zavala viewed the rise of the escocés party from a different perspective:

The individuals of the opposition formed a party which acquired greater force with the establishment of the masonic lodges which, under the title of 'Scottish Rite,' was established for them and their followers. A group of people became affiliated with these lodges who hoped to become deputies or employees of whatever type: the existing employees joined also, in order to preserve their posts.²⁷

Spaniards who had received government posts in New Spain from the Bourbons or their ministers must have found the plan of Iguala attractive. Aside from its guarantees of union and of respect for the property of foreigners, the plan promised them a Bourbon prince who could make use of their services. Members of the many sections of the colonial bureaucracy, considering their posts as personal property, were uncertain of their future in Mexico.

Spaniards who had recently arrived in Mexico, particularly those who came with O-Donojú, were strongly opposed to Iturbide's imperial aspirations. They spoke out against Iturbide in the lodge meetings in Mexico City. Zavala, a member who was present at these meetings, reported two such incidents:

In one meeting . . . a colonel in the heat of his discourse, shouted: 'If a Brutus is lacking to take the life of this tyrant, he would offer his arm in the service of the fatherland.' In another, presided over by the Spanish colonel Antonio Valero, one of those who had come with O-Donojú, it was decided that Iturbide must be assassinated.²⁸

Zavala reports that Iturbide, having learned of the masonic resolution, undid Colonel Valero's plan by confronting the escoceses with

his knowledge of the resolution and by promoting Valero to brigadier. These actions on the part of Iturbide led the masons to believe that Valero had betrayed their secret and the new brigadier beat a hasty retreat to Spain.²⁹

The nucleus of the *escocés* lodges was not united simply on the common ground of opposition to Iturbide. The spirit of nineteenth century liberalism united them, attracting members whose attachment to modern ideas was more apparent than their interest in masonic "landmarks." For this reason, the *escoceses* were known as the "party of progress" or even the "popular party" in 1821. The man most qualified to express the liberal idea, as it was understood in Mexico during her first century of independence was José María Luis Mora. Dr. Mora defined his conception of liberalism, on one occasion, in the following manner:

In order to avoid disputes over ill-defined words, I shall state immediately that by 'march of progress' I understand that which tends to affect, in a more or less rapid manner, the occupation of the ecclesiastical properties [*bienes*]: the abolition of the privileges [*fueros*] of this class and of the military; the diffusion among the popular classes of popular education, absolutely independent of the clergy; the suppression of the monopolies; [and] the absolute liberty of opinions . . .³⁰

These were, in brief, the ideas which were circulating in Mexico City and in the provincial capitals among the literate sector of society in the 1820's and 1830's. Alamán noted that liberal ideas were being spread through translations of French works made in Mexico by Spanish *afrancesados*, or supporters of King Joseph Bonaparte who had emigrated, following the fall of the Francophile party in Madrid. These translations,

said to be financed by book sellers in Mexico, were devoted to "all the works most pernicious for politics, religion and customs, corrupting at the same time not only these but the language."³¹

That the fate of the Spaniards residing in Mexico in 1821 was entrusted to the *escocés* party, must be understood in light of what has been said above. In exchange for their support in the removal of Iturbide, the liberal or *escocés* party afforded the Spaniards protection for their property and the hope of future success in independent Mexico. What the Spaniards could not have known was that once Agustín I was removed, the potential for disunion, which was inherent in the alliance of the opposition, would divide Mexican society into irreconcilable factions, making constitutional guarantees unenforceable and, therefore, residence in Mexico virtually impossible for Spaniards. Peninsulares, in turn, would conspire to return the former colony to Ferdinand and, as a result, contribute to the expulsion of their fellow countrymen from Mexican soil. For the majority of Spaniards, who did not participate in the political struggle, it would mean exile from families and death in an alien land. These Spaniards, or the majority of them, had lacked the social standing to belong to the *escocés* lodges.

The Fall of the Iturbidean Empire

The leaders of the opposition to the empire found support for their goals within the military hierarchy. In Michoacán, Brigadier Joaquín Parrés, a creole, planned a republican revolt but was arrested and imprisoned in Mexico City. Deputy Juan Pablo de Anaya of Guadalupe, a field marshal during the original insurrection, headed a

republican conspiracy in the capital with Padre Servando Teresa de Mier and Miguel Santa Marfa, a native of Veracruz who had been named minister of Colombia. Support for their conspiratorial plan centered in the congress and in the military.³² On the night of August 26, 1822, Iturbide ordered the imprisonment of a number of persons who had been implicated by government agents in the conspiracy. The deputies arrested included republicans and liberals alike, five of whom were Spaniards while more than 14 were creoles. The Spanish deputies implicated were José Marfa Pagoaga, Juan de la Serna Echarte, General Juan Orbegozo, and Manuel Carrasco, of Mexico City and Rafael Leandro de Echenique of Yucatán. The Spaniards, Brigadier José Antonio Echavarrri and Colonel Francisco de Paula Alvarez, were in charge of the arrest and prosecution of the conspirators.³³

A policy aimed at preserving their traditional privileges might have attracted additional Spanish supporters to the emperor's cause. But protective legislation was notably lacking under the empire. On September 17, 1822, the constituent congress passed a measure designed to prohibit the classification, in official documents, of citizens by their origin.³⁴ The decree was intended to fulfill the promise contained in article 12 of the plan of Iguala concerning the eligibility of all residents for government posts with merit the sole criterion. The measure established the equality of rights required for a more broadly based bureaucracy rather than assuring citizenship or residency privileges to Spaniards.

The peninsulares were not yet wholly united in their opposition to the government. The congress insisted that deputies were immune

from arrest, recognizing in the events of August 26 an indication of its impending dissolution.³⁵ Armed revolt threatened in New Santander, where Brigadier Felipe de la Garza had called for the establishment of a republic by congressional decree. Garza was said to be under the influence of Miguel Ramos Arizpe whose republican sentiments were well known. When other provinces failed to respond, the attempt failed completely. The government charged that the revolution was to have been financed by deputies; the miner José María Fagoaga, the merchant Rafael Leandro de Echenique, both Spaniards, and the creole jewel merchant Joaquín Obregón of Mexico City.³⁶ A number of the prisoners were held due to their revolutionary potential when evidence implicating them could not be uncovered.³⁷

The arrest of Bourbonists and republicans alike contributed, according to Alamán, to the union of the two camps against the emperor.³⁸ Iturbide attempted to introduce a system of provincial courts for the castigation of seditious persons but his move was checked by the congress. The emperor attempted to reform the congress, which was illegally constituted, having been organized in a single chamber rather than two as prescribed in its instrument of convocation. Deputy Lorenzo de Zavala advocated congressional reorganization. The creole military leadership agreed with the emperor concerning the necessity of dissolving the congress. On October 31 this was accomplished by Brigadier Luis Cortazar with the cooperation of the captain general José Antonio Andrade.³⁹

In order to avoid the charge that he had usurped the legislative function, Iturbide named an "instituting junta" (junta instituyente), composed of one or two deputies from each of the provinces.⁴⁰ The new deputies were selected from among the Iturbideans in and out of the former congress. On November 2 the junta was formally installed and the bishop of Durango was named its president.⁴¹ The awesome financial problems of the empire awaited the attention of the junta.

Spaniards had continued to depart from Mexico following independence, shipping their specie to Havana whenever possible. In July, 1821, the Cuban government had received a petition from 75 Spanish merchants who had emigrated from Mexico to Havana.⁴² Their nearly 20,000,000 pesos of valuables and merchandise were being detained at the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa by General José Dávila due to a shortage of soldiers and warships for the transportation of the fortune to Cuba. Spanish merchants converted the Castle of San Juan into a black market by the act of extracting their wealth from Mexico. In his correspondence with Havana General Dávila revealed the grave incidents and risks taken by those who attempted to escape from Mexico with their money and jewels by means of disguises and subterfuge.⁴³

The instituting junta, while considering the state of the treasury, learned that a shipment of specie bound for Veracruz had been detained at Perote. The greater part of it belonged to Spaniards who either had left or were leaving Mexico. The serious state of the treasury and the slowness of negotiations for loans from

English bankers led the junta to consider new sources of income. On November 5, the junta decreed a new forced loan of 2,800,000 pesos to aid the government in meeting its immediate obligations.⁴⁴ Once again wealthy Spaniards, principally merchants, were to be subjected to financial exactions by the imperial government. In order to meet the most pressing immediate expenses, the government decided to seize the funds detained at Perote.⁴⁵

José Antonio Echavarri had been appointed to fill the post of captain general vacated at Puebla by the death of the Spanish Field Marshal Luaces in September. Echavarri, who was trusted explicitly by the emperor, was ordered to accompany a convoy of specie which was departing the capital for Veracruz. Spanish merchants who had hesitated to risk their capital on such a convoy were encouraged to do so by the presence of Echavarri.⁴⁶ A similar convoy had been robbed previously at Tortolitas. Echavarri reached Perote where he was ordered on October 9 by the ministry to deposit the funds in the castle and to retrieve a convoy that had departed Perote for Veracruz, least the latter fall into the hands of Brigadier Francisco Lemaire at Ulúa. An order of October 19 advised the consulado of Mexico City to keep on deposit at Jalapa, in the power of the Spanish merchant Pedro Miguel de Echevarría, 557,000 pesos and at Perote 740,200 pesos, a total of 1,297,200 pesos.⁴⁷

Brigadier Echavarri was then ordered by Minister of the treasury Antonio Medina to send the 740,200 pesos to Mexico City, depositing a small part in Puebla en route, for the use of the treasury. Of the 557,000 pesos deposited in Jalapa, 200,000 were to be sent to Córdoba

and Orizaba for distribution to the tobacco growers. The remaining 337,000 pesos were to be used for government expenses in the province and City of Veracruz.⁴⁸ In his manifesto, Iturbide attributed the seizures of capital to the congress.⁴⁹ The treasurer Medina, however, said that the decision was made by the instituting junta.⁵⁰ The actions were tantamount to a declaration of war on the merchants. By this act the government's credit was destroyed and the wealthy Spaniards no longer doubted that the government was their enemy.

Echavarri was next ordered to Veracruz, where he arrived on October 25, to consult with Santa Anna concerning a plan reportedly conceived by the latter for the capture of the castle of San Juan de Ulúa.⁵¹ While the plan was in the process of execution, a detachment of Spanish soldiers from the fortress landed and attacked the city, frustrating the arrangements allegedly made by Santa Anna. The expeditionary troops were forced to reembark for the castle, leaving behind a small number of prisoners. These developments resulted in an appeal by the emperor to the junta for strong measures to be taken against Spaniards who wished to emigrate. A new decree prohibited a Spaniard departing Mexico from either shipping or taking with him specie and jewelry. He could depart with his personal luggage and nothing more.⁵²

In either November or December 1822 an order was issued by the emperor demanding that all Spaniards who had served in the royalist army and obtained a discharge present themselves to local authorities

to give an account of their political conduct.⁵³ The Spaniards were ordered to provide evidence of their allegiance to the empire, their mode of employment, and their marital status. Local authorities were ordered to respect the rights of those whose families were born in Mexico and who possessed employments or property (*bienes*). A Spaniard found to have no employment or who could not obtain employment within three days, was to be handed over to the local jefe político (provincial governor) who should attempt at the expense of the imperial treasury to find employment for him. In Puebla and Veracruz those in this category were to be sent to the governor of the province of Mexico. Former officers of the Spanish army were also covered in the decree. The governors of the provinces were instructed to compile data, to be relayed to the minister of war, on each former officer. Discharged Spanish soldiers were invited to join the Mexican ranks where they were promised fair treatment and promotions according to merit. Those residing in Puebla or Veracruz who wished to accept this offer were instructed to report to the captain general at Mexico City.⁵⁴ Iturbide must have desired to incorporate into the imperial army all Spaniards who might take up arms against him.

Iturbide recommended to the junta that war be declared on Spain and a decree to that effect was issued on December 21, 1822.⁵⁵ In addition, the junta of government and the emperor issued a demand to Brigadier Lemaire that the fortress of Ulúa be surrendered within 48 hours or an embargo would be placed on the "property and possessions" of all Spanish subjects.⁵⁶ Severe measures were to be instituted for

the discovery of all such property. These threats had an immediate effect, not on Lemaun, but on the Spaniards of Mexico whose security and commerce was now further jeopardized. A new wave of Spaniards attempted to depart with their realizable wealth.⁵⁷

Reports in the periodicals of the capital had treated the fighting at Veracruz as a surprise assault by the Spaniards who had been repelled by the Mexicans.⁵⁸ The emperor promoted the principal officials involved in the affair. The Spaniards Echavarri and Gregorio Arana attained the ranks of field marshal and brigadier respectively. But in a secret report Echavarri informed the emperor that the affair seemed to have been contrived by Santa Anna who had been ignored in the selection of a captain general at Puebla to replace Luaces.⁵⁹ Santa Anna was suspected of plotting to remove Echavarri, by capture or death, even if it meant the loss of the city of Veracruz. As a result of complaints against Santa Anna, Iturbide, accompanied by Echavarri, went to Jalapa in person to meet and depose the brigadier from command at Veracruz. The attitude and influence of the Spaniards in the province of Veracruz were readily apparent at Jalapa where the emperor received a hostile reception.⁶⁰

Following the interview, Santa Anna returned to Veracruz, where he announced his adherence to the republican cause and organized an armed force with which he hoped to retain his control over the province and end the Iturbidean empire.⁶¹ While the Spaniards of Veracruz had little liking for Santa Anna, there can be no doubt that their disapproval of Iturbide was of greater consequence.

Spanish trade with Havana and the export of specie through Veracruz resumed immediately.⁶² The cause of the peninsulares of Veracruz was identified with the revolution, despite its republican theme.⁶³

While General Santa Anna organized his movement the financial difficulties of the empire were being debated by the instituting junta in Mexico City. According to a new plan it prepared, the government's monetary difficulties were to be overcome by funds from four sources: the government monopolies, a head tax on individuals, a 10 per cent tax on consumption, and an issue of paper and copper money.⁶⁴ Beginning on January 1, 1823, all office workers, government and private, were to be paid one-third of their salaries in paper. All sales of three pesos or more were to be transacted in the same proportion of paper money. Paper money to the value of 4,000,000 pesos and 500,000 pesos of copper money was placed in circulation.⁶⁵ A general lack of faith in the government affected the public acceptance of the paper currency, causing it to be discredited immediately.⁶⁶

In the meantime, the republican revolt in Veracruz was joined by Miguel Santa Marfa, the minister of Colombia who prepared the main plan.⁶⁷ General Lemaire offered financial aid to the revolutionists.⁶⁸ The local political authorities joined in support of the plan which demanded the reestablishment of commerce with Spain, the restoration of the privilege to export specie, and the necessity of arranging an armistice with General Lemaire.⁶⁹ The wishes of the merchants of Veracruz were clearly set forth in these demands. Guadalupe Victoria

had escaped from confinement in Mexico City with the aid of the Spanish merchants Echarte and Carrasco, former deputies in the congress. When the revolt commenced, Victoria was hiding on an hacienda belonging to the Spanish merchant Francisco de Arillaga, as the old insurgent had done from 1818 until the proclamation of Iguala. Victoria emerged to join the revolt in Veracruz.⁷⁰ Vicente Guerrero and Nicolás Bravo fled Mexico City to join the movement, abandoning the empire which they had served as field marshals.⁷¹ As the rebel force took shape, it appeared that the revolt would be carried out by the old insurgents with the financial aid of Veracruz's Spaniards and wealthy creoles.

With the province of Veracruz in revolt, a delegation of Spanish diplomatic agents arrived at San Juan de Ulúa, appointed by the cortes to treat with the governments established in America, "excepting those that prevent or limit in any way the freedom of the Spaniards or Americans to remove or dispose of their persons, families or properties."⁷² Negotiations proved to be impossible, however, due to the fact that neither side would concede on the principal issue, that of independence itself.

The revolution seemed under control, or at least limited to the state of Veracruz.⁷³ Santa Anna was operating within the city itself, Guerrero was presumed dead from a severe wound which he had received and Bravo's whereabouts was unknown. Field Marshal Echavarri departed Puebla to regain Veracruz, leaving José Morán in charge of the captaincy general. Echavarri established his general headquarters

at Casa Mata near the port city. The creole brigadiers Luis Cortazar and José María Lobato were camped to the north of Veracruz, awaiting orders from Echavarri.⁷⁴

At this point, the political and military situation was drastically altered when the masons entered the movement, determined to end the empire.⁷⁵ This was to be done by turning the army against the emperor. Iturbide had complete confidence in Echavarri, as he later revealed in his manifesto.⁷⁶ The purpose of the plan of Casa Mata was to end the empire while respecting the person of Iturbide and leaving the question of the type of government to be established to a new congress.⁷⁷ The plan, which was published on February 1, 1823, called for the convocation of a new congress, the maintenance of the army as constituted under the empire, and pledged its supporters to sustain the congress at all costs.⁷⁸ The escoceses apparently anticipated a leading role for themselves in the new congress, after winning the resultant elections by means of their growing organization. The masonic officers who had adhered to the plan of Veracruz joined the plan, dropping all reference to a republic as the goal of the revolt.⁷⁹ Since the lodges were comprised of persons with widely differing commitments, it was essential to postpone political decisions until the revolt had succeeded.

The leadership of the escocés lodges included creoles such as Mariano Michelena and Miguel Ramos Arizpe, as well as Spaniards. Casa Mata was a movement supported by a number of Spanish liberals, but it was not led solely by Spaniards or for the peninsular cause.

The two months which passed between the Plan of Veracruz and the Plan of Casa Mata, according to a report by a Colonel Arana at San Juan de Ulúa:

. . . favored in an extraordinary manner the interests of the European Spaniards, who accomplished the embarkation of their fortunes, which had been prohibited by the declaration of War made to the Nation on November 9 of the said year of 22; since then Santa Anna, in order to gain the respect of the Peninsulares as well as that of his countrymen, has permitted all commerce, exhibiting a conduct different from that of Yturvide, the recent abductor of 1,400,000 pesos which had been charged to the well-known conductors Solabarrieta, Guerrero and B. Ruño.⁸⁰

The Spanish and European creole supporters of Casa Mata shared two things in common; their dislike for the imperial government under Iturbide and their conviction that Mexico was well on its way to economic ruin.

The old insurgents Brigadier Antonio León of Oaxaca and Nicolás Bravo joined forces in the south, but without adopting the plan of Casa Mata.⁸¹ At Jalapa, however, Brigadier José María Calderón adhered to it. Iturbide sent a commission headed by the Spaniard Lt. General Pedro Celestino Negrete to treat with Echavarrí, hoping to terminate the revolt on the basis of a promise to reconvene the congress. In Puebla, the ayuntamiento, the provincial deputation and the commander, José de Morán, elected to support the plan on February 14. Casa Mata was adopted rapidly by provincial deputations throughout the country in February.⁸² Military commanders who resisted encountered stiff opposition from the provincial deputations and political officials of their provinces. The commanders José Gabriel Armijo in Cuernavaca, Miguel Barragán in Querétaro, and Pedro Otero in Guanajuato rapidly abandoned the government.⁸³

The parties to the conflict agreed that their purposes would be best served by avoiding civil war.⁸⁴ A means to this end would be the reestablishment of the congress, but the representatives of the two sides were hard pressed to agree on a means of convening it. Iturbide's ministers had resigned from the government following the revolutionary proclamation. José Manuel Herrera, minister of relations, went into hiding in Guadalajara, having been charged publicly with conceiving the financial exactions declared by the junta.⁸⁵ Iturbide's secretary, the Spanish colonel Francisco de Paula Alvarez, became universal minister. The emperor situated himself at Iztapaluca on the road to Puebla with a body of troops to await the results of the negotiations.

Desertion occurred on a grander scale than during the revolt of Iguala as entire bodies of troops with their officers joined the revolt of Casa Mata.⁸⁶ In the capital militia marched to the Inquisition where they released political prisoners, with the exception of Anastasio Zerecero whose views they considered suspicious. Zerecero would later prove himself to be a vocal enemy of the Spaniards in congress.⁸⁷ The junta forwarded a plan for the selection and installation of a congress to the emperor at Iztapaluca with the observations of the creole liberal Andrés Quintana Roo, who had published his views prior to relaying them to Iturbide. Since Quintana opposed placing restrictions on the matters to be treated in future congressional deliberations, the way would be left open for discussion of religious toleration, which would have alienated the Church, and the

form of government, which could not please Iturbide. Quintana was forced to flee to Toluca, following his attempt to reconcile the government to the liberal's demands.⁸⁸

An effort was made by the supporters of Iturbide to portray the revolt as a conspiracy led by Spaniards who were in communication with the castle of San Juan de Ulúa. The rumor was sanctioned by the junta which, since the announcement of Casa Mata, had been diligently seeking a means of saving the government.⁸⁹ This interpretation of the movement would become the theme of the Iturbidean's attack on the Spaniards in subsequent years. The "conspiracy of the Spaniards" hypothesis, however, was weakened by the presence of Mexicans in the movement and by the presence of Spaniards like Bishop Cabanas, Miguel Cavaleri, the colonels Francisco de Paula Alvarez, and José Antonio Matiauda and even the merchant Antonio Terán and others in the camp of the emperor.

The Liberating Army, as it was called, moved to Puebla, where Echavarri ceded command to José de Morán, the marquis of Vivanco. When Iturbide's commissioners departed for Mexico City without achieving a diplomatic solution, Lt. General Negrete remained in Puebla.⁹⁰ The government attempted to quiet the rumors which this event produced, but Negrete's adherence to the revolt was confirmed by the general himself on March 8, 1823.⁹¹ Three paths of action were now open to Iturbide: he could recall the old congress, summon a new congress, or surrender his title and depart for Puebla where the generals had offered to accept him as their commander, but not as their emperor.⁹² Iturbide chose to recall the old congress,

knowing that it would be his enemy. On March 7, 58 of the original 150 deputies convened, but decided to await the arrival of the necessary majority before attempting to pass legislation. José María Fagoaga and Manuel Sánchez de Tagle soon rejoined the body, which they had left following the imperial proclamation, and the number of deputies rose to no more than 70.⁹³ The plan of Casa Mata had called for the establishment of a new congress. The first constituent congress had cause to fear that it might not gain recognition by the provinces which had adhered to the plan.

At this time Iturbide summoned Brigadier Manuel Gómez Pedraza from the Huasteca to Mexico City to become commanding general and governor of the capital. Pedraza had made public his allegiance to the emperor and his views that republicanism was inappropriate for Mexico, that the Spaniards were responsible for the revolt, and that the movement would rebound to the discredit of the peninsulares.⁹⁴ These statements by Pedraza would give rise to future accusations that during his subsequent tenure in public office he sought to avenge Iturbide by persecuting the Spaniards.

In the capital, armed groups from the lower class barrios (wards) had been raised to defend the empire.⁹⁵ The congress, sharing the fear of persons of property in Mexico City, had demanded that the emperor "disarm the people," raising instead a national militia. The military junta at Puebla decided, in response to the proposal of Negrete, to draw nearer to the capital. Santa Anna sailed with his regiment from Veracruz, where Victoria was in charge, toward Tampico,

in order to aid the revolt in San Luis Potosí. José Mariano Michelena, a member of the provincial deputation of Michoacán, acted as the escocés liaison in the revolutionary junta.⁹⁶

Iturbide offered to withdraw from the capital while the congress prepared a constitution.⁹⁷ Delegates from the congress proceeded toward Puebla to confer with the revolutionary junta. Generals Morán and Negrete met with the emissaries and, following a lengthy discussion, the revolutionists agreed to recognize the old congress if its ranks were sufficiently replenished to pass laws. The generals agreed to obey the congress as long as it was permitted to operate with complete freedom. Iturbide, learning of this resolution, called the body into extraordinary secret session on the night of March 19, in order to announce his resignation and his determination to leave the country within a few days. Iturbide asked only that the congress pay the debts incurred by his household, since he had devoted his own income to the payment of the army and the government employees.⁹⁸

The military junta proposed that Iturbide depart with his family from Tulancingo.⁹⁹ The revolutionary army occupied the capital and the congress increased its numbers to 103 when deputies who had fled the capital from fear of public disorders returned to their seats. The congress decreed on March 31 the establishment of a provisional government, or Executive Power, composed of three men who would alternate the presidency among them on a monthly basis.¹⁰⁰ Elected to the Executive Power were generals Negrete, Bravo, and Victoria. Due to the absence of Victoria and Bravo, two substitutes,

José Mariano Michelena and José Miguel Domínguez, were also elected. José Ignacio García Illueca was named sole minister of the provisional government.¹⁰¹ Among the members of the new government, only Negrete was a Spaniard.

The congress next resolved the question of Iturbide's future, adopting a proposal, opposed by the spokesman for the Church, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, that the emperor depart for Italy with a yearly subsidy of 25,000 pesos.¹⁰² The ex-emperor was accompanied into exile by his secretary, the Spaniard Colonel Alvarez. His needs during the voyage were supplied by the Spanish merchant of Veracruz, Pedro del Paso y Troncoso. Iturbide embarked on May 11, 1823 with his family, including his Spanish cousin, Brigadier José Ramón Malo, and his retainers. "The course of events surrounding the fall of Iturbide," observed Alamán, "was remarkably similar to that of the previous revolution, which Iturbide himself had led."¹⁰³

The Spaniards under the Executive Power

A cabinet was erected, composed of prominent persons from the province of Veracruz but headed by Lucas Alamán. Dr. Pablo de la Llave of Córdoba accepted the ministry of justice and the Spanish merchant of Veracruz, Francisco de Arillaga, who had concealed Guadalupe Victoria on two occasions, became minister of the treasury. José Joaquín de Herrera of Veracruz assumed the ministry of war.¹⁰⁴ The captains general created by Iturbide were eliminated and a commanding general was placed in each province. Compared with the epoch

of the empire few Spaniards remained in high places in the new order. Negrete was in the Executive Power; Arillaga in the treasury ministry; Echavarri was commander of the province of Puebla, and a few Spaniards, such as Fagoaga, remained in the congress. The victory belonged to the masonic, or liberal party, whose membership included prominent creoles as well as a number of Spaniards, and to the provincial deputations.

The first acts of the Executive Power were designed to eliminate the decrees of the empire which had injured the opposition.¹⁰⁵ The release of all remaining political prisoners was ordered and the exportation of specie was allowed to resume, with the proviso that the duty prescribed in the tariff schedule must be paid. The issue of paper money was suspended and the paper in circulation was retired. The institutions created by Iturbide, such as the council of state and the Order of Guadalupe, were suppressed.¹⁰⁶ On April 8, the congress officially nullified the plan of Iguala, the treaty of Córdoba and the imperial proclamation of February 22, 1822. By article two of the decree of April 8, "the three guarantees of religion, independence and union" were declared to be in force "by the free will of the nation."¹⁰⁷ By the terms of article three, all the provisions of these documents not specifically referring to the type of government Mexico should enjoy were declared to remain in force. This qualification preserved the safeguards for government posts and personal property which had been written into the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba in 1821. The preservation of the third guarantee

provided the Spaniard with a legal claim to Mexican citizenship. The escocés political program was determined with the preservation of the third guarantee in mind.

The Church had lost the revolution, inasmuch as the new government was responsive to liberal demands. As the principal banker and property holder of the nation, the Church's financial position would be severely damaged by the type of liberal legislation enacted in Spain. The legislature soon turned to the Church's possessions as a possible source of revenue.¹⁰⁸ Congress ordered the sale of the temporalities pertaining to the Jesuits, Hospitalarios and the Inquisition. But when the sale of these properties proved impossible, the Executive Power, like Iturbide before it, turned to the English bankers for a loan to support their government.¹⁰⁹ Forced loans were not decreed by a government established to prevent that expedient. The funds obtained from the English bankers were used for military purposes, principally for the construction of two warships to be used against the Spaniards at San Juan de Ulúa. The Spanish merchants of Mexico benefited indirectly by the foreign loans. A part of the customhouse revenues was freed for the repayment of the funds owed to Spanish merchants who had lost vast sums in the Manila convoy, in the funds detained at Perote, and in the forced loans.¹¹⁰

Political divisions emerging after the fall of Iturbide attained a level of complexity which had not previously been apparent. The republicans divided over the republican alternatives of centralism

and federalism. The escoceses in the coalition of government supporters would cause federalist republicans to band together in new masonic organizations which, in turn, converted the older masonic body into a defender of the old mercantile elites of Mexico City and Veracruz.

The Iturbideans joined the federalist camp, partly to separate their provincial strongholds, such as Guadalajara, from the grasp of Mexico City, and partly to oppose more effectively those who had defeated Iturbide. Each faction, or party, established periodicals in Mexico City and in the provincial capitals. El Sol reopened in the capital to speak for the escoceses in their quest for a centralized republic.¹¹¹ The federalists, aided by the Iturbideans, began a periodical in the capital called, at first El Archivista, and later Aguila Mexicana.¹¹² The federalist periodical was edited by a prominent Iturbidean, Juan Gómez Navarrete, while the centralist organ often featured articles written by the Colombian minister, Santa Marfa, who wrote under the name "Captain Chinchilla."¹¹³

El Sol began its renewed existence, on June 15, with an editorial defense of the Spaniards' role in the recent revolt. The editors noted that the Europeans aided independence in order to protect their positions and properties, and wisely so. The Spaniards had prevented much loss of life by their cooperation, which had shortened the war. The first congress had, wisely disregarding the question of origins, a policy which had given confidence to the Spaniards. The editors asserted that many Spaniards had remained with their interests while only a few had left Mexico following independence. This fact had been

instrumental in the reestablishment of commerce following the treaty of Córdoba. El Sol charged that Iturbide attempted to drive out the Spaniards. Those he attacked had caused all business activities and began to collect their interests in order to depart. Commerce had been threatened with destruction, the editors concluded, and for that reason Iturbide was driven out.¹¹⁴

The present danger, according to the editors of El Sol, stemmed from the federalist threat. Civil war would result from the adoption of the federal system, while the good of the nation rested in the quest of "union and brotherhood." The editors appealed to all Mexicans to accept the presence of the Spaniards. It was only by doing so that Mexico could live in peace and, consequently, commerce would prosper once again.¹¹⁵

The federalists had machinery in the provinces already in operation which favored their cause. The provincial deputations were, in a concrete sense, the beneficiaries of federalism.¹¹⁶ The provincial deputations lacked faith in the reestablished congress, which was suspected of furthering the cause of centralism in the capital. Guadalajara was among the most insistent of the provinces in demanding a new congress.¹¹⁷ The congress, in turn, attempted to forestall the movement by granting the provincial deputations additional powers, such as the right to nominate jefes políticos (provincial governors) and virtually all the employees of the provincial governments, as well as control over the tax revenues collected in the provinces. But the will of the provincial deputations prevailed and an election was called

for a new constituent congress, which was to be installed on October 31, 1823.¹¹⁸

In Guadalajara the Iturbideans, led by the creole generals Luis Quintanar and Anastasio Bustamante, were planning to resist the authority of Mexico City.¹¹⁹ The Iturbidean party published Iris de Jalisco in Guadalajara, a periodical which attacked the Spaniards for their role in the fall of Iturbide and in the new government. It should be recalled that Iturbide's most faithful and generous patron had been the Spaniard Bishop Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabañas of Guadalajara. The Executive Power organized a two thousand-man army to restore the control of Mexico City over Guadalajara.¹²⁰ General Negrete was selected for the task in view of his connections in Guadalajara, but due to the anti-Spanish feeling which was being propagated there, General Bravo assumed command of the army, while Negrete accompanied him during the march.¹²¹

The presence of Negrete and Bravo in the west and Victoria in Veracruz, where he had remained to prevent Santa Anna from renewing his revolt, deprived the Executive Power of its principal members. Vicente Guerrero was added to the Executive Power as a suplente (substitute) in July. Neither General Guerrero nor the aging José Domínguez could reduce the influence of the escocés Michelena and the Colombian minister Santa María in the government.¹²² The expedition against Guadalajara was successful. Negrete ordered the district of Colima separated from New Galicia in order to weaken Guadalajara. General Bravo reached an amicable agreement with Cortezar in an interview at Lagos.

The congress reorganized the army and prescribed new grades for general officers.¹²³ Generals were now of two classes: general of division and brigadier. The lieutenant generals and field marshals of the empire became the generals of division under the republic. The brigadiers "with letters" of the empire became the brigadiers of the republic. Bravo and Victoria were named generals of division by the congress while the escocés political figure Mariano Michelena was made a brigadier. Mexican officers newly returned from Spain, such as José Antonio Facio and José Joaquín Ayestarán, were made colonels and given units to command.¹²⁴

The congress passed a law on September 27, 1823, designed to punish "conspirators and thieves" who appeared in armed groups of four or more men (en cuadrilla).¹²⁵ These persons "whatever their condition or class" were to be judged by "ordinary council of war" rather than by a civilian court and the decision of the court was to be placed in effect immediately. This law would serve the various parties in the future in their political conflicts. The congress was stimulated to pass such a law by the revolutionary efforts of the Iturbideans since the emperor's departure. The most serious of these conspiracies was discovered on October 2, resulting in the arrest of a number of officials and troops, as well as a certain Lorenzo Zavala [sic].¹²⁶

In the meantime, tentative agreement had been reached between General Guadalupe Victoria and the Spanish commissioners at Veracruz

on a treaty of commerce between Spain and Mexico.¹²⁷ But the restoration of absolutism in Spain, facilitated by the French invasion, spurred Ferdinand VII to conspire for the reconquest of Mexico. Brigadier Francisco Lemauro at San Juan de Ulúa began a sustained bombardment of the city of Veracruz on September 25. Since most of the property in Veracruz pertained to Spaniards or to persons in the employment of Spaniards, the resulting damage was principally to Spanish commerce.¹²⁸ New ports were being established at Sacrificio and Alvarado where goods bound for the central and southern provinces were landed.¹²⁹ Tampico received a stimulus from the change, which made it the port for goods bound for the northern provinces.¹³⁰ Lemauro's decision to shell the city of Veracruz may have stemmed from steps taken by the Executive Power. On September 8, the Mexican government had declared the castle blockaded, although the republic lacked the navy needed to implement the measure.¹³¹ Consul Taylor at Veracruz charged that Lemauro had threatened to bombard the city if the plan to open alternate ports was carried out, causing the Spaniards of the city to flee to the safety of the castle, leaving their unguarded homes to the mercy of Lemauro.¹³² The bombardment of Veracruz was sustained, at intervals, until the capitulation of the castle in November, 1825. Contemporary observers agreed that the lengthy bombardment of Veracruz endangered the future of Mexico's Spaniards, providing fuel for the burgeoning anti-Spanish campaign.¹³³

The commencement of hostilities by Brigadier Lemaux led to retaliatory legislation from Mexico City. On September 30, the minister of the treasury, Francisco de Arillaga, informed the Intendent of Veracruz, Guadalupe Victoria, that all mercantile and political relations with Spain were to be terminated and Spanish merchant ships were ordered to leave Mexican ports.¹³⁴ Evidence for the existence of commerce between Havana and Veracruz may be found in the fact that from 1821 until October 1823 Mexican silver pesos had been arriving in the Cuban port transported by North American and Spanish merchant ships.¹³⁵ On October 25, the Executive Power, like Iturbide before it, declared war on Spain.¹³⁶

The elections for the new congress resulted in a federalist majority, with an anti-Iturbidean orientation.¹³⁷ The escocés party no longer possessed the preponderance it had enjoyed in the first constituent congress. Monarchists were eliminated from the new congress, forcing the temporary retirement of Tagle and the Spaniard Fagoaga. The new congress opened its sessions on November 7, with the members divided into two factions: federalist and centralist. Though there were no Bourbonists in the congress, the federalists were prone to call their opponents by that name. Dr. José Miguel Ramos Arizpe of Coahuila emerged as the leading spokesman for the federalist majority, while the centralists were led by Dr. José Luciano Becerra of Veracruz, Fr. Servando Teresa de Mier of Monterrey, and Lic. Carlos María Bustamante of the capital.¹³⁸

Ramos Arizpe, as president of the constitutional commission, submitted on December 3, 1823, an Acta Constitutiva which was intended to serve as the fundamental document of the federal republic until a constitution could be provided. Article five, prescribing federalism as the essential form of the new republic, was designed to fulfill the wishes of the provincial diputations.¹³⁹ The Acta Constitutiva was sanctioned on February 3, 1824, resulting in a victory for the provincial elites over the centralist republicans.¹⁴⁰

In order to assure their victory, the provincial leaders began organizing federalist state governments while the discussion of the Acta was still under way. The federalists were accused of promoting revolts in the provinces in order to assure a favorable vote in the capital and to remove local officials who stood in the way of federalization.¹⁴¹ The most important of these movements occurred in Puebla where the federalists attempted to erect their own state government in December, 1823. General Echavarri, the commander of Puebla and leader of Casa Mata, attempted to sustain the new state government in the face of opposition from the authorities in Mexico City.¹⁴² When the Executive Power appointed General Manuel Gómez Pedraza to assume political and military command in Puebla, Echavarri gathered the provincial militia to withstand him. General Vicente Guerrero was commissioned by the Executive Power to terminate the Puebla revolt. Guerrero and Pedraza entered Puebla without resistance and the Executive Power ordered Echavarri to appear before the government in Mexico City.¹⁴³

While differences were being resolved in Puebla, a series of revolts broke out in the south aimed at the removal of the Spaniards from government posts and demanding, in some instances, the expulsion of the Spaniards from the republic. General Guerrero, who was ordered by the Executive Power to quell the uprisings, hurried toward Cuernavaca and Cuaútla from Puebla.¹⁴⁴ The presence of Guerrero was sufficient to calm these revolts which, during January, 1824, occurred sporadically throughout the south. In early January, the infantry battalion at Querétaro rebelled, imprisoning the commander of the province. General Nicolás Bravo was forced to suppress this uprising.¹⁴⁵

Conservative writers, such as Alamán and Cuevas, have suggested that the anti-Spanish tone of these movements, excepting that of Puebla, was a device to advance the federalist cause.¹⁴⁶ Iturbideans had identified the anti-Spanish cause with the federalist movement. Pedraza focused on the Spaniards themselves as the cause of the unrest of 1823.¹⁴⁷ He cited, of course, his difficulty with Echavarri in Puebla, an affair in which he was by no means disinterested.

Conclusions

It seems clear that the Spanish merchants had been a motivating force behind the removal of Iturbide, although the fall of the empire was overtly the work of the army. Alamán assigned a major role to the Spaniards by fact and implication in his treatment of the empire. The presence of Echavarri at the head of a federalist revolt in Puebla may indicate that some Spaniards and European creoles, recognizing

the inevitability of federalism in the make-up of the new congress, had opted for federalized state governments of their own creation.¹⁴⁸

In retrospect, it would seem that the Spanish liberals risked the future of Mexico's Spaniards by cooperating in the removal of Iturbide. Cuevas charged that the Spanish liberals pursued an impolitic course of action which would contribute to their future persecution.¹⁴⁹ It seems clear, in view of Iturbide's popularity with the masses and the efforts of his supporters to attribute the emperor's fall to the peninsulares, that the Spaniard's cause was seriously undermined by January, 1824. The wealthy Spanish property owner and merchant had been insecure under the empire and his fortune was diminishing. Having successfully removed viceroys and defied the Church in the past, the Spanish merchants and liberal military officers joined again to achieve a similar goal. But the movement of 1823 required the help of the old insurgents, a faction whose anti-Spanish inclinations were well known.

The divisions which matured after the fall of the empire were inherent in the alliance of former enemies. The provincial insurgents would divorce themselves from the Spanish and European creole republicans who aspired to control the provinces from the capital. The provincial insurgents and the American creoles generally would soon distrust the Spaniards who had opposed Iturbide. Urged on by the Iturbideans, the American creoles would attack generals Echavarri and Negrete for their betrayal of the emperor.¹⁵⁰ José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, using

the pseudonym "he who never praised the evil deeds of Iturbide," provided in 1823 a glimpse of what the Spaniards would confront in the years ahead:

. . . these monopolistic employees, the cause of the exhausted state in which the Nation finds itself . . . and the asylum of the greatest despotism [these] revolutionaries . . . who gave us an emperor against our will, tolerated under threats and sustained by force and, finally, this mob of monarchists, satellites of the tyranny which they now wish to tear down, will be the object of our criticism so that the Nation may know them The Nations who have witnessed our indulgence with our oppressors the Spaniards: what judgment might they form of the American character . . .? Mexicans, I . . . cannot help but feel ashamed at our weakness.¹⁵¹

Notes

¹ Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), Chapter VII, entitled "Religion," includes a succinct treatment of the impact of masonry on Mexican history. Brandenburg states that he had access to private sources, the nature of which he does not reveal (see pp. 191-204).

² Félix Navarrete, La masonería en la historia y en las leyes de México (México, 1957), p. 30. Navarrete's work is a Mexican Catholic's answer to the "official" masonic histories and, in particular, to José María Mateos, Historia de la masonería en México desde 1806 hasta 1884 (2 vols.; México, 1884). Mateos was founder of the Mexican National Rite in 1825.

³ Dr. Richard E. Chism, Una contribución a la historia masónica en Méjico, cited in Navarrete, p. 30. Dr. Chism was a North American mason.

⁴ Brandenburg, p. 191.

⁵ Ibid., p. 192.

⁶ Navarrete, pp. 30-31; Mateos, pp. 52-53.

⁷ Navarrete, p. 14.

⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹ Mariano Tirada y Rojas, La masonería en España; ensayo histórico (Madrid, 1893), cited in Navarrete, p. 25.

¹⁰ Navarrete, p. 25.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Brandenburg, p. 192.

¹³ Vicente de la Fuente, Historia de las sociedades secretas antiguas y modernas en España, y especialmente de la Franc-Masonería (3 vols.; Lugo, 1871), cited in Navarrete, p. 26.

¹⁴ Navarrete, p. 26.

¹⁵ Lorenzo de Zavala, Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; París, 1831), I, 259.

¹⁶Mateos, p. 14. That this "Mexicanization" occurred in 1813, during the struggle for independence, is not surprising. Had it occurred in 1821, as Catalina Sierra has reported, it would have made subsequent events more difficult to comprehend, Catalina Sierra, El nacimiento de México (México, 1960), p. 88.

¹⁷The "Ancient and Accepted" variation did not enter Mexico, according to Brandenburg, until the 1860's (pp. 192-94). Due to the ambiguity inherent in the terms "Scottish Rite," or "Scottish Party," the contemporary Mexican designation *escocés* will be used below.

¹⁸Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 46.

¹⁹Ibid., V, 383-84.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., V, 537.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., V, 601.

²⁵Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 123.

²⁶Alamán, V, 386.

²⁷Zavala, Ensayo histórico, I, 103.

²⁸Ibid., cited in Alamán, V, 547.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰José María Luis Mora, Obras sueltas (3 vols.; Paris, 1837), I, iv.

³¹Alamán, V, 600.

³²Alamán, V, 603-04; Cuevas, p. 139.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Mariano Galván Rivera (ed.), Colección de órdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa y soberanos congresos generales de la Nación Mexicana . . . (8 vols.; México, 1829-40), II, 80.

³⁵Alamán, V, 604-10.

³⁶The houses of Echenique and Obregón in Mexico City were robbed by the populacho while their owners languished in prison. Ibid., V, 610.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., V, 611.

³⁹Ibid., V, 612-16; Cuevas, p. 157-58.

⁴⁰Alamán, V, 618.

⁴¹Ibid., V, 619.

⁴²Havana. Archivo Nacional. Correspondencia de los capitanes generales, leg. 181, No. 1; leg. 152, No. 1; Real consulado y junta de fomento, leg. 27, No. 1409; leg. 27, No. 1411; Asuntos políticos, leg. 112, No. 62; leg. 21, No. 6, cited in José L. Franco, Documentos para la historia de México existentes en el Archivo Nacional de Cuba (Havana, 1961), pp. lxxvii-lxxviii.

⁴³Havana. Archivo Nacional. Asuntos políticos, leg. 20, No. 37; leg. 21, No. 23; Floridas, leg. 1, No. 41, cited in ibid., p. lxxviii.

⁴⁴Alamán, V, 619-21.

⁴⁵Ibid., V, 622.

⁴⁶Ibid., V, 612-22.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., V, 622.

⁴⁹Agustín de Iturbide, Manifiesto del General D. Agustín de Iturbide, libertador de México (México, 1871), cited in ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., V, 621-625.

⁵²Ibid., V, 625.

⁵³Ibid., V, 626; The bando was published by José Marfa Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-46 (2 vols.; México, 1892, 1897), I, 169-71. Neither Alamán nor Bocanegra revealed the date of the decree. While Alamán places it in early November, Bocanegra implies that it was passed in early December. Since the published collections of decrees did not include those passed by the junta instituyente, there is no way of ascertaining the date of the decree and, consequently, the circumstance which gave rise to it.

⁵⁴Bocanegra, I, 169-71.

⁵⁵The declaration was published by Bocanegra, I, 171-83.

⁵⁶Alamán, V, 626.

⁵⁷ibid.

⁵⁸ibid., V, 627-29; Cuevas, p. 142.

⁵⁹Cuevas, p. 142.

⁶⁰ibid.

⁶¹For a clear distinction between the Plan of Veracruz (December 6, 1822) and the Plan of Casa Mata (February 1, 1823) see Nettie Lee Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXV (February, 1945), 45-56.

⁶²Havana. Archivo Nacional. Documentación Vilanova, leg. 5; Boletín del Archivo Nacional, Año XXIX, Nos. 1-6 (January-December, 1925), cited in Franco, p. lxxxix.

⁶³J. M. Miquel I. Vergès, La diplomacia española en México (1822-23) (México, 1956), p. 58.

⁶⁴Alamán, V, 632-33.

⁶⁵ibid.

⁶⁶ibid., V, 634.

⁶⁷Nettie Lee Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," p. 46. A copy of the Plan of Veracruz was published by Bocanegra, I, 183-91.

⁶⁸Alamán, V, 639-41; Vergès, p. 60.

⁶⁹Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," p. 47.

⁷⁰Vergès, p. 65; Alamán, V, 641.

⁷¹Alamán, V, 641.

⁷²Vergès, p. 87.

⁷³Alamán, V, 652-53.

⁷⁴ibid., V, 653; Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," p. 48.

⁷⁵Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," p. 48.

⁷⁶Iturbide, Manifiesto, p. 57; Alamán, V, 655.

⁷⁷Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," pp. 50-51.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 49-50. The Plan of Casa Mata was first published by Miguel M. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes de la heroica ciudad de Vera Cruz (3 vols.; México, 1850-58), II, 262.

⁷⁹Alamán, V, 768-68; Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de México, dedica a sus compatriotas; o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), p. 14.

⁸⁰Havana. Archivo Nacional. Documentación Vilanova, leg. 5; Boletín del Archivo Nacional, Año XXIX, Nos. 1-6 (January-December, 1925), cited in Franco, p. lxxix.

⁸¹Alamán, V, 664.

⁸²Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," pp. 52-54.

⁸³Alamán, V, 664.

⁸⁴Ibid., V, 665-68.

⁸⁵Ibid., V, 669.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Zerecero published memoirs in 1869 which failed to discuss his revolutionary activities after 1811. See Memorias para la historia de las revoluciones en México (México, 1869).

⁸⁸Alamán, V, 669.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Taylor to Adams, Veracruz, March 13, 1823 in United States. Department of State. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives. No. 183. Despatches from United States Consuls in Veracruz, 1822-1906 [cited hereafter as DUSCV].

⁹¹Alamán, V, 676.

⁹²Ibid.; Iturbide, p. 72; Cuevas, p. 154.

⁹³Alamán, V, 679.

⁹⁴Ibid., V, 681; Pedraza, p. 14.

⁹⁵Alamán, V, 684.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid., V, 685.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid., V, 686-89.

¹⁰⁰Galván Rivera, II, 90; Cuevas, p. 155.

¹⁰¹Alamán, V, 690-92.

¹⁰²Ibid., V, 696-99.

¹⁰³Ibid., V, 699.

¹⁰⁴See Suplemento; Diccionario Porrúa (México, 1966), p. 138.

¹⁰⁵Alamán, V, 704.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Galván Rivera, II, 92.

¹⁰⁸Alamán, V, 705-06.

¹⁰⁹On the English loans during the period see C. Allen True, "British Loans to the Mexican Government, 1822-1832," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XVII (1937), 353-62.

¹¹⁰Alamán, V, 705-06.

¹¹¹El Sol, during its earlier existence, had called for the establishment of a monarchy headed by a European prince. Consequently, it was suppressed by Iturbide in 1822. See Nettie Lee Benson, La diputación provincial y el federalismo mexicano (México, 1955), p. 86.

¹¹²The first issue of the Aguila appeared on April 15, 1823. The differences between the two principal periodicals were recognized by Cuevas, p. 169.

¹¹³Alamán, V, 706-07.

¹¹⁴El Sol (June 15, 1823), p. 2.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶On the nature and role of the provincial deputations see Benson, La diputación provincial, pp. 15-21, 48-59, 62-84.

117 Lorenzo Zavala, Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829 (México, 1830), p. 8; Benson, "The Plan of Casa Mata," pp. 55-56.

118 Alamán, V, 707.

119 Ibid., V, 703.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.; Benson, La diputación provincial, pp. 160-165.

122 Alamán, V, 709.

123 Ibid., V, 714-15.

124 Ibid., Cuevas mistakenly referred to Ayestarán as a Spaniard in Porvenir de México, p. 190.

125 Alamán, V, 715-16.

126 The list of those arrested was published in El Sol (October 4, 1823), p. 448; (October 8, 1823), p. 464.

127 The minister of relations, Lucas Alamán, noted the tentative agreement in his Historia de México, V, 716. J. M. Miquel I. Vergès failed to comment on the matter in La diplomacia española en México.

128 Taylor to Adams, Veracruz, May 14, 1823, in DUSCV.

129 Taylor to Adams, New York, October 25, 1823, in DUSCV; Alamán, V, 716-17.

130 Alamán, V, 717.

131 Bocanegra, I, 278-80.

132 Taylor to Adams, New York, October 25, 1823, in DUSCV.

133 Cuevas, p. 164.

134 "Declaración comunicada por el ministerio de hacienda sobre quedar cortada toda relación política y mercantil con la Nación Española," Guía de hacienda de la República Mexicana (México, 1825-28), pp. 295-97.

135 Havana. Archivo Nacional. Asuntos políticos, leg. 113, No. 93, cited in Franco, p. lxxix.

136 Galván Rivera, II, 205.

¹³⁷Alamán, V, 718.

¹³⁸ibid. For an analysis of Dr. Mier's "centralist" views see Nettie Lee Benson, "Servando Teresa de Mier, Federalist," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVIII (November, 1948), 514-25.

¹³⁹Alamán, V, 719.

¹⁴⁰Bocanegra, I, 294.

¹⁴¹Alamán, V, 720-21; Cuevas, pp. 176-77.

¹⁴²Pedraza, pp. 18-20; Bocanegra, I, 331-37.

¹⁴³Alamán, V, 720-21; Cuevas, pp. 176-77.

¹⁴⁴Cuevas, pp. 176-77.

¹⁴⁵ibid.

¹⁴⁶ibid.

¹⁴⁷Pedraza, p. 18.

¹⁴⁸Nettie Lee Benson asserts that federalism was the inevitable result and ultimate goal of the Plan of Casa Mata. See "The Plan of Casa Mata," pp. 50-56.

¹⁴⁹Cuevas, pp. 147-48.

¹⁵⁰ibid., p. 144; Alamán, V, 654.

¹⁵¹El que jamás a alabado los hechos malos de Iturbide [pseud.], "Perdónesele a Iturbide y mueran los traidores," in Paul Radin (ed.), Catalogue of Mexican Pamphlets in the Sutro Collection, 1623-1888 (San Francisco, 1939).

CHAPTER III

THE OPPOSITION TO THE SPANIARDS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC

The Revolt of General Lobato, January, 1824

As early as November, 1823, observed José María Bocanegra, "inquiet spirits" were beginning to incite anti-Spanish feeling, just as they had done in 1810.¹ He placed the blame on the "intransigent posture" of General Francisco Lemaux who commenced the bombardment of the city of Veracruz in 1823 and continued the sporadic shelling well into 1825. Lemaux's attempt to destroy Veracruz led to the creation of numerous atrocity stories which circulated freely in all parts of the republic. Mexican resentment against all Spaniards was intensified by the reports from Veracruz.

In the south, the Spaniards were most unpopular. Anti-Spanish feeling had deep roots in this region, where the guerrilleros of the long independence struggle had found support as well as recruits. Bocanegra characterized the temper of the southerners, at this time, as having " . . . forgot all rational sentiment, allowing the most unbridled passions to work, in all their deformity."² Many were caught up in the inevitable force of events which obliged them to commit acts against their wishes." Bocanegra contended that, in the tierra caliente, the inhabitants were attempting to destroy the

dominant influence of the Spaniards. This was particularly true of the residents of southern haciendas, known as trapiches or beneficios de la caña de azúcar. Here the Spaniards continued to work, noted Bocanegra, "with the impudence and pride which had characterized them during the viceregal period."³

In Cuernavaca and Cuaútla de Amilpas, regions surrounded by haciendas of this type, armed movements sprang up which caused the government in Mexico City to speculate that a general movement against the Spaniards was under way. Spanish soldiers, who had been incorporated into the ranks of General Nicolas Bravo's corps, added fuel to the flames in the south. They provoked the Mexicans by plotting a conspiracy directed at the removal of their commander and even included the threat of putting some towns to the sack if they were not paid their back salaries immediately. When the plan was uncovered, some officials acted "very unwisely." The cry "Mueran los gachupines" was spread among the ranks, resulting in the "commission of vile and degrading acts which shocked the entire public." The Commandant, aided by the national militia, suffocated the movement. The Mexican unit was then purged of its rebellious elements. In the process, "many of its sergeants suffered the pain of death, decreed by the General in Chief, who was complying with orders from the Executive Power."⁴ Government orders of this type could not fail to hurt the Executive Power's image among the military officials and troops.

The plan of rebellion formed by the Spaniards was widely publicized, throughout central Mexico, a fact which contributed to the

movements of Cuernavaca and Cuaútla de Amilpas. The latter were organized in support of the Mexican troops who had attempted to remove their Spanish officers. The leaders of the anti-Spanish revolt in the south increased its strength by recruiting partidas de tropa for the purpose of organizing a campaign of terror against local Spaniards. General Guerrero was able to bring the movement under control, not by extolling the merits of the Executive Power which had sent him, but by utilizing his personal prestige in the south for that end.⁵

It appeared at this point that the anti-Spanish movement had been contained without any serious effect on the social or legal base of Mexican society. The Executive Power had survived the early revolts without undergoing a change in its personnel. But the revolt of Brigadier José María Lobato in the Federal District on January 23 was to have a much greater effect on the federal government than had the guerrilla activity encountered in the region of Querétaro and Cuernavaca. The revolutionists' chief complaint was that the government was made up, in the main, of European creoles and Spaniards. José Mariano Michelena and Miguel Domínguez were at the head of the Executive Power on January 23 due to the rotation system practiced by the six men who had made up the junta since July 1823.⁶ General Lobato complained specifically about the presence of Domínguez and Michelena at the head of the government.⁷

General Lobato spoke for the disorganized opposition of "American creoles" whose cause found support in the revolt of January 1824. Lorenzo Zavala explained creole opinion in the following manner:

PODER EJECUTIVO

General Nicolás Bravo^aGeneral Guadalupe Victoria^aGeneral Pedro Celestino Negrete,^a Spaniard

SUPLENTE

Miguel Domínguez^bJosé Mariano Michelena^bGeneral Vicente Guerrero^cSECRETARIAS DEL DESPACHO^d

Lucas Alamán	Relaciones
Pablo de la Llave ^e	Justicia
Francisco Arillaga, Spaniard	Hacienda
General José Joaquín de Herrera	Guerra

^aAppointed 31 March 1823^bAppointed 1 April 1823^cAppointed 2 July 1823^dMinisters who held office during the Lobato Revolt, 23-27 January 1824.^eResigned 25 January 1824, during the Lobato Revolt.

Sources: Cuevas, p. 155; "Decreto de 31 de marzo de 1823," Leves y Decretos . . . , II, 90; Diccionario Porrúa . . . Suplemento (México, 1966), p. 139.

Figure 1. The Personnel Directing the Executive Power: March 31, 1823-October 10, 1824.

The supporters of Iturbide attributed his fall to the Spaniards; civil servants and military men believed that independence had not been completed because they had before them Spaniards who still held posts received from the Spanish Government; the employees of rich Spaniards believed they had a right to the properties of their masters; and even the poor attributed their state to the opulence of their old oppressors. They remembered the system of commercial monopoly and the favor shown peninsulares in filling vacant posts; and they considered [the Spaniard's] riches, acquired in this manner, not as the fruit of their industry but as the effect of privileges conceded through favoritism and to the detriment of the creoles . . . it was not uncommon to see Spaniards living in the midst of abundance after independence who had accumulated riches from their past depredations.⁸

Justo Sierra referred to the supporters of the anti-Spanish revolts as pequeña burguesía (petty bourgeois).⁹ The term "American criollo," as defined by Hamill, includes a broader economic segment of society.¹⁰ A Lorenzo Zavala or a José María Tornel could not be classed with the petty bourgeoisie. The term American creole, as used in the present study, encompasses all the supporters of the anti-Spanish movement, whatever their economic, social or political motives and backgrounds. By our definition, the term "creole" will include the literate mestizos and former castas who, no doubt, thought and acted in a manner similar to the American creole.

Michelena and Domínguez were counted among the American creoles in 1809-10,¹¹ but not in 1824. They lacked the prestige of the old insurgents, such as Vicente Guerrero and Guadalupe Victoria, among the American creoles. Michelena and Domínguez owed their positions in 1824 to having been involved in the conspiracies of Querétaro and Valladolid in 1809-10. But Domínguez had not entirely lost favor with the Spanish government during the struggle for independence, and Michelena had led his revolt in the name of Ferdinand VII.¹² Domínguez

and Michelena were rejected by the American creoles who considered them "men of intrigue and ambition."¹³

Brigadier Lobato emerged as the spokesman for the impatient creoles by virtue of his leading role in the revolt of January 1824. General Guerrero, who declined an offer of leadership in the revolt, was not yet ready to become the military leader of the American creoles. As a member of the government, Guerrero supported the Executive Power in 1824.

Peaceful relations between Spaniard and Mexican were ended by the series of armed revolts which commenced in January 1824. General José María Lobato, who had been a second to General José Antonio Echavarri in the division of Casa Mata, proclaimed a movement for the removal of all Spaniards from government posts. Lobato's proclamation followed a series of local revolts led by military officials.¹⁴ The first occurred at Querétaro on January 9, the second at Cuernavaca on January 17, and the third in the Federal District led by General Lobato on January 23. The Executive Power was visibly shaken by the portent of these disturbances, the purpose of which was to end the policy of employing Spaniards which had continued into the era of independence. General Bravo terminated the movement at Querétaro and General Guerrero halted the disturbance at Cuernavaca. But the movement of General Lobato in the capital presented a more complex problem and the government initially retreated in utter confusion in the face of Lobato's threats. Zavala reported that the Executive Power was

forced to seek refuge with the congress, fearing that it would be abandoned by the troops.¹⁵

The Mexico City garrison soon joined the revolutionists, demonstrating by their act that support for the Executive Power was weak among military officials. Lobato's proclamation received the support, not only of the military in the capital, but of the "lower orders" of the city as well.¹⁶ On the night of January 23, General Lobato's troops seized the convent of Bethlehemites on Calle San Andrés and also the barracks commonly known as "de los Gallos." From these fortified structures, Lobato issued his ultimatums to congress.¹⁷

The military commander of Jalisco was also taking steps against the Spaniards at this time. Following the discovery of the plot among Bravo's Spanish troops, General Luis Quintanar had taken steps of his own to prevent a conspiracy among the military Spaniards in Jalisco.¹⁸ Quintanar had ordered the collection of all arms possessed by Spaniards. He had also begun the systematic removal of all Spaniards from the military in Jalisco. The question of the Spaniards was also being debated at this time in Puebla.¹⁹ A former leader of insurgent bands, Vicente Gómez, who had sullied his reputation since independence through banditry, had raised the cry of "Mueran los gachupines" in the south. His violent acts were frequently reported in the periodicals of Mexico City.²⁰

The Lobato revolt, viewed in the light of these events, emerges as a political move potentially acceptable to the Iturbidist party as well as to the republican-minded among the American creoles. Should

the Iturbidist movement, centered since 1823 in Mexico City and Guadalajara, unite with the anti-Spanish movement in the south of the nation, the Executive Power would be seriously undermined.

Evidence exists that Lobato offered Iturbide's close friend and ally, Manuel Gómez Pedraza, the leadership of the movement. A general of Pedraza's stature would have added luster and considerable support to the movement. Pedraza's version of the offer, as well as his refusal to accept the command are quite revealing:

. . . one afternoon in Puebla I received an official inquiry from the Ministry of Relations in which I was informed of a revolutionary project in the Capital concerning which I was believed to possess knowledge, because the Junta de Gefes y Oficiales who planned the uprising, were thinking of making me its leader: I responded that I knew nothing concerning the content of their question; but that, if I were to receive such an invitation, I would pass it on to the Government for its purposes: Two hours [later] . . . Captain Alvino [Angel] Pérez appeared bearing a document signed by Lobato and several officers: It spoke of the expulsion of Spaniards, of the forces which could be counted upon, of my nomination for the leadership of the movement, and said they were waiting to execute my orders: the official commissioned [to deliver the note] added that the members of the Junta charged him to relay to me verbally that should I disapprove of the project they would abandon it: I who for self-esteem, or for whatever reason, having always paid for the fact that people confided in me, showed the envoy the letter from the Ministry, and I assured him that if Lobato and the other conspirators would withdraw from their ill-advised action, their names would never pass my lips; but that if they wished to carry out the project, I would be relieved from my word: I wrote thusly to the Government, and I also disclosed that, if my decision seemed a bad one, they could order me relieved [as Commanding General of Puebla]; but I would not release the communication which I retained, and that I would only deliver it if the rebels failed to accept my offer and proceeded with their attempt.²¹

Pedraza, who was military commander of Puebla at that time, reports that Lobato announced the revolt before receiving his reply, thereby voiding the proposed agreement which was en route from Puebla.²²

Pedraza, however, did not send the document bearing the names of the revolutionists to Mexico City.²³

The possibility that Lobato either sought other support or was initially instigated by persons whose motives were other than those announced has been suggested. Justo Sierra revealed that Lobato:

. . . later denounced as his instigators, Michelena, who conspired in the Executive Power in order to clear the road of ambition of obstacles, and Brigadier Santa Anna, who was being tried at the time for an attempted federalist revolution.²⁴

Santa Anna would have found his position in Veracruz, where a coalition of Spaniards and European creoles directed affairs, considerably enhanced should the government attack the vested interests of Spaniards. Michelena's role in the movement remains uncertain, but Santa Anna's involvement is a certainty, demonstrated by his signature on the "plan de Lobato."²⁵

The demands of the revolutionists were twofold: 1) that Domínguez and Michelena, "who are to be found at the head of the government," be removed from the Executive Power, "always preserving Sr. Guerrero" in the government, and 2) that all Spaniards be removed from government posts.²⁶ The revolutionists' subsequent pronouncements repeated their call for "the renovation of the Executive Power with Americans of accredited patriotic sentiments and the separation of the Spaniards from their government posts."²⁷

Bocanegra has provided a succinct account of the course of the revolt.²⁸ On the evening of January 23, the congress went into emergency session to discuss means for avoiding bloodshed and securing

the Executive Power against the rebels. The Executive Power joined the congress temporarily abandoning the National Palace. Both sides seemed anxious to avoid armed conflict and to maintain "public tranquility." Private property did not suffer from the actions of either side: Lobato was exercising his "right of petition," without contemplating actual military action. This can be seen in the diplomatic probing which characterized the actions of both parties.

On the morning of January 24, the congress issued an appeal to the revolutionists to lay down their arms. Lobato released a statement on behalf of the revolutionists, setting forth their motives and demands. The Mexico City garrison, "almost to the man," joined the movement. Only Corone! Félix Merino and his "Infantry Regiment No. 7" remained loyal: the government was deserted by the military in less than 24 hours. The congress passed the entire day in secret sessions, and the Executive Power, fearing for its safety, remained with the congress in the massive structure known as "San Juan y San Pablo."²⁹

The government and General Lobato continued to exchange notes on January 25, but without progressing toward an agreement with the revolutionists. On January 26, the congress decreed that the reserve officers (oficiales sueltos) must report for duty, threatening to brand as traitors all those who failed to respond. Any who hesitated would be declared "outside the law," that is, without legal protection. The congress granted "extraordinary powers" to the Executive Power, then publicly marched to the National Palace to join the government.

Both bodies addressed the revolutionists, demanding an immediate termination of the revolt. The government now operated from a position of strength. The rebels complied, with only a small group of their adherents resisting. All opposition collapsed with the capture of the leaders of the intransigent group on January 27.

The Executive Power, in possession of extraordinary powers granted by congress, decreed by executive fiat penalties for the officials who had resisted too long. Bocanegra reports that when an official named Staboli was condemned to death, the wife of the victim made a successful appeal to José Mariano Michelena, president of the government. Popular rumour had connected Michelena with the revolutionists and the public demonstrated little surprise when the Executive Power after reconsidering the matter, granted an amnesty to all who had resisted too drastically. Peace was reestablished completely by the arrival of General Guerrero in the capital. Guerrero publicly disapproved of the revolutionist's methods, in spite of his often expressed view that "public opinion was against the Spaniards."³⁰ The capital had returned to normal by January 28, when the amnesty decree was published.

General Lobato released a "letter to the Mexican Public" on January 29, in which he expressed the reasons for his rebellion, the demands that he had made on the government, and his reason for abandoning the attempt at this time.³¹ Lobato attributed the revolution to a general lack of confidence in the government "because of the Spanish origin of its members." His own role in the revolt had been one of

centralizing the regional elements which had lacked organization. The goal of the movement consisted in placing its petition before congress. The legitimacy of congress had never been questioned: "Congress should be respected and obeyed We must await the fulfillment of our demands by the congress."³² Lobato assured his supporters that their persons were safe due to the guarantees which had been extended by congress in order to encourage the rebels to disarm. The letter was intended to serve as a public announcement of the agreement between Lobato and congress. The congress had promised to consider the revolutionists' demands in exchange for the termination of the revolt.

The thinking of Lobato and his followers on the Spanish question and the threat to Mexican independence is clarified in his letter to the public:

Our lack of confidence in the loyalty of the Spaniards is a natural sentiment which we share with all other nations who are to be found in equal circumstance. There seems little hope that Spain will recognize our independence . . . her vassals living among us are the instruments which Ferdinand has destined, together with their friends and relations, to forge our chains. The indispensable precautions taken in a state of war must not be construed as an attack on the existence and property of the Spaniards which all governments should defend . . . blind confidence is the principal [cause] of the ruin of all nations. The king of Spain cannot do anything without the Spaniards. Britain has promised her protection against threats from Europe and it is fitting that we should take our precautions at home against our Spaniards. The government is servile to our Spaniards: the liberal party, inferior in number, resources and importance to the addicts of the king, has appeared to be about to succumb, and it would not be strange if, following their victory, the Spaniards were to hand us over to the king. The purpose of this revolt has been to avoid this by removing the Spaniards from their government posts The solution consists in the patriotic election of

government employees . . . and in the necessity to respect and obey the congress, awaiting its wise determination [concerning] the fulfillment of our demands.³³

The line of reasoning followed by the popular faction is clarified by Lobato's letter. The Spaniards could not be trusted, especially during a state of war, because they were monarchists by nature and because Ferdinand had chosen them to serve as instruments in his plan for reconquest. Action was needed to reduce the internal threat. The government had done nothing to counter the Spanish danger and, moreover, it was actually falling under the influence of the Spaniards. The Spaniards continued to wield influence through their wealth, positions, and family ties. Therefore, the congress should respond to the popular will and reduce the Spanish influence in government. And finally, the implication was present that the congress must act in order to avoid further revolutionary activity.

The Conflict between the Escoceses and the American Creoles in 1824

The Spanish question would not be easily dismissed by the congress. Sierra suggested, probably incorrectly, that the congressional majority agreed with Lobato.³⁴ Certainly, influential members who, like Miguel Ramos Arizpe, were identified with the federalist cause, supported the need for legislation on the question of government posts. But the second constituent congress was not ready to deal with the Spanish problem. On January 30 a proposition was presented in congress "That the rights which should be enjoyed by the Spaniards residing in the Republic during the state of war which exists between this Nation

and the Peninsula should be regulated, as well as the conditions and obligations with which the rights should be enjoyed."³⁵ An appeal concerning the same matter had been received from Tamaulipas, and the congress began to consider the matter "under the influence of this recent excitation."³⁶

Despite Lobato's final remarks, it seems clear that the purpose of his revolt was more than merely "placing the matter before congress." Initially, Lobato and his followers had intended to effect the removal of the Spaniards from all government posts, rather than to merely generate a discussion of the matter in congress. The Lobato revolt failed in its original purpose, a fact that is all the more apparent in light of the subsequent refusal by congress to legislate on the Spanish question in 1824. Cuevas offers several reasons for the abortion of the Lobato revolt.³⁷ Lobato lacked the support of prominent generals, particularly that of Guerrero. Brigadier Santa Anna, an early supporter of the movement, soon abandoned Lobato, offering his services to the government. The property owners of Mexico City backed the congress in its efforts to prevent an outbreak of actual hostilities. Lobato's troops deserted him following the announcement of the amnesty offer, and Lobato himself did not wish to confront General Guerrero militarily, following the return of the latter to Mexico City. Finally, Cuevas asserts that Lobato came to realize that he was merely a tool of interests within the government. Cuevas supports the charge, made publicly at the time, that Mariano Michelena was involved in the conspiracy. Lobato's call for the

resignation of Michelena would seem to run counter to this interpretation.

The fact that Lobato's revolt succeeded to the degree that it did can be attributed to the popularity of his cause. The government was defied with impunity and the American creoles learned the extent to which the military rank and file would support the anti-Spanish banner. The American creoles also learned, during the congressional debates which followed, exactly where the second constituent congress stood on the Spanish question. Out of these lessons would be shaped the ideas and methods utilized by the nascent popular party, which would make the Spanish question its principal concern. The revolutionists of 1824 would enlist in the Yorkist lodges in 1825.

The Lobato revolt and the depredations of Vicente Gómez in the south of Mexico state were part of a pattern of widespread insubordination by military officials and their troops. Government correspondence reveals that movements occurred also in Yucatán, Jalisco, Guanjuato, and Michoacán in early 1824.³⁸

The revolt in Yucatán, which began on February 15, 1824, illustrates the pattern of subsequent movements. State government was formed in imitation of the federal government: an Executive Power headed the state while a constituent congress met to prepare a constitution for the "federalized" state. On February 15, a junta of military officials declared themselves in revolt against the state's Executive Power and demanded "the removal of the Spaniards from their government posts, as was done [elsewhere] according to

reports."³⁹ The constituent congress in Mérida undaunted by the insubordinant officers, decreed on the same day that the Spaniards of Yucatán should enjoy "an efficacious and positive guarantee that their rights of liberty, property and security are and will be perpetually inviolable."⁴⁰ The decree was intended to provide the legal basis for the government's defense against future anti-Spanish revolts. Anyone who attacked, directly or indirectly, the person, property, or rights of Spaniards residing in Yucatán was to be prosecuted as a "conspirator against order and public security." Anyone who, directly or indirectly, attacked authorities or officials of the government in order to remove or insult them was to be treated as a "conspirator against society." And, finally, the decree guaranteed the right of legal petition against "public prevaricators" as "sacred and inviolable." The decree produced unrest among the military in Yucatán and, on February 21, the officers of the garrison in Campeche revolted against the state government.⁴¹

Anti-Spanish feeling was too strong among the American creoles of Yucatán, and most of the states, to be suppressed by congressional decree. The erection of state governments in all sections of the country invariably raised the issue of the Spanish presence and, in numerous states, provoked disobedience among military officials who were unwilling to accept the presence of Spaniards in the new state governments.

Repercussions from the Lobato revolt were not limited to armed movements against the legalization of the status quo at the local level.

The federal government was also affected. General Negrete, who had considered resigning numerous times, removed himself from the Executive Power.⁴² General Guerrero replaced Negrete, in conformity with the expressed wishes of the revolutionists in the south and in Mexico City. Pablo de la Llave had resigned the Ministry of Justice during the revolt. The American creoles looked to Guerrero, who represented the "old insurgents" of the pre-Iguala era, for the satisfaction of their social and political demands.

The congress in Mexico City had agreed to consider the question of government posts in exchange for the disarmament of the followers of General Lobato. Having received a number of appeals from local governing bodies, congress formed a committee on January 30 to make recommendations on the matter of the rights of Spaniards. The committee was headed by the prominent federalist, Miguel Ramos Arizpe, who was known to have views acceptable to the American creoles on the matter of Spanish employments.

Two weeks passed before the committee filed its report, or "Project Concerning the Rights which the European Spaniards Resident in these States Should Enjoy."⁴³ The specific issue, which attracted the committee's attention, was the question of government employments. Ramos' committee recommended the removal of the Spaniards from government posts. Legal justification for the move was provided in article fifteen of the Ramos report. The government was to be granted the right:

to suspend any employ of the federation, without trial, for the duration of the war with Spain, whether he be American or European, for the purpose of varying his residence or extending a passport for his expulsion from the country.⁴⁴

Any employee who might be suspended under the provisions of the measure would lose neither his salary nor his right to the post. He would continue to receive his salary, whereas his post would be restored to him following the termination of hostilities with Spain. These provisions were moderate due to the prevailing Spanish attitude that one possessed a government post as property and enjoyed the emoluments of that office as virtually an inalienable right.

The matter at issue, in the view of Ramos Arizpe, was how to reconcile the national interest with the Spanish concept of property and the rights pertaining thereto. The dominant Scottish Rite faction in congress could not be expected to accept a proposal which would threaten, even mildly, this traditional view of the rights of property. The apparent moderation of the Ramos report was unacceptable to the more impassioned among the American creoles, while, to the European creole and to the Spaniard, the provisions of the plan represented an intolerable threat to property and position. The structure of the representation in congress had not been altered by the Lobato revolt. The Scottish Rite party was still enjoying a plurality of votes in the congress. Debate failed to produce either agreement or compromise and the Ramos report was returned to committee. At this point, the matter was dropped and the report was forgotten until 1827.

While failing to produce a measure in 1824 for suspension of the Spanish employees, the congress also failed to reaffirm the rights of the Spaniards residing in the Mexican nation. The Ramos report was shelved due to disagreement over the employments question, but that same report contained the reaffirmation of the rights due to Spaniards which had been lacking since the destruction of Iturbide's empire. Rather than open the door which would allow the government to dispose of the Spanish employees, the congressional majority dispensed with the rights proposal entirely. The congress had considered the Spanish question, as they promised Lobato, but in failing to remove the Spaniards or even legislate on the matter, the congress forced the unyielding American creoles to mount a belligerent political campaign throughout the nation to wrest control of the congress from the escocés party.

While the congress occupied itself with these matters, the provinces carried on the task of reconstituting themselves as states of the federation. The role of the provincial deputations, meeting in the provincial capitals, was crucial in this process.⁴⁵ These bodies, made up of creoles, many of whom had stood up for federalism at the Cortes of Cádiz, played a major role in the formation of the constituent congresses which prepared state constitutions.⁴⁶ Not all provincial deputations were unfavorably disposed toward the Spaniards. On the contrary, that of San Luis Potosí was sufficiently favorable toward Spanish residents to issue a "manifiesto" aimed at its constituents in defense of the third guarantee:

The establishment of peace demands the punctual compliance with that which was adopted in the treaties of Iguala and Córdoba, or of the third guarantee, conserving for the old residents from overseas, or those who lately became rooted in our society and the Republic of Anáhuac, the same rights as those of the indigenous inhabitants, conserving them in the posts they obtain, and admitting them with equality to all [posts] that the state may dispense.⁴⁷

The manifesto noted approvingly that "the states of Guanajuato, Valladolid, Querétaro, Zacatecas, Puebla and Oaxaca" had expressed a similar attitude.⁴⁸

The governments of many of the new states decreed measures granting protection to the Spaniards under their jurisdiction. In Yucatán the constituent congress decreed the personal security and citizenship of resident Spaniards on the same day that the act of federation was passed.⁴⁹

The Acta Constitutiva, or the Constitutional Act which provided for the organization of a federal type government, was passed by the constituent congress on 31 January 1824. This document was inspired, if not written, by Miguel Ramos Arizpe, an ardent federalist who, at this time, also headed the committee which was considering the rights of Spaniards. It was on the authority of this document that the provinces were being "federalized." The formal constitution which was to serve as the fundamental charter for the Federal Republic was presented to the constituent congress in draft form on April 1 and received final approval on October 3, 1824.⁵⁰

The new constitution contained a number of clauses of importance to the Spanish residents of Mexico. Article eighteen, for example, defined a citizen as "one who was born or naturalized in any part of

the republic and who was a resident (vecino) of the same." Article nineteen defined a citizen as "one who had resided in any part of the republic for one year; practiced an art, industry, or profession, or who had possessed property valued at a minimum of 6,000 pesos for one year." By these provisions, a foreign merchant could very easily become a citizen. Article twenty-six provided that no person covered in either of the above articles "could be condemned without a hearing." Nothing was said about Spaniards per se in the constitution, but the articles defining citizenship were clearly designed to make it possible for a European to obtain citizenship in any state, as authorized by the federal constitution. Since citizenship was vested in the states, rather than in the Federation, any Spaniards who sought citizenship must do so from the state governments. This fact would force the Spaniards to curry favor with the state legislatures who had power to decree citizenship and who frequently used that power.

While these legal changes were evolving, the American creoles were engaged in a fiery debate with their adversaries, the *escoceses*. The pamphleteers (folleteros) for the American creole cause achieved a level of originality which, if they are not judged too severely on their factual competence, merits for them recognition as the creators of a national literary form. The most productive of the propagandists were "El Pensador Mexicano," José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi,⁵¹ and "El Payo del Rosario," Pablo de Villavicencio.⁵² A crucial role was played by the popular pamphleteers in stirring hatred of the Spaniards during the 1820's. Villavicencio's pamphlets, for example, utilized

satirical metaphor to portray the gachupín as a coyote or galli-coyote who, lacking surveillance, would devour the gallinas or ovejas. Numerous pamphleteers of less merit were equally active.

In March, 1824, an important anonymous pamphlet, entitled "Borbonism Unmasked," was circulated in the capital. Authored by either Villavicencio or Lizardi, the pamphlet included a list of "Borbonists," containing the names of a number of important persons, many of whom were in the government.⁵³ At the head of the list was General Echavarrri, leader of the plan of Casa Mata and prominent escocés and Spaniard. This pamphlet set a precedent in the battle of words: the escoceses would henceforth be dubbed "Borbonists." Some evidence exists to indicate that the pamphlet launched a new Iturbidist strategy.⁵⁴

The escocés periodical El Sol attacked the pamphlet on numerous occasions in April. General Echavarrri affirmed his republican sentiments and demanded that the anonymous pamphleteer produce evidences before making such damning charges.⁵⁵ Even Michelena was accused of Borbonist sentiments in a pamphlet issued in Guadalajara, and re-issued in Mexico City. The pamphlet offered this as an explanation for the persecution of Michelena by Iturbide.⁵⁶ Charges of "Borbonism" were the weapon used by the American creole in 1824, whether by popular republican or by Iturbidist, against the leaders of the escocés party.

The constituent congress began debating the draft of the constitution in April and, at the same time, took up the question of

sanctions against the outspoken Iturbidean faction. Rumors of surreptitious activities on the part of the Iturbideans were being circulated in the capital and Guadalajara. On April 23, the congress passed a measure designed to terminate the threat forever.⁵⁷ By this decree, all members of the Iturbidean party were declared "traitors to the federation" for "plotting the return of their leader with a foreign force." Moreover, the decree proscribed Iturbide himself, and pronounced him "outside the law," should he attempt a return to Mexican soil. The escocés party in the congress pushed the bill through and actually succeeded in mustering an overwhelming majority of favorable votes.

The escocés majority, fearing the growing Iturbidean party and determined to make its decision prevail in the government, attempted in April "to concentrate all power in the hands of one man."⁵⁸ It was proposed in the constituent congress, "that from the present members of the government, one should be selected to assume command, and he should be called Supremo Director."⁵⁹ The escoceses hoped to place their Grand Master, General Bravo, in the post.⁶⁰ The matter was finally resolved by means of a compromise.⁶¹ Pablo de la Llave, who was acceptable to the escoceses, assumed the Ministry of Justice on April 21, and became official in charge of the Ministry of Relations as well on April 23, exercising both posts simultaneously. The cabinet was now solidly escocés, with Coronel Manuel de Mier y Terán in the Ministry of War and an old Spaniard, Francisco Arrillaga, in the Ministry of the Treasury. The position of the European creoles

and the Spaniards appeared secure as the escocés party increased its hold on the government.

Impatient voices in the congress, such as Miguel Ramos Arizpe, refused to surrender on the matter of government posts. This matter was brought before the constituent body a second time in April. On April 24 Ramos Arizpe defended the report previously submitted by his Committee on the Rights of Spaniards:

[I] am not of the opinion that the employees have a right of property as such, which destroys that which the nation has, like that of the private employer to release those who do not serve him well; and especially when you recall that the country is suffering dilapidations due to the difficulty of removing employees; and moreover that many of those existing today are from the time of the Spanish government and many of them acquired their posts by means that were employed then and which are not apt to inspire confidence.⁶²

But the congress was now more concerned about the activities of the Iturbideans than the qualifications and rights of the Spanish employees.

Passage of the law proscribing Iturbide and his followers on April 23, set the stage for a purge in May. Twenty-four leaders of the Iturbidean movement were arrested in the capital on the night of May 13.⁶³ Among those arrested were brigadiers Hernández and Velázquez, General of Division José Antonio Andrade, and the Conde del Valle. The report was circulated that important papers, bearing names and the plan of operations, were captured with the prisoners of Calle Celaya. The grito to be used by the conspirators was "Dios, Independencia, Héroes de Iguala." El Sol reported that the plan contemplated using the hatred of the Spaniards as a pretext for proclaiming Iturbide.⁶⁴

In Mexico City, Puebla and Oaxaca the revolt failed to transpire. Only in Guadalajara, where Generals Anastasio Bustamante and Luis

Quintanar had built a strong Iturbidean party while heading the provincial government, did the conspiracy actually materialize.⁶⁵ Bocanegra characterized the movement in Guadalajara as "Iturbidean" in a speech before the chamber of deputies on June 8.⁶⁶ It was known in Mexico, by this time, that Agustín Iturbide had departed London for the coast of Mexico. Cuevas reported that the Iturbidean party organization in Guadalajara was lead by José Manuel Herrera, former prime minister of the empire.⁶⁷ The Executive Power had acted in May to reduce the threat from Guadalajara by replacing the governor (jefe político) of Jalisco with the anti-Iturbidean general, José Joaquín de Herrera (no relation). The state legislature had refused to accept the Acta Constitutiva, and subsequently refused to accept the new governor. The province had been in rebellion against the Executive Power since January 1824.⁶⁸

Luis Quintanar was military chief of the revolt in the province of Jalisco. His plan consisted of five points:

1. The Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion.
2. Independence.
3. Restoration of Iturbide to Mexico "and to the post which the nation may wish to give him."
4. Removal of Europeans "from all civil, political and military command."
5. "Reward for the good and punishment for the evil."⁶⁹

The plan found among the papers of the conspirators of Calle Celaya in Mexico City was different in only one respect from that of Quintanar

in Jalisco. The Mexico City plan would have called for:

. . . a convention which would elect a subject to rule the nation according to the pleasure of the convention. That [this subject], in consultation with [the convention], would remove, separate and assign the coyotes and gallicoyotes against whom there are suspicions of Borbonism and disaffection toward independence, and that those who live peacefully among us should be guaranteed their lives and properties and nothing more.⁷⁰

The Executive Power prepared for its clash with the rebels of Guadalajara by placing Coronel Manuel Terán in the Ministry of War⁷¹ and equipping a force of 3,000 men,⁷² under Generals Bravo and Negrete, both members of the Executive Power.⁷³ It will be recalled that many of the officers and soldiers who served under General Bravo were Spaniards.

Bravo's forces outnumbered those available to Quintanar and Bustamante and, on May 11, his troops entered Guadalajara without resistance. By May 18, "all differences had been adjusted without the loss of life or limb."⁷⁴ The state legislature had agreed to accept the Acta Constitutiva, according to an Iturbidean version, "in exchange for Bravo's promise that the participants would neither be tried nor lose their posts."⁷⁵ Quintanar and Bustamante were apparently arrested by General Bravo.⁷⁶ Cuevas reports that Bravo justified his actions before the state legislature as an attempt to clear the way for the election of a new governor. Quintanar and Bustamante were eventually removed to the capital for surveillance.⁷⁷ The Iturbidist movement in Jalisco was extinguished by the coordinated action of military officials from the capital, all of whom were escoceses.

The prisoners taken in the Federal District, though at first condemned, either to death or to long terms of exile, were pardoned in June.⁷⁸ But the Executive Power and the escocés party had another conspiracy to deal with by mid-June, this time in Oaxaca.⁷⁹ The Oaxaca revolt was similar to that recently terminated in Jalisco, except in two particulars. It was led by General Antonio León, commanding general of Oaxaca, but in open defiance of the state's executive power and congress. León issued no call for the return of Iturbide, whose imperial decree he had opposed vigorously. León's movement was strictly anti-Spanish. Utilizing the so-called "right of petition," he appealed to the state constituent congress rather than challenge the federal government, as the Iturbideans had done.

General León's petition demanded the removal of the Spaniards from government posts. The constituent congress referred it to a committee where it was discussed and rejected on June 25.⁸⁰ The matter was said to be within the domain of the federal constituent congress, rather than that of a state, because of the question at issue concerned the third guarantee which was adopted by the nation as a whole during the first general congress. General León was rebuffed by the congress but not defeated.

The destruction of the Iturbidean party's leadership in Mexico City and in Guadalajara damaged it beyond repair. But, had this not been so, the actions of the constituent congress on April 28 and Commanding General Garza of Nueva Santander on July 19 would have ended the threat in any case. Iturbide arrived at Soto la Marina on July 14,

only to be arrested by Garza on July 18. After consultation with the local legislative body on July 19, Garza ordered Iturbide executed that same afternoon. The popular reaction throughout Mexico was not particularly profound. Periodicals carried the reports without comment, and "none but Spaniards rejoiced in the event."⁸¹ A foreign merchant-consul, residing in Veracruz, analyzed the portent of Iturbide's death in a report to his Secretary of State, John Q. Adams:

How parties will now stand requires no great penetration to predict. The Republicans will be joined by all these of Iturbide's party who were ever opposed to Spanish supremacy and they composed his only active effective force. The Spanish party will receive an accession of strength by the force and influence of the Clergy (who in the establishment of the present government see the destruction of their own power) and the Nobility and wealth of the country. I should suppose that of the two parties, the Spanish will profit most by the downfall of Iturbide for having money, with a corrupt soldiery, like that of Mexico, what may not be done.⁸²

Consul Taylor was mistaken in one respect: the American creoles in the officer corp could not be bought and it was they who would ultimately determine the allegiance of the "soldiery." The officer corps was the backbone of the American creole sector of society. The removal of Iturbide facilitated the achievement of unity among American creoles. Unity was essential for the destruction of the escocés party that dominated the constituent congress, the cabinet and the Executive Power.

The hopes of the American creoles rested in the approaching elections to be held in September. The public vote would provide the state elites with an opportunity to alter the course of action being pursued in Mexico City. The American creoles, lacking an organized party, would face candidates selected by the escocés lodges. Sporadic

violence was a recurring problem during the months immediately preceding the election. Luis Cuevas noted that the Executive Power procured additional generals, following the death of Iturbide, in order to strengthen itself.⁸³ Principal among these was Manuel Gómez Pedraza 'who had openly supported Iturbide during the final days of the empire.'⁸⁴ Pedraza served the Executive Power as governor and commanding general of the State of Puebla, a region second only to Mexico in its wealth and ecclesiastical importance. General Pedraza was an *escocés* in 1824, when the execution of Iturbide was carried out. This event must have contributed to his eventual alienation from the *escocés* camp, and his acquisition of the ministry of war under the Victoria government.

The violence which punctuated the pre-election atmosphere during the summer of 1824 was generally attributed to popular anti-Spanish feeling. The rebellion in July of General Antonio León in Oaxaca, stemmed from the state congress' defiance of León's petition in June. The Executive Power had attempted, from Mexico City, to replace León with a commander who would 're-establish public confidence.'⁸⁵ The persecution of Spaniards residing in Oaxaca commenced, evidently, on orders from the office of the commanding general. The Spaniard Cayetano Machado, a collector of alcabalas (excise taxes) from Huamantla, was assassinated by a sergeant.⁸⁶ Word reached Puebla that León had ordered the *alcaldes* of the "Indian" villages to murder Spaniards who passed their way.⁸⁷

The followers of General León favored the confiscation of the Spaniard's property as well as his post. General Victoria volunteered to undertake the pacification of Oaxaca,⁸⁸ while General Guerrero was recovering from wounds received during a recent engagement.⁸⁹ Victoria ended the movement in August, bringing the León brothers, Antonio and Manuel, to Mexico City to face court martial for the death of Machado.⁹⁰ The approaching elections found the congress in a conciliatory mood. When the court martial found Manuel León guilty, the congress voted to exonerate him, and the León brothers were released.⁹¹ Those directly involved in the murder were executed in Puebla.⁹² But the release of the León brothers set a precedent: they would be the first of many military officials to be pardoned for crimes committed against Spaniards.

Amid the highly charged atmosphere, the Executive Power resolved to accept the resignation tendered by the Spaniard Francisco Arillaga from the post of Treasury Minister. Victoria's close personal friend José Ignacio Esteva acquired the post vacated by Arillaga. The new government would require money, a commodity available in the necessary quantities only from foreign sources. Esteva's task was to procure foreign loans, which he did, from Great Britain.⁹³ The new "First Magistrate" would inherit a full treasury, a heavy foreign debt, and a vexatious, unresolved problem: the bitter conflict which was evolving between the escoceses and the American creoles.

The principal candidates to present themselves for the presidency were Nicolás Bravo and Guadalupe Victoria (whose real name was Miguel Fernández Félix. The essential differences in the two candidates were summarized by an Iturbidean:

Bravo . . . gave greater guarantees of respect for all classes and all citizens, and of a special protection for the Spaniards. Victoria, more popular and less well disposed toward those men who like himself had been enemies of Iturbide, was better received by the partisans of the latter, and by the demagogues who appeared then as the only organs of public opinion.⁹⁴

In other words, Bravo would receive the votes of the state legislatures dominated by the *escoceses*, while the remainder would devolve upon Victoria. The American creoles dominated the majority of state legislatures and, therefore, Victoria was elected the first President of the Republic of Mexico. General Bravo was granted the vice presidency for having placed second in the voting. The Spaniards' advantage would have been best served by the election of Nicolás Bravo.

Frustrated in 1821 by the imperial decree of Iturbide, the *escoceses* had conspired successfully to remove him in 1823 and to achieve his assassination in 1824. Frustrated in 1824 by the election of Victoria, the Scottish party was faced with a difficult choice. Their goals required that they dominate the new government, as they had the Executive Power, or destroy it as they had broken the empire. The choice of *escocés* policy would be based upon their success in acquiring and retaining government posts for their adherents. Any attempt by the Victoria government, or the new congress, to increase the number of American creoles in public office would be met by the

opposition of the escoceses. It was this fact, in addition to the recognizable weakness of the Victoria government, which led the American creoles to organize an effective political force in 1825. The task of the new party would be to oppose any real or suspected attempts by the escocés party to undermine the Victoria government.

Notes

¹Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-46 (2 vols.; México, 1892, 1897), I, 286-88.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶General Vicente Guerrero became the sixth and final member to be appointed on July 2, 1823.

⁷Lobato to Bocanegra, January 23, 1824, México, in Bocanegra, I, 338-43.

⁸Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829 (México, 1830), pp. 8-9.

⁹Evolución política del pueblo mexicano (2nd ed.; México, 1940), p. 206.

¹⁰Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence (Gainesville, 1966), p. 33 ff.

¹¹Ibid., p. 42.

¹²Ibid., pp. 97-106.

¹³Sierra, p. 206.

¹⁴Taylor to Adams, March 29, 1824, Alvarado, in United States. Department of State. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives, No. 183. Despatches from United States Consuls in Veracruz, 1822-1906 [cited hereafter as DUSCV].

¹⁵Zavala, Juicio imparcial, pp. 8-9.

¹⁶Bocanegra, I, 337-38.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., I, 291-94.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Government correspondence concerning attempts to capture Vicente Gómez has been preserved in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 1367, exp. 21 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG]. In this correspondence the Ministry of Relations referred to Gómez as a "bandit."

²¹Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico, dedica a sus patriotas; o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), pp. 20-22.

²²Ibid., p. 22.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Sierra, pp. 207-08.

²⁵Bocanegra, I, 337-38.

²⁶Lobato to Bocanegra, January 23, 1824, México, in ibid., I, 338-43.

²⁷Ibid., I, 292.

²⁸The account below is found in ibid., I, 291-94. Government correspondence concerning the Lobato revolt, as well as movements elsewhere in early 1824, may be found in AGN:RG, leg. 1367, exp. 22.

²⁹Bocanegra, I, 291-94.

³⁰Ibid., I, 294.

³¹Lobato to the Mexican Public, January 29, 1824, México, in ibid., I, 340-43.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Sierra, p. 208.

³⁵Bocanegra, I, 294.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 178.

³⁸Government correspondence concerning these revolts is preserved in AGN:RG, leg. 1367, exps. 1-30. These documents were, at one time, part of a Ramo de tranquilidad pública, which has since been scattered. Parts of the ramo are to be found throughout the AGN:RC.

³⁹Ibid., leg. 1367, exp. 5, fol. 1.

⁴⁰Ibid., fol. 4.

⁴¹Ibid., exp. 6, fol. 10.

⁴²Cuevas, pp. 188-89.

⁴³"Proyecto de los derechos que deben disfrutar los europeos españoles existentes en estos estados por la comisión nombrada al efecto y leído en el soberano congreso el día 14 de este mes." El Sol (February 18, 1824), pp. 994-95.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Nettie Lee Benson, La diputación provincial y el federalismo mexicano (México, 1955), p. 85 ff.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 207.

⁴⁷"Manifiesto que la exma. diputación de San Luis Potosí hace a sus pueblos sobre la tercera garantía," El Sol (March 22, 1824), p. 1128.

⁴⁸Ibid. (March 23, 1824), p. 1132.

⁴⁹Bando, February 15, 1824, AGN:RG, leg. 1367, exp. 5.

⁵⁰The Acta Constituyente and the Constitution of 1824 may be seen in Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano (eds.), Legislación mexicana. Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República (34 vols.; México, 1876-1904), I.

⁵¹The anti-Spanish pamphlets of Lizardi are less well known than his works as editor of the periodical El Pensador Mexicano (1812-14). Among his anti-Spanish writings was a comedy Tragedia del Padre Arenas.

⁵²Villavicencio produced a number of anti-Spanish pamphlets. Among the more important of these were: "O se destierra el coyote o mata nuestras gallinas" (1824), "El hijito del coyote" (1824), "Si no se vienen los ingleses, hemos de ser sus esclavos" (1825), "Plan de desgachupinar si vienen los de la liga" (1826), "Si vienen los godos nos cuelgan a todos" (1826), "Testamento del Padre Arenas" (1827).

⁵³The pamphlet is published verbatim in Paul Radin (ed.), Catalogue of Mexican Pamphlets in the Sutro Collection, 1623-1888 (San Francisco, 1939).

⁵⁴See El Sol (May 8, 1824), pp. 1314-15.

⁵⁵General Echavarri to Editors, ibid. (April 3, 1824).

⁵⁶Ibid. (April 24, 1824), p. 1260.

⁵⁷Mariano Galván Rivera (ed.), Colección de órdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa y soberanos congresos generales de la Nación Mexicana (8 vols.; México, 1829-40), III, 44.

⁵⁸Bocanegra, I, 300-01.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 729.

⁶¹Bocanegra, I, 300-01.

⁶²El Sol (April 26, 1824), p. 1265.

⁶³Ibid. (May 14, 1824), p. 1340.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Bocanegra, I, 347; Cuevas, pp. 184-85.

⁶⁶Bocanegra, I, 347.

⁶⁷Cuevas, pp. 186-87.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 187.

⁶⁹Bocanegra, I, 347.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Cuevas, pp. 186-87.

⁷²Taylor to Adams, July 7, 1824, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

⁷³Cuevas, pp. 186-87.

⁷⁴Taylor to Adams, July 7, 1824, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

⁷⁵Cuevas, pp. 186-87.

⁷⁶Ibid. United States consul Taylor stated that generals Quintanar and Bustamante "surrendered themselves" to General Bravo. Taylor to Adams, July 7, 1824, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸El Sol (June 7, 1824), p. 1436; Taylor to Adams, June 22, 1824, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

⁷⁹Bocanegra, I, 351-56.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Taylor to Adams, August 3, 1824, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Porvenir de México, pp. 203-04.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 217-18.

⁸⁶Alamán, V, 747-48.

⁸⁷Ibid., V, 748.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Cuevas, p. 218.

⁹⁰Alamán, V, 748.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Cuevas, p. 217.

CHAPTER IV

THE YORKINOS AND THE SPANISH QUESTION

The Emergence of the Yorkino Party

In its early nineteenth century Mexican context, freemasonry can be said to have contained revolutionary principles. A member of an *escocés* lodge in Mexico City in the 1820's would have found it difficult to separate the teachings of his lodge from those of nineteenth century liberalism.¹ In 1821, the *escocés* lodges formed the "party of progress" and, in spite of their rather aristocratic composition, they promoted popular education of the Lancastrian school and advocated nineteenth century liberalism. Their ideas were found in the writings of the Englishman Jeremy Bentham,² and of the Spanish economists, Count Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes and Gaspar Melchor Jovellanos, and the Spanish rationalistic Benedictine Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro. Bentham's work found its way onto the papal index for forbidden books in 1826.³

The idea of a republic was not unacceptable to the *escoceses* or, at least, to most of them. But their conception of a republic was rather like the Roman Republic; ordered, centralized, and representing no threat to existing class distinctions. It can be said that the *escocés* party was willing to accept the republic proclaimed in 1824, though it preferred to disregard the notion of "federal." It could

even accept the election of General Guadalupe Victoria, though his family origins were questionable. But the escocés party feared the factions which had a voice in the new republic such as the supporters of Iturbide, who charged the Spaniards with the fall and eventual death of their leader, and the old insurgents, who looked to General Vicente Guerrero to rid Mexico of its aristocracy.

The enemies of the escoceses, now that Agustín Iturbide was dead, were all republicans also, but their conception of the perfect republic was more akin to the "virtuous republic" of the French Jacobins, tempered by a conception of federation which would make the federal government responsive to the demands of the states.

Given these differences in social and political outlook, plus the fact that the escocés party possessed strength through organization, the need was present for a new party which would represent the Jacobin tendency in the American creole segment of society. Since masonry had served as the vehicle which united the liberal party in 1821, it was consonant that a new masonic rite would unite the democratic party in 1825. The fact that the Victoria government and a foreign emissary could play a role in the formation of the new rite, conscious that it would give birth to a more democratic party, demonstrates that the escocés party possessed numerous enemies by 1825. An attempt will be made below to explain who these enemies were and what they hoped to gain through the formation of a new masonic rite in Mexico.

The yorkino party, or the political faction which emerged from the yorkino lodges founded in 1825, viewed as its primary goal the defense of Mexican independence against an external and internal Spanish threat. The yorkino believed that the escocés was ambivalent on the question of independence. Listening only to the will of the Spaniards, they were unqualified to defend the nation against the "lackeys of Ferdinand." The fact that the escocés party was led by General Nicolás Bravo, an old insurgent, gave no assurance to the yorkinos. Bravo's leniency with Spanish prisoners during the recent war was used against him in the yorkino press; it demonstrated that he was a European creole, a man who could be grand master of a lodge representing Spanish interests.

The yorkino party conceived of itself as the defender of the Constitution of 1824, a federalist charter which would de facto cease to be respected by the escocés party should the latter gain control over the government. The escocés attachment to strong central government led them to interpret the constitution in a light favorable to strong government from Mexico City. Escocés senators supported the position that the federal congress could strike down state laws as unconstitutional, a position the yorkinos refused to concede. Arguments of this type divided the congress, since the Constitution of 1824 provided for congressional rather than judicial review, and contributed to the growth of factionalism.

The yorkino party favored the creation of state and local militias, ostensibly for the defense of local rights against the attempted

usurpation of those rights by the federal government in Mexico City. The rapid multiplication of yorkino lodges throughout the countryside demonstrated the popularity of the lodges among local elites who sought to protect their patrimony against the long arm of Mexico City. The states would gain their local militias in 1827, when the yorkinos came to power.

To the yorkinos, the legal and constitutional basis of Mexican society consisted, first, in the state constitutions and the laws passed by the state legislatures; and secondly in the *Acta Constitutiva* and Constitution of 1824, and the laws passed by the federal congress. The plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba were not recognized as a part of the legal framework. The "three guarantees" had no legal basis. Citizenship was vested in the states: constitutional guarantees must stem from the states themselves, not from the federal government, whose function it was merely to comply with the will of the states.

The yorkino party would not yield on the Spanish question. The party was born amid a growing tide of anti-Spanish feeling. The yorkinos made the anti-Spanish cause their own and this fact serves to explain, in large measure, the party's rapid rise to power. The yorkino lodges served the American creole as his party, in opposition to that of the aristocracy of the land. Despising the Spaniard, and all men who owed their positions to the colonial order, he was radical and politically ambitious. In his public pronouncements the yorkino demonstrated his belief in the idea of progress.

The yorkino wanted to possess the political and bureaucratic offices in the government of an independent Mexico. The American creole desired the posts still possessed by Spaniards in 1825. Cuevas in speaking of the birth of the yorkino party, laments that "Here began the problem of greed to live at the expense of the treasury which has troubled us since."⁴ Even Lorenzo Zavala, a founder of the yorkino party, said of the new yorkinos "Each one had his motives . . .," but was careful to protest his own lack of ambition.⁵ The yorkino party would take up the cry sounded by General José María Lobato in January 1824, demanding the removal of the Spaniards from all government posts. The rationale for the purge would be the state of war which existed between Mexico and Spain and the resultant threat which the Spaniards represented to national security.

The secrecy which surrounded the yorkino lodges and the peculiar circumstances connected with their establishment in Mexico has given rise to a prolonged controversy in the historical literature. The question which has attracted the greatest attention and, consequently, generated the polemics, has been the attempt to determine who was "to blame" for the creation of the yorkino lodges. The emphasis on placing guilt stems from a commitment on the part of Mexican historians of the period to an interpretation of the yorkino impact as harmful if not disastrous for Mexico. Unfortunately, the debate over responsibility tends to ignore the popularity of the movement as well as its historical basis, preferring to view it as a conspiracy on the part of a few persons, whose motives were questionable or even immoral.

Even yorkinos of the highest rank, writing in later years, sought to place "guilt" for the founding of their order: Zavala "blamed" José María Alpuche, and Colonel José María Tornel "blamed" Zavala.⁶ But the most frequently cited scapegoat is the United States plenipotentiary, Joel R. Poinsett. With this charge, the plot thickens, taking on the pernicious implications of a foreign-directed conspiracy. This is the charge made by Cuevas, supported by Alamán and Justo Sierra, and reiterated in our own time by José Fuentes Mares.

Let us examine each of these arguments in turn, attempting to assay their value. Lorenzo Zavala was the first to attempt a history of the yorkino movement. His version of the founding and growth of the yorkino lodges was summarized in a pamphlet written in 1830:

In 1825 José María Alpuche, a man known in Mexican affairs for his indomitable and exalted zeal for the federal system, together with Colonel José A. Mejía, the Minister Esteva, the official who was then minister of justice, D. Miguel Ramos Arizpe, and another person, formed the project of creating yorkino lodges in counter-position to the Scottish lodges which worked through certain persons to govern the country. President Victoria entered into the project, and his intimate friend Esteva, secretary of treasury, was the principal chief of the first societies Five lodges were soon formed and, following their establishment, Sr. Poinsett . . . was asked to procure through his friends the grand regulating charters. This and the installation of the Grand Lodge was the only intervention made by this American, so calumniated by the aristocrats and various European agents in Mexico who have played a larger role in the affairs of the country than he.

The formation of the yorkino lodges was, it is true, a very important event. The popular party found itself organized, and, in a short time, overpowered the Scottish party which was composed, in the main, of persons little addicted to the established order of things. The number of [yorkino] lodges rose to 130; they were created in all the states and they opened their doors to the

people, who entered with fanaticism. At first, the meetings (*tenidas*) were only concerned with the ceremonies of the rite, and works of charity and functions; but later they were converted into juntas in which public affairs were discussed. Elections, projects of law, cabinet resolutions, the collocation of government posts, were all treated in the Grand Lodge, where deputies, ministers, senators, generals, ecclesiastics, governors, merchants and all types of persons who had any influence were present. How could a resolution made in such a society be resisted? Victoria himself became frightened, and although he retained a great influence by means of Esteva, Tornel and other of his servants, he knew that this was extremely precarious.⁷

Needless to say, that "other person" mentioned by the author as a founder of the society was Zavala himself.

Emerging from Zavala's description, is a clear picture of the American creole, in opposition to the attempt, real or imagined, of the *escocés* party to alter "the established order of things." The yorkino federalism is more than a political theory; it is his defense against the remnants of the colonial elite, as represented by the *escocés* party, in Mexico City and Veracruz. Moreover, the yorkino party appears as the government party, drawing the president into its own camp and committing the government to the destruction of the *escoceses*, "who were little addicted to the established order of things."

Zavala explained the rapid expansion of the yorkino lodges and the role they played in Mexican society from 1825 through 1829 in his history of the period:

The people, or at least, a great majority, were infatuated with the popular promises of the yorkinos, who had made use of the pretext that seemed most national [which was] that of "finishing the task of removing the yoke imposed by the gachupines," as they themselves explained it. 300,000 creoles wanted to enter into or to occupy the places occupied for 300 years by 70,000 Spaniards, and the yorkino faction, which had this tendency in all its extension, supporting the hopes and the desires of the

mob, was a torrent which could not be resisted by the *escocés* faction, composed of the few Spaniards that had remained, and of the creoles who participated in their wealth and desired a less popular government.⁸

The Yorkist rite in Mexico became a party whose function it was to achieve the goals announced by the American creoles in the late eighteenth century. The goals of the yorkino party led Spaniards and European creoles to charge its members with *empleomanía*, the desire to live at the expense of the treasury.

Juan Suárez y Navarro, writing in 1850, supported Zavala's description of the foundation of the Yorkist rite.⁹ Suárez discounted the importance of the United States plenipotentiary, Poinsett. He felt that writers had been led astray by *escocés* propaganda which had attributed everything to Poinsett in order to disgrace the yorkinos. General Guerrero's expulsion of Poinsett in 1829 was cited by Suárez as certain proof that the diplomat played no important role in yorkino decision-making.

José G. Cuevas, in his analysis of Mexico's ills published in 1853, places a major portion of the blame for the introduction of divisive masonic system into Mexico on Joel Poinsett. Cuevas was convinced that Poinsett's intentions corresponded with the outcome, the destruction of the "principle of union between Spaniards and creoles."¹⁰ Cuevas attributed an uncanny and malicious foresight to Poinsett:

Poinsett was not deceived . . . and did not fail to see that the absurd ideas that were held concerning the system would rob the government of its force, that the weak and tolerant policy adopted by the president would make the war of parties bloody, but that none would triumph completely, and that the expulsion of the

Spaniards would definitively break the ties of the new society with the old and place the republic in the situation of being forced to seek security and progress in an unceasing change of persons and institutions.¹¹

Poinsett's doctrine, which was put into practice by the yorkinos, according to Cuevas, was that " . . . without numbers and popular passions they could not resist the escoceses." Therefore, Cuevas concluded, Poinsett " . . . extended over all the republic agitation and evil principles, fomenting hatred of the Spaniards in order to have them expelled from the territory."¹²

Having divulged his feelings about Poinsett, Cuevas supported Zavala's contention that the Yorkist society served the needs of the administration of Guadalupe Victoria by counterbalancing the influence of the escocés party.¹³ Cuevas evaluated the roles played by the leaders of the movement, revealing his own opinions of their merits:

They disputed among themselves the preponderance which each thought pertained to him, either because of his personal relations with the president such as Esteva, or due to his greater talent and instruction, such as Zavala, or due to his profound knowledge of the business and intrigues of the cabinet such as Arizpe, or due to his name among the old insurgents such as Guerrero, or due to the demagogic audacity that appeared in Alpuche to be a natural instinct and a title more recommendable than that of being one of the founders of the Yorkist rite.¹⁴

Evidence for the argument that the yorkino party organized support for the government in 1825 may be gleaned from the following facts. It was General Guerrero who served as the government's chief keeper of the peace in 1824, while General Bravo, the vice president, was titular leader of the escocés party. President Victoria, according to Lucas Alamán, lacked faith in the loyalty pledge made following his election by the escocés leadership.¹⁵ The government was represented in the

yorkino Grand Lodge by Esteva, Ramos Arizpe and Tornel.

As the yorkino party grew in strength and membership, it attempted to lead the government it supported. This development found the Victoria government helpless to resist. Justo Sierra observed that the lodges soon became "a de facto government that aspired to subjugate Victoria's complacent administration."¹⁶

Lucas Alamán's interpretation of the introduction of the Yorkist Rite is similar to that of Cuevas. Poinsett, once again, took the center of the stage:

Having scarcely arrived in the character of minister plenipotentiary [Poinsett] formed the plan to alter the, to a certain degree, aristocratic character which the government had conserved, with persons of older families, the clergy and the military possessing influence in it, in order to substitute in its place, not a democracy, impossible in a country in which the people do not take part in public things, but the unrestrained aspirantism of some individuals full of ambition and of less respectable connections.¹⁷

Alamán attributed the rapid growth of the new sect to *empleomanía*--the desire to live at the expense of the treasury. There was good reason for the creoles to hope for their efforts to be rewarded:

[With] the Minister of the Treasury Esteva named Grand Master and Ramos Arizpe the Venerable of a lodge, they could count on the help of the government, so much more powerful then, in so much as Esteva had at his disposition all the funds of the foreign loans (*empréstitos*): thus all who aspired to government posts, all the aspirants to the posts of deputies, all those who wished to free themselves from responsibility in the management of public interests or to protect themselves from some persecution, and finally, all lost people who aspired to make a fortune . . . [joined].¹⁸

The *escocés* lodges were deserted by many who, like José Mariano Michelena, let their aspirations interfere with their loyalties.

Though Alamón's attack on the new yorkinos and their motives left no room for either ideas or ideals, these were not absent. Among the new yorkinos were men like Tomás Salgado and Prisciliano Sánchez, autodidacts who had read their French authors well enough to have developed strong convictions about the evil influence of the Church on society. The yorkinos aspired for much more than public office. They were early nationalists, American creoles and literate mestizos, praising things Mexican over things Spanish, José María Mateos recalled that:

. . . the escoceses made their religious ceremonies to the Virgen del Pilar de Zaragoza and to Santiago de Galicia and the yorkinos to the Virgen de Guadalupe.¹⁹

The act symbolized more than a religious preference: the choice of Virgens indicated then, as in the twentieth century, the believer's cultural identification.

Rejecting all evidence which supports the interpretation of Zavala and Tornel concerning the national origins of the yorkino movement, José Fuentes Mares, a twentieth century author, has attempted to sustain charges made earlier against Poinsett.²⁰ Fuentes Mares searched the correspondence of Minister Poinsett for some indication of the conspiracy. He rested his case on evidence contained in a letter from Poinsett to Rufus King, United States Minister to England, in which Poinsett stated, among other things, that:

In order to counteract the fanatical Party in this city, and, if it were possible, to diffuse to a higher degree the liberal principles which have to govern the country, I aided and animated a certain number of respectable persons, men of high rank and consideration, to form a Grand Lodge of Ancient Yorkist Masons. This I did and a numerous group of the brotherhood dined happily in my house.²¹

Poinsett's revelations were relayed to Lord Canning by Rufus King and the British foreign secretary reportedly found Poinsett's role in the affair somewhat questionable. Informed of this, Poinsett hastened to clarify his role: he had responded to a request for assistance in obtaining the charter, he said, and he took advantage of the opportunity to become intimate "with the government and with the Federalist Party."²² Poinsett's admissions confirm no more than Zavala or Mateos had attributed to the emissary while defending him. They do reveal a breach of diplomatic protocol but, Poinsett's admissions cannot be cited as proof of the creation and management of a conspiracy. Poinsett's unabashed support for the American creoles and the yorkino party, during its first years, has provided a scapegoat for critics of the nineteenth century Jacobin movement in Mexico.

The Yorkino Party and the Spaniards, 1825-1826

As General Guadalupe Victoria assumed the presidency on October 10, 1824, American creoles and escoceses alike anticipated the selection of a cabinet favorable to their interests. The escocés party, having failed to acquire the presidency, aspired to dominate the president through the cabinet of the new government. American creoles, recognizing Victoria's election as the result of their efforts, expected their leaders to enter the administration.

Victoria and his advisor Esteva moved cautiously, perhaps fearing the reaction of the escocés party more than the impatience of the American creoles. Victoria waited three months to fill the important

	Minister of Relations	Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs	Minister of War	Minister of Finance	Minister of Relations	
					Appointed	Resigned
I.	Guzmán (O. M.) ^a	De la Llave	Mier y Terán	Esteva	10 Oct. 1824	11 Jan. 1825
II.	Alamán	De la Llave	Pedraza	Esteva	12 Jan. 1825	26 Sept. 1825
III.	Canacho	Arizpe	Pedraza	Esteva	30 Nov. 1825	5 July 1826
IV.	Espinosa de los Monteros (O.M.E.) ^b	Arizpe	Pedraza	Esteva, Salgado, García, Pavón	6 July 1826	7 March 1828
V.	Canedo	Espinosa de los Monteros	Pedraza	Esteva	8 March 1828	25 Jan. 1829

^aOficial mayor

^bOficial mayor encargado

Figure 2. The Five Cabinets of the Victoria Government: 1824-1829.

post of minister of relations. Esteva, who was acceptable to the American creoles, was secure in the treasury ministry. But to the profound disappointment of the American creoles, Victoria seemed content to allow Pablo de la Llave and Manuel de Mier y Terán to continue in the ministries of justice and war. Had Victoria selected an American creole to fill the ministry of relations, the government would have risked rebellion by the escoceses. The selection of an escocés might have unleashed unrest in the streets of the capital and in the provinces. Faced with undesirable alternatives, the new government summoned Lucas Alamán to the ministry in January 1825. A European creole monarchist of proven talent, Alamán would give needed assurance to the escoceses. But Alamán could provide no guarantee of continued support from the American creoles. Popular leaders such as Miguel Ramos Arizpe and Manuel Gómez Farfás could not work with the aristocratic Alamán.

The ministry of justice remained under De la Llave, but the escocés Colonel Mier y Terán was replaced by the escocés General Gómez Pedraza in the ministry of war. This change would prove to be an important one. Mier y Terán was an ideal candidate, from the escocés point of view. His reputation as an able soldier, his active role in the first campaigns for independence, and his determination to defend the Spaniards, had qualified Mier y Terán for the post under the Executive Power.²³ But the old insurgents had raised questions about his conduct during the final years of the struggle. Mier y Terán was unacceptable to the American creoles in 1824.

The qualifications of Gómez Pedraza were of a different order. Though he was an *escocés*, General Pedraza had been an Iturbidist, loyal to the very end of the empire. Pedraza had refrained from participation in the Iturbidist movements of 1824, but his views on the Spanish question were suspected by the *escoceses*. During the election of 1824, Pedraza, as governor of Puebla, had obstructed General Gregorio Arana's passage to the fortress of Perote.²⁴ General Arana, an *escocés* and a Spaniard, had been ordered to Perote by the Executive Power. Pedraza's refusal was interpreted as a personal vendetta against Arana who had participated in the removal of Iturbide. As a result of his actions, Pedraza was prevented from competing against General Bravo in the presidential election. The governor's pending prosecution had made him ineligible.²⁵ The *escoceses* would soon drive him from their brotherhood. Pedraza was a compromise candidate for minister of war. His talent and political acumen would enable him to retain his post in four consecutive cabinets, during the years 1825-1828.

Alamán and De la Llave could not support the views of the American creoles in the manner of Pedraza and Esteva. The Alamán cabinet survived until September 26, 1825, at which time the minister of finance, Esteva and the federalist congressional leader, Ramos Arizpe, were organizing the *yorkino* lodges of Mexico City.

The new administration found, like the Executive Power before it, that the road to peace and tranquility in the new republic was

made more difficult by the Spanish question. This vexing problem invariably cropped up in local disputes. In February 1825, disagreement between Campeche and Mérida, Yucatán posed a new crisis. The igniting spark in Yucatán had been the passage in Campeche of a measure which called for 1) Yucatán to remain united to Mexico under the federal constitution adopted in the republic, 2) the continuation of the war with Spain, and 3) the separation of the Spaniards from their government posts.²⁶ The measure was another in a series of attempts by Campeche authorities to wrest control of Yucatán affairs from Mérida. General Antonio López de Santa Anna, commanding general of Yucatán, departed Mérida for Campeche to restore his authority over the port. The conflict involved the separatist tendency of Yucatán's Spanish merchants who wished to avoid the interruption of their trade with Cuba. The Spaniard's strength lay in Mérida, the capital of the province. The American creoles of Campeche supported by the local garrison, were repeating their attempt of 1824. The Victoria government soon:

. . . lost all confidence in General Santaana, and wishing to remove him from Yucatán, determined to do it a lo militar. With this view they appointed Genl. Ignacio Mora of Mexico, military governor of Yucatán, putting under his command Regiment no. 9, consisting of more than 1,000 men, and at the same time ordering an embargo on all vessels then in this port . . .²⁷

The expedition was forced to depart from Alvarado because the Spanish controlled the port of Veracruz. Departure was delayed by the arrival of a Spanish squadron off San Juan de Ulúa.²⁸ The Yucatán example serves to demonstrate the disruptive effect of the Spanish question on the Victoria government.

The continued hostility of San Juan de Ulúa was a serious problem. Commerce was severely limited by the threat from the castle against all who traded with Mexico. This forced the transfer of commerce to Alvarado, an inadequate and inconvenient port. It was in the interest of the Victoria government to remove the Spanish forces from the castle but, lacking a navy, the Mexicans were powerless to do so.

A new influx of Spaniards seems to have begun in 1825 through the ports of the east coast. United States consul Taylor reported the trend to his government in June:

. . . a number of Spaniards whose political principles are well known to be hostile to the independence of this country have recently arrived here from the United States, principally from New York, where it would appear they carried long enough to file declarations of their intentions to become citizens of the United States. Upon the strength of their declarations or through other channels they procured . . . papers as citizens of the United States. Several, thus provided, have arrived here . . . One of these passports was from the Dept. of State . . . The bearer of it was recognized here to have been a colonel in the Spanish army . . . The authorities here grumble not a little of the facility with which their enemies obtain papers in the United States . . .²⁹

The problems of Spaniards bearing United States passports demanding entry at Mexican ports would continue to vex Mexican authorities into the 1830's. Lucas Alamán, as minister of relations, was not opposed to Spanish entry into Mexico. The facility with which Spaniards could obtain United States passports, especially in New Orleans, and the decision of ministers of European creole sentiments to tolerate this subterfuge, made it possible for some Spaniards to enter Mexico.

The Victoria government, even during the Alamán cabinet, was not adverse to expelling Spaniards who were outspoken in their disapproval of Mexican independence. For example, "the celebrated Spaniard Spinola,"

who edited the Tampico periodical El Filántropo, was exiled to New Orleans in September, 1825, for having published the papal encyclical condemning the revolts against Spain.³⁰ Spinola was commonly believed to be an agent of Ferdinand VII. He was perhaps typical of the Spaniards who entered Mexico after the proclamation of Iguala. Spinola had been exiled to the Canary Islands by the Spanish constitutional government in 1823.³¹

Despite the changes which had occurred in Mexico, Spaniards desired to enter the country in 1825. American creoles considered the tendency ill-advised in view of the state of war which existed between Spain and Mexico. This was the rock on which the Alamán cabinet foundered. Opposition to Alamán had mounted since January, due to his stand on the Spanish question and to certain "dispositions which he had dictated concerning passports issued to foreigners to come to the republic."³² The attack on Alamán was led in the congress by Deputy Juan de Dios Cañedo, an American creole and heir to the wealthy mayorazgo de Cañedo³³ of Guadalajara.

The second cabinet of the Victoria government was formed in November, headed by Sebastián Camacho of Jalapa. The post of minister of justice was entrusted to Miguel Ramos Arizpe while Pedraza and Esteva retained the ministries of war and treasury respectively. Camacho published a periodical in Jalapa, El Oriente, which was frequently quoted in El Sol, the escocés periodical of Mexico City. As a liberal, Camacho would not oppose Ramos Arizpe's attempt to bring the Church under an effective state control. Sebastián Camacho was acceptable

to the escocés party. The yorkino party, which was in formation at the time of the cabinet change, would succeed in forcing Camacho from the cabinet in July, 1826.

The position of the Victoria government was strengthened in November, 1825, by the long-awaited surrender of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz bay.³⁴ The capitulation of the castle on November 16 facilitated the reopening of the port of Veracruz, an event which led the merchants of Mexico to anticipate better days ahead. A second result of the surrender was a reduction of the Spanish influence in the city and state of Veracruz. The port of Veracruz had served the Spaniards resident in Mexico, surreptitiously, as a link with Havana. All correspondence passing through the port would now be watched by the Mexican government. Numerous letters destined for Havana, written by Spaniards resident in Mexico, were subsequently captured.³⁵ The Spanish troops who had held the fort were to be shipped to Havana as soon as they had sufficiently recovered from their deprivations to make the trip.³⁶

With the approach of the year 1826, the yorkino party was organizing its lodges or "clubs" across the nation. In every state, American creoles were adding their names to the rolls of the discontented. Escocés lodges were being deserted by their creole membership. "Almost without thinking it," Cuevas observed, "we confessed that without persecutions and without expulsion it was impossible that independence could be assured."³⁷ The escocés influence prevailed throughout 1826

In Mexico and Veracruz, "the states that were most influential then."³⁸ The yorkino party organized in the remaining states "under the protection of their governors and legislatures,"³⁹ just as the party had organized in Mexico City under the protection of President Victoria. In Jalisco, the center of Mexican federalism, Governor Prisciliano Sánchez launched an attack on the Church which included the publication of "irreligious" pamphlets.⁴⁰

The Spaniards of Mexico united behind the escocés party in 1826, fearing the apparent progress and belligerent pronouncements of their adversaries.⁴¹ Prominent persons in the military had committed themselves to the defense of the Spaniards. General Manuel Mier y Terán, former minister of war; General Miguel Barragán, governor of Veracruz; General Melchor Múzquiz, governor of Mexico; Commanding General José Morán, jefe del estado mayor; and General Nicolás Bravo, vice president of the republic, formed, as Cuevas noted, "a strong counterweight to Guerrero, Ramos Arizpe, Zavala, and Gómez Pedraza."⁴² Minister of War Pedraza was considered a member of the anti-Spanish camp in 1826.

The congress was not anti-Spanish in 1826, though it included some members who were inclined toward the opinions of the ardent federalist José María Alpuche. Congress decreed measures which were generally considered appropriate in light of the state of war which still existed between Spain and Mexico. A measure forbidding entry to Spaniards was passed on April 25.⁴³ The measure was not an absolute denial, however, since article two seemed to deny the prohibition:

Spaniards or subjects of the Spanish government who wish to come to the republic may enter only with a passport from the government, acquired by forwarding an appeal from their place of residence.⁴⁴

Requests would be accepted beginning July 25, according to article three. Sebastián Camacho signed the decree into law, indicating that his views did not differ from those of Alamán and the previous cabinet. Needless to say, the American creoles in congress considered the measure inadequate.

The American creoles achieved a victory of their own in the next measure passed by congress. The decree of May 2, abolished forever the titles of conde, marqués, caballero, "and all those of a similar nature, whatever may be their origin."⁴⁵ An additional clause provided that:

The government shall dispose that the owners of buildings, coaches and other furnishing used in public destroy all coats of arms and other signs that recall the old dependence and connection of this America with Spain.

In the senate, José María Alpuche introduced a proposal which would have empowered the government to deny government positions to Spaniards and to remove Spaniards from government posts while a state of war existed with Spain.⁴⁶ Alpuche's proposal was evaded by the senate majority who voted to forward it to the senate committee on relations, where it would remain until early 1827. The yorkinos were winning votes in congress and, consequently, becoming more vocal on the floor of both the chamber of deputies and the senate.

In July, 1826, Sebastián Camacho resigned under yorkino pressure ostensibly to undertake a diplomatic mission to London. The negotiations for a trade agreement with Great Britain were drawing to a close

and the Victoria government proposed to send Sebastián Camacho to London to conclude the treaty. Camacho's resignation was not popular among the escoceses, who had supported him as minister of relations. His replacement threatened the escocés party which now lost its voice in the Victoria government.

The new minister of relations, Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros, was particularly well suited to head a cabinet composed of Ramos Arizpe, Gómez Pedraza and Esteva. Pedraza had renounced his escocés membership in 1826, without joining the yorkino lodges. Esteva and Ramos Arizpe were founding members of the Yorkist masonic lodges. Espinosa was not a mason, and his views were similar to those of Pedraza.⁴⁷ Events would demonstrate that Espinosa de los Monteros, like Pedraza, was, in inclination, a moderate yorkino without belonging to that branch of masonry. The new cabinet was responsive to the programs and plans of the American creoles. The Victoria government, as reflected in its cabinet, had now almost completed its evolution from an initially European creole-Spanish orientation to that of the American creole.

The yorkinos mounted an impressive editorial campaign in late 1826, designed to attract the literate sector of society to the American creole camp. Pamphleteers were actively urging the necessity of ridding Mexico of the Spaniards, and coining new verbs such as desqachupinar and descoyotar to describe the process.⁴⁸ Villavicencio penned at least three pamphlets in 1826 to convince American creoles that Iturbide, who had been betrayed by the Spaniards, was not responsible for the errors committed under his government: the fault

rested with his advisors.⁴⁹ Only in Veracruz was the Spaniard seemingly immune from attack in 1826: "There is evidently a feeling of hostility in this place towards all foreigners, the Spaniards excepted, who continue to exercise a great deal of influence."⁵⁰

The appearance in November, 1826, of the Correo de la Federación in Mexico City, signaled the completion of the yorkino party as a new force in the capital. The aim of the party in late 1826 was to capture federal and state offices in the December elections. The attitude of the yorkino party was moderate at the time of its inception, as may be seen in the statement of the editors on November 1, in its first issue. The editors acknowledged the fact that the Spanish question was the crucial issue in the minds of the yorkinos. The Correo lamented the fact that the Spaniards were viewed as unreconcilable enemies by the people, without distinguishing between those who have embraced independence in good faith and those who have not. The editors proposed to distinguish between three distinct groups of Spaniards who merited public vigilance. The people should focus their attention on the Spanish clergy first because the ecclesiastics see their privileges threatened by the republic and are clamoring against the government.⁵¹

A second group of Spaniards were said to be working silently to discredit the government, hoping to prevent its consolidation. These Spaniards were the agents of Ferdinand VII. A third group actually favored the existing government and institutions and, consequently, should not be molested. They were the unfortunate Spaniards

who were obliged to leave Spain in order to escape death or imprisonment at the hands of the king. The editors reasoned that the nation did not desire the proscription of the Spaniards. What the nation desired was simply that the Spaniards refrain from all interference in public affairs.⁵²

The editors concluded their recommendations in the first issue of the Correo by asserting that the government should pursue a policy of complete freedom of the press respecting the pamphleteers.⁵³ The Correo would harden its stand on the Spanish question following the revelation of the Arenas conspiracy in January 1827. The attack would ultimately be expanded beyond the Spanish clergy to include all Spaniards who had not played a positive role in the independence movement of 1821.

There is evidence to indicate that, despite the increasing volume of the anti-Spanish campaign, individual Spaniards were still investing in the dislocated Mexican economy. This was particularly true in the underdeveloped iron industry. In 1826 the Spaniard José Anaya constructed an iron foundry in Tuxpan, which he operated successfully until the expulsion of Spaniards was declared in December, 1827.⁵⁴ The Spaniard Manuel Gutiérrez acquired the iron foundry of Coalcomán in 1827, even while the expulsion law was debated in congress.⁵⁵

Events in the states themselves must have had a greater impact on the Spaniard's daily affairs than did the debate in Mexico City. The campaign of local disturbances designed to provoke government

action on the Spanish question which commenced in November, 1826, was an early indication of things to come. Impatient American creoles in the state capitals created local movements to promote the removal of Spaniards from their posts and, often, their expulsion from the state. The trend was attributed, in Mexico City, to the approaching congressional election and to the formation of the yorkino party. One such disturbance, in Villahermosa, Tabasco, was reported by Governor Marcelino Margalli on November 21.⁵⁶ A certain Manuel Eseta had organized a disturbance demanding that Governor Margalli expel the Spaniards from Tabasco on the grounds that the nation had never agreed to allow them to continue in their government posts.⁵⁷ With his report, Margalli forwarded 32 pasquines (wall posters) which had recently appeared in public places. The posters threatened all "Europeans" who failed to depart from Tabasco with emasculation or even the hangman's noose.

This state of unrest existed in some areas while the congressional elections of December were being conducted. The victory of the yorkinos was assured, Cuevas contends, because Lorenzo Zavala, "the most able and active supporter of the yorkinos," had prepared matters in all the states, and particularly in Mexico.⁵⁸ Whether one can agree with Cuevas' attribution of such omnipresence to Zavala, there can be little doubt that the electoral victory was impressive.⁵⁹ In the State of Mexico, General Melchor Múzquiz was forced to concede the governorship to Lorenzo Zavala. The yorkinos gained control of the state legislature of Mexico as well. Governorships and seats in the

chamber of deputies and senate were all being contested, and the yorkinos seized the majority of these. In addition, the majority of seats in the federal congress now belonged to the yorkinos.⁶⁰

The political strength of the escoceses was reduced to a few principal cities, and to the state of Veracruz.⁶¹ Yorkinos were found "in even the smallest villages," denouncing the escoceses as "Borbonists."⁶² The American creoles would now place their demands before the government. As the major support of the Victoria administration, they were in a position to achieve their legislative goals. The first of these would be the removal of the Spaniards from all government posts.

Notes

¹Charles A. Hale, "José María Luis Mora and the Structure of Mexican Liberalism," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV (May, 1965), 196-227; Jesús Reyes Heróles, El liberalismo mexicano (3 vols.; Mexico, 1957, 1958, 1962), I.

²Jeremías Bentham, Tratados de legislación civil y penal, according to Félix Navarrete, La masonería en la historia y en las leyes de México (México, 1957), p. 5.

³Ibid.

⁴Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 258.

⁵Lorenzo Zavala, Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829 (México, 1830), p. 10.

⁶Ibid.; José María Tornel, Breve reseña histórica de los acontecimientos más notables de la Nación Mexicana (México, 1852), p. 100.

⁷Lorenzo Zavala, Juicio imparcial, pp. 10-11.

⁸Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), II, 33.

⁹Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; México, 1850-51), I, 80.

¹⁰Porvenir de México, p. 235.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 237.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Historia de México (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 760.

¹⁶Evolución política del pueblo mexicano (2nd ed.; México, 1940), pp. 212-13.

¹⁷Historia de México, V, 760.

¹⁸Ibid., V, 761-62.

¹⁹Historia de la masonería en México desde 1806 hasta 1884 (2 vols.; México, 1884), I, 30-31.

²⁰Poinsett, historia de una gran intriga (México, 1951). Fuentes Mares was used by Navarrete, who accepted the argument of the former.

²¹Ibid., pp. 125-126.

²²Ibid., pp. 126-27.

²³Cuevas, p. 232.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., p. 233.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 238-39.

²⁷Taylor to Adams, February 25, 1825, Alvarado, in United States, Department of State. File Microcopies of Records in the National Archives. No. 183. Despatches from United States Consuls in Veracruz, 1822-1906 [cited hereafter as DUSCV].

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Taylor to Adams, June 15, 1825, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

³⁰"Expulsión del editor de la encíclica del Papa," Gaceta Diaria de México, I (September 24, 1825), I.

³¹Ibid.

³²Cuevas, p. 247.

³³A mayorazgo was an entailed estate which, by promogeniture, inharited to the first-born son. The mayorazgo de Canedo was one of the oldest in Mexico, dating from the sixteenth century.

³⁴For the terms of the surrender, see José María Bocanegra, Memoria para la historia de México independiente, 1822-46 (2 vols.; Mexico, 1892, 1897), I, 570-73.

³⁵An abstract of this captured correspondence was published in Suárez y Navarro, I, 414-24.

³⁶Taylor to Adams, November 18, 1825, Alvarado, in DUSCV.

³⁷Cuevas, p. 252.

³⁸ibid.

³⁹ibid.

⁴⁰ibid.

⁴¹ibid., p. 253.

⁴²ibid.

⁴³Mariano Galván Rivera (ed.), Colección de órdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa y soberanos congresos generales de la Nación Mexicana (8 vols.; México, 1829-40), IV, 26.

⁴⁴ibid.

⁴⁵ibid., IV, 27.

⁴⁶México. Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo de gobernación, leg. 66, exp. 14 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG].

⁴⁷Alamán, V, 763-64; Suárez y Navarro, I, 79.

⁴⁸For example, see Pablo Villavicencio, "Plan de desgachupinar si vienen los de la liga," in Luis Chávez Orozco (ed.), Colección de documentos para la historia del comercio exterior de México. Segunda serie, Vol. II. El comercio exterior y la expulsión de los españoles, pp. 95-105; also published in Paul Radin (ed.), Catalogue of Mexican Pamphlets in the Sutro Collection, 1623-1888 (San Francisco, 1939), pp. 468-73.

⁴⁹"Muerto que se le aparece al Señor Provisor de México" (1826), "El Payo del Rosario a la grata memoria de Iturbide" (which appeared in two parts during 1826), listed in ibid.

⁵⁰Taylor to Adams, June 21, 1826, Veracruz, in DUSCV.

⁵¹"Política Interior," Correo de la Federación, I (November 1, 1826), 2-3.

⁵²ibid.

⁵³ibid.

⁵⁴Modesto Bargalló, La minería y la metalurgia en la América española durante la época colonial (México, 1955), p. 355.

⁵⁵ibid.

⁵⁶Governor Margall to Minister of Relations, November 21, 1826, Villahermosa, in AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 5, fol. 34.

⁵⁷Eseta to los Sindicatos del Ayuntamiento de Villahermosa, undated, in ibid., fols. 71-72.

⁵⁸Cuevas, pp. 260-61.

⁵⁹For an analysis of the yorkino rise to power see "Política Interior," Correo, VIII (December 29, 1828), 2-3; Cuevas, pp. 260-61; Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico, dedica a sus compatriotas; o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), p. 34.

⁶⁰ibid.

⁶¹Cuevas, p. 263.

⁶²ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE SPANIARDS AND THE ARENAS CONSPIRACY

The Conspiracy of January 1827

Mexican historians have voiced different opinions concerning the nature and authenticity of the so-called Arenas conspiracy which came to light in Mexico City on January 19, 1827. Agreement in general, however, on the seriousness of the damage done to the cause of the peninsular Spaniards by the discovery of a Spanish-inspired plot against Mexican independence and by the arrest of Spaniards implicated in the conspiracy. Disclosure of the Arenas affair and the publicity surrounding the trial of the conspirators reenforced public suspicion of the Spaniards and their supporters and defenders in Mexico.

Numerous writers, following the interpretation of Lucas Alamán, have denied the seriousness of the threat implicit in the conspiracy, while hesitating to deny the authenticity of the conspiracy itself.¹ Alamán considered the Arenas plot "an act of dementedness." Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza and the Yorkist lodges exaggerated its importance in order to discredit the escocés lodges who defended the Spaniards. The escoceses denied the existence of a plot, contributing thereby to their own disgrace and ceding the advantage to the Yorkists. Minister of Justice Miguel Ramos Arizpe made certain, according to Alamán, that the prisoners "went to the gallows."

Juan Suárez y Navarro, writing in 1850, accepted the Arenas plot as a conspiracy guided by the Scottish lodges.² Following the arrest of Padre Joaquín Arenas, Suárez asserts, the Mexican public saw in every Spaniard an accomplice of the conspirators. Rumors circulated and, confronted with accusations, the escocés press failed to speak rationally. El Sol at first denied the existence of the plot, arguing that it was a yorkino hoax contrived to disgrace the escoceses. El Sol eventually resorted to accusations against the United States plenipotentiary, Joel R. Poinsett, who was said to have encouraged Arenas in order to disgrace the escoceses. Suárez could not accept the malevolent role commonly attributed to Poinsett by conservatives in the 1820's. The escoceses conspired in January, 1827, according to Suárez, because the government, under the influence of Minister of War Pedraza, was granting aid and protection to the yorkino lodges.

Manuel Gómez Pedraza answered his accusers from his New Orleans exile in 1830.³ Pedraza asserted that the Arenas affair had important ramifications, and represented a real threat to Mexican independence. The "parties" had taken up the matter, distorting and negating the conspiracy to the extent that the government was required to commission a lawyer to draw up extracts of the cases which could be distributed to the public. As minister of war, Pedraza had ordered the commandant general to make the records of the trials available to those who wished to compare them with the extracts. Lic. José María Bocanegra was given the task of forming the extracts.

Bocanegra then became the best informed reporter of the Arenas conspiracy.⁴ In 1862 Bocanegra wrote the account of the Arenas affair, which appeared in his Memoria, in order to defend himself and those who sat in judgment of General Gregorio Arana from the charge of judicial homicide which Lorenzo Zavala had made in 1831.⁵ Bocanegra was assessor in the Arana case, which was the most controversial of the judicial proceedings instituted in connection with the Arenas conspiracy.⁶

Bocanegra's version of the conspiracy, which was based upon his study of the evidence presented at the trials, supported the government's case. In other words, Bocanegra's interpretation was a defense of Pedraza's position. Suárez y Navarro and José María Tornel saw the case materials which had been turned over to Bocanegra, a fact which may account for their acceptance of the authenticity of the conspiracy. But only Bocanegra and Pedraza, whose reputation was at stake, accepted unquestioningly the guilt of the Spanish generals Arana, Negrete and Echavarri. According to Bocanegra, the threat was as real as the yorkinos and the government insisted. The agents who were captured were only instruments of a more important and well-placed leadership, of whom only the generals Arana, Negrete, and Echavarri were uncovered. The yorkino position on the Arenas conspiracy was supported, then, not by the yorkino Zavala, but by Bocanegra and Pedraza.

The events surrounding the discovery of the Arenas affair were reported by the government as follows. On January 18, 1827, a

Spanish regular of the Dieguino order, Joaquín Arenas, attempted to suborn the commanding general of the State of Mexico, Ignacio Mora, hoping to enlist the general in a revolt for the restoration of Spanish sovereignty over New Spain.⁷

The banner of revolt was to be raised on Saturday, January 20, only two days hence. General Mora described the affair to Colonel José Antonio Facio on the following day.⁸ Friar Arenas had wished to ascertain General Mora's position regarding the coming revolt. Mora was shown a copy of the plan consisting of eighteen articles which provided the grito for the movement: "Viva Espana, viva la religión de Jesucristo!"⁹

The plan called for the arrest of General Vicente Guerrero as well as the president, should he refuse to embrace the cause, while extending protection to General Nicolás Bravo in consideration of his leniency toward Spanish prisoners during the recent civil war.¹⁰ All Spaniards were to be restored to their government posts. Representatives of foreign governments and foreign merchants residing in Mexico were to remain unmolested pending further notification from Madrid. All persons who joined the movement would be amply rewarded following the restoration of the rule of Ferdinand VII in New Spain.¹¹

General Mora requested information concerning "what class of persons could be counted upon for this operation; what funds and what assurances."¹² Friar Arenas replied as follows, according to Mora:

. . . there was a royal commissioner near the capital who was fully authorized by the king to concede amnesties, concessions (gracias), etc., and that if I decided favorably, he would clear

away all doubts, and I would see the matter from its true point of view. That my decision would be kept secret, that no one would discover it, and that shortly I would be put in touch with the royal commissioner. That all of the Ecclesiastical cabildos could be counted upon, as well as the individual ecclesiastics, with all the people (pueblos), and finally with the commanding general of Puebla, with that bishop [of Puebla] and the remaining persons of influence.¹³

General Mora requested time to consider the matter and the friar replied that there was little time, since the grito was scheduled for January 28. Mora then asked Arenas to return on the following day to receive the general's final decision. Arenas accepted Mora's proposal, cautioning the general that:

. . . if, as he hoped, I did not reveal the secret . . . I had nothing to fear because my person was quite safe; but if on the contrary, I made use of it, he would be sent to the gallows, which would not halt the revolution, and I would be assassinated.¹⁴

General Mora relayed this information to the president in person. President Victoria thought it wise to induce the friar to repeat his performance on the following day while witnesses listened in hiding. The arrangement was carried out with Deputy José María Tornel, Senator Francisco Molinos del Campo and Lt. Col. Ignacio de la Garza Falcón and two aides,¹⁵ in an adjoining room. Friar Arenas appeared, verbally reproduced the nature of his mission, and was overheard by the witnesses. In this way Deputy Tornel, a yorkino, and Senator Molinos, an escocés, learned of the conspiracy. The trap was evidently designed to forestall party rivalry. The friar repeated his earlier statements before his accusers and was conducted to prison. His cell in the house of Dieguinos was searched, producing "pistols, a dagger and papers."¹⁶

Bocanegra reported that the government collected information in the Federal District and in the States of Puebla and Oaxaca which revealed the extent of the revolutionary plan's effectiveness and provided the necessary details for the government's case against the conspirators.¹⁷ Mexican historians have named fourteen individuals arrested between January 19 and March 22 who were said to be implicated in the conspiracy, but the total number was much higher.¹⁸ When the names of the conspirators listed in the documents located in the Ramo de expulsión were added by this investigator to those noted in the histories of the period, the lists which may be seen below resulted.¹⁹

Both Suárez y Navarro and Tornel agreed with Bocanegra's judgment that the cases were based upon genuine evidence which implicated the defendants in a pro-Spanish conspiracy.²⁰ An explanation must be found, then, for the furor created in the Mexican periodicals of 1827. Why was public opinion so divided concerning the reality of the conspiracy and the government's case against the conspirators? Several explanations have been offered to this question. Suárez y Navarro attributed the public scepticism to the "spirit of party" which was responsible for rumors circulated against Minister of War Pedraza, whose function it was to prosecute conspirators. "There were those," Suárez concluded, "who had reason to lead public opinion astray by denying the existence of a conspiracy."²¹ Suárez's comment indicates that he believed the conspirators to be members of the *escocés* party. The public denial of the conspiracy was sounded by

El Sol, the periodical voice in Mexico City of the escoceses. The Jacobin tendency was reflected in the Correo de la Federación, spokesman for the Grand Lodge of the Yorkist Rite in Mexico City. The Correo demanded action against the conspirators, whom it identified with the Spanish community, and criticized the government's failure to produce quick results.²² Mexican pamphleteers were active as well, depicting the Spaniards as potentially subversive if not conspiratorial by birth.²³

The judgment of José María Tornel reflects his position as a leader of the yorkinos. From July 1827, Tornel edited El Amigo del Pueblo, a weekly periodical of Mexico City which publicized the need for the expulsion of the Spaniards. Tornel was vigilante of the "India Azteca" yorkino lodge which met in the castle of Chapultepec.²⁴ He was a sponsor and defender of legislation designed to remove the Spaniards from government posts and, soon after, to expel them from Mexico. Tornel's opinion of the Arenas affair in 1827 was that of his lodge.²⁵ But evidence for the existence of a significant conspiracy does not depend wholly on the testimony of interested parties.

Bocanegra possessed documents, which he published, that demonstrated, in his opinion, the validity of the conspiracy.²⁶ First, Bocanegra cited an article published in a Cuban periodical concerning the failure of certain attempts by "former governmental employees in New Spain" to restore Spanish rule:

. . . they did not suspend for even a moment their attempts to reestablish the legitimate government of their king, and more

Name	Residence	Date of Arrest Execution	
Fr. Joaquín Arenas ^a	D.F. (Dieguino)	19 Jan. '27	2 June '27
General de Brigada Gregorio Arana ^a	D.F.	4 Feb. '27	5 Jan. '28
Manuel Segura	D.F.	24 Feb. '27	7 Apr. '27
Fr. Francisco Martínez ^a	D.F.	15 Mar. '27	29 Mar. '28
Fr. Rafael Torres ^a	Puebla (Franciscano)	--	--
Presbítero Manuel Hidalgo	Puebla	--	--
Manuel David ^a	Puebla	--	Exiled, ^b April '31
Ramón López de Castro	Puebla	--	--
Santiago Prado	Puebla	--	--
Juan Ortet	Puebla	--	--
Juan González	Puebla	--	--
Policarpo Puebla y García	Puebla	--	Exiled, ^b April '31
General de División Pedro Celestino Negrete ^a	D.F.	22 Mar. '27	Exiled, ^c Dec. '28
General de División José Antonio Echavarri ^a	D.F.	22 Mar. '27	Exiled, ^c Dec. '28
Fr. Domingo de San José	Oaxaca (Carmelita)	--	Dec. '27
Fr. Mateo Morán	Oaxaca (Carmelita)	--	Dec. '27

^aIndicates a person known to have been born in Spain

^bMinister of Relations to Governor of Puebla, Mexico City, April 19, 1831, AGN:RE, leg. 23, Vol. 60, exp. 110, fol. 23.

^cGovernor Haro to Minister of Relations, Puebla, December 9, 1828, AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 54, fol. 66.

Sources: Juan Suárez y Navarro, Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 394-95; Jaime Delgado, España y México en el Siglo XIX, I, 372.

Figure 3. The Conspirators of 1827 Reported in Published Sources.

Source A

Subte. Antonio Valdovi*
 Justo González Escalante*
 Felipe Movellan*
 Toribio Rubio*
 Fr. Martín Unda
 José Rieza*
 Manuel Resquera*
 Gaspar González*
 José Arrequi
 Pedro Arguinoso*
 Vicente Huidobro
 Antonio Rueda
 José María Carriaga*
 Vicente Garay*
 José Manuel Palacio*
 Manuel Vitorero
 Miguel Gongiti*
 Pedro del Valle*
 Miguel Valladares
 Gabriel Morán
 Ysidro Alejandro Colen
 Juan Robles

Source B

Presbítero Martín Unda*
 Fr. Antonio de San Joaquín* (Agustino)
 Fr. Manuel Méndez*
 José Arrevui
 José Osante*
 Antonio Puseda*
 Manuel Garay*
 Vicente Hisidrovo* [sic]

Source C

José Viance
 Fr. Francisco Antonio Arenas (Dieguino)
 Fr. Manuel Muñoz (Dominicano)
 Feliciano Arroyo
 Francisco Ronduelas
 Francisco Posadas

Source D

Manuel David*
 Juan Bautista Soleta*
 Policarpo Puebla*

*Indicates a person known to have been born in Spain.

Sources: AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 54

"A" Fol. 120: List of prisoners, sent by Pedraza to Cañedo, June 21, 1828.

"B" Fols. 105-106: List of prisoners, sent by the Commanding General of Mexico State to the Governor of the Federal District, June 19, 1828.

"C" Fol. 9: List of prisoners freed on bond, sent by the Commanding General of Mexico State to the Governor of the Federal District, June 21, 1828.

AGN:RE, leg. 23, Vol. 60, exp. 110, fol. 23.

"D" List of prisoners at Puebla being exiled, sent by the Minister of Relations to the Governor of Puebla, April 19, 1831.

Figure 4. Thirty-Nine Conspirators of January 1827 Whose Trials Had Not Been Completed by June 1828.

than once they were on the verge of accomplishing it during the years 24 and 26, had they not lacked certain proffered aid, the lack of which cost the lives of many good Spaniards, who expired on the scaffold.²⁷

The term "former government employees" could have meant creoles, but probably meant Spaniards. Military personnel may have been intended in the meaning of the term. More intriguing than this, however, was the implication that, in 1824 and 1826, prominent persons in Mexico failed to provide the assistance expected of them for the cause of Ferdinand VII.

Bocanegra possessed a second document which supported his belief in a Spanish conspiracy. This was a written statement by the Archbishop of Mexico, Dr. Manuel Posada y Garduno, concerning a visit to New Orleans which the prelate had made in 1834.²⁸ Archbishop Posada reported having seen the report which the royal commissioner made to Madrid concerning the attempted revolution of January 1827. He noted that the royal commissioner was Eugenio Aviraneta, a Spaniard who had lived for some time in Veracruz.²⁹ Bocanegra accepted Archbishop Posada's observations as another proof of the conspiracy. Aviraneta's identification as the royal commissioner was accepted also by Bocanegra. Aviraneta had returned to Mexico in August, 1829, as the political leader of the Spanish invasion forces commanded by General Isidro Barradas.³⁰

Luis G. Cuevas, writing in 1854, was less certain than Bocanegra concerning the identity of the royal commissioner. Cuevas noted that, though Aviraneta had generally been identified as the royal commissioner in the past, the belief that there had actually been a royal commissioner was becoming discredited by 1850.³¹ Few still believed that Spain could have trusted such a task to a small group of priests and persons so ill-

placed in Mexican society. But Bocanegra, who had read and condensed the "nearly 5,000 folios" which constituted the cases against the conspirators, could not doubt the reality of the conspiracy.³²

Minister of Relations Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros joined Minister of War Pedraza in assuring the public that the conspiracy was indeed a reality.³³ In his Memoria to Congress on January 30, 1828, one year after the arrest of Arenas, Espinosa launched a verbal attack on the Spanish government for its attempts to exploit the instability of the former colonies in order to restore Spanish rule in America. Espinosa charged that Spain had sent a "royal commissioner who, in order to realize his plan, took charge of an immense chain of colleagues who in a single day might have caused a general upheaval of the existing institutions and government." Espinosa asserted that in the Federal District the government had discovered "papers which gave a perfect idea of the extension and malignant combination of the plan," which "originated in the Cabinet of Madrid." The Mexican government overcame the plan, Espinosa noted, by making ample use of "the great authority which the Constitution conferred on the Executive Power for use in cases of emergency, and in the zeal of this Government." Espinosa concluded his discourse by expressing his gratitude for the cooperation which the government had received from state governors and legislatures in halting the spread of the conspiracy.³⁴

Espinosa's concluding remarks would seem to indicate that the new yorkino governments in the states had worked harmoniously with the Victoria government in seeking out conspirators connected with the Arenas affair. Pedraza noted in his New Orleans manifesto of 1830 that the

government had accepted a proffered alliance with the Yorkist party in early 1827 to forestall threats to Mexican Independence.³⁵

The dilemma facing the historian who would solve this riddle is posed in the following question: did the government and the yorkinos join forces for the sole purpose of preserving Mexican independence, or, was their purpose the destruction of the escocés party? The yorkinos would have replied that the latter goal, the destruction of the escoceses was a necessary step in the assurance of the former. The answer to this question depends upon the validity of the threat to Independence posed by the Arenas conspiracy. In the section which follows, the answer to this question may emerge through an examination of the government's response to the Arenas affair.

The Reaction of the Victoria Government

The Mexican public found in the Arenas affair convincing evidence of the perfidy of all Spaniards. The yorkinos spread the news effectively, contributing to the general malaise which followed the revelation of the plot in January, 1827. There can be no doubt that the news served to confirm the popular attitude toward the Spaniards. It would seem also that the yorkino believed that the conspiracy was an escocés-sponsored movement which had very nearly succeeded.

Virtually no one has questioned the existence of a plot of at least local importance. The debate has focused on the matter of importance. The question was asked: was the Arenas conspiracy as widespread and dangerous as the government insisted? If the government view was correct, the plot must have originated in Spain, as the Mexican government charged.

This interpretation has been disputed by Jaime Delgado, a modern student of Spanish-Mexican relations in the last century.³⁶ Evidence for Delgado's assertion that the Arenas affair did not originate in Spain was derived from the correspondence of Francisco Tacón and Hilario de Rivas, Spanish Ministers to the United States during the years 1826-27. Hilario de Rivas, Minister at the time of Friar Arenas' arrest, limited his concern over the news from Mexico to a single letter.³⁷ One observation made by Minister Rivas is of particular interest: "Some say that the Mexican Government wishes to give to this conspiracy more importance than it has in order to be able to rid itself of some persons." Perhaps the persons Rivas had in mind were, among others, generals Arana, Negrete and Echavarri, all Spaniards and leaders of the Scottish Rite party. Rivas' successor, Francisco Tacón, limited his concern to merely attaching a copy of the case against General Arana to a routine dispatch, reporting the existence of a new conspiracy in Iguala led by Andrés María Nieto and the execution of the two clerics in Oaxaca who had been arrested in connection with the Arenas affair.³⁸

Delgado concluded that Spain's lack of interest indicated that the plot was locally contrived, probably invented by the friars Arenas and Martínez without prior knowledge in Spain. Martínez's confession, which implied a greater importance is dismissed by Delgado as a mere gesture of vanity. Aviraneta, who was accused by Bocanegra of heading the Arenas conspiracy, is simply noted by Delgado as the head of a conspiratorial organization located in New Orleans in 1828-29.

Delgado cites one additional piece of evidence supporting his assertion that the Arenas conspiracy was a real but local phenomenon. A letter from Friar Antonio Alvarez, a Dominican who departed Mexico in December, 1826, to Miguel de la Torre, Captain General of Puerto Rico, provided further evidence that a conspiratorial plan was circulating in Mexico at the time of his departure.³⁹ Alvarez spoke of the existence of a "counterrevolution of creoles and gachupines" and reported that "after my departure I received a copy of the plan from a friend of mine, a member of my Order" The fact that Alvarez reported the details of the plan in the same terms as those contained in the plan found in Martínez's cell convinced Delgado of the existence of a local conspiracy.

The charge that the Mexican government wished to use the conspiracy to "rid itself of some persons," which was included in Minister Rivas' despatch to Madrid, was not without adherents in Mexico in early 1828. The charge was made, for example, by Lucas Alamán, who accused Minister of War Pedraza of launching a campaign on behalf of the yorkino party to destroy the leadership of the escocés party.⁴⁰ This interpretation was followed by Suárez y Navarro⁴¹ and Cuevas⁴² who recognized, in addition, the motive of personal vengeance against the enemies of Iturbide in Pedraza's actions. The developments stemming from the Arenas affair which most concerned these authors was the arrest and imprisonment of Generals Arana, Negrete, and Echavarri and, in particular, the execution of General Arana. The execution of a general officer was unprecedented in the civil war, as of January

1828, excepting, of course, that of Iturbide in 1824.

Charges by Mexican historians against Pedraza are uncompromisingly critical. Especially did the Yorkist Zavala, "mortal enemy" of Pedraza, join in the attack.⁴³ Pedraza was charged with ordering the arrest of the Spanish generals arbitrarily, while lacking evidence of their complicity in the Arenas affair. Suárez charged Pedraza with delegating the task of trumping up charges to military officials: colonels Andrade, Romero, Arango, and Facio.⁴⁴ The colonels served as the government's prosecutors (fiscales) in the subsequent trials. All but Colonel Facio were members of the yorkino party. Cuevas thought that the painful slowness of the Arana trial, which lasted more than a year, contributed more to the expulsion movement than the revelation of the Arenas conspiracy itself.⁴⁵

The case against General Arana was extracted in Bocanegra's memoirs.⁴⁶ The evidence used against Arana was derived from the confessions of persons who had been imprisoned as accomplices in the Arenas conspiracy.⁴⁷ Friar Rafael Torres testified that General Arana had been in correspondence with the elusive Manuel David who was not captured until almost one year after the first arrests. The two had used assumed names in their correspondence, that of Arana being "Gerónimo Gongoiti." A letter was found in Arenas' monastic cell signed by "Gerónimo Gongoiti." The Presbiter Hidalgo testified that Arana had told David of the plan. During the course of the trial, two officials from the Renta de Correos in Mexico City were arrested for having extracted two letters from the mails addressed to "Gerónimo

Gongoiti" in order to hide evidence. Two letters addressed to Arana, allegedly by the royal commissioner, were found in the mails. A letter from the royal commissioner to one "Pérez," following the arrest of Arana on February 5, noted that the mails would be intercepted in Puebla to prevent letters from falling into the hands of officials in Mexico City. An Alberto Comargo called for letters to "Gongoiti" in Mexico City and, later, hid the suspect, Friar Martínez in his house. Policarpo Puebla testified that Arana and David were in touch and that David had visited Arana in Mexico City, at the general's invitation. David returned to Puebla with a note-book of instructions and the information that Arana was in charge of the revolutionists in Mexico City. David told Puebla y García that the royal commissioner was in Mexico City. The prosecution produced a witness who testified to having seen Arana and Martínez together in Mexico City. One Juan Bautista Soleta testified that he had actually been present at a meeting between the defendant and generals Negrete and Echavarri while the conspiracy was discussed. The testimony of Manuel Segura and the confession of Padre Arenas on the day of his execution implicated Arana. Finally, the prosecution introduced the testimony of a Lt. Velasco who had been imprisoned by the government for the sole purpose of gaining the confidence and the secrets of General Arana. Testimony of prison guards and that of Lt. Velasco indicated that Arana had condemned himself by his own words.

The evidence mustered by Colonel Andrade and aides was considered by the court martial to be sufficient proof of General Arana's guilt.

The military tribunal voted unanimously for the maximum penalty: degradation, to be followed by the firing squad.⁴⁸ The conviction and penalty were based upon the federal conspiracy law of May 11, 1826. General Arana met death on January 5, 1828, calmly protesting his innocence to the last.⁴⁹

On March 22, 1827, Generals Negrete and Echavarri had been arrested in Mexico City. Alamán charged Pedraza with arbitrary conduct in the arrests.⁵⁰ Pedraza planned to expel Negrete and Echavarri as "suspicious persons," Alamán argued, in case they should not be condemned to a more serious penalty by the "ordinary council of war" which was to judge the generals by "the law of September 27, 1823, which had been prorogued indefinitely on April 6, 1824."⁵¹ Negrete was imprisoned in Acapulco, then removed to Toluca, moved again to Tacubaya, and finally, placed in the old prison of the defunct Inquisition. Alamán reported that the case against Negrete was based entirely on circumstantial evidence and was easily disproved by the defense headed by Colonel Cirilo Gómez Anaya. Negrete's defense was written by the eloquent and able Francisco Manuel Sánchez de Tagle, who was at that time deputy from Michoacán and a leader of the Spaniard's cause in congress.

The cases against Negrete and Echavarri were finally resolved in mid-1828. Both men were absolved by the court. Suárez y Navarro charged Pedraza and the yorkino party with conspiring to remove the generals from the public arena. The yorkino press, according to Suárez, invented lies and supposed crimes to attribute to them. He accused the

Correo, in particular, of having headed the campaign.⁵²

In the light of these charges, the evidence against Negrete and Echavarri must be weighed. Correspondence published by Bocanegra reveals how intimately the evidence used against Arana was linked with that utilized against Negrete and Echavarri.⁵³ Pedraza was accused by five senators before the congress of "responsibility" for the arrest of Echavarri and Negrete. The senators demanded that Pedraza release correspondence known to exist in the ministry of war concerning the arrests. Pedraza protested that, prior to June 16, 1828, he had been unable to release the correspondence which was being held for use in the trial of Friar Martínez. Pedraza's accusers complained that they could have proved their charges if the ministry of war had released the documents. In response, Pedraza promised to publish the correspondence as soon as possible. He apparently chose to submit the correspondence to El Aquila because of its semi-official status as well as its friendly attitude toward him.

The first letter, written from Puebla by Colonel Juan Arago to General Ignacio Mora in the Federal District, was evidently intended to provide information for use in the trial of General Arana.⁵⁴ Colonel Arago's letter reported the testimony of Juan Bautista Saleta, Policarpo Puebla y García and Friar Rafael Torres, given in the trials of Torres and Presbiter Manuel Hidalgo in Puebla. Testimony reported in the letter indicated that Juan Bautista Saleta knew of a meeting between the suspect David and the generals Arana, Negrete, and Echavarri in Mexico City while plans were being discussed. On that occasion,

Arana had commented that all was ready and that he had been designated by the royal commissioner for "Tehuantepec." Policarpo Puebla y García had reportedly testified that these conversations had occurred in an hacienda near Mexico City. Friar Rafael Torres had testified that the meeting occurred in the hacienda de Santa Teresa. Torres repeated a remark by David that there were "two hundred men near General Bravo in tierra caliente who were receiving salaries in return for their promise to seize the general should he fail to take part in the plan." According to Torres, the conspirators had lacked confidence in General Bravo because, having been given knowledge of the plan, he had either disapproved of it or shown indifference to it. Torres reported that David had also told him that Negrete and Arana had joked about the posts which they were to receive. The royal commissioner had allegedly given Negrete the rank of colonel and had applied to Havana for the pardon (indulto) of Echavarri and Negrete, whose "particulars had already been forwarded by Presbíter Hidalgo."

Colonel Andrade, in charge of the prosecution, had then recommended to General Mora in a secret letter, the immediate arrest of generals Negrete and Echavarri.⁵⁵ The action was to be taken on the basis of the testimony forwarded from Puebla by Colonel Arago, a copy of which was sent to Mora attached to Andrade's instructions. The arrests had been carried out on the following day. Pedraza's purpose in publishing the correspondence was to demonstrate that he had not personally ordered the arrest of Negrete and Echavarri.

The evidence cited above, circumstantial though it is, implicates the vice president, Nicolás Bravo, who credited with knowledge of the plan if not adherence to it. But General Bravo was neither tried nor interrogated. The vice president would lead an unsuccessful revolt on behalf of his party in late December 1827, following passage of the first federal law for the expulsion of the Spaniards.

The question of the extent of involvement of prominent persons, both creole and Spanish, in the January conspiracy was never resolved. Cuevas' point, that those arrested were mainly insignificant priests and friars, would imply that the conspiracy did not reach into the upper ranks of society. This interpretation is supported by conservative contemporary writers who refused to take the conspiracy seriously. The government's position, as supported by Espinosa and Pedraza, was the opposite, as demonstrated by the arrest of Arana, Negrete, and Echavarri. If the government's position was correct, one must acknowledge that many persons were left untouched through lack of evidence to conspire again another day. Friar Arenas' reference on January 18 to "all the ecclesiastical cabildos, the bishop and commanding general of Puebla" lent support to that proposition.

The state of Veracruz was untouched by the government's search for conspirators in early 1827. The fact is striking when one recalls that Veracruz was still an *escocés* stronghold. General Miguel Barragán held the offices of governor and commanding general jointly, and the legislature was securely in the hands of an *escocés* majority. Pedraza reported that the federal government took precautions aimed at neutralizing the strong position occupied by Barragán.⁵⁶ General

Manuel Rincón, a yorkino,⁵⁷ was sent with a large force to Veracruz. By this move, as in other instances, the Victoria government contributed to the strengthening of the yorkino party at the expense of the Scottish lodges. The Victoria government accepted the yorkino contention that the escocés party was a threat to internal security and acted accordingly. The Arenas affair was accepted by the cabinet as a serious matter, deserving of cautious investigation and, when evidence permitted, of suppression.

The Effect of the Arenas Affair on Mexican Politics

Having won at the polls in late 1826, the yorkinos were in a position to chart a new legislative course in Mexico City as well as in the states. The Arenas conspiracy presented a challenge to the Yorkist lodges which, in the context of the struggle between the two masonic orders, would not pass unheeded. The conflict would ultimately lead to a military confrontation in December, 1827. The struggle for survival, which the escoceses were destined to lose, might have been less intense and less disruptive had it not involved opposed social attitudes in conflict. The lodges differed on the issues which had been first raised by the Hidalgo revolt in 1810, and which were temporarily smoothed over during the Iguala movement led by Iturbide in 1821. The American creoles had finally realized, by 1824, that neither the plan of Iguala nor the plan of Casa Mata had provided them with sufficient positions or what they considered to be a sufficient voice in their government.⁵⁸ The American creoles were as

resentful of rule by European creoles after 1824 as they had been of rule by Spaniards prior to 1821. The first major step toward a change in the social elite which had ruled Mexico was accomplished by the voluntary migration of numerous Spaniards following the proclamation of independence in 1821. The second step would be accomplished through the organized expulsion of Spaniards which would begin in December, 1827. The efforts of the American creole at both the national and local level was devoted to the achievement of this goal throughout 1827.

Minister of War Pedraza, who supervised the government's attack on the Arenas conspiracy, understood the desperate situation in which the escoceses and the Spaniards found themselves in 1827. He blamed the expulsion of the Spaniards on the failure of the escocés party to recognize the weakness of its position and to act accordingly, following the discovery of the Arenas conspiracy. His reasoning seems sound in retrospect:

The escoceses chose to exculpate, and even to protect the conspirators, and the yorkinos did not lose, as one might have hoped, the occasion to attack them with advantage; in this battle it was clear that the [yorkinos] would win, because they had in their hands a powerful weapon: the press took part in these debates between parties, which diffusing their mutual recriminations throughout the Republic, gave rise to the pronunciamientos for the expulsion of the Spaniards: almost all the conspirators pertained to [the Spanish] Nation, and the People, thinking its independence and liberty attacked, placed itself at the disposition of those it judged to be its defenders If the escoceses, freeing themselves from their bias, had known the disadvantage of their position, they would not have undertaken a debate, which in the end produced a law ominous to many families but indispensable when it was dictated, in order to avoid civil war.⁵⁹

The Arenas affair, then, had important repercussions in Mexican political life. In fact, the conspiracy had its concrete significance in internal politics rather than in the form of an external threat. Political conflict in Mexico by January, 1827, had reached a degree of violence and intensity which could not admit the insignificance of a counter-revolutionary effort on the part of less than half a hundred Spaniards. The major parties, escocés and yorkino, seized the issue, when it was presented to them, as fuel for their mutually antagonistic propaganda. This is not to imply that there was no conspiracy, for surely there was sufficient cause in the fact that the Church lacked representation in either party. Since the fall of Iturbide in 1823, the Church had been increasingly under attack and no caudillo sufficient to the task had as yet presented himself for her defense.

The yorkinos, with the support of the government and the American creoles generally, availed themselves of their newly won political power to dispose of their enemies the Spaniards, seizing upon the Arenas affair as final proof of the perfidy of the Spaniards and their European creole allies. The anti-Spanish feeling generated by the yorkinos during the congressional and gubernatorial elections of late 1826 and subsequent to the discovery of the Arenas conspiracy on January 19, 1827, would culminate in the passage of state and national decrees aimed at the expulsion of the Spanish community. Perhaps the Arenas affair was the Church's response to the yorkino political victory in the states and in the federal legislature. The Church

could have found the protection it desired under Ferdinand VII. Some light may be shed on this matter when the "5,000 fojas" of testimony mentioned by Lic. Bocanegra come to light in the Mexican archives.⁶⁰

Notes

¹Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 762-64.

²Juan Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; México, 1850-51), I, 79-80.

³Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico, dedica a sus compatriotas: o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), p. 39.

⁴See Chapter VI, entitled "La conspiración conocida con el nombre del padre Arenas," in José María Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de México independiente, 1822-46 (2 vols.; México, 1892, 1897), I, 414-40.

⁵Lorenzo Zavala, Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; París, 1831), II, 35.

⁶Bocanegra, I, 415.

⁷The historical accounts by contemporaries are in agreement on these events. See Bocanegra, I, 415-16; Alamán, V, 762; Suárez y Navarro, I, 79; Pedraza, p. 39; Zavala, Ensayo histórico, I, 432.

⁸Ignacio de Mora to Colonel José Antonio Facio, January 19, 1827, Mexico, published in Bocanegra, I, 416-19.

⁹The plan was published for the first time in 1842 in Suárez y Navarro, I, 390-94. Suárez copied the three sections of the plan from documents used in the government's case against "Fr. Rafael Torres y cómplices," in Puebla.

¹⁰The plan viewed by General Mora differed in this respect from that discovered in Puebla and published in ibid.

¹¹Bocanegra, I, 417.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., I, 418.

¹⁵Joaquín Muñoz and Francisco Ruiz Fernández were aides to General Mora.

¹⁶Bocanegra, I, 418-19.

¹⁷Memorias, I, 415-16.

¹⁸Suárez y Navarro listed many of those arrested, specifying the date of their arrest and the date of their execution or exile (I, 394-95). Bocanegra published a brief résumé of four cases (I, 426-36), plus extracts of the cases of General Arana (L, 704-22), Fr. Francisco Martínez and others.

¹⁹México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 54 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

²⁰Suárez y Navarro, I, 394-95; Bocanegra, I, 414-15; José María Tornel, Breve resena histórica de los acontecimientos más notables de la Nación Mexicana (México, 1852), pp. 110-13.

²¹Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 394-95.

²²The Correo de la Federación commenced publication in Mexico City on November 1, 1826.

²³The impact of the Arenas affair on Mexican pamphleteers may be gaged from the multiplicity of titles included in the Suro Collection of Mexican Pamphlets, California State Library, San Francisco. In Puebla "El Enemigo de los Tiranos" called for "Guerra contra los coyotes" in 1827. In Mexico City Luis Espino penned pamphlets on the "Degradación del Padre Arenas" and "Debilidad del gobierno y embrollas del Padre Arenas." José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi published a brief comedy in verse entitled "La tragedia del Padre Arenas" and pamphlets calling for the execution of Arenas in the plaza mayor and protesting the government's cautious actions in "Que duerma el gobierno más y nos lleva Barrabás." Pablo de Villavicencio published three separate versions of his "Testamento del Padre Arenas," as the trial progressed in 1827. The arrest and imprisonment of generals Echavarrí and Negrete also met with the pamphleteers approval. Anonymous pieces appeared citing the "Virtudes y gracias de los traidores, Fray Echavarrí y Fray Negrete. O sea: historia abreviada de sus crímenes," and the "Nueva traición descubierta de escoceses y coyotes." Amid the clamour of the yorkinos exaltados, the prosecutor in the Arenas case, José Antonio Facio, published his "Pedimento fiscal del coronel Sr. . . . en la causa formada al religioso dieguino fr. Joaquín de Arenas, por el delito de alta traición . . ." See Paul Radin (ed.), Catalogue of Mexican Pamphlets in the Suro Collection, 1623-1888 (San Francisco, 1939).

²⁴José María Mateos, Historia de la masonería en México desde 1806 hasta 1884 (2 vols.; México, 1884), I, 23.

²⁵Reseña histórica, p. 113.

²⁶Memorias, I, 429-40.

²⁷"Emigrados de América," Diario de la Habana por la real sociedad patriótica, September 6, 1831, cited in Bocanegra, I, 429-32; the quotation was found on p. 431.

²⁸Bocanegra, I, 433.

²⁹Eugenio Aviraneta e Ibargoyen's memoirs failed to lend support to the assertion that he was the royal commissioner of 1827. See Mis memorias íntimas (1825-1829) (México, 1906).

³⁰On the Barradas invasion, see in addition to the memoirs of Aviraneta, the extensive account in Niceto Zamacois, Historia de Méjico desde sus tiempos más remotos hasta nuestros días (23 vols.; Barcelona, 1878-88), XI, 717-803.

³¹Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 270.

³²Bocanegra, I, 438.

³³Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores e Interiores. Memoria (México, 1828), pp. 8-15.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Manifiesto, p. 44.

³⁶Jaime Delgado, España y México en el siglo xix (3 vols.; Madrid, 1950), I, 357-75.

³⁷Hilario de Rivas, dispatch no. 405, Philadelphia, February 24, 1827, cited in ibid., I, 372.

³⁸The case of General Gregorio Arana was sent with Tacón's dispatch no. 394, Philadelphia, December 30, 1827, cited in ibid.

³⁹Alvarez to De la Torre, n.p., April 19, 1827, cited in ibid., I, 433-34.

⁴⁰Historia de Méjico, V, 762-64.

⁴¹Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 81.

⁴²Porvenir de México, pp. 270-71.

⁴³Ensayo histórico, II, 35; Pedraza defended himself against Zavala's charges in Manifiesto, p. 41. Zavala referred to Pedraza as his "enemigo capital" in Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de México en 1828 y 1829 (México, 1830), p. 12.

⁴⁴Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 81.

⁴⁵Porvenir de México, p. 272.

⁴⁶Bocanegra was assessor and Colonel Andrade was prosecutor in the Arana case. Memorias, I, 704-722.

⁴⁷Government correspondence concerning generals Negrete, Arana and Morán, marked reservada, was located in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 75, exp. 1-3 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG].

⁴⁸The officers composing the tribunal were: Pedro José Lanuza, Isidro Torres Granados, Juan Osorno, Luis Villegas, Mariano Arista, Florencio Villareal, José Celso Díaz, Manuel Romero, and Antonio Ayala. See Bocanegra, I, 713-15.

⁴⁹Alamán, V, 770.

⁵⁰Ibid., V, 768.

⁵¹Ibid., V, 770.

⁵²Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 80.

⁵³Gómez Pedraza to Editors, El Aquila Mexicana, June 16, 1828, Mexico, published in Bocanegra, I, 584-87.

⁵⁴Arago to Mora, Puebla, March 21, 1827, published in ibid., I, 584-86.

⁵⁵Juan José Andrade to Ignacio Mora, March 21, 1827, Mexico, published in ibid., I, 587.

⁵⁶Manifiesto, pp. 42-44.

⁵⁷Eugenio Aviraneta, "Memoria sobre el estado actual del Reyno de Méjico y modo de pacificarlo," in José L. Franco, Documentos para la historia de México existentes en el Archivo Nacional de Cuba (Havana, 1961), p. 346 ff.

⁵⁸The useful distinction between European criollo and American criollo, in terms of political, social, and economic orientations, may be found in Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence (Gainesville, 1966), pp. 33-35.

⁵⁹Pedraza, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁰The cases and extracts prepared by Bocanegra continued to be useful to the government and, apparently, were deposited in the Comandancia General de México by Minister of War Facio in 1830. By January 5, 1828 Pedraza had forwarded twelve completed cases to Bocanegra to be extracted for publication in the public periodicals. On January 30, 1830, General Facio, who became minister of war following the success of the plan of Jalapa, demanded the return of the cases for use in "other cases," threatening Bocanegra with judicial action should the latter withhold them. Bocanegra returned extracts for fifteen cases drawn from 4,000 fojas, plus nine additional cases partially extracted. Bocanegra noted that only the case of Padre Arenas had as yet been published. On February 19, 1833, Manuel Gómez Pedraza requested information from Bocanegra concerning the state of the extracts, to which Bocanegra replied from Zacatecas that both the cases and the extracts had been deposited in the Comandancia General de México by Facio. See the correspondence published in Memorias, I, 414-26.

CHAPTER VI

THE REMOVAL OF THE SPANIARDS FROM GOVERNMENT POSTS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF MAY 10, 1827

The debate on the Spanish question, which occupied a large part of the congress' time in 1827, revealed the issues involved and the position of factions and prominent persons on those issues. The enemies as well as the friends of the Spaniards were forced to speak out in public and private sessions. The social thought of the American creole and of the European creole was set forth in the debate, in addition to their respective notions of law and economics. Influential creoles such as Dr. José María Luis Mora and Deputy Carlos María Bustamante defended the Spaniards in the senate and chamber of deputies. Excerpts from Mora's speeches were published in his Obras sueltas.¹ Bustamante was among the most active of the Spaniard's defenders publishing his frequent speeches in the form of pamphlets. In 1828, Bustamante commenced publication of his "History of the Misgovernment of Victoria," which centered upon the development of the anti-Spanish movement, 1824-1828.²

Two periodicals were founded in the capital in 1827 to defend the two sides of the Spanish question. José María Tornel edited El Amigo del Pueblo, a weekly founded on August 1, which had a federalist and anti-Spanish orientation.³ El Amigo was published by the same

press as the Iturbidean Aguila. Dr. Mora edited a liberal weekly founded on April 11, which had as its goals the defense of the Spaniards and the defense of free trade against protectionism. El Observador ceased publication during the unsuccessful revolt of the escoceses in January, 1828.⁴ The three major "unofficial" periodicals of the capital dealt with the Spanish question frequently in 1827. El Aguila, which was edited by former Iturbideans, claimed to be "imparcial," opposing an indiscriminate law for the removal of Spaniards from government posts and hesitant to endorse proscription. The Correo, spokesman for the yorkinos of the capital, became more radical on the Spanish question as the year progressed. The Correo advocated the law on government posts of May, then advocated the expulsion law of December, 1827. El Sol spoke for the escocés party in the capital, opposing the restrictive and proscriptive measures proposed in the states and in the congress. El Sol denied the allegation of the yorkinos concerning the involvement of Spaniards in Bourbonist conspiracies. Each of these daily periodicals followed the congressional debates closely, publishing the official abstracts of the sessions while featuring the full length speeches of those who expressed the position of the periodical.

No one who read the congressional debates of January and February 1827, observed Luis G. Cuevas, would have suspected that a "revolutionary agent" sat in the chambers.⁵ The congress: preoccupation with routine affairs "conformed to the yorkino plan to do nothing

against the Spaniards until the public clamor demanded it."⁶ Armed movements against the Spaniards followed the revelation of the Arenas conspiracy as a matter of course. On March 10, 1827, Lt. Colonel José María González revolted in Durango and succeeded in freeing and arming the prisoners, dispersing the state legislature, and arresting Governor Santiago Vaca Ortíz.⁷ The ostensible purpose of González's revolt was to fill the posts in state government with centralists and to call for the expulsion of the Spaniards. On the following day, the troops reverted to the government when General Joaquín Parres took control of the city for the federal government. Military petitions with similar motives in view quickly spread throughout the countryside.

The escoceses as well as the yorkinos were accused of fomenting disturbances in early 1827. Petitions for centralism were attributed to the escoceses while petitions for the expulsion of Spaniards or for their removal from government offices were attributed to yorkinos. The petition for centralism in Durango accompanied a call for expulsion because the existing state executive and legislature protected the Spaniards of Durango. As late as November, 1827, Durango still had not passed anti-Spanish legislation. The unrest which spread across Mexico, following the arrest of Padre Joaquín Arenas, was related to the dissatisfaction produced among American creoles by the continued presence of Spaniards in government posts. The congress was provided with adequate cause to treat the Spanish question by the increasing threat to public peace. Moreover, it was forced to deal with the Spanish question by Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza's steadfast refusal to use military force against the rebels.⁸

Rumors that a movement was under way in the senate to pass a general law of expulsion were circulated as early as January, 1827. Senator Anastasio Zerecero thought it expedient to pen a public denial of his role in the movement. Zerecero had allegedly proposed in a secret session that the senate pass a general law of expulsion. In his public denial, Zerecero stated that such a measure would not be convenient "at the present time."⁹ The earliest proposal heard in a public session of the senate concerning the expulsion of Spaniards was submitted by senators José María Alpuche and Acosta on January 23. The measure called for the expulsion of all Spanish religious clergy "who had not performed services in the cause of independence."¹⁰ Alpuche and Acosta withdrew their proposal in the same session when it met with a cool reception in the senate.

The climate of opinion on the Spanish question in the federal congress was a reflection of the attitudes which were evolving in the states. State legislatures were beginning to consider measures for the definition of the legal status of Spaniards residing in the states. The relationship between the states and the federal government, as defined in the Constitution of 1824, had placed citizenship under the jurisdiction of the state governments. The legislature of San Luis Potosí ordered an investigation of all Spaniards residing within the state in order to determine whether they were capitulados, their occupations and the length of time they had resided in San Luis Potosí.¹¹ Spaniards who had arrived in the state after 1821 were to be considered foreigners and, in order to remain, were required to obtain passports

from the government, in compliance with the federal passport law of April 25, 1826. The same legislature passed laws providing severe penalties for crying "Viva España" in public, or for possessing arms "without reason."¹² The election to public office of a Spaniard who failed to swear fealty to the new state constitution would be nullified.¹³ Citizenship in San Luis Potosí was acquired by simply making the formal pledge specified in the constitution.¹⁴

The federal senate in Mexico City took up a measure on about February 1 which would have required an oath of allegiance from "all foreigners who had become Mexican citizens by virtue of the plan of Iguala."¹⁵ The oath to be required was as follows:

I swear to renounce forever all loyalty and fidelity to whatever nation or government, especially (here the name of his nation, prince or government): I swear to maintain fidelity and obedience to the laws and authorities of the Estados Unidos Mexicanos, of which I am a citizen by the grace of her laws, and by my own will . . .¹⁶

The proposal was defeated in the senate. The Spaniard was never forced to pledge his support for the national regime until passage of the expulsion law in December, 1827. At that time, Spaniards exempted from the law were required to swear a prescribed oath of allegiance to the republic. By virtue of the oath originally proposed in the senate, the president would have been empowered to apprehend or expel all males over 14 years of age pertaining to any nation with which the republic might be at war.

The constitution passed by the State of Mexico on February 14, 1827, included provisions for naturalization and a definition of

citizenship and vecindad (residency) amenable to the interests of the Spaniards.¹⁷ Vecindad required a year's residence within the state and the possession of property or the practice of an occupation. Citizenship was denied to regular clergy, but foreigners might acquire citizenship in the state by obtaining a letter of citizenship (carta de ciudadanfa) from the state congress.¹⁸ Citizenship in any state of the federation, plus a year's residence and employment within the state of Mexico, automatically qualified one for citizenship.¹⁹ In another article, the state constitution defined citizenship as the right to elect or to be elected.²⁰ Spaniards would not find it difficult to obtain citizenship or vecindad in Mexico State.

The state legislature of Mexico modified these provisions by a later decree in the case of Spaniards who entered the republic after 1821.²¹ By the terms of this law, Spaniards who had arrived following the proclamation of independence, as well as capitulados who had illegally remained, were not allowed to vote, or to hold political office, or to obtain a government post. State congresses throughout the nation passed decrees defining citizenship in a manner favorable to the Spaniards who had arrived prior to the proclamation of independence in 1821. Spaniards who could not meet local requirements automatically, arranged for a senator or a deputy in the state congress to steer a bill through the legislature, granting citizenship in the state to the Spaniard in question. The published collections of decrees passed by the state congresses in 1827 contain a number of

these congressional acts. Some Spaniards who lived in the Federal District in early 1827 obtained citizenship in a state, preferably the State of Mexico, as an insurance measure.²²

The state and federal congresses were still hesitant as late as February 1827 to legislate on matters which might further disturb the Spaniards. The federal chamber of deputies refused to debate a proposal introduced on February 19 by deputies José María Bocanegra, José María Tornel, Escudero and Matías Quintana, which would have empowered the government to expel:

. . . foreigners whose nation might be at war with the Mexican Republic and whose conduct might be judged contrary to either independence or the prevailing form of government . . .²³

The measure was forwarded to the chamber's commission on constitutional matters where it was allowed to expire.²⁴ The congress withheld passage of these measures to avoid fostering a state of anxiety among the Spaniards, as evidenced by the fact that the Correo disapproved of the measures for this reason.²⁵

An important segment of the Spanish population had come under attack in January. Minister of Justice Miguel Ramos Arizpe read a memoria before the chamber of deputies on January 4 and before the senate on January 9 which analyzed the population distribution and income of properties pertaining to the monastic houses of Mexico. Ramos Arizpe's memoria documented the fact that extraordinarily large rural estates were owned by some of the smaller regular orders, such as the Carmelites, whose membership was small and primarily

Spanish.²⁶ Congressional sessions of 1827 were characterized by a continuing discussion of the religious houses and their landed estates. The prominence of Spaniards within the regular orders raised the spectre of sizable receipts from land rents being used by a few potential enemies of the republic for political ends. The Carmelites, whose members were mainly Spaniards were the most frequently attacked in the congress and in articles appearing in the Correo. The future use of rural and urban estates pertaining to the house of Philippine Missionaries was debated in the chamber of deputies in February.²⁷

Senator Alpuche of Tabasco had introduced a measure into the senate in April, 1826, for the removal of Spanish employees from federal posts. The measure had languished in the senate's commission on internal and external relations from May, 1826, until February, 1827. Senator Matías Quintero, chairman of the committee, informed Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros, the official in charge of the ministry of relations, on February 24 that the proposal would soon be released for debate in the senate.²⁸ The version of the proposal released by the committee on February 26 had been reduced to two basic propositions: that no Spaniard who had not been naturalized in the republic be permitted to obtain a civil or ecclesiastical post while the state of war with Spain continued, and that Spaniards who held posts already without being naturalized could be removed from their posts at the behest of the federal government.

Senator Alpuche objected to the committee's reduced version of his proposal. Senator Acosta called the senate's attention to a resolution forwarded by the chamber of deputies. The senate suspended discussion of the report until the senators could review the chamber's resolution.²⁹

Alpuche's proposal was more comprehensive than the chamber's resolution. The chamber of deputies was reputedly the more anti-Spanish body of the congress, but it lacked an Alpuche to initiate a strong proposal and force it through committee. The chamber's resolution was not a general law regulating government posts, rather it provided for the removal of only the Spaniards employed in the postal service (renta de correos) and in the maritime customhouses.³⁰ All proprietary employees suspended were to receive full salary and credit for the time of their suspension in their careers. In cases not governed by existing laws, the offices were to be temporarily filled by those immediately below in the scale. Over three-quarters of the deputies had voted for the resolution.

The chamber's commission on public tranquility had produced the resolution in response to a petition to that effect signed by sixteen deputies.³¹ The debate which had transpired in the chamber of deputies revealed the numerous conceptions of the Spaniard's legal position in Mexico held by the creole deputies. Deputy José Domingo Couto, a member of the ecclesiastical cabildo of Puebla, and Deputy Manuel Sánchez de Tagle were the most persistent defenders of the

Spaniards in the chamber.³² Couto and Tagle charged that the proposal would re-introduce juridical inequality, this time directed against the Spaniards. Tagle drew upon the record of protective legislation since 1821 to support what he termed the "onerous contract" which the nation had made and must keep with the Spaniards. He cited a trend of legislative guarantees which had provided "equality of opportunities and rights." Couto and Tagle warned that passage of the measure would reopen old wounds and stir popular indignation against the peaceful Spaniards.

The principal defenders of the proposal were deputies Manuel Crecencio Rejón, Juan de Dios Cañedo and the president of the commission, Deputy José Mariano Blasco. They were quick to reply to Couto and Tagle that the plan of Iguala and the treaty of Córdoba were invalid, having never been approved by the constituted authorities of either Spain or Mexico. Blasco insisted that the proposal under consideration was both moderate and just. Cañedo called for a stronger measure but was inclined to accept the proposal under debate. The Arenas conspiracy, noted Cañedo, had demonstrated the insalubrious effect of allowing Spaniards to continue in key posts. Rejón insisted that defensive measures were needed under the circumstances. The measure was just, he asserted, by virtue of its liberal financial provisions. The point was made repeatedly that the chamber would fulfill its function as "representative of the popular will" by voting for the measure.

Before the resolution could be sent to the senate, two additions to its text were proposed. Deputy Miguel Pacheco introduced a provision which would extend the terms of the resolution to Spanish military officials. Deputy Rejón wished to provide an exemption for those who had served in one of the national congresses. These additions were sent to the commission on public tranquility for study and recommendation. The committee's resolution on Pacheco's proposal was over a month in coming.³³ On the day of the report, the president of the chamber, José Joaquín de Herrera of Jalapa, had advocated a separate measure designed to remove the Spanish officers without prejudice to the national treasury. The new proposal was introduced for the president by eighteen deputies who favored a stronger measure.³⁴ According to Herrera's proposal, no naturalized citizen would be granted a military office while Mexico was at war with the nation of his origin. Those who actually possessed such posts would be granted an unconditional leave of absence. Should Mexico be at war with two or more nations, these individuals might be used against the forces of a nation other than their own. Economy was to be achieved by extending an unconditional leave of absence without pay to all Spanish military officers. The commission recommended passage of Pacheco's proposal, which would have continued the salaries of the suspended officers.

President Herrera spoke on behalf of his own measure, noting that the Spanish officers were resented by their own troops and that army discipline was adversely affected as a result. Herrera lamented

the effect that suspension with pay would have on the treasury because the posts would have to be filled. Deputy Anastasio Zerecero defended Herrera's measure but Deputy José Ignacio Espinosa opposed the proposal, on the grounds that no Spanish officer had as yet been accused of disloyalty. Espinosa warned that passage of Herrera's proposal would discourage all foreigners who might want to join the Mexican army. Juan de Dios Cañedo of Guadalajara favored Pacheco's addition, arguing that all posts requiring confidence should be cleared of Spaniards. Deputy Aburto favored passage of both Pacheco's addition and Herrera's proposal, noting that the people viewed the removal of the Spaniards as the culmination of independence. Aburto reminded the chamber that generals José Antonio Echavarri and Pedro Celestino Negrete had recently attracted suspicion. Pacheco defended his addition which he felt was justified by the presence of Spanish generals and capitulados in the army.

The legislators of Jalisco had petitioned the chamber of deputies for the passage of a measure which would expel the Spaniards from Mexico.³⁵ Pacheco cited the popular movements in the states and the petitions received from state legislatures, notably that of Jalisco, as evidence of the popular desire for legislation on the question of Spaniards occupying government posts. Pacheco concluded that, although it would have been desirable to avoid paying the salaries, article two had already been approved.

Pacheco's addition was approved on April 9 by a vote of 42-16.³⁶ The resolution was forwarded to the senate by the chamber of deputies in the following form:

- Article 1. While Spain fails to recognize Mexican independence, no Spaniard may be employed in the postal service or in the maritime customhouses, though he may have acquired Mexican citizenship.
- Article 2. Spaniards who have merited the confidence of the nation by representing it in congress are exempted from the effects of the above provision.
- Article 3. Spaniards presently employed proprietarily in the posts noted above and those holding military posts who failed to embrace independence prior to the proclamation of Iguala, will be suspended temporarily while enjoying the full salaries of their offices and receiving credit for the time of their suspension toward their retirement.
- Article 4. Said offices, whether of a graduated scale (de escala) or not, will be filled provisionally in accordance with existing laws.

But as the resolution was being forwarded to the senate, the political climate in Mexico City was becoming increasingly charged as recriminations in the popular press reached new proportions.

In April the escoceses launched a campaign to discredit Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza following the arrest on March 22 of generals Echavarri and Negrete in connection with the Arenas affair.³⁷ El Sol criticized the Victoria government for its activities in the Arenas case and blamed Pedraza personally for the recent arrests. In June the campaign of criticism against Pedraza was joined by a new periodical, El Observador de la República Mexicana. El Observador was "sustained and, at one time, financed" by the wealthy Spanish miner José María Fagoaga, and edited by the liberal Dr. José María Luis Mora.³⁸ Senators Juan de Dios Rodríguez and Florentino Martínez penned articles on laizzez faire economics for El Observador, while

Dr. Mora wrote in defense of the Spaniards' rights. Armed petitions aimed at the removal of the Spaniards from their government posts began anew in April and violent acts were committed against individual Spaniards.³⁹ The critics of the minister of war charged him with complicity in the revolts due to his refusal to dispatch armed units to suppress the movements.

Carlos Marfa Bustamante and Lucas Alamán accused Pedraza of desiring to foment rather than suppress the armed movements. Lorenzo Zavala attributed Pedraza's cautious response to personal ambition and the desire of the minister of war to succeed Victoria in the presidency in 1829.⁴⁰ Pedraza insisted in his defense that the government was powerless to act, unable to trust the military officials, and fearful of the consequences of a confrontation in which the military officers would be forced to choose between masonic loyalty and military duty. Pedraza maintained, in his defense, that the government was forced to concentrate its efforts on pacification through promises of legal action on the revolutionists demands, including amnesty for those in revolt, in order to avoid civil war. General Melchor Múzquiz, who like Manuel Mier y Terán was resolved to defend the Spaniards, visited Pedraza and argued for the use of force, but failed to dissuade the minister of war from his conciliatory course of action.⁴¹

Officials with moderate views on the Spanish question came under heavy attack from the yorkinos in April. In the senate, José Marfa Alpuche, a founder of the yorkino grand lodge, accused the minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, Miguel Ramos Arizpe,

of treason for having appointed a Spaniard to a judgeship in Veracruz.⁴² The commission appointed by the senate to study the charge decided in favor of the justice minister after receiving a communication in which Ramos Arizpe insisted that he had made the appointment under existing laws.⁴³ Ramos Arizpe reminded the senators that the government had not yet received a law fixing the rules regarding naturalization and citizenship. Under these circumstances, Ramos concluded, the government would continue to fill posts according to existing laws. The senate rejected Alpuche's charges against the minister of justice by a vote of 30-4.

The senate took up the resolution forwarded by the chamber of deputies for debate on April 24, calling on the ministers of war and the treasury to attend the debate.⁴⁴ The special commission on public security, had reviewed the chamber's resolution and recommended to the senate that the measure be passed as it stood.⁴⁵ The commission's minority opinion, as expressed by Senator Francisco Molinos del Campo, opposed the measure on the grounds that it exempted present and past members of congress. Molinos presented his own plan which called for the suspension of all Spaniards from government posts.⁴⁶ The chamber's resolution and Molinos' proposal differed in that the latter extended the purge to all Spanish office-holders, as can be seen below:

Article 1. No Spaniard may hold a government post, in spite of the constitutional guarantees he may have received, until Spain recognizes Mexican independence.

Article 2. All Spaniards now employed will be immediately separated from their posts until such recognition occurs.

Article 3. Spaniards separated from their posts will receive their full salaries and credit for the time of their suspension toward their retirement.

Article 4. All posts vacated will be filled temporarily according to existing laws.

When asked to state the government's position on the resolution forwarded by the chamber of deputies, Minister of War Pedraza replied that the government was in conformity with the resolution. But the ensuing debate found the senate inclined toward Molinos' proposal rather than toward the chamber's resolution.⁴⁷ Senator José Agustín Paz spoke against the chamber's resolution on the grounds that it was contrary to existing laws. Legislation in force allowed the president to suspend federal employees, following judicial process, for a maximum of three months with the loss of one-half pay. Those who were guilty, Paz concluded, should be tried and dismissed. The entire Spanish community should not be singled out for punishment. Senator Pablo de la Llave, a member of the commission, noted that a lenient measure such as the chamber's resolution was needed due to the growing dissatisfaction in the nation over the Mexican-Spanish relationship. Llave observed that the Spaniards who had supported independence had been persuaded by the guarantees of Iguala and the promise of a Bourbon dynasty in Mexico.

Molinos' proposal reentered the discussion when Senator Florentino Martínez spoke against the chamber's resolution. Martínez reasoned that the disloyal Spaniards had left when Iturbide proclaimed the empire

and when the congress had declared for federalism. But, if a law of this type was needed, Martínez concluded, we should accept Molinos' proposal as the more just since it allowed no exceptions. Senator Juan de Dios Rodríguez protested that Molinos' proposal was unacceptable because it included congressmen, making the measure unconstitutional. Molinos defended his proposal, asserting that the chamber's resolution favored pre-1821 patriots over post-1821 patriots and distinguished between Spaniards who had been members of congress and those who had not. Molinos offered to alter his proposal so that it would not include "publicly elected employees" and could then be admitted for discussion.

Senator Gómez Farfás, the federalist leader, noted that three years had passed since the congress promised a general law regulating the possession of government posts during the revolt of General José María Lobato. Gómez Farfás favored Molinos' proposal which was "more in tune with public opinion." Senator Llave reported that the special commission on public security would support the new version of Molinos' proposal. Molinos' measure was then considered as a whole and, subsequently, accepted by a vote of 23-7.⁴⁸ In this manner, the chamber's resolution was dismissed and the discussion began on each article of Molinos' proposal. A measure was usually debated article by article after having been accepted "in general" by the senate or the chamber of deputies.

The first article of the proposal was placed under discussion in the following form: "No Spaniard may exercise any charge or post whatsoever in the Republic while the peninsula does not recognize Mexican independence." Senator Florentino Martínez raised an objection to the procedure being followed by the senate. Noting that the chamber's resolution had been discarded without coming to a vote, Martínez asserted that the senate as the "revisory chamber" should not disassociate itself from the resolutions forwarded to it by the lower house. Senators Juan de Dios Rodríguez and Florencio Castillo disputed Martínez's contention, citing past practice to demonstrate its fallacy. Molinos' proposal was returned to committee for revision as the session ended on April 25.

Debate was resumed in the senate on April 27, when the special commission on public security submitted a new version of article one, which read as follows:

No individual who may be of Spanish birth will be allowed to exercise either charge or post of any kind by appointment of the general and state congresses in any branch of public administration until Spain recognizes the independence of the Nation.⁴⁹

On the suggestion of Senator Cañedo, the article was divided for discussion purposes into two parts, the first part being limited to posts filled by the federal government. Cañedo and Molinos supported the clause because it applied to Spanish employees in general without introducing distinctions based on different classes of employees. Senator Florentino Martínez reiterated his contention that the only feasible solution would be to grant the president authority to purge employees whose loyalty was questionable. Cañedo countered Martínez's proposal

with a warning that, should this discretionary power be granted to the president, criticism would accrue to the executive. By exercising this authority, Cañedo contended, the president would be charged with either practicing favoritism or possessing animosity toward the Spaniards.

Senator Dr. Tomás Vargas interrupted the debate to object to the article's failure to include the employees of the secretariats of both the congress and the Supreme Court. When the commission agreed to remedy this deficiency, the first part of article one was approved by a vote of 28-7. The commission agreed to add the phrase " . . . appointed by the general powers," a change which would bring all federal employees under the jurisdiction of the law.

The second part of article one, which referred to posts in state governments, stirred the sensibilities of the federalist senators and had to be withdrawn by the commission. The clause would have authorized the federal government to remove all Spaniards from posts filled by the state governments, Senator Cañedo led the federalist opposition to the clause, which might have set a dangerous precedent from the federalist point of view. Cañedo asserted that, should the federal government be permitted to invade the rights of the states in this instance, the state treasuries would find themselves forced to pay the salaries of employees removed by the federal government. Federalist senators insisted that jurisdiction over posts in state government was an attribute of the state legislatures alone.

Defenders of the Spaniards, such as senators Paz and Florentino Martínez, were opposed to the clause also. Llave and Molinos, both members of the commission, had defended the second clause on constitutional grounds. The congress, noted Llave, was charged by constitutional provision 49 with the responsibility of safeguarding the independence and public peace of the nation. Molinos supported Llave's argument, citing similar instances in which the federal government had invaded the rights of the states in order to preserve peace and order. Molinos noted that the federal government had recently annulled all of the decrees issued by the state government of Durango because that government had been established unconstitutionally. But Molinos was forced to concede defeat and the principal article of the proposal was limited in its application to employees of the federation.

Article two was presented for debate in the following form:

The provisions of the first article will be extended to include the ecclesiastical charges and employments of both the secular and regular clergy in the economic, governmental, and judicial attributes. This disposition will not comprehend the Reverend Bishops.⁵⁰

For discussion purposes, the article was divided into two parts, corresponding to the two sentences. Senator José Agustín Paz opposed the first clause on the grounds that:

. . . the civil powers could not deprive canons of their benefices nor regulars of their prelacies which they had obtained canonically, nor the ecclesiastical cabildos of the government of its diocese without causing the delinquents of this class to go unattended by their superiors and their respective judges.

Senator José Manuel Cevallos also objected, arguing that the general congress could not proceed further on this matter which properly

pertained to the states. Senators Llave and Gómez Farías countered that the civil authority might do all that was necessary in the fulfillment of its function as protector of society. Among the faculties attributed to the civil power, noted Llave, was that of protecting individuals possessing the fuero eclesiástico from oppression by their superiors. Llave asserted that the measure was not an attack on the ecclesiastical cabildos, but upon some of the individuals pertaining to these bodies.

Gómez Farías pursued the argument further, noting that for the preservation of public tranquility, it was more important to remove ecclesiastics than military personnel since the former possessed funds, either of their own or pertaining to their provinces or religious communities, which could be used against the nation. The measure's proponents insisted that the matter pertained to the general congress rather than to those of the states because a number of ecclesiastics held offices with jurisdiction over areas not conforming to state boundaries.

The Spaniard's defenders raised new objections to the article. Senator Paz noted that some ecclesiastical cabildos would be forced to cease functioning due to the removal of a majority of their members. Moreover, certain religious houses, notably those of Carmen and San Fernando in the Federal District, would be unable to fill their offices due to a scarcity of members. Cañedo denied the validity of this argument, reasoning that the offices could and would be filled canonically with members from the lower ranks. Alpuche objected to

the tenor of the article, since even ecclesiastics fulfilling harmless tasks such as "singer of masses" (cantor de misas) and "attending chorus" (asistir al coro) would be excused from these functions. Senator Rodríguez replied for the commission that the intention of the article was not to remove Spanish ecclesiastics from these necessary functions. For that reason, the article said nothing about the disposition of the rents pertaining to these offices. The clause was approved by a vote of 27-7.

The second clause of article two, which would have preserved the Spanish bishops in their offices, was placed under discussion. Senators Martínez, Berduzco and Cárdeno opposed the exemption of the bishops who were "more dangerous than their inferiors by virtue of their greater influence and resources." Senators Rodríguez, Gómez Farfías and Molinos supported the clause in light of the scant number of prelates actually remaining in the republic. Only three bishops remained; the Spaniards Juan Cruz Ruiz Cabánas of Guadalajara and Manuel Isidro Pérez of Oaxaca, and the creole Dr. Joaquín Pérez of Puebla. The proponents of the measures noted that the removal of the prelates would cause unrest and foment charges of impiety against the congress. The presence of only two Spanish bishops posed no problem of surveillance. But Senator Martínez, a liberal, insisted that they should be removed from their temporal offices, reserving only essential spiritual functions such as confirmation and orders for the prelates. Senator José Manuel Galván proposed limiting the

exceptions to the present bishops since additional bishops might arrive to fill the vacancies, but Senator Llave considered the modification unnecessary since "no others would come without the approval and permission of the government by virtue of existing laws." The clause was approved by the senate: the Spanish bishops would not lose their posts in 1827.

At this point in the debate, the defenders as well as the opponents of the Spaniards introduced additions to article two, which had just been passed.⁵¹ Senator Alpuche proposed that Spaniards who had aided the cause of independence during the first epoch of the wars, as opposed to the Iturbidean epoch, be exempted from the purge of Spanish officeholders. Franco Coronel proposed that provision be made to exempt those born in Spain of Mexican parents. Senators Pedro José Guzmán and Franco Coronel suggested that Spaniards who had been married in Mexico be exempted. Senators Carlos María Bustamante and Franco Coronel proposed that Spaniards who might obtain either government posts or "facultative knowledge," which could be of use to the government, be exempted. Senator Berduzco suggested that Spanish ecclesiastics who had served in their positions for ten years or more be exempted. Senator Florencio Castillo proposed that exemptions be extended to those who, though born in the peninsula, had come to Mexico prior to their first birthday and had remained there permanently. The proposed additions to article two were forwarded to the special commission on public security for advisement.

Article three was placed under discussion in the following form:

The government shall be authorized to remove priests (curas), ministers (ministros) and curates (doctrineros) from their posts when it deems necessary, for the time period indicated in article one.

Federalists immediately objected to the application of this article to the states, causing the commission to rephrase the article in order to limit its application to the Federal District and the territories. Senator Galván called for a suspension of the debate until Berduzco's proposal, which called for the exemption of all ecclesiastics who had held their posts for ten or more years, could be considered. According to Galván, Spanish priests were few in number and deserved, like the bishops, to be exempted.

Senator Cañedo opposed article three because it authorized the government to remove ecclesiastical officeholders while the executive lacked the same authority over civil and military offices. Cañedo acknowledged, however, that there was a number of idle priests available to take the place of any who might be suspended. Senator Cevallos argued that respecting the missionary orders (misioneros), the faculty of removal should be left to the governors of the states who, should removal become necessary, might proceed with the appropriate prelates.

Senator Llave defended article three for the commission, noting that the article represented the lesser of two evils, separating only the guilty at present while allowing the resulting vacancies to be filled from the scarce number of available ecclesiastics. Article three was approved as it stood, and Alpuche and Berduzco withdrew

their additions in order to speed passage of the measure.⁵² Senator Paz then adopted Berduzco's proposal as his own. The senate suspended public debate at this point and entered into "ordinary secret" session.⁵³

On April 30, article four was admitted for debate, in the following form: "Employees separated by virtue of this law will receive their full salaries and credit for the time of their suspensions toward their careers."⁵⁴ The American creoles immediately objected to this provision. Senators Berduzco and Alpuche argued that the Spanish employees should be considered public employees who had been dismissed (cesantes) and, as such, should not be credited with the time of their suspension toward their retirement. Alpuche asserted that a large number of Spaniards would be dismissed as a result of this law and the senate, he insisted, lacked the right to better their lot in this manner. Senator Gómez Farfás urged that the dismissed employees be denied their salaries as well, since, being completely at liberty, they could shift for themselves.

The supporters of the commission's report, senators Llave and Rodríguez, noted that article four preserved the essence of the chamber's resolution while demonstrating that the nation was not removing the Spaniards out of rancor. Senator Rodríguez noted that the posts in question were held proprietarily rather than temporarily and, therefore, under existing laws their occupants could not be dismissed without remuneration. Government offices held permanently

were considered to be personal property and the fruits of that property accrued to its owner by right of law. The supporters of the law were divided over the question of the proprietary government posts under the republic.

The Spaniard's friends voiced concern over the effect article four might have on the already overburdened treasury. Senator Paz argued that article four would increase government spending and, consequently, require an increase in the "contribution." The point made by Senator Paz was designed to present the article as a financial matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the chamber of deputies rather than the senate. Molinos replied that the provision under consideration had been initiated in the chamber of deputies. Molinos insisted that justice demanded that the Spaniards receive their salaries, in conformity with the provisions of the plan of Iguala, "later ratified by the nation." The fact that the government posts vacated by Spaniards were not being suppressed, plus the fact that the Spaniards were ineligible for alternate positions, prevented the Spaniards de legibus from being classified as "dismissed employees" (cesantes), according to Molinos. The senator concluded that article four must be passed because article one had been passed: the removal of proprietary employees made remuneration necessary, regardless of the cost. The debate concluded with a defense by Rodríguez of the senate's right to ratify legislation which incurred expenses and to amplify initiatives sent to it by the chamber of deputies. Article four was approved in its original form.

Article five was presented for debate in the following form: "Vacancies occurring as a result of this law will be provisionally filled in conformity with existing laws." Senator Paz objected to article five on the grounds that a number of "facultative appointments" could not be filled by lower ranking employees. The term "facultative appointments" (empleos facultativos) referred to posts which required facultative or specialized knowledge. Paz also raised the question of the bonds (fianzas) required of some public employees. According to existing law, an employee substituting for his immediate superior in a post requiring a bond was entitled to receive the salary attached to the posts. The question of bonds was not mentioned in article five. Must the substitutes deposit bonds also? What was to become of the Spaniard's bonds?

Senator Rodríguez reminded Paz that the article called for the provisional occupancy of the posts in order to preserve the owner's property and that the offices were to be filled according to existing law. Paz and Cevallos challenged the supporters of the measure to specify which provisions regulating government posts were meant. Rodríguez, Alpuche and Molinos replied simply that the laws referred to were "those applicable to the respective cases." Article five was passed in its original form.

El Águila, taking note of the progress of the measure in the senate, reasoned on May 2 that the merit of some Spaniards, who were indispensable in their posts, would be recognized and that exceptions

would follow as a matter of course. The editors cited, as examples of meritorious Spaniards: Andrés del Rfo, Vicente Cervantes and Tomás Murfi.⁵⁵

The senate commission on public security submitted two new articles for the law on government posts in the session of May 4.⁵⁶ The opposition prevented consideration of the new articles "in general" prior to their discussion "in particular," a move which led Franco Coronel to protest the procedure. Rodríguez replied that the articles were merely additions to a measure which had already been approved. Rodríguez pointed out that one of the two new articles dealt with priests and was "absolutely necessary to complete the project." The senate agreed to discuss the articles separately.

Article seven was presented in the following form:

Priests removed from their posts by virtue of article three will continue to receive their emoluments in the same terms, while their substitutes, or coadjutors, will be paid by the public treasury.

Senator Martínez Zurita protested immediately, arguing that since priests will not be removed unless the government considers them dangerous, those removed would not be worthy of recovering all of their emoluments. Gómez Farfás and Llave noted that the faculty conceded to the government by article three was that the executive might exercise his own volition concerning the remaining employees. The article was approved as it stood.

Article eight extended the law to any foreigner who might be holding a post in Mexico when a state of war was declared between

his native country and Mexico. The article was opposed by proponents of the law such as Cañedo and Gómez Farfás as well as opponents such as Tarrazo and Cevallos. They argued that the case would not be the same for foreigners other than Spaniards. The Spaniards were dangerous precisely because they were the conquerors and colonizers of Mexico. The congress should pass a measure of this type only when and if a situation arose demanding it. Senators Molinos and Martínez supported the article, stressing the point that all men are attached to the country of their birth, making this type of law necessary. The article was passed over the opposition of Cañedo and Gómez Farfás.

The commission on public safety recommended that the majority of the additions proposed earlier be rejected.⁵⁷ The Bustamante-Franco Coronel proposal survived: Spaniards considered indispensable or possessing useful knowledge were to be exempted at the discretion of the federal government. The Franco Coronel proposal survived also: sons born in Spain of Mexican parents were to be excepted. The senate rejected the addition which would have exempted Spaniards who had served in the national congresses. Senators Alpuche and Berduzco argued that the mere act of having been a member of congress in the past did not indicate that an individual was above suspicion at present. The measure under consideration did not exempt those who had fought for independence prior to 1821, observed Alpuche and Berduzco, and congressmen were no more deserving than "those who had secured independence."

The measure was forwarded to the chamber of deputies for review. The lower house presented the senate resolution to the chamber's special commission on public tranquility, urging the commission to hasten its resolution. The commission presented its approval of the senate resolution as it stood at the following session on May 7.⁵⁸ Debate was scheduled for the following day with the cabinet ministers in attendance. El Aquila predicted that the measure would be passed within two days without undergoing the least alteration.

The chamber of deputies had sent a resolution to the senate on May 4 concerning the capitulados who had remained in Mexico.⁵⁹ All Spanish troops who had capitulated in 1821 under the guarantee that they would be shipped to Spanish territory, and had not married since 1821, were to be expelled from Mexican territory, by the terms of the chamber's resolution.⁶⁰ The chamber's special commission on public tranquility had recommended additions, which the chamber approved, allowing the capitulados to request letters of citizenship (cartas de ciudadanía). The chamber's resolution became stalled in the senate and never emerged as law. The time for expulsions, however qualified, was not yet at hand.

Debate in the chamber of deputies on the senate's government posts resolution commenced on May 8 and terminated on May 10 with the law of that date. The discussion began with the approval of a motion by José María Bocanegra that the discussion be limited to the additions recommended by the senate.⁶¹ Despite the approval of Bocanegra's proposal, the deputies embarked upon an exploration of the

moral questions involved, led by the defenders of the Spaniards. Deputy José Antonio Couto headed the attack on the measure. Couto was a member of the ecclesiastical cabildo of Puebla which, since it included six Spaniards among its members, would be destroyed by the passage of the measure under consideration.⁶²

The arguments presented by Deputy Couto against the resolution exemplified the, by this time, classic responses of the European creoles to the charges of the Spaniards' enemies. The law was unnecessary due to the small number of Spaniards present in the federation. The rich and influential Spaniards had already departed. Mexico's problems stemmed, not from the presence of the Spaniards, but from the presence of two antagonistic parties that divided the nation. The law would be dangerous because it would burden the treasury and made the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico more difficult to achieve by frightening the Spaniards who resided there. Additional problems would arise from the fact that the new officials would be operating without the prerequisite raise in pay and, in some case, without depositing the necessary bonds.

Deputy Anastasio Zerecero responded to Couto's challenge. After acknowledging that the galleries were filled with "the people who desire this measure," Zerecero proclaimed that "seven years of philanthropic and generous" co-existence should now end in order to preserve public peace. Prior to Lobato's revolt a petition calling for the removal of the Spanish employees had been presented to the congress bearing thousands of signatures. A second petition had been sent at

the same time by a number of Mexican employees who had offered to surrender a part of their salaries to aid the government in paying the salaries of the Spaniards who might be removed. Zerecero equated the removal of the Spaniards with Mexican patriotism.

Deputy Manuel Sánchez de Tagle replied to Zerecero by lecturing the chamber on the political thought of the frenchman Daunoy.⁶³ Tagle read lengthy excerpts from chapter eight of Daunoy's Essai sur les garanties in order to instruct his fellow deputies on the political importance of protecting rights constitutionally guaranteed. The measure was intrinsically unjust and unconstitutional. The senate had acted illegally by remitting a new measure in place of the chamber's original resolution. The injustice of the new proposal rested in its disavowal of established rights. The chamber must respect principles rather than the uncontrolled will of the people. Insurmountable complications would arise from preserving the Spaniard's salaries. But, above all else, Tagle was concerned about the fact that, henceforth, the Spaniards would be viewed as "proscribed persons whose status as Mexican citizens had been revoked."

Deputy Miguel Pacheco of Jalisco replied to Tagle's discourse by defending the "authority of the popular will," a justification which had been stressed by Zerecero.⁶⁴ "If the people demand more severe measures tomorrow," Pacheco announced, "they shall have a stronger law." The expulsion of the Spaniards was not out of the question. Rather, expulsion would be justified "if the Spaniards continue to plot against independence." Within fifty days, Pacheco

predicted, the world would know the true extent of the Arenas conspiracy. Generals Negrete, Echavarri and Gregorio Arana were involved in the conspiracy and it was known that Spanish employees had been in contact with the royal agents who arrived in 1823.

Deputy Manuel Crecencio Rejón joined in the defense of the measure by launching an attack on the ministry.⁶⁵ Rejón proposed that the cabinet be ordered to present to the chamber on the following day a list of the government posts granted to Spaniards during the past two years. Rejón wished to "make known the scandalous use which the government has made of the faculty granted to it to fill military and civil posts." He charged that military posts were given to "emigrant Spaniards who had arrived at the very moment our coasts were being assaulted." If the government had been more circumspect in this matter, Rejón concluded, this law would be less damaging to the public treasury.

The chamber voted against Rejón's proposal by the margin of 35-21. Pacheco attempted to save the proposal by requesting that the ministry produce a list, "without prejudice to the discussion," expressing the names, classes, time in service and salaries of all Spanish employees. Pacheco was forced to retire his proposal. The congress did not know in May 1827 the actual extent to which Spaniards were employed in the federal government. As a result, the senators and deputies were uncertain of the effect which the law might have on the federal bureaucracy, the military, and the Church. The Iturbidean law forbidding the classification of employees by national

origins had effectively disguised the identity of the Spaniards in the records of the federal government.

During the session of May 9, the chamber of deputies approved the empleos measure, article by article.⁶⁶ The vote margin on the first article, which removed the capitulados from military office, was 46-11. The law was signed on May 10 and published as a bando on May 14.⁶⁷ The laws' supporters in Mexico City gained access to the cathedral bells and urged the president to fire a cannon volley. Their request was refused.⁶⁸

Passage of the employments law was not celebrated by Mexico City periodicals. The "impartial" Aguila noted the considerable difference between Senator Molinos' original proposal and the final product.⁶⁹ El Aguila discounted rumors which held that the law was only preparatory to the expulsion of the Spaniards. Proper exceptions, "as demanded by circumstances," would surely be forthcoming, the editors concluded. El Sol, having always defended the Spaniard's interests, was distressed by the employments law.⁷⁰ The Correo considered the measure necessary, under the circumstances, as well as just, because it preserved the employees' emoluments.⁷¹

A partial list of Spanish employees was published by yorkinos in the office of Cabrera on May 10, entitled "Ejecución de justicia en coyotes despojados."⁷² It was republished in November 1827 on the eve of a new congressional debate on the Spanish question.⁷³ The American creoles succeeded, with the enforcement of this law, in

replacing the Spaniards in their government posts. The exceptions were rare, and limited to posts of a technical order such as engineering or positions in the Casa de Moneda in Mexico City. The burden on the treasury must have been great. But the Mexican aspirant to public office was willing to pay the price. A careful study of the cases of individual Spaniards, present in the Ramo de expulsión and the Ramo de gobernación, would provide a solid idea of the extent to which Spaniards occupied military and bureaucratic posts prior to May 10, 1827.

The government of General Guadalupe Victoria, guided by the counsel of its minister of war, committed itself to produce the legislation demanded by the leaders of armed petitions in the states. Under coercive circumstances, the federal congress passed the law of May 10, a measure which satisfied the demands of the regional revolutionists only until August 1827 when armed petitions were renewed in order to procure a federal law for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the nation.

The decree of May 10 provided that no Spaniard could exercise any public, civil or military post by federal appointment until Spain recognized Mexican independence. Included in this provision were ecclesiastical posts of an economic, administrative, and judicial nature for both secular and regular clergy, excluding the bishops. The federal government was authorized to separate priests and missionaries from their posts in the Federal District and in the territories until Spain should recognize Mexican independence. Employees

separated by virtue of the law were to enjoy their full salaries during their suspension and to receive credit for the period of their suspension in their careers. Posts vacated by virtue of the law of May 10 were to be filled provisionally in accordance with existing laws governing replacement. Priests separated by the federal government were to enjoy the emoluments of their posts while their substitutes would be paid from the public treasury. Individuals born in Spain of Mexican parents were exempted from the provisions of the law.

The federal law of May 10 was extended, by a presidential decree of May 18, to cover persons born in the islands adjacent to the Spanish peninsula.⁷⁴ Military personnel from the Canary Islands were also included. The Spaniards were suspended from their posts in accordance with the terms of the law of May 10. Some priests were suspended in the Federal District. Lucas Alamán lamented the removal of ranking military officials such as Brigadiers Rafael Ramiro and Agustín Bustillos, and the colonels Francisco Manuel Hidalgo, José Antonio Martiada, Leandro García, Santiago Moreno, Arista, Juan Bautista Miota, Miangolarra, José Batres and Eulogio Villa Urrutia, to name only a few.⁷⁵ The suspended employees continued to draw their salaries, in whole or in part. Persons immediately beneath them in the scale fulfilled the functions of the offices left vacant, but without enjoying the salaries commensurate with their new positions.⁷⁶

Notes

¹(3 vols.; Paris, 1837), II, 132-33, 137-38, 146.

²Carlos María Bustamante, Voz de la Patria (3 vols.; México, 1828-31).

³A nearly complete set of El Amigo exists in five volumes in the Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin.

⁴El Observador was reborn in March, 1830, only to die a second time in October, 1830. The two series exist in five volumes in the Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin.

⁵Porvenir de México (2nd. ed.; México, 1954), p. 269.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Juan Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; México, 1850-51), I, 82.

⁸Ibid.; Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico dedica a sus compatriotas; o sea una resena de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), p. 44; Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; Mexico, 1849-52), V, 765.

⁹Zerēcero to Editors, Correo de la Federación, I (January 22, 1827), 4.

¹⁰El Aguila Mexicana, V (January 29, 1827), 1.

¹¹Decree 11, January 29, 1827. San Luis Potosí. Colección de decretos y ordenes de la primera legislatura constitucional del estado libre de San Luis Potosí . . . (San Luis Potosí, 1829), p. 17.

¹²Decree 20, February 7, 1827; ibid., pp. 29-30.

¹³Order of Congress, February 13, 1827; ibid., p. 32; Bando in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 67, exp. 2 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG].

¹⁴Decree 29, March 2, 1827. San Luis Potosí. Colección de decretos, pp. 53-54.

¹⁵Correo, I (February 1, 1827), 4.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷"Constitución política del estado libre de México," Mexico, Colección de decretos y órdenes del congreso constituyente del estado libre y soberano de México (2 vols.; Toluca, 1848-50), I, 105-38.

¹⁸Título Primero, Capítulo II, Artículo 18.

¹⁹Artículo 18.

²⁰Artículo 2^o.

²¹Decree 20, April 23, 1827; ibid., II, 10.

²²Examples may be cited from Mexico and San Luis Potosí. The Spaniard Ramón Ceruti, a yorkino, obtained citizenship in the State of Mexico by Decree 75, October 10, 1827. Ibid., II, 33. The Spaniard Juan Estremera became a citizen of San Luis Potosí after the passage of both the state and federal expulsion law by means of Decree 76, February 7, 1828. San Luis Potosí. Colección de decretos, p. 193.

²³Correo, II (February 20, 1827), 4; II (March 4, 1827), 1.

²⁴Ibid., II (March 4, 1827), 1.

²⁵Ibid., II (February 20, 1827), 4.

²⁶Secretaría de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos. Memorias (México, 1827).

²⁷Correo, I (February 27, 1827), 4.

²⁸Quintero to Espinosa, February 24, 1827, México, in AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 14, fol. 1.

²⁹Senate, session of February 26, 1829; Correo, II (March 6, 1827), 1.

³⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of February 26, 1827; El Aguila, V (March 12, 1827), 1-2; V (March 16, 1827), 2.

³¹See the speech by Deputy Rejón in the session of February 26 in ibid., V (March 12, 1827), 2.

³²Ibid., V (March 12, 1827), 1-3; V (March 13, 1827), 1-3; V (March 14, 1827), 1-2.

³³Chamber of Deputies, session of April 7, 1827; ibid., V (April 20, 1827), 2.

³⁴The deputies supporting the proposal were: both Herreras, Llano, Esnaurrizar, Tames, Hevia, Barraza, Zerecero, Cuervo, Guido, Tornel, Bocanegra, Gondra, Domínguez, Pacheco, Escudero, Aburto, Olloqui, and Pérez Palacios.

³⁵El Aguila, V (April 22, 1827), 2-3.

³⁶Chamber of Deputies, session of April 9, 1829; ibid., V (April 22, 1827), 3.

³⁷Pedraza, p. 1.

³⁸Cuevas, p. 289.

³⁹Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (April 13, 1830); II (April 17, 1830).

⁴⁰Pedraza, p. 44.

⁴¹ibid.

⁴²El Aguila, V (April 20, 1827), 4.

⁴³Ramos Arizpe to Secretary, Special Senate Commission, April 19, 1827, Mexico, in ibid.

⁴⁴Senate, session of April 19, 1827; ibid., V (April 29, 1827), 2.

⁴⁵Senate, session of April 24, 1827; ibid., V (May 5, 1827), 1-2.

⁴⁶ibid.

⁴⁷Senate, sessions of April 24 and April 25, 1827; ibid., V (May 7, 1827), 1-2.

⁴⁸ibid.

⁴⁹Senate, session of April 27, 1827; ibid., V (May 8, 1827), 1-2.

⁵⁰Senate, session of April 28, 1827; ibid., V (May 11, 1827), 1-2.

⁵¹Senate, session of April 30, 1829; ibid., V (May 12, 1827), 1.

⁵²Alpuche's addition had called for exemptions for Spaniards who had aided the revolutions of 1810-18; Berduzco had suggested that Spanish ecclesiastics who had served in their posts for ten or more years be exempted.

⁵³ibid.

⁵⁴Senate, session of May 1, 1827; ibid., V (May 14, 1827), 1-2.

⁵⁵ibid., V (May 2, 1827), 4.

⁵⁶Senate, session of May 4, 1827; ibid., V (May 22, 1827), 1.

⁵⁷Senate, session of May 5, 1827; ibid., V (May 23, 1827), 1.

⁵⁸Chamber of Deputies, session of May 7, 1827; ibid., V (May 8, 1827), 4.

⁵⁹ibid.

⁶⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of May 4, 1827; ibid., V (May 26, 1827), 2.

⁶¹Chamber of Deputies, session of May 8, 1827; ibid., V (May 31, 1827), 1-2.

⁶²See Deputy Couto's speech in ibid.

⁶³ibid., V (June 1, 1827), 1-2.

⁶⁴ibid., V (June 4, 1827), 2-3; V (June 5, 1827), 1-2.

⁶⁵ibid., V (June 6, 1827), 1.

⁶⁶Chamber of Deputies, session of May 9, 1827; ibid., V (June 8, 1827), 1.

⁶⁷Decree 516, May 10, 1827. Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, Legislación mexicana. Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República (34 vols.; Mexico, 1876-1904), II, 12.

⁶⁸El Aquila, V (May 15, 1827), 4.

⁶⁹ibid., V (May 11, 1827), 4.

⁷⁰El Sol, II (May 11, 1827), 3-4.

⁷¹Correo, II (May 11, 1827), 3-4.

⁷²Lucas Alamán, Historia de México (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 766.

⁷³Published by the Imprenta de las Escalerillas a cargo del C. Jimeno. See José Villaverde to Editors, El Aquila, V (December 2, 1827), 4.

⁷⁴Minister of the Treasury José Ignacio Esteva discussed the decree in his Memoria for 1828. See Guía de Hacienda de la República Mexicana (México, 1825-28), pp. 63-64.

⁷⁵Alamán, V, 764-65.

⁷⁶Lorenzo Zavala, Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), II, 23. Zavala mistakenly dated the law August 3, 1827.

CHAPTER VII

THE MOVEMENTS AGAINST THE SPANIARDS IN THE STATES

The Removal of the Spanish Employees in the States

Under the federal system in force in Mexico in 1827, it would be necessary for each state government to legislate on the matter of officeholding by Spaniards if it wished to see them removed in all parts of the nation. In May state legislatures began debating their own measures for the removal of the Spaniards from state offices. The chamber of deputies of Oaxaca forwarded a projected law regulating state posts to the state senate on May 26.¹ The project extended the principal provisions of the federal law to the Spanish employees of Oaxaca, including the clause providing for termination of the suspensions upon Spain's recognition of Mexican independence. Spanish priests and curates, excepting only the bishop, were to be suspended and their substitutes would be selected by the bishop. All proprietary employees were to receive full salary for the duration of their suspension. Judges of the primary court of claims (de primera instancia) were to enjoy their full salaries during the term of their appointments. Non-proprietary employees would receive a salary equivalent to their average yearly earnings during the previous five-year period.

The state law passed in Querétaro on May 31 differed from the Oaxaca measure in that the former said nothing about Spanish clergy.²

	Fed. Gov't	Oaxaca	Queretaro	Zacatecas	Michoacán	Tabasco	México
Employees suspended until recognition by Spain	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Ecclesiastics: economic, administrative and judicial	X	X		X			
Receive full salaries and credit toward careers	X	X		X			
Receive two-thirds salaries.					X		
Maximum 1,000 pesos yearly; full salary if less			X				
Half salaries and credit toward careers							
Ecclesiastical substitutes paid by public treasury	X						
Bishops excepted	X	X					
Mexicans born in Spain exempted (Mexican parents)	X		X*	X		X	
Covered Spanish Isles and Canary Isles	X		X				
Mexican employees immediately below advance	X	X	X	X			
Private employees also suspended with full pay			X				
(New employee receives pay half- gov't. half private)							
New proprietary employee but old also get salary					X		
Spaniards may not gain elective office				X			
Governor, in council, may remove or expel ecclesiastics							X

*If "notoriously addicted to the federal system."

Figure 5. The Laws Removing the Spaniards from Their Government Posts in 1827.

Suspended employees were to receive half-salary and the time of their suspension toward their careers. The Querétaro law differed from both the federal and the Oaxaca laws in that it removed the Spaniards from their posts in industry and commerce as well as in government. Spaniards other than public employees were said to function within the state with its approval and authorization. Private employees were to be suspended also, but with their salaries intact. The state promised to pay one-half the salary of the Spaniard's substitute, while the employer would be responsible for the remaining half, in addition to the full salary of the suspended Spaniard.

The first decree on the Spanish question passed by the congress of Mexico state was concerned with Spanish ecclesiastics rather than state employees.³ The law of June 1 granted the governor the right to request the suspension of any Spanish ecclesiastic from his office (destino) or benefice (beneficio), either secular or regular, by the competent Church authority. The governor was to expel the suspended ecclesiastic from the state, should public tranquility demand it. The suspended Spaniard was to enjoy a part of his emoluments, according to state laws already in effect.

The state congress of Chiapas passed a law on August 27, 1827 removing Spaniards from their posts, according to Governor Ygnacio Velasco's Memoria of 1828.⁴ Zacatecas' state congress passed a law removing Spaniards from government posts on September 6.⁵ The suspended employee was to receive two-thirds salary and the coverage of the law was extended to ecclesiastics. No Spaniard could obtain an

elective post in the future. Spaniards expelled from other states were prohibited from residing in Zacatecas.

Some state laws on the matter of government posts were passed in conjunction with or as a result of the state laws of expulsion. In Michoacán, for example, state posts held by Spaniard were vacated as a result of the state expulsion decree, a fact which led to the passage of a law on November 9 clarifying the question of the Spaniards' removal.⁶ The Michoacán law preserved the full yearly salary of the suspended Spaniards, with the proviso that the maximum paid would be 1,000 pesos yearly. The state of Mexico passed a second law on October 16, granting preference to citizens and residents of the state in the acquisition of employments.⁷ Perhaps this was aimed at preventing vecinos of the capital from competing for posts in the state of Mexico.

The states decreed the replacement of the Spanish employees by Mexicans, but on a temporary basis and without serious financial loss, in many cases, to the Spaniards. Only in the case of Querétaro was the Spanish merchant covered in the employments laws. Ecclesiastics were a special case and, except in Mexico state, when they were removed it was only from their secular functions. After the state laws of expulsion were passed, new laws, such as that of Michoacán, authorized the state governments to allot new proprietary employments to replace the Spaniards who were being expelled. This did not mean that the salaries of the Spaniards would be cut off. In the state of Mexico, for example, the families of expelled former state employees continued to enjoy a pension from the state government.⁸ Spanish

military officials in the states were suspended by their regional commanders in accordance with the terms of the federal law of May 10.

The Renewal of the Expulsion Movements in the States

The government of the State of Jalisco continued in 1827 to be the most vocal and uncompromising focus of anti-Spanish feeling in the republic. Perhaps this fact was related to the separatist aspirations of the western region as well as the link between the old Spaniards and the centralist republicans and monarchists. The congress of Jalisco scheduled an extraordinary session for July to discuss the question of the Spanish residents and internal security.⁹ El Sol feared that the goal of the yorkinos in this session would be to produce a state law for the expulsion of the Spaniards. The fears of the escoceses were justified. In August the state congress began debate on expulsion proposals. The Spaniards of Jalisco were defended by European creoles such as Luis Cayetano Portugal and Juan Cresencio Hermosillo.¹⁰ The American creole attack was led by Deputy Pacheco Leal, whose discourses were published by the yorkino press in Mexico City in 1829.¹¹ Jalisco passed the first law of expulsion in the republic on September 3, 1827.¹²

The Jalisco law as well as the subsequent state laws of expulsion were the result of a series of revolts which increased in strength and intensity from January through December 1827. Mexican historians have seen a system or plan behind these movements. The armed petitions produced results under a yorkino supported government which they failed

to produce under the escocés-supported Executive Power. Armed petitions of late 1826 had preceded the election of yorkist majorities in state and federal congresses. Armed petitions preceded the passage of the federal law of May 10 and the subsequent employment laws of a number of the states. Beginning in August an intense campaign of armed petitions produced expulsion laws in the states and, finally, in the federal congress. Passage of these laws was justified as the only means of restoring public peace and military obedience. Local military commanders either failed to restrain the disturbances or were often themselves restrained by Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza, to the horror of the Spaniards and European creoles.

Pedraza's contention that the government was powerless to halt the revolt found support in the correspondence of the cabinet ministers with the governors and commanders of the disturbed areas.¹³ The movements had a popular base. Government correspondence did not refer to the revolts as "yorkino-inspired," nor did Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros, official in charge of the ministry of relations, warn the governors against an organized masonic conspiracy. Rather, the government instructed the governors and military commanders to watch events closely, reporting developments to Mexico City. The cabinet repeatedly assured the revolutionists that the state and federal congresses would produce the laws of expulsion which the public desired.

It is perhaps important to note that Espinosa de los Monteros was from July 6, 1826, until March 7, 1828, 'major official in charge

Origin of the Revolt	State or Territory	Month (1827)
Guadalajara	Jalisco	August
Chihuahua	Chihuahua	August
Acapulco	México	September
Ajusco	México	September
Llanos de Apam	México	September
Toluca	México	September
Orizaba	Veracruz	September
Valladolid	Michoacán	October
Oaxaca	Oaxaca	November
Huamantla	Tlaxcala	November
Puebla	Puebla	December
Veracruz	Veracruz	December
Atenco	México	December
Mixcoac	Federal District	December

Source: Ramo de gobernación, leg. 66, exps. 5, 8-13, fols. 1-369.

Figure 6. Some Armed Petitions of 1827 Calling for the Expulsion of the Spaniards.

of the ministry of relations," rather than minister of relations. The cabinet, which should have been headed by its minister of relations, was, from the departure of Sebastián Camacho for London until three months after the passage of the expulsion law, without a prime minister. Espinosa de los Monteros, like Pedraza, was sympathetic to the yorkino cause without being a member of that brotherhood.¹⁴ Minister of War Pedraza apparently directed the cabinet, to the degree that General Guadalupe Victoria operated on the advise of the war minister. In this state of affairs, Pedraza received the blame or the praise, depending on whether the observer was pro-escocés or pro-yorkino, for the fate of the Spaniards in 1827-28.

Sebastián Camacho returned from London in August and might have accepted the ministry of relations post but for yorkino opposition. Instead, he retired to Jalapa and the Victoria government continued under the influence of the yorkinos and its minister of war. General José Morán, the army chief of staff, was relieved of his post in early November by the minister of war.¹⁵ Morán was an escocés and an officer who had pledged his support for the Spaniards. His frequent criticisms of Pedraza's conduct of affairs and the attacks of the yorkinos on the ex-Marquis of Vivanco provided the rationale behind his removal.¹⁶

The undeclared civil war may be said to have begun with the revolt at Acapulco, by Lt. José María Gallardo on August 27.¹⁷ Gallardo and his followers, most of whom were not soldiers, robbed and killed Spaniards near Acapulco. When notified of these developments by the

municipal corporation of Texpan, General Isidro Montes de Oca, the commander of the southern region refused to take any action of a military nature. The Spaniards of Texpan fled to Acapulco where the local ayuntamiento attempted to defend them, but without complete success. General Montes de Oca refused to cooperate with the civil authorities.

Lt. Gallardo moved on to the pueblo of Atoyac where he seized a Spaniard whom he forced to lead the band to the house of a second Spaniard. These Spaniards were shot and their houses sacked. Gallardo moved on collecting rifles from haciendas. When he returned to his barracks, he had 200 men. At length, Montes de Oca received orders from the federal government to confront the rebels. The general encountered Gallardo at Puerto de Coyuca where they entered into conversations which were reported to the federal government. The president responded with the following instructions:

In view of what you have told us . . . enter into relations with these unhappy soldiers who are fascinated by Gallardo, and assure them in the most positive manner that the government until today in no way considers them delinquents because it understands that their proceedings are born of a misunderstood patriotism and not from another less laudable motive . . . finally, that they should not by their resistance give cause for severe measures to be taken . . . since up to now, fortunately, there has been no need for them . . .¹⁸

In order to disperse the roving bands of armed men, the cabinet in Mexico City rationalized criminal acts which had already occurred by protesting that nothing had happened that could not be forgiven.

In Jalisco the law of September 3 was preceded by considerable activity on the part of the yorkinos Anastasio Zerecero and Olloqui, deputies from Guadalajara to the federal congress. Rumors spread in

Mexico City that the grand consistory of the yorkinos in the capital had ordered the two deputies from Jalisco to get the measure started in the state congress. It was also said that the grand consistory had suggested that the military commanders of the neighboring states promote armed petitions aimed at the expulsion of the Spaniards to help achieve the measure's passage.¹⁹

The yorkino leader and governor of Mexico state, Lorenzo Zavala, attributed the campaign of violence to the yorkino lodges. The yorkinos believed and taught that without the expulsion of the Spaniards "the security of liberty and national independence" could not be assured. Zavala states:

As governor of the state of Mexico, I daily received denunciations against the Spaniards of Cuernavaca. Cuautla de Amilpas and Llanos de Apam who were said to be collecting arms . . . All of these charges were fictions of party . . .²⁰

State governments were not always inclined to see the Spaniards persecuted, as the Tabasco case will illustrate. In July Governor Agustín Ruiz de la Peña, whose faction included Spaniards, revolted against the new legislature which had attempted to prevent his intervention in recent elections.²¹ The federal government lent its moral support to the legislature and the regional military commander arrested the governor, bringing the revolt to an end by October.²² The federal government could act with energy and confidence in the suppression of unpopular movements.

In August the chamber of deputies of the state of Mexico began debate on a proposed law of expulsion. Governor Zavala, who was opposed to the measure, circulated a letter among the governors of all

the states in which he protested his opposition.²³ The Chihuahua chamber of deputies was also debating the expulsion question at this time. Espinosa de los Monteros informed the governor of Chihuahua that, in the opinion of the federal government, the matter was the proper concern of the general congress since it involved a question of constitutional guarantees.²⁴ The proposal was set aside by the Chihuahua chamber in compliance with the wishes of the federal executive. Governor Leandro Gómez of Durango ordered, on September 17, Espinosa's letter published and circulated throughout his state to demonstrate to his enemies the rectitude of the state government's course of action in not passing anti-Spanish legislation.²⁵

Revolts accompanied the debate in Mexico state as they had in Jalisco. For the federal government, revolts in Mexico state were of particular importance since the Federal District was surrounded by the state. Zavala maintained that the wealthiest Spaniards owned rural estates in the state of Mexico. The revolts forced these Spaniards to flee to the Federal District. In his history of the period, Zavala argued that his vice-governor, Manuel Reyes Veramendi, and the military commander of the southern region, General Isidro Montes de Oca, supported the revolts.²⁶

On the night of September 11, Lt. Colonel Manuel González announced his revolt in Ajusco, only six leagues from the capital. González informed Zavala at Tlalpam of his motives, whereupon many of the inhabitants of Tlalpam departed for Ajusco to support the revolt which Zavala opposed. Zavala suspected eleven of the twenty-one

deputies in the state legislature plus the vice-governor of complicity in the movement. The conspiracy quickly spread across the state: Colonel Espinosa in the Llanos de Apam, Pascual Muñoz and Ramón Parres in Toluca, General Montes de Oca and Colonel Alvarez at Aca-pulco, all rebelled in rapid succession. A state law of expulsion was passed on October 1 by a majority vote in the legislature. Governor Zavala and General Vicente Guerrero persuaded all but General Montes de Oca to disarm and await the passage of the federal expulsion law.²⁷ Minister of War Pedraza assured the revolutionists that they would receive amnesty and urged them to refrain from committing additional acts of violence.²⁸

The local militias were important as a source of potential armed revolutionists. In order to observe the process of an armed petition against the Spaniards by the militia, a close look at the revolt in Valladolid is in order. On October 23 the state legislature was confronted with the armed militias of Tarimbaro and Tiripitio, commanded by the first adjutant of Tarimbaro, Ignacio Vázquez.²⁹ Following the arrival of Vázquez, the governor found that he had insufficient force to resist, since the local cavalry garrison of only 200 men would not confront the more numerous militia. Vázquez took the title "chief protector of public opinion." In order to finance their enterprise, the rebels took funds from the office of the tobacco monopoly in the village of Tarimbaro. The revolutionists in Mexico state had seized local municipal funds for their cause, setting a precedent which was no doubt followed wherever possible by the

revolutionists of other states. Governor Antonio Castro became particularly concerned about Vázquez's movement after the revolutionist seized weapons from an hacienda owned by a Spaniard on the night of October 25. General Vicente Filisola sent an officer to persuade Vázquez to lay down arms, assuring him that the general would intervene personally with the president on Vázquez's behalf. The adjutant responded that a "patriotic junta" in Valladolid had named him to restore peace and public order; that his division consisted of 4,000 men and 700 horses, and that his plan consisted of achieving the expulsion of the Spaniards in order to permanently assure independence. Vázquez promised that property would be protected, but that, should his unit be attacked, they would fight.

The "patriotic junta" of Valladolid which Vázquez had cited as his sponsor, was, according to Bustamante, a yorkino lodge located in the episcopal house of Valladolid, whose prominent leaders were Vice Governor José Salgado, Canon Martín Carrasquedo and First Adjutant Vázquez. José Salgado would soon become governor of Michoacán. The role of the vice governors in the state revolts was central. Since the governor was responsible to the federal government and to the state congress, the vice governor was able to undermine the position of the governor, should the need arise, by contracting an alliance with the state military commander or with a junta of officials below the commander. The military could easily intimidate a recalcitrant state congress, extracting an expulsion decree which conformed to the alleged or actual state of public opinion.

There were only 200 men of the civil militia (cívicos) in arms in the service of the government at Valladolid on October 25. It was thought that the majority of the active troops of the line were for Vázquez. The government also thought that the revolutionists remained close to Valladolid because they were receiving arms from the city itself and because they hoped to intimidate the congress. New troops arrived from Zinapécuaro on October 26 to increase the size of the rebel forces. General Filisola called for a council of war and Governor Castro announced his refusal to compromise with the revolutionists. A number of heads of small neighboring villages offered local contingents to support the government. The gates to the city were kept under heavy guard. When the rebels were reinforced with militia from Cueneo, Governor Castro requested that the congress send a representative to Mexico City to plead for aid from the federal government. President Pérez Gil of the chamber of deputies, was sent to the capital where, according to Bustamante, "he was heard with the usual false política" of Victoria.³⁰

Deputy Manuel Sánchez de Tagle of Michoacán also requested federal troops, as well as the replacement of Commander Filisola, who was suspected of complicity, by the commander at Chilapa, Colonel José Esteban Moctezuma.³¹ Minister of War Pedraza selected Mariano Villa Urrutia's second cavalry to reinforce Valladolid, but chose an itininerary which required 15 days to reach the capital of Michoacán. The civil militia of Valladolid demanded of the state congress that

Filisola be kept as regional commander. On November 4, Governor Antonio Castro attempted to depart with a contingent troops for Patzcuaro but General Filisola sent orders for a countermarch to Valladolid. In Mexico City General Luis Cortazar, the commander of Guanajuato, was named commander of Michoacán. But Cortazar could not be expected, according to Bustamante, to counter "the plans of the Grand Lodge in Mexico City."

On the evening of November 7, a delegation appeared at the west gate to the city of Valladolid, bearing letters for Governor Castro which called for the expulsion of the Spaniards. The governor refused to accede to their demands. On the following day he sent the letters to the congress, with a note stating that, should the congress wish to consider the matter in view of the threat from the rebels, he would resign the governorship. When the rebels appeared on the hill above the city on November 8, Governor Castro led his regiment out onto the plain. Before Castro could give further orders, he was arrested by his adjutant Valenzuela and two officers, Cardona and Suárez, who then ordered the troops to pass over to the rebels. General Filisola informed the congress that the regiment had "defected" and that the civil militia had followed their example. There remained to the government, according to Filisola, only the few officials faithful to Castro and the congressional guards. Filisola noted that "all the people" were in the plain with the rebels and that Vázquez awaited the decision of the authorities.

The congress passed the law of expulsion, Governor Castro resigned and Vázquez entered Valladolid, bringing with him more than 700 of his own men, the Valladolid regiment and the civil militia. Among those accompanying Vázquez were Vice Governor Salgado, Canon Carrasquedo, Presbiter Carvajal and others who were reported to be yorkinos. Two versions of the events at Valladolid were reported to the federal government; that sent to General José Morán by Governor Castro and that reported by General Filisola to the president. While Filisola emphasized the strength of the rebels and the popularity of their cause, Castro reported that the rebels possessed no more than 100 rifles, some carried only swords or machetes, while many had no weapon at all. According to Castro, the revolt had been decided by betrayal rather than military strength. General Luis Cortazar arrived shortly in Valladolid, not to suppress the revolt but to "arbitrate between the contending parties." The interview between Cortazar and Filisola produced no change in the state of affairs.³²

Whether Bustamante's detailed version of the course of events at Valladolid was wholly accurate, it seemed clear that the pattern followed by the revolution there was essentially the same as that unfolding in Mexico state. The length of the revolt and threat to property and personal security resulting from the revolt was in direct proportion to the willingness of the governor and the state congress to produce an expulsion law. Whether the Grand Lodge in Mexico City arranged these matters, as Mexican historians have said, or the events

were an authentic reflection of Zerecero and Berduzco's "popular will," the yorkinos effectively excited popular support through propaganda and military insubordination.

Events in Oaxaca followed a different course, perhaps because the popular movement lacked a representative in the executive office and a majority in the legislature. Colonel Santiago García effectively eliminated the state government in November by seizing the capital, arresting the military commander, and establishing a governing junta of public safety whose job it was to enforce the plan of García.³³ The Oaxaca revolt lasted from November 20 until December 28, 1827. During this period, the junta reviewed the status of each Spaniard residing in Oaxaca, issuing an exemption (resguardo) to those not covered in the terms of the plan.³⁴ García published his plan on the government press and circulated it throughout the state of Oaxaca. The congress, failing to receive military aid from the federal government, passed a moderate measure for the expulsion of the Spaniards. The ruling Junta of Public Safety found the measure weak when compared with García's plan and continued to enforce the latter. The junta functioned as the executive authority of the state until the federal law of expulsion reached Oaxaca.

Puebla also suffered popular unrest related to the Spanish question in late November and December 1827.³⁵ The press of El Patriota, the yorkino voice in Puebla, issued a "plan of operations," aimed at obtaining the total expulsion of the Spaniards from the state. The

plan had originated in Matamoros in November and was signed by Francisco Espinosa de los Monteros, Manuel de Arruti, Juan Cortés and Mariano Juárez, all of whom were military officials.³⁶ The ayuntamiento of Puebla treated with the revolutionists, assuring them of their personal safety, should they surrender their arms.³⁷ Local authorities were convinced that the rank and file serving under the rebellious officers had no conception of the illegality of their activities, a circumstance which, according to the intermediaries, made the offer of amnesty justifiable and imperative. Governing officials were convinced in each of these revolts that the soldiery did not recognize the extra-legal nature of their activities. Pedraza cites this fact as the justification for the government's amnesty policy.³⁸

By December, twenty-seven officers with their men had joined the revolt in Puebla and acts of violence and looting had begun.³⁹ The revolutionists of Puebla attempted to link their cause to that of their counterparts in Michoacán, demanding the expulsion of the Spaniards according to the terms of the plan of Valladolid. In order to calm public spirit, the state chamber of deputies began debate on an expulsion proposal.⁴⁰ During the ensuing debates, mobs sacked stores and homes belonging to Spaniards. A band of Spaniards from the hacienda of San Nicolás in Chietla took up arms and was arrested by local authorities. Governor José María Calderón dispersed the mob, at length, with a show of force, bringing upon himself the ire of the

yorkino press. El Patriota circulated a pamphlet entitled "Victory of General Calderón," which was intended to portray the governor as the protector of the Spaniards and to renew the demand for an expulsion decree.⁴¹

The armed petition in Puebla was renewed in December when the state chamber of deputies produced a measure which the revolutionists considered unsatisfactory.⁴² The goal was now the removal of the governor and the chamber of deputies as well as the expulsion of the Spaniards. The revolt took on new significance, in the view of the federal government, when a retired military official attempted to organize a centralist movement. This development stemmed from the fact that the federal congress was discussing a more severe expulsion law. The threat of a centralist revolt brought an immediate reaction from the cabinet in Mexico City, which was not willing to extend amnesty to revolutionists who attacked the federal system.⁴³

Minister of War Pedraza sent General Mariano Diez de Bonilla to Puebla to protect the legal government. On December 14, Pedraza informed Espinosa de los Monteros that the federal expulsion measure, having passed the chamber of deputies, was being sent to the senate for final revision and approval, a fact which "made the reunions unnecessary and lacking in purpose."⁴⁴ Calderón wrote that the revolutionists in Puebla were still under arms because they wanted reassurances concerning amnesty.⁴⁵ A promise to that effect was forthcoming and the armed groups retired to their homes.⁴⁶

The last of the series of revolts in 1827 for the expulsion of the Spaniards occurred in the Federal District in December. The purpose of these final movements was to coerce the federal congress to produce an expulsion law acceptable to the revolutionists. The civil militia of San Angel gathered in Mixcoac under Colonel Manuel González to petition the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Federal District. Ignacio Esteva, governor of the Federal District and a yorkino founder, informed the rebels that the federal congress was "working night and day" to produce an expulsion law.⁴⁷ Governor Esteva made it clear that he did not consider it proper to employ force against the legislative body.

While the government correspondence does not speak of a yorkino plan of revolt, Minister of War Pedraza suggested as much in his New Orleans manifesto.⁴⁸ Zavala, a founder of the brotherhood and governor of Mexico state at the time, pointed to a yorkino plan to make anti-Spanish feeling popular. For Luis G. Cuevas and Lucas Alamán, these events were all a part of yorkino empleomanía, or what Cuevas called "a vile speculation in offices."⁴⁹ The yorkinos endeavored to make passage of the expulsion laws appear to be the only means of restoring order and public order. The government agreed with the yorkinos. The federal congress, as well as the state congresses, was intimidated by the revolutionists, especially by those of Mexico state. By the end of 1827 all of the states had passed measures expelling the Spaniards from their territories.⁵⁰ The policy pursued by the minister of war

was justified on grounds that the laws were needed to assure the future peace and preservation of the federal republic. While the Victoria government viewed the Spaniard as an internal threat, it was moved to carry out his expulsion more from its desire to resolve internal tensions than from its concern for national security. An empty treasury in Mexico City possibly contributed as much to the federal government's weakness as its stated view that the revolutionists were "misguided patriots."

The Expulsion Law of Jalisco

Jalisco produced the first law for the expulsion of the Spaniards on September 3, establishing a pattern for the other states of the republic.⁵¹ The Spaniards were required to depart from Jalisco within twenty days and would not be allowed to re-enter the state until Spain recognized Mexican independence. Exceptions were granted to Spaniards married to Americans or who had American children, and to those who were physically impeded from departing. These exceptions could not be granted to capitulados, nor to Spaniards who had arrived after 1821, nor to Spaniards who had been hesitant to pledge to accept and uphold national independence.

The government of Jalisco was charged with the responsibility of seeing that no Spaniard came to reside within the state prior to Spanish recognition. All Spaniards were declared suspended from the exercise of their government posts, except those who had received special appointments from the state government. All suspended employees, those

departing as well as those remaining, were to receive their full salaries, either until the end of their prescribed appointment or until the end of 1828, if they had been appointed on a temporary basis. Ecclesiastics were to receive their dotations "until the declaration and regulation of the patronage" (patronato). Priests were to receive an annual sum equivalent to their average remuneration, calculated from a previous five-year period. Substitutes or assistants were to receive a salary to be assigned by the government from the state treasury, not to exceed half the dotation assigned to the priest replaced.

Restrictions were placed upon the resident Spaniard's right of assembly as well as his right to bear arms and to change his place of residence. He was to appear before the local authorities on the first day of each month. A record was to be made on each Spanish resident, stating his name, age, marital status, residence and mode of living. These records would be passed on to the state congress during its sessions in 1828.

The government of Jalisco was authorized to seize and administer, for the duration of the state of war, all properties pertaining to persons residing in enemy territory. The fruits of such properties were to be accounted for by the government and handed over to their rightful owners when the state of war ceased. Violators of the expulsion law would be sentenced to five years at the garrisoned fortress (presidio) of Mescala, following which they would be deported from the state.

Instructions for the use of officials concerned with the enforcement of the law were also issued.⁵² The official directive provided that Spaniards excepted from the expulsion were to appear before the authorities of their locality within twenty days to present the personal information required for the report requested by congress. Within the same period, Spaniards with physical impediments were to appear to have their appeals judged. Transient Spaniards were to present their passports to the first political authority encountered within the state. If the Spaniard's documents were found to be in order, he would be granted a safe conduct (salvo conducto), which should be reported to the state government. Local police officials (jefes de policía) were to compile a list of employees who had been removed from their posts.

Spaniards excepted from the expulsion in Jalisco were ordered to present the firearms which they possessed to the authorities, following which they would be licensed to retain only those judged necessary for their personal defense. Local police officials were to compile a record of the properties in their jurisdictions pertaining to individuals residing in "enemy territory" in order to enable the government to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to such estates.

The Jalisco law was at once more thorough and more complex than the subsequent state laws of expulsion. Published more than a month prior to the Mexico state law, the Jalisco measure became the model

or prototype for the future efforts of neighboring states. Due to its revolutionary implications, the Jalisco law launched a vigorous debate in the federal senate, the purpose of which was to resolve the question of the constitutionality of the state law. The federal government had maintained in its correspondence with the governments of Chihuahua and other states where revolts had occurred in August, that the Spanish question was a matter for the federal congress to decide because of the constitutional guarantees involved. The federal constitution of 1824 extended to the senate the authority of review over legislation emerging from the state legislatures.

Espinosa de los Monteros informed the chamber of deputies as early as September 4 that the expulsion measures being discussed in some legislatures had alarmed foreigners and divided public opinion "among people of all classes."⁵³ The acting minister relayed the government's opinion that "all decrees of this type pertain exclusively to the national congress and should be reserved to its deliberations." On September 14, Espinosa de los Monteros forwarded the expulsion law of Jalisco to the chamber of deputies where it was sent to the commission on constitutional matters.⁵⁴ The chamber was hesitant to discuss the proposition stated by the acting minister. The assertion that the Spanish question was a constitutional matter appropriate to the general congress sounded like centralism to the more ardent federalists, and, when asked to restate its contentions in the form of an initiative, the ministry refused. The Correo asserted that even the discussion of this question would "alarm the states."⁵⁵

In the senate on September 15 the commission of government (gubernación) called for a statement of opinion by the government on the Jalisco decree. The commission presented, in the meantime, its resolution for discussion in the senate:

The decree published in the state of Jalisco on September 5 concerning the expulsion of the Spaniards residing in its territory is contrary to articles 49 and 50, faculty 31, of the General Constitution and to article 30 of the Constitutive Act.

Senator José María Alpuche, a member of the commission, dissented from the majority report and presented his opinion in the session of September 17, with Espinosa de los Monteros in attendance.⁵⁶

Alpuche denied that the Jalisco law had occasioned disorders in other states, as charged by the majority report. Disavowal of the Jalisco law, he reasoned, would not contribute to peace. State legislatures must determine when a law is unconstitutional. The Spaniards who deserve guarantees should receive them but those who do not should be expelled. Alpuche proposed a substitute resolution:

Reserve the revision of decrees from the state legislatures concerning the Spaniards until the General Congress dictates a law which, clearly expressing the limits granted by the constitution to the states in this matter, provides guarantees for the Spaniards and foreigners and regulates the conservation and expulsion of capitulados and other suspicious persons.

Federalist senators warned that the general congress must not become involved in the "internal administration of the states" by striking down a state law without first establishing guidelines for the use of the states in determining what is constitutional in these cases. An important defector from their ranks was Juan de Dios Cañedo

of Guadalajara who, though a senator from Jalisco, supported the commission resolution. Cañedo spoke for the unconstitutionality of the Jalisco law which, he felt, violated the constitutionally guaranteed liberty of persons to reside where they wished, threatened the social contract and violated the fundamental guarantee of union. "The rights of man and the citizen are sacred in a constituted republic," Cañedo declared, "What can a few thousand disgraced men do against seven millions with the power of the government and the army?"

Valentín Gómez Farfás, also a senator for Jalisco, argued that the basic premises of the resolution were false: public order had not been disturbed by the law, nor were foreigners disturbed by it. In order to end the violent acts against the Spaniards, congress should dictate a measure, not against all the Spaniards, but against the ecclesiastics, the capitulados, and "those who did not enjoy the rights of citizenship." Senator José Agustín Paz responded that should the Spaniards be expelled, the paralization of commerce would result, as well as international embarrassment. "We must learn from the example set by our sister Colombia," Paz observed, "who due to political differences is threatened with civil war . . . in spite of the fact that the Spaniards were expelled some years ago."

The commission of government presented a reformed version of its resolution on September 18:⁵⁷

The decree published in Jalisco on September 5 concerning the expulsion of Spaniards resident in the territory of the state, is contrary in its articles 1, 2, and 3, to articles 49 and 50, faculty 31, of the General Constitution and to article 30 of the Constitutional Act.

Senator Alpuche attempted to introduce his proposition a second time but was prevented by a vote in which only Gómez Farfás and Acosta joined him in voting favorably. Gómez Farfás attacked the new resolution, denying that the Jalisco decree violated individual guarantees. Gómez Farfás observed that twelve legislators had introduced a similar proposal into the congress of Mexico state. The courts are too slow, he insisted, and there are too many persons involved in cases of conspiracy already, making rapid action on cases of this type impossible. The dangerous Spaniards must be removed now before they can hurt us.

The vote on the committee resolution revealed the identity of the hard core anti-Spanish group in the senate. The law of employments of May 10 had been created in the senate where a favorable majority of approximately three to one existed. The expulsion question found the senate opposed in September by nearly the same ratio: the vote against the Jalisco law was 24 to 9. The senators who upheld the constitutionality of the law were Acosta, Alpuche, Berduzco, Francisco García, Gómez Farfás, Pablo de la Llave, Pablo Paredes, Juan de Dios Rodríguez and Agustín Viesca. The "Exalted" federalists as they were known, were the hard core enemies of the Spaniards.

The senate, having approved the resolution condemning the Jalisco law, proceeded to discuss the law article by article. Senator Llave wanted it understood that his vote against the resolution was not an indication that he favored the Jalisco law, rather it was an appeal for the establishment of constitutional guidelines to be

followed by the states in these cases. Senator Cañedo defended the resolution, maintaining that the Jalisco decree violated "the rights of man and the citizen." Senator José María Castillo Portugal objected to the Jalisco law because it failed to distinguish between "good Spaniards," who possessed citizenship and the rights extended by the constitution as a result of having joined the independence movement, and "bad Spaniards," who, failing to join the movement, were supposed to leave.

A distinction between Spaniards "resident in" Jalisco and Spanish vecinos of Jalisco was made by Senator Berduzco. Since the Jalisco decree spoke only of the former, it was not expelling persons enjoying constitutional rights. But Cañedo, Florentino Martínez and Francisco Molinos del Campo reiterated the argument in defense of the rights of liberty, security and property, basing their case this time on the Spanish fuero juzgo.

The senate refused to condemn article two of the Jalisco decree, which extended exceptions to Spaniards married to Mexicans and bachelors with a physical impediment, since it limited article one.⁵⁸ Article eight of the Jalisco law, which expelled capitulados, Spaniards arriving since 1821, and those who had resisted taking an oath of allegiance, was considered next by the senate. Senator Martínez Zurita had based his opposition to the law in general on his belief that it violated article twelve of the plan of Iguala and article three of the Law of April 8, 1823. But Martínez Zurita could not oppose the article

in question because the individuals expelled by the article were not covered in the Iturbidean guarantees. Senator Martínez responded that since article one had been ruled unconstitutional, article eight must be as well. Senator Tarrazo felt that the commission should specify which Spaniards could be expelled and which could not be expelled. Molinos argued that the capitulations left the capitulados free to choose whether they wished to remain, and that the states should not be allowed to violate these agreements. Moreover, the legislature of Jalisco could not usurp the general government's right to expel illegal foreigners.

The resolution was returned to the commission where after two weeks of debate and consultation with the government a new resolution was completed in seven articles. In the meantime, the Jalisco law was in force and the Mexico state law was almost completed. Periodicals in the capital showed concern over the possible loss of foreign credit and the blow to commerce resulting from the uncertainty. El Aguila supported the view of Senator Juan de Dios Rodríguez, that the state laws should be suspended while the question was debated in the senate, in order to produce a regulatory law defining the constitutional limits of the Spanish question.⁵⁹

In the commission's discussion of its new resolution, it was noted that "the majority of the capitulados were permitted to remain."⁶⁰ The committee felt that they were protected as citizens of the nation by virtue of constitutional pacts as well as the surviving provisions of the plan of Iguala and treaty of Córdoba. The committee also felt

that most of the capitulados were not specifically committed to either leave or to remain in their capitulations. Concerning those who had arrived since 1821, the commission believed that those who had arrived with the permission of the federal government could not be expelled by the state of Jalisco. The commission was uncertain of exactly what was meant in the allegation that some Spaniards had "resisted swearing allegiance." Any who had not sworn allegiance to the constitution could be forced to do so by existing law.

The new resolution introduced on September 28, was debated article by article rather than in general.⁶¹ Senator Rodríguez insisted that a distinction should be made between capitulados whose capitulations committed them to depart and those whose capitulations allowed them to remain. Senator Llave insisted that the question at issue was whether the states could expel from their territory persons who were not citizens of those states. Moreover, he insisted, the states may take steps furthering the goals of the general government concerning national security. Senator Martínez replied that the basic flaw in the law was that it assumed that the capitulados were not citizens while article twelve of the plan of Iguala insisted that they were all citizens and could remain if they chose.

Cañedo quoted from part 4, article 12 of the Constitution of Jalisco which stated that the foreigners resident in the state at the time of its publication were citizens, regardless of their national origins.⁶² Gómez Farfás replied that the state of war with Spain took precedence over previous legal considerations. Cañedo responded that

the colonization law of August 18, 1824, had encouraged foreigners to establish themselves in the republic, without excepting Spaniards, guaranteeing the security of their property and persons.

The Jalisco proposition contained in article four that no Spaniard could reside in Jalisco in the future, drew the support of Cañedo. The provision was said to be constitutional because the states could decide the matter of vecindad within their territories. But Senator Huarte replied that the provision prohibited Spaniards from colonizing there, violating rights granted to Spaniards by the general government. Senator Martínez agreed, citing article two of the federal law of April 25, 1826, which allowed Spaniards to enter and reside where they pleased in the republic.⁶³ Senator Tarrazo held that the Jalisco provision did not violate the federal law because the former did not prevent Spaniards from residing in the republic.

Gómez Farías reminded the senate that the Mexican law of citizenship was unlike that of the United States. There was no law in Mexico granting citizenship in the nation, but rather separate state laws granting citizenship in the states. Senator Martínez replied that persons residing legally in the republic may not be deprived of vecindad, which was acquired by means of residence. Senator Rodríguez argued that the states had jurisdiction over vecindad. Senator Huarte responded that the states did not have the right to deny vecindad. The senate voted in favor of Jalisco's right to forbid Spaniards to reside in the state in the future.

The question of the nature of civil rights was raised by Senator Martínez, who argued that civil rights, as opposed to political rights, could not be suspended for a segment of society. Senator Martínez Zurita argued that civil rights could be regulated by the sovereign states. Gómez Farfás reinforced the argument, noting that Bentham had stated: "When security and equality are in opposition, there can be no doubt that equality should give way." Gómez Farfás maintained that all members of society were subject to restrictions introduced for the good of society. Llave and Acosta agreed, noting that the constitution and the laws were insufficient when so many suspicious persons were involved.

As the discussion ended on the revised resolution, the senate was divided into two warring camps, led by the following senators:

Anti-Expulsion

Martínez
Cañedo
Molinos
Huarte
Paz
Galván
Castillo

Pro-Expulsion

Gómez Farfás
Rodríguez
Acosta
Llave
Alpuche
Martínez Zurita
Berduzco
Tarrazo
Estrada
García
Viesca

Among the supporters of the Spanish cause, only Cañedo was a federalist.

The senate passed the final clause of the commission's revised resolution on October 3 and the completed resolution, which declared a number of the articles of the Jalisco law unconstitutional, was forwarded to the chamber of deputies on October 10. The legislature of the state of Mexico had passed its first law of expulsion on October 6.

The Jalisco law, as a whole, had not been declared unconstitutional. The delay occasioned by the lengthy debate in the senate had provided time for additional states to experience disorders and for legislatures to begin debating similar laws. The Jalisco law and the Mexico law were already in force and the congress could not muster the votes necessary to declare them unconstitutional. The federal executive, supported by the yorkino party, would not act to suppress the regional revolts which had the support of the local yorkinos. The only solution to the constitutional dilemma appeared to be the passage of a federal expulsion law which would take precedence over those of the states.

Notes

¹El Aquila, V (June 6, 1827), 1-2.

²El Sol (June 23, 1827), p. 3054.

³Decree 52, June 1, 1827. México. Colección de decretos y ordenes del congreso constituyente del estado libre y soberano de México (2 vols.; Toluca, 1848-50), II, 22.

⁴Chiapas. Secretaría del Gobierno. Memoria del estado en que se hallan los ramos de la administración pública de las Chiapas (San Cristóbal, 1828).

⁵El Aquila, V (September 22, 1827), 3.

⁶Ibid., V (November 19, 1827), 3.

⁷Decree 86, October 16, 1827. México. Colección de decretos y ordenes, II, 46.

⁸México. Memoria en que el gobierno del estado libre de México da cuenta al congreso (8 vols.; Tlalpam and Toluca, 1824-31), VIII.

⁹El Sol (June 27, 1827), p. 3072.

¹⁰The complete speeches of Portugal and Hermosillo were published in El Aquila, V (September 13, 1827); V (October 15, 1827).

¹¹See, for example, Correo, VIII (April 29, 1829), 4.

¹²El Aquila, V (September 22, 1827), 2-3.

¹³México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 66, exps. 5, 8-13, fols. 1-369 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG].

¹⁴Luis G. Cuevas, Porvenir de México (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 259.

¹⁵Carlos María Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (April 24, 1830), 4.

¹⁶Cuevas, pp. 253, 257-58.

¹⁷Juan Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; Mexico, 1850-51), I, 88; Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (April 13, 1830), 6-7; II (April 17, 1830), 1-8; AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 11, fols. 1-70.

¹⁸Pedraza to Montes de Oca, cited in Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (April 17, 1830), 7-8.

¹⁹ibid., II (April 24, 1827), 4.

²⁰Lorenzo Zavala, Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), II, 21-22.

²¹Secretary of the Congress of Tabasco to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, July 22, 1827, Villahermosa, in AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 5, fol. 75.

²²Minister Pedraza to Minister Espinosa de los Monteros, October 9, 1827, México, in ibid., leg. 66, exp. 5, fol. 202.

²³Governor Zavala to the Governor of Chihuahua, August 29, 1827, Agustín de las Cuevas, in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 13, Vol. 29, exp. 28b, fol. 34 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

²⁴Minister Espinosa de los Monteros to the Governor of Chihuahua, September 1, 1827, México, in ibid., fol. 35.

²⁵ibid.

²⁶Zavala, Ensayo histórico, II, 23-25.

²⁷ibid.

²⁸See the letter of December 24 from Pedraza to an unnamed intermediary in the state of Mexico, promising amnesty to the revolutionists of Atenco, in El Aquila, V (December 27, 1827), 3.

²⁹Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (April 17, 1830), 5-8.

³⁰ibid.

³¹ibid., II (April 24, 1830), 1-6.

³²ibid., II (April 17, 1830), 5-8.

³³El Aquila, V (November 29, 1827), 1-4; V (December 8, 1827), 2-4; V (December 26, 1827), 1-2.

³⁴A resguardo given to the Spaniard José Riveiro de Aguilar on November 27, 1827, has been preserved in AGN:RE, leg. 22-1/2, Vol. 49, exp. 4, fol. 10.

³⁵Ministry of Relations correspondence concerning the Puebla revolt has been preserved in AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 8, fols. 1-34.

³⁶ibid., fol. 3.

³⁷General Calderón to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 2, 1827, Puebla, in ibid., fol. 7.

³⁸Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de México, dedica a sus compatriotas; o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), p. 44.

³⁹General Calderón to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 2, 1827, Puebla, in AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 8, fol. 7.

⁴⁰General Calderón to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 13, 1827, Puebla, in ibid., fol. 11.

⁴¹ibid., fol. 7.

⁴²Secretaries of the Puebla Congress to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 13, 1827, Puebla, in ibid., fol. 21.

⁴³Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, to Secretaries of the Puebla Congress, December 14, 1827, Mexico, in ibid., fol. 22.

⁴⁴Minister of War to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 14, 1827, Mexico, in ibid., fol. 24.

⁴⁵General Calderón to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 16, 1827, Puebla, in ibid., fols. 26-28.

⁴⁶General Calderón to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 23, 1827, Puebla, in ibid., fol. 32.

⁴⁷Governor Esteva to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, December 13, 1827, Mexico, in ibid., exp. 7, fol. 1.

⁴⁸Pedrazas, p. 44.

⁴⁹Cuevas, pp. 274-75.

⁵⁰Suárez y Navarro, I, 88.

⁵¹Decree 101, September 3, 1827; El Águila, V (September 22, 1827), 2-3.

⁵²Bando, September 5, 1827, Guadalajara; El Águila, V (September 22, 1827), 2-3.

⁵³Chamber of Deputies, session of September 4, 1827; El Aquila, V (September 6, 1827), 1.

⁵⁴Chamber of Deputies, session of September 14, 1827; El Aquila, V (September 19, 1827), 2-3.

⁵⁵Correo, II (September 14, 1827), 4.

⁵⁶Senate, session of September 17, 1827; El Aquila, V (September 20, 1827), 4.

⁵⁷Senate, sessions of September 18, 19 and 21, 1827; El Aquila, V (September 26, 1827), 1-3.

⁵⁸Senate, session of September 21, 1827; El Aquila, V (September 28, 1827), 1-2.

⁵⁹El Aquila, V (September 28, 1827), 4.

⁶⁰An extract of the commission's meetings appeared in ibid., V (October 4, 1827), 1-3.

⁶¹Senate, session of September 28, 1827; El Aquila, V (October 5, 1827), 1-3.

⁶²Senate, session of September 29, 1827; El Aquila, V (October 5, 1827), 1-2.

⁶³Senate, sessions of October 1, 2 and 3, 1827; El Aquila, V (October 9, 1827), 1-3.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXPULSION OF THE SPANIARDS FROM THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL LAW OF DECEMBER 20, 1827

The Expulsion Laws of the Remaining States

On October 6, Mexico became the second state to pass an expulsion measure.¹ The law was directed at the removal of the capitulados and immigrant Spaniards who had arrived since 1821, and who lacked the legal requisites to remain in the republic. A capitulado was required to produce his capitulation and an immigrant his passport issued by the federal government. If he could not present these documents, he was required to depart within thirty days. The Mexico state law separated Spaniards from their public appointments or benefices, granting half-salary to former government employees. Ecclesiastical rents affected by the separation were to be divided between the former Spanish employee and his American replacement. The state government was ordered to observe the conduct of Spanish residents carefully and Spanish gatherings were prohibited unless permission from the state government had been obtained.

Spanish residents could not move to a new community without first obtaining a passport. Should a Spaniard remain in a town other than his own for three days or more, he was required to report to the local authorities. In order to alter his place of residence, a Spaniard was required to obtain a "certificate of good conduct" from the authorities

in his former community which he was to present to the alcaldes in his new place of residence. The state government would be informed of all such moves. In Mexico, as in Jalisco, remaining Spaniards were ordered to report to their local authorities on the first day of each month and a detailed list of all the Spaniards residing in the state was prepared by the state authorities.

The Mexico state law was ostensibly aimed at the expulsion of only those Spaniards whose status was demonstrably illegal. The law provided a legal basis for the vigilance over the resident Spaniards which was considered necessary for reasons of internal security. In practice, the law hastened the flight of wealthy Spaniards who owned rural estates. By virtue of their departure, Spaniards who fled to the Federal District forfeited all legal right to return to the state of Mexico.²

A Spaniard could avoid the effects of the Mexico state law by obtaining citizenship within the state. The usual procedure consisted of having a senator or representative propose a measure to that effect in the state congress. The senate and chamber of deputies of Mexico state were not opposed to granting citizenship to some Spaniards in 1827. For example, the Spaniard Ramón Ceruti, a controversial figure who wrote anti-Spanish articles for the yorkino periodicals of Mexico and Veracruz, was granted citizenship on October 10.³

A second expulsion decree, complementing the limited provisions of the first, authorized the expulsion of the Spanish regular clergy from the state of Mexico.⁴ Their religious houses were to be placed

under the care of American regulars of the same order designated by the competent prelate. In cases where no American regular clergy existed, the house with all of its estates and properties would be entrusted to another regular order to be designated by the state government. The friars were ordered to refrain from removing images pertaining to their convent or funds belonging to the religious body. The law was silent concerning the possibility of a future return by the Spanish monks.

Prior to authorizing its publication, Governor Zavala forwarded the decree to his council of state, which was headed by the vice governor, Manuel Reyes Veramendi.⁵ The Council recommended immediate circulation of the measures adding that trustworthy commissioners should be sent to all the convents to make an inventory of their possessions.⁶ Governor Zavala published the law at Tlalpam on October 28 and dispatched the commissioners who were to be paid by the religious houses as recommended by the council.

Creole military officials were anxious to obtain guarantees of immunity from government reprisals for their recent "petitions." The first amnesty law for those who had taken up arms against the Spaniards was passed in Michoacán on October 16.⁷ The armed petition led by adjutant Vázquez in Michoacán had attracted all but a few of the military officials of the state. The congress at Valladolid conceded amnesty to all those who had in any way "perturbed or attempted to perturb the public tranquility." All persons presently in prison for these acts were to be placed at liberty, save those who had "conspired against independence." Needless to say, the law was passed under duress.

While these laws were emerging from the state legislatures, the federal congress was still grappling with the constitutional issues raised by the passage of the state laws. Deputy José Mariano Blasco of Querétaro had proposed that the chamber of deputies declare the state laws unconstitutional. Blasco's proposal was defeated on October 8, following a recommendation from the chamber's commissions of government and constitutional matters that the state governments, as well as the federal government, could expel "persons of foreign birth for the good of the state or for the preservation of Internal peace."⁸

The federal chamber of deputies and the senate received the second state law from Mexico on October 30.⁹ The chamber passed the measure on to its commission on constitutional matters. The senate forwarded the measure, which called for the expulsion of Spanish regular clergy, to its commission on government. The senate commission presented a resolution in the session of November 2, recommending that the senate accept the proposal of Senator Juan de Dios Rodríguez, that all such laws be declared suspended until congress could legislate on the constitutional question involved in the expulsion.¹⁰ The commission on government was headed by the opponents of expulsion, senators Isidro Huarte and Florentino Martínez. The commission found all of the articles objectionable, "inconsistent, unconstitutional and impolitic." It proposed that the congress:

Suspend the effects of all decrees made by legislatures concerning expulsion and all measures that pertain exclusively to Spaniards within their territories until the general congress dictates means which it thinks conducive to assure Independence and public order in all the federation.

Senator José María Alpuche, the federalist yorkino member of the committee, dissented from its recommendations, presenting his view in a minority report.¹¹ Alpuche argued that the general congress had never been granted the right to suspend the effects of a state law. Only if the laws, rather than public opinion, were responsible for the disturbances, would the congress be free to suspend those laws. The sovereignty of the states was threatened, according to Alpuche, by the acts of the federal congress. The law of May 10 had opened the door to the state legislatures, leading them to believe that they could do as they pleased regarding the Spanish question. To clash with the state legislatures would not aid the cause of the worthy among the Spaniards. Alpuche informed the senate:

The federation will suffer neither now nor later by the departure of 6,000 Spaniards, as the majority of the commission supposes, nor by the departure of 12,000 perverse Mexicans who may have betrayed the country, and the states will expel them since they would imperil the peace and the federal union if the legitimate rights of the respective sovereignties were attacked.

Alpuche informed the senate that the legislature of Mexico state had in hand the revision of the Jalisco decree made by the federal congress and acted accordingly. Senator Alpuche proposed that the senate adopt the following resolution:

That we suspend treating the laws dictated by the honorable legislatures on Spaniards until the senate dispatches the resolution relative to capitulados and the general law which regulates the conduct of the legislatures concerning foreigners.

Senator Agustín Viesca, of the federalist camp, took an even more extreme state's rights stand than Alpuche.¹² According to Viesca, the decrees of the state legislatures could not be contrary to the

constitution or to the general laws. The federal government exercised only the powers granted to it by the states. It had no jurisdiction within the states themselves concerning the maintenance of public order. Pointing to the "generosity" of the Mexico state law, Viesca noted that, among some circles, its moderation had created dissatisfaction. The Mexico state law had recognized the guarantees made in the plan of Iguala and treaty of Córdoba, which were now "notoriously null." These contracts were invalid because, according to Bentham and Vattel, utility was the only criterion which could make a contract binding.¹³ Since the contracts were no longer useful, Viesca reasoned, they were no longer binding. The rebellions of capitulados in the past had revealed the Spaniard's addiction to the king of Spain. The government which had allowed the capitulados to remain was not chosen by the popular will. Viesca concluded his argument by noting that the senate had already approved the right of a state to take special police precautions in the case of Jalisco, a fact that prevented the senate from denying that right to Mexico.

Senator Florentino Martínez, the most outspoken critic of the expulsion laws, attacked the basic propositions contained in Viesca's defense of the Mexico law. According to Martínez, the commission's report did not offend state sovereignty. The federal government created the states, rather than the reverse, as a certain Jalisco periodical was proclaiming. The federal government could strike down unconstitutional state laws. Despite Vattel's opinion, the fundamental social contracts were still in force.

Senator Martínez Zurita, of the federalist camp, defended congressional review while noting that it was not specifically called for by either the constitution or the fundamental acts. The senate should decide the constitutionality of state laws but it should also refrain from proposing changes in those laws. The federal law of May 10 set the example for discriminatory legislation. Having already passed its own discriminatory law, the federal congress could not refuse that right to the states. Martínez Zurita called for the return of the resolution to the commission.

Senator Valentín Gómez Farfás supported the federalist cause, arguing that the general congress had never suspended a state law. While some measures had been ruled unconstitutional, none had yet been suspended. Gómez Farfás wished to make the senate aware that since the measure under consideration was unprecedented, its passage would have struck a blow at federalism.

Senator Huarte of the commission, a defender of the Spaniard's interests, attempted to salvage the Rodríguez proposal from the federalist attack.¹⁴ He proposed that the resolution calling for the suspension of the state laws be divided into two parts, the first treating of laws of expulsion and the second pertaining to laws placing restrictions on the Spaniards. Senator Viesca responded that the report could not be divided and should not be, since it was unconstitutional and inadmissible in any form. If the congress were to become a general censor of state laws, it would destroy the federal pact. Viesca lamented the fact that the senate had "discriminated against Jalisco"

by approving the first reprobatory ruling.

Alpuche concluded the federalist attack, labeling the commission's report "subversive," because it took powers from the states and gave them to the general congress. Senator Martínez defended the Spaniards against the charge that they were conspirators, noting that none had as yet been convicted. If there had been conspiracies, Martínez concluded, the conspirators should be punished rather than the Spaniards as a group.

The report was rejected by a vote of 20-9 and returned to the commission. Once again, the senate had failed to suspend the state decrees while the constitutional question was being resolved. The defeat of the report on November 3 must have encouraged the besiegers of Valladolid, who could see that no assistance of a military or legislative nature for the government of Michoacán was likely to come from Mexico City.

While the congress was debating the legal and moral issues suggested by the state expulsion laws, the federal government was confronted with the problem of defining its own sphere of authority in the face of the new state legislation. The difficulty created by the Jalisco law was apparent by early November. Governor Juan Nepomuceno Cumplido of Jalisco raised the question on November 6 of the status of federal employees in Jalisco with respect to the state expulsion law.¹⁵ Spaniards who had been federal employees and had enjoyed the fuero militar were threatened by an increasing popular demand, according to Governor Cumplido, for their expulsion from Jalisco.

Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros relayed Cumplido's query to the ministers of war and the treasury for advisement. Minister of War Pedraza had replied to an earlier inquiry from the commanding general of Jalisco that he believed the matter would be resolved by a forthcoming decision from the federal congress concerning the constitutionality of the Jalisco law. Pedraza repeated his view to Espinosa de los Monteros in reply to the latter's consultation.¹⁶ The office of treasury minister was vacant at the time, but Francisco García, the official in charge of the ministry, replied that, aside from the questionable constitutionality of the Jalisco law, there were solid reasons for believing that employees of the federation could not be affected by a state law of expulsion.¹⁷ He cited the recent expulsion of Ignacio Esteva from Veracruz, which had set an "embarrassing precedent" for state-federal relations. President Victoria had appointed the minister of treasury to the federal post of inspector of custom-houses for Veracruz. Esteva had made the journey to Veracruz only to find himself barred from entry by a decree of the state legislature. The escocés majority in the state congress acted from fear that Esteva's actual purpose for coming to Veracruz was to instigate and organize yorkino clubs. Veracruz was the final bastion of escocés strength in late 1827.

Francisco García informed Espinosa de los Monteros that a number of former employees of the federal commissary in Guadalajara had "responsibilities" pending with that organism and their expulsion would be harmful to government finances. García did not elaborate on

the nature of these obligations. Espinosa de los Monteros informed Governor Cumplido that the president was disposed to await the decision of the general congress in order to avoid "placing the faculties of the supreme government in doubt."¹⁸ He informed the governor that former treasury employees had financial responsibilities with the federal government. The resolution of this ambiguous situation in the states was facilitated by passage of the federal expulsion law in December though the question remained due to the tendency of the federal government to grant exceptions in 1828.

The congress of Michoacán passed its law of expulsion on November 9, granting thirty days of grace to those who were to be expelled under its terms.¹⁹ Provision was made for the expulsion of all Spaniards who were not residing with their families and under fifty years of age. In either case, to be excepted from the law a man must have resided in the country for a minimum of thirty-five years. All capitulados were to be expelled from the state since their presence was considered illegal. Spaniards who might enter the state within the succeeding two years were to be expelled as well. No Spaniard would be allowed to reside in Michoacán in the future unless he brought with him "an establishment of known utility" and proved that he had at no time worked against Mexican independence.

Michoacán's Spanish state employees were removed from their offices by the law and provided with an income. Spaniards who had held their offices proprietarily were to receive their full salaries in retirement with the maximum set at 1,000 pesos annually. Their offices

were to be filled with Americans who would become the proprietors of the posts. The law guaranteed Spanish property, which might remain in Mexico, as well as the right of the expelled Spaniard to take his moveable property with him. The provisions of the law were to remain in force until Spain recognized Mexican independence.

The Michoacán law failed to mention any of the corporations by name, save that of the state bureaucracy. The provision concerning the wholesale expulsion of unmarried Spaniards under sixty years of age was a direct attack on Spanish ecclesiastics, while the law failed to deal with the subject of ecclesiastical emoluments and their future distribution. Some influential Spaniards found it possible to escape the expulsion provisions of the law in Michoacán as they had in Mexico. Antonio Cosío, for example, was excepted by a congressional decree of November 21, 1827, having been defended by "ninety citizens and aided by the government."²⁰ Former Spanish employees in Michoacán, who were covered in the law's expulsion requirements, were ordered, by a decree of December 5, to present a gloss of their accounts prior to their departure.²¹

The expulsion law in Tamaulipas followed that of Michoacán by only three days.²² The Tamaulipas law was aimed at the expulsion of capitulados and immigrants who had arrived since 1821. The capitulados affected were those "whose respective capitulations do not allow them to remain in the republic." The state government was granted the right to extend a certificate of residence (*carta de residencia*) to any Spaniard who had arrived since 1821 but had rendered service

to independence. How this could have been possible was not clarified in the law.

The state congress of Oaxaca passed an expulsion decree on November 23 which, as noted above, was unacceptable to Colonel Santiago García. A supplementary issue of El Aquila of Mexico City was devoted to the problem created by García's rejection of the congressional decree.²³ The measure was submitted to the editors for printing in Mexico City by an anonymous Oaxacan due to García's prohibition against the publication of the decree within the state. The Junta of Public Security, named by García, enforced the expulsion provisions of the plan of García while ignoring the congressional decree. The revolutionary plan called for the expulsion within three days of all Spaniards and their families who had arrived in the state after 1821, excepting only those who had been married to Mexicans prior to 1821.

By the terms of the plan of García, expelled Spaniards could take with them only one-third of their possessions, leaving behind all money and negotiable instruments. The "unacceptable" decree had provided exceptions for all Spaniards married to Oaxacans and for those naturalized within the state. The decree would have made it mandatory for each excepted Spaniard to appear once a month before local political authorities until Spain extended recognition to the Mexican republic. Spanish property in the state would have been guaranteed by the state government while Spaniards from other states

were banned from residing in Oaxaca. The essential difference between the García plan and the congressional decree was that only the plan assured the expulsion of recent emigrants as well as the retention of their capital and specie within the state.

The state congress of Coahuila y Tejas passed an expulsion law on November 24 which granted capitulados and unmarried Spaniards thirty days in which to depart.²⁴ Among the Spanish bachelors, only those who had lived in "the republic" for thirty or more years could remain. This provision resulted in the departure of the Spanish missionaries who had been working among the Indians in Coahuila and Tejas, as well as the Spanish ecclesiastics generally. No Spaniard could enter the state for the purpose of establishing his residence until Spain recognized Mexican independence. This provision was intended to nullify the federal colonization decree of August 18, 1824, which had encouraged Spaniards to settle in Texas.

The civil rights of Spaniards remaining in the state were limited by the decree. The ayuntamientos were to gather information on all Spaniards and those remaining were to appear before the local authorities on the first day of each month. A Spaniard could no longer bear arms, except after dark when he might carry a sword for his defense. In order to travel between towns, a Spaniard was required to carry a pass. Political activity by Spaniards was severely circumscribed: they could neither publicly criticize the "system," nor meet in groups of more than three persons. Any official violating

this law would lose his post and pay a fine of 100 pesos.

In San Luis Potosí, the congress was called into special session on December 1, to produce a state law of expulsion.²⁵ The measure which resulted on December 7, called for the expulsion of all capitulados; all Spanish immigrants who had arrived since 1821; all Spanish bachelors who had lived in the state for three years without purchasing property (bienes raices); all Spanish clergy, secular and regular, under seventy years of age and in good health; all Spaniards who had resisted taking a pledge to support Mexican independence; and all Spaniards who had been expelled from other states.²⁶ Exceptions were severely limited. The governor was allowed to select from among the clergy those whose "doctrine and opinions" merited their exception from the expulsion. In the future, Spaniards were to be prohibited from coming to reside in the state. The authority of enforcing the expulsion was granted to the prefects and sub-prefects in the departments and partidos, and to the alcaldes primeros in the villas. Should a local official be remiss in his execution of the law, he would be deprived of his post. In San Luis Potosí detailed reports concerning the Spaniards residing in the state were to be compiled by local authorities for the use of state officials.

The state congress of San Luis Potosí also passed a "law of public security" on December 10.²⁷ The measure provided the death penalty for "conspirators" as well as those who attempted to disturb "public tranquility." The definition of conspirators included persons who worked against either independence or the federal system. Spaniards

were denied the right of assembly and were forbidden to possess arms "in excess of those considered necessary for personal defense." A violation of any of these dispositions by a Spaniard would result in his expulsion from the state.

After serious debate had begun in the federal chamber of deputies on the general law of expulsion, word reached the capital of the passage of a state expulsion law in Veracruz on December 4.²⁸ The Veracruz decree expelled within thirty days all unmarried Spaniards under fifty years of age excepting those who had "served in arms in the cause of independence before 1827." All capitulados "who resided in the state illegally" were forced to leave. No Spaniard would be allowed to reside in the state in the future. All Spanish employees were suspended with full salary and the salaries of temporary employees were to cease when their period of appointment expired. Vacant posts in Veracruz would be filled on a temporary basis with Mexicans. Spaniards might take their moveable possessions with them or leave them behind; in either case, the state guaranteed the security of their estates. The expulsion provisions of the Veracruz law would cease when Spain recognized Mexican independence.

In Querétaro the state expulsion law, which was passed on December 11, expelled within thirty days all Spaniards who had served in the Spanish military in 1821 without passing over to the army of independence.²⁹ An exception from the above provision could be obtained by a Spaniard who was married to a Mexican or by a widower, provided he had children and possessed "an art, office, or industry" in which he

was actively engaged for the support of his family. In addition, those over sixty years of age or those possessing a physical impediment would be excepted. Spanish military men who were "notoriously disaffected" or who were "supposed to depart" by the terms of their capitulations would not be eligible for these exceptions.

Spaniards who had immigrated to Querétaro after 1821 were also required to depart, if they had entered the republic "without permission." All Spaniards who had come after the publication of the federal constitution were required to leave without exception. Spanish vagrants and the "notoriously disaffected," with either independence or federalism, were required to depart. All unmarried Spaniards under seventy years of age who had lived in the republic for less than twenty years were to be expelled. The law mentioned clergy specifically, although they would have been expelled under the "unmarried Spaniards," clause as they were under the provisions of most state laws.

No Spaniard could depart from Querétaro without first clearing his public and private debts. Local officials were ordered to collect data on all resident Spaniards which should be submitted for the use of the next congress. Spaniards remaining in Querétaro would be required to make a new loyalty pledge, the form of which was set forth in article fifteen of the state law. The names of those taking the pledge would be published in the periodicals of Mexico City, while the names of any who refused to do so would be turned over to the congress within fifty days. A Spaniard expelled from another state

could not find refuge in Querétaro, nor could a Spaniard without a citizenship card issued by that state reside there until Spain recognized Mexican independence. A Spaniard passing through the state in transit was required to appear before the local authorities in every town along his route. The Querétaro law left few means of escape for the Spaniard who was determined to remain.

Among the last of the states to surrender to the "popular will" on the Spanish question was Puebla. The creole bishop of Puebla, Antonio Joaquín Pérez, who had played a prominent role in the Iturbidean empire, was a strong defender of the third guarantee. The Spanish regular and secular clergy were numerous in Puebla, and the Church was supported by a strong state government headed by the creole, General Juan José Andrade. The Spaniards and European creoles of Puebla refused to surrender on the Spanish question until passage of the federal law of expulsion seemed inevitable.

The Puebla law of December 12 called for the expulsion, within thirty days, of all capitulados; all Spaniards who had entered the republic since 1821, and all Spaniards who were known to be "disaffected" with either independence or federalism.³⁰ No Spaniard would be granted an empleo in the future, nor could he be elected to public office in the state. Spaniards holding government posts would be removed, enjoying their full salaries in retirement, until Spain recognized Mexican independence. Employees on temporary appointments would receive their salaries only until the scheduled expiration of their posts. The state government was authorized to fill the vacated posts on a temporary basis.

The Puebla law committed the state government to enforce the federal law which would soon emerge from the national congress. The Puebla decree was specific about the precedence of a federal law, which "should not be contradicted in any way by the present law." The measure concluded with an appeal to the federal government to dictate the measures and provide the funds needed to restore "order and public tranquility" to the state.

The congress of Puebla decreed a general amnesty on December 16 for all who had been involved in the riots against the Spaniards.³¹ All who had participated in the "armed petitions" prior to the passage of the expulsion law on December 12, were to receive amnesty and were secured in their posts, provided they surrendered their arms immediately following publication of the amnesty decree.

The expulsion decree in the northern state of Durango actually postdated the federal decree by four days.³² Durango had remained quiet throughout the anti-Spanish movement. The state law of December 24, sanctioned the expulsion of the Spaniards along lines similar to the measure passed by other states before the passage of the federal law. But it was more generous, in that provision was made for Spaniards to obtain letters of citizenship which would exempt them from the expulsion provisions. Requests for citizenship in Durango were to be directed to the ayuntamiento of the Spaniard's town, and from there his appeal would be forwarded to the congress by way of the governor's office. The congress was to decide whether the Spaniard should be granted citizenship. In order to receive the congress'

approval, the Spaniard had to possess a political record which demonstrated his attachment to independence, an occupation which was "socially useful," and evidence that he had not fought for the Spanish cause in 1821. This final provision would effectively eliminate any Spanish troops who had entered Durango with General Cruz from Guadalupe in 1821.

It should also be noted that the path to exemption through citizenship did not aid the cause of Spanish regular clergy who, having renounced the world, were denied citizenship in the states of the republic. Article ten of the Durango law stated openly that any Spaniard who came under its expulsion provisions but obtained a favorable ruling from the congress on his citizenship appeal was to be exempted from the expulsion.

The chart below attempts to illustrate the variations among the state laws discussed above. This should not be understood as a complete analysis since only eleven of the nineteen states are represented. The laws passed in the eight remaining states have so far eluded the author.

Several general and provocative notions emerge from a comparison of the several laws. Only four states specifically stated that their laws would terminate with Spanish recognition of the federal republic, while seven states saw fit to restrict the rights of Spaniards to live within their borders in the future. All of the states wished to expel the capitulados who had remained in Mexico after 1821. Nine of the eleven states included provisions which either openly or indirectly,

	Jalisco, Sept. 3	México, Oct. 6 & 16	Michoacán, Nov. 9	Tamaulipas, Nov. 9	Oaxaca, Nov. 23	Oaxaca, Plan de García	Coahuila y Tejas, Nov. 24	San Luis Potosí, Dec. 7 & 10	Veracruz, Dec. 4	Puebla, Dec. 12	Querétaro, Dec. 15	Durango, Dec. 24
Suspended	X	X	X	X					X	X		
With full salary	X	X	X						X			
With half salary	X	X							X			
Ecclesiastics get full rents	X	X						X	X			
Ecclesiastics get half rents								X				
Substitutes paid by state								X				
Restrictions and Limitations:												
Restricted property exportation	X	X	X			X		X				
Restricted right of future residence	X	X	X					X				
Restrictions on civil rights	X	X	X					X				
Must report once per month	X	X	X					X				
Data must be kept on residence	X	X	X					X				
Spanish property guaranteed by state	X	X	X					X				
Passports required to move	X	X						X				
Restricted entry until recognition	X	X						X				
Expulsos from other states to be expelled								X				

Penalties for Violation:	
Violators sent to <u>presidio</u> & exile	
Violators lose employes and fined	
Jalisco, Sept. 3	X
México, Oct. 6 & 16	X
Michoacán, Nov. 9	
Tamaulipas, Nov. 9	
Oaxaca, Nov. 23	
Oaxaca, Plan de García	
Coahuila y Tejas, Nov. 24	X
San Luis Potosí, Dec. 7 & 10	X
Veracruz, Dec. 4	
Puebla, Dec. 12	
Querétaro, Dec. 15	
Durango, Dec. 24	

Figure 7. The Provisions of the Expulsion Laws of 1827 in Eleven States.

by means of the "unmarried Spaniards" provision, expelled the regular and secular Spanish clergy. Only three states exempted Spaniards who had married and begun raising families since 1821. In late 1827, the only course of action remaining to a Spaniard who could not obtain an exemption in his own state, was to flee to the Federal District where he might seek the protection of the federal government and await the passage of the federal law which he hoped would be more generous.

The Evolution of the Federal Law in the Congress

The federal senate took up the question of the capitulados in its session of November 10, having received a resolution on the matter from the chamber of deputies.³³ The senate commission of public security agreed that the subject would be difficult to treat without having at hand the diverse capitulations celebrated between the Army and the Three Guarantees and the Spanish expeditionary units. A preliminary search revealed that many of the documents did not exist in the offices of the ministries. Only the capitulations of San Luis de la Paz, Jalapa, San Juan del Río, San Fernando Inquetlan, Puebla, Querétaro, and Valladolid were located by the commission. These documents reinforced the concept previously held by the commission, that the capitulados were not bound by their capitulations to leave Mexico.

On the basis of these capitulations, the senate commission of public security recommended that the resolution forwarded by the chamber of deputies be rejected, since it had called for the expulsion of "those whose departure had been stipulated by their capitulations."

Following repeated attempts by Senator Pablo de la Llave to introduce a new variation of the measure, the senate agreed to reject the chamber's resolution without substituting a new proposal for the expulsion of the capitulados.

The entry of Spaniards into the republic was still permitted, in spite of the state of war existing between Spain and Mexico. The law of May 26, 1826, which permitted the entry of Spaniards and all foreigners, came under attack in the senate on November 13, 1827.³⁴ Senator Berduzco, a federalist, introduced a proposal which would deny entry to Spaniards while the state of war existed by revoking the law of May 26, 1826. Senator Tomás Vargas, a centralist, introduced a new proposal aimed at nullifying the measures passed by state and federal governments in response to the demands of armed factions, until order had been restored and arms were put aside:

As a consequence, the decrees of the legislature of Valladolid concerning the expulsion of Spaniards and the admission of the renunciation of the governor, as well as all those dictated during the invasion, are of no value whatsoever.

In the session of November 14, the commission of government reported favorably on an appeal by the Spanish Carmelites of Mexico state that the state law expelling Spanish regular clergy be suspended.³⁵ The commission also approved, on November 16, Senator Vargas' proposal, in a report drawn up by senators Huarte and Martínez.³⁶ Senator Alpuche attacked Vargas' proposal, arguing that the federal senate could not condemn the actions of either the state legislature of Valladolid or of the "local faction" which requested it. Force was not used in

Michoacán, as evidenced by the fact that none of the authorities were "forced" to resign. Senator Llave supported Alpuche, noting that the federal congress was not the "tutor of the state legislatures or the state governments." Senator Martínez defended the commission's report, citing evidence provided by the federal government to show that an armed mob had extracted the law from the legislature at Valladolid and also the governor's resignation.

Senator Juan de Dios Cañedo demonstrated his attachment to the federalist cause, when it clashed with the welfare of the Spaniards. Cañedo felt that time alone could cure the present infirmities of Mexico. Congress should function "not as a professor but as a legislator." Senator José Agustín Paz stood by the Spaniards, arguing that, should this condition in the states be allowed to persist, the nation would "become slave to a domestic or foreign tyrant."

The congress of Tamaulipas forwarded an initiative to the federal chamber of deputies, which was introduced in the session of November 16, calling for the repeal of the provision for "union" in the federal decree of April 8, 1823, and for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the republic.³⁷ The first fully elaborated project for a federal law of expulsion was introduced in the chamber of deputies on November 17 by Deputy Olloqui.³⁸ The project of law submitted by Olloqui, consisting of fifteen articles, called for the expulsion of the capitulados; all Spaniards who entered the republic after 1821, and those Spaniards who had acquired United States citizenship papers in order to remain in Mexico.

In the following session of the chamber, on November 19, 1827, Deputy Anastasio Zerecero submitted a project in twelve articles for the expulsion of the Spaniards.³⁹ Zerecero's proposal called for the expulsion of all Spaniards 'who had not received guarantees by Mexican laws,' including the Spanish regular clergy.

In the session of November 20, the chamber began debate on the proposal of Deputy Olloqui, who defended his measure as the solution to the Spanish problem corresponding most nearly to the 'will of the people.'⁴⁰ Since the Hidalgo revolt of September 16, 1810, was the genuine popular movement for independence, the nation had not committed itself to live with the Spaniards. The nation must expel the "Seguras, Arenas, Negretes, Echavarris and all those who are suffering deserved penalties in the prisons." It would be better to satisfy popular demands, he argued, than to be forced to put down the disorders by military force. Deputy Olloqui's proposal was sent to the commission of public security, as he requested.

The second expulsion measure passed by the Mexico state legislature which expelled the Spanish religious clergy, was disapproved by a vote of 21-7 in the federal senate on November 22.⁴¹ This was the first state expulsion decree to be declared null by the senate.¹ The resolution was forwarded to the chamber of deputies where it was sent to the commission on constitutional matters.⁴²

The congress of Guanajuato forwarded an initiative signed on November 22 to the federal chamber of deputies requesting that the congress 'remedy the chaos by occupying itself completely with the

question of public peace."⁴³ Thirty-one deputies presented a project of law in the session of November 25, calling for the expulsion of the Spaniards.⁴⁴ Deputy Olloqui, who had presented the first project on November 17, was among the group sponsoring the project of fifteen articles, as was Zerecero who had presented the plan of November 19.

The first expulsion proposals to be introduced into the senate were sponsored by senators Alpuche and Berduzco, who introduced separate measures on November 26.⁴⁵ Berduzco's proposal called for the "disarmament" of the Spaniards as well as their expulsion. On the following day the senate agreed to send Berduzco's project to the united commissions of government and constitutional matters.⁴⁶

In the chamber of deputies, the commissions of public security and constitutional matters reported on December 5, that the measure signed by thirty-one deputies would be reported for discussion on the following day.⁴⁷ The measure presented by the united commissions contained three additional articles and some minor changes in wording. All of the members of the united commissions, save one, Deputy Rejón, were among the original signers of the proposal. At the end of the measure there now appeared a form to be used in registering the citizenship of excepted Spaniards.

The proposal presented in the chamber of deputies on December 5, was to be the basis of the first federal expulsion law of December 20, 1827. The chart below illustrates how the report of December 5 and the subsequent law differed from the proposals previously made in the chamber of deputies. It should be noted that no proposal called

		Deputy Olloqui Nov. 17	Deputy Zerecero Nov. 19	Deputy Berduzco Nov. 26	31 deputies Nov. 28	Commission's Report, Dec. 5	Federal Law of Dec. 20
Time limit on departures:	Days	60	90	70			
	Months				6	6	6
Expelled Spaniards:							
"Disaffected		X		X	X	X	X
Capitulados		X	X	X	X	X	X
Unmarried		X	X	X		X	X
Widowed, without children			X				
Unmarried, without 6,000 pesos			X				
Immigrants arriving since 1821		X	X	X	X	X	X
U.S. citizenship		X					
Regular clergy		X	X	X	X	X	X
Secularized former regulars			X				
Secular clergy							
Non-citizens			X				
Those expelled from a state					X		
Constitutional monarchists					X		
Supported Spain, 1810-20			X				
Exile would end with recognition					X	X	X
Excepted Spaniards:							
Professors of useful arts							X
Aged and infirm		X			X	X	X
Married to Mexicans					X	X	X
Fathers of American children					X	X	X
Services to independence						X	X
Amnesty for armed petitioners			X	X	X	X	X
Expenses paid to U.S. for the poor		X		X	X	X	X
Ex-employees get full salary						X	X
Excepted may not seek employ		X					
Half-salary to exiles who aided							
independence		X					
They get full salary upon return		X					
Must appear within 30 days				X			
Leave within 60 days or go to prison				X			
Trials of conspirators to continue		X					
May not enter until recognition				X		X	X
Will redeem capital before leaving		X					
Willful departure loses property			X				
Abroad since 1821 loses property			X				
Excepted may not live near coast						X	X

	Deputy Olloqui Nov. 17	Deputy Zerecero Nov. 19	Deputy Berduzco Nov. 26	31 deputies Nov. 28	Commission's Report, Dec. 5	Federal Law of Dec. 20
Time limit on departures: Days	60	90	70			
Months				6	6	6
Excepted must acquire citizenship					X	
Excepted must pledge anew		X			X	X
Monthly ministry report to congress						X

Figure 8. The Expulsion Proposals Considered by the Chamber of Deputies in 1827 and the Law of December 20.

specifically for the expulsion of the secular clergy, while all proposals and the law of December 20 called for the expulsion of the regular clergy. It should also be noted that the final law is basically the accepted committee report which was a modification of the proposal submitted by the thirty-one deputies on November 28. The final law was based upon a plan agreed upon outside the chamber by the federalist majority, as can be seen below:

Signers of the Proposal of Nov. 28 (F) Outspoken federalists

Esnaurrizar	Zerecero (F)	Aburto
Hevia	Padrés	Herrera (José Manuel)
Bocanegra (F)	Cañedo (F)	Tornel (F)
Tames	García (F)	Guido
Muñoz	Cicero	Gondra
Llano	Pérez Palacios	Quintana (José Matías)
Huerta	Cuervo	Silicio
Romero (F)	Quintana Roo	Pacheco (F)
Moral	Escudero	Ollolqui (F)
Barraza	Escandón	Guerrero
Liceaga		

A number of the deputies who had not signed the proposal approved it in principle and would later vote for its acceptance.

As the deputies began their discussion of the thirty-one deputies' proposal on December 6, an appeal was received from the legislature of Veracruz, calling for the passage of a law on the Spanish question.⁴⁸ Deputy Escudero suggested that the ministers be called to attend the debate and Deputy Escandón attempted without success to commit the chamber to complete its discussion on the project that same day, prior to adjournment. Deputies Juan José Romero and Domínguez succeeded in obtaining a resolution committing the chamber to "permanent session, treating no other matter" and extending the daily adjournment to 7:00 p.m. until the project was dispatched. As the hour of

adjournment neared on December 6, Deputy Zerecero moved successfully that the session should continue until the measure was approved "in general." His goal was accomplished at 9:15 in the evening.

The measure approved "in general" on the night of December 6 called for the expulsion of the capitulados, the "disaffected," those who came after 1821, the regular clergy, and unmarried Spaniards "who have had no known home during the past two years." Exceptions could be extended to Spaniards over sixty years of age or permanently physically disabled from departing; and those who, in the judgment of the president and the ministry, had rendered distinguished service to independence and had "accredited their affection for our institutions." A Spaniard who might be excepted under the terms of the law, could still be expelled if he were considered dangerous by the president and the ministry. The government was committed to pay the transportation "to the nearest foreign port" of former employees whose annual salary was less than 1,500 pesos, as well as that of the poor and the regular clergy whose houses lacked sufficient funds. The exile of the Spaniards was to last until Spain recognized Mexican independence.

Spaniards excepted from the expulsion were to make a pledge to the republic which included a renunciation of their allegiance to Ferdinand VII. Those remaining were to be granted a letter of citizenship similar to the copy included in the committee report. The right of Spaniards to enter the republic was suspended until Spain recognized Mexican independence. Remaining Spaniards were prohibited from residing near the coasts of the republic. An amnesty was promised to all who

had participated in the armed petitions against the Spaniards.⁴⁹

The debate resumed on the report, article by article, on December 7, with the proponents of the measure encountering little opposition.⁵⁰ The first three articles were approved on December 7; the second three on December 8; two on December 9; eight on December 10; and the final three articles were approved on December 11. The chart below illustrates the votes on several key articles. The provisions drawing the greatest opposition were contained in article four, which expelled the regular clergy, and article eight, which granted the president the power to expel Spaniards the government considered dangerous. The opposition in the latter case, stemmed from a fear of extending arbitrary power to the executive.

The chamber of deputies forwarded its resolution to the senate and, shortly thereafter, sent also an appeal from Veracruz concerning the inconvenience caused to British commerce by the state law of expulsion.⁵¹ The British consul at Veracruz and twenty-four British "mercantile societies" had requested that the state congress extend the thirty-day limit for departures prescribed in the Veracruz law. The English employed a number of Spaniards in their new mercantile operations in Mexico, and they conducted business with the established mercantile houses of Veracruz which were owned by Spaniards. The Spaniards could not conclude their operations so quickly without occasioning losses to the British as well as themselves. The expulsion measure under consideration in the congress provided a six-month time

TABLE 17

THE RESOLUTION COMPLETED BY THE CHAMBER OF
DEPUTIES, ON DECEMBER 11, 1827, SUMMARIZED
WITH THE VOTES ON KEY ARTICLES

Article	Description	For	Against
1	Expelled capitulados	-	15
2	Exceptions which the government might make	44	0
3	Expelled Spaniards who had arrived since 1821	50	3
4	Expelled regular clergy	30	20
5	Expelled homeless unmarried Spaniards	50	0
6	Exceptions for rendering services to independence	41	3
7	Exceptions may be made by president in council	-	-
8	President in council will decide on the dangerous	31	20
9	These faculties will cease in six months	45	0
10	Reports each month: Congress may extend time	47	0
11	Passage for the poor paid by government	37	15
12	Passage for religious clergy paid by government	35	11
13	Exiled employees will draw salary in republic	34	14
14	Exile ends with Spanish recognition	34	7
15	President in council may except exiles who came under pain of death for cause of freedom	45	0
16	Remaining Spaniards must pledge anew	-	-
17	Refusal to pledge will result in expulsion	-	-
18	Remaining Spaniards may not live near coasts	-	-
19	Amnesty for armed petitioners	-	-

Note: Blanks indicate that the vote was not reported.

Sources: El Aguila, V (December 9, 1827), 4; V (December 10, 1827), 4; V (December 11, 1827), 4; V (December 12, 1827), 4.

limit which, when accepted, would take precedence over state provisions, allowing the Spaniards more time to dispose of their interests.

The senate began debate on the chamber's resolution on December 17, with Senator Cañedo leading the defense of the measure forwarded by the chamber.⁵² The session was public and the galleries were filled with the people of the capital who, in their impatience for the law, constantly interrupted the proceedings. The senate, after several hours of debate, approved the resolution "in general" by a vote of 18-11 on December 17.

Discussion of the measure article by article began on December 18.⁵³ The coughing and general noise in the galleries became worse and the senate went into secret session for one hour in order to continue. The wrath of the public was directed at Senator Paz, the most outspoken of the opponents of the law. Exhortations from senators Berduzco and Alpuche were needed to clear the galleries. During the sessions of December 18-19, the senate approved all of the articles, including an additional article sent by the chamber of deputies. The new article deprived any revolutionists who had called for a change in the "popular, representative, federal form of government adopted by the Mexican nation," of the amnesty conceded in the project of law.

The only success achieved by the defenders of the Spaniards was the acceptance of an addition to article seven, proposed by Senator Florentino Martínez, which extended the exceptions to include: "professors of a science, art or industry useful [to the republic], who may not be suspected by the government." The approval of Martínez's

addition required that the measure be returned to the chamber of deputies for review. In the chamber, Deputy Anastasio Zerecero called for the acceptance of the addition, which was accomplished on December 19.⁵⁴ The chamber then notified the government that the project was complete and the law was published on the following day, December 20, 1827.⁵⁵

The remarks of the editors of El Aquila, published on the day of the law's passage, reveal the optimism of the government and its supporters concerning the changes in the states which would result from the federal expulsion law:

. . . the law will be published throughout the nation; the state legislatures will work to make their measures agree with the general law, in order to avoid the very grave inconveniences which would result from the contrary case; those who wished more, those who wished less, and those who wished nothing will all be silent and obedient; tranquility and confidence will be reestablished, and the sorrows we have had will serve as a warning for the future.⁵⁶

Deputy José María Tornel, who signed the proposal of the thirty-one deputies and supported the measures in the chamber, reflected on these events in his Breve reseña histórica, twenty-five years later.⁵⁷

Certain it is that the majority of votes would not have been counted in both chambers without the exigencies of the governors to the government, and of the government to the general congress, representing the country as devoured by anarchy and even in danger of losing its independence if the fate of the Spaniards were not decided quickly. It is apparent that various deputies and senators vacillated until the end, among others Bocanegra and Tornel. Tagle impugned the law, with an expression as eloquent as that of an angel . . .; Tornel, who contradicted him, eagerly solicited arguments in his imagination, which his sensitive heart reproved, and the extreme party which he adopted, preoccupied with the exaggerations of the epoch, caused a genuine martyrdom. It is known that Tornel has anxiously desired and searched for a solemn occasion in order to confess that he committed a lamentable error,

that the years have made him repent of his complacency, that he bitterly moans the damage caused to humanity and to justice, and that he prays to heaven that his country, of such noble and distinguished character, will never reproduce facts which history would keep silent, if it were possible to repress them in the memory of man.⁵⁸

Notes

¹Decree 72, October 6, 1827, Mexico, Colección de decretos y órdenes del congreso constituyente del estado libre y soberano de México (2 vols.; Toluca, 1848-50), II, 31-32.

²Lorenzo Zavala, Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de México desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), II, 25.

³Decree 75, October 10, 1827. México. Colección de decretos y órdenes, II, 33.

⁴Decree 87, October 16, 1827. Colección de decretos y órdenes, II, 33.

⁵Governor Zavala to the Council of State, October 17, 1827, Tlalpam, in El Águila, V (November 3, 1827), 3.

⁶Council of State to Governor Zavala, October 23, 1827, Tlalpam, in ibid.

⁷Congressional decree, October 16, 1827. Michoacán. Amador Coromina (ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, reglamentos y circulares expedidos en el estado de Michoacán (9 vols.; Morelia, 1886-1913), III, 13.

⁸Chamber of Deputies, session of October 8, 1827. El Águila, V (October 14, 1827), 3-4.

⁹Juan Antonio Mateos (ed.), Historia parlamentaria de los congresos mexicanos de 1821 a 1857 (10 vols.; México, 1877-1912), IV, 294.

¹⁰Senate, session of November 2, 1827. El Águila, V (November 18, 1827), 1-2.

¹¹Ibid., V (November 19, 1827), 1-2.

¹²Ibid., V (November 20, 1827), 1-3.

¹³Viesca's source was Mason's edition of Vattel's Derecho de gentes (1824), II, 136, cited in ibid.

¹⁴Senate, session of November 3, 1827. El Águila, V (November 22, 1827), 1-3.

¹⁵Governor Cumplido to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, November 6, 1827, Guadalajara, in México. Archivo General de la Nación, Ramo de espulsión, leg. 8, Vol. 19, exp. 47, fols. 2, 7 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

¹⁶Minister of War Pedraza to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, November 16, 1827, Mexico, in ibid., fol. 6.

¹⁷Francisco García to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, November 16, 1827, Mexico, in ibid., fol. 8.

¹⁸Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, to Governor Cuapilido, November 17, 1827, Mexico City, in ibid., fol. 9.

¹⁹Congressional decree, November 9, 1827, Coromina, III, 13-14.

²⁰Congressional decree, November 21, 1827, ibid., III, 16.

²¹Congressional decree, December 5, 1827, ibid., III, 24.

²²Congressional decree 20, November 12, 1827. El Aguila, V (December 4, 1827), 2.

²³"Suplemento No. 340," El Aguila, V (December 6, 1827), 1-2.

²⁴"Proyecto de ley del estado de Coahuila y Tejas," November 24, 1827, El Aguila, V (December 10, 1827), 3-4.

²⁵San Luis Potosí. Colección de decretos y órdenes de la primer legislatura constitucional del estado libre de San Luis Potosí desde su instalación en 1 de enero de 1827, hasta 16 de septiembre de 1828, en que cerró sus últimas sesiones (San Luis Potosí, 1829), p. 172.

²⁶Decree 63, December 7, 1827, ibid., pp. 173-74.

²⁷Decree 64, December 10, 1827, ibid., pp. 174-75.

²⁸Decree 83, December 4, 1827, El Aguila, V (December 8, 1827), 4.

²⁹Decree, December 11, 1827, ibid., V (December 24, 1827), 3-4.

³⁰Decree 162, December 12, 1827. Puebla. Colección de los decretos y ordenes más importantes que espidió el congreso constituyente del estado de Puebla en los años de 1824-25, 1826-28, 1830-31 (3 vols.; Puebla, 1827-32), II, 151-52.

³¹Decree 163, December 16, 1827, ibid., II, 152-53.

³²Congressional decree, December 24, 1827, El Aguila, VI (January 14, 1828), 2.

³³Senate, session of November 10, 1827, ibid., V (December 3, 1827), 1-2.

- ³⁴Senate, session of November 13, 1827, ibid., V (December 6, 1827), 1.
- ³⁵Senate, session of November 14, 1827, ibid.
- ³⁶Senate, session of November 16, 1827, ibid., V (December 10, 1827), 1-4.
- ³⁷Chamber of Deputies, session of November 16, 1827, ibid., V (December 11, 1827), 1.
- ³⁸Chamber of Deputies, session of November 17, 1827, ibid., V (December 12, 1827), 1.
- ³⁹Chamber of Deputies, session of November 19, 1827, ibid., V (December 16, 1827), 1.
- ⁴⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of November 20, 1827, ibid., V (December 18, 1827), 1-2.
- ⁴¹Senate session of November 22, 1827, ibid., V (November 23, 1827), 4; Mateos (ed.), *Historia parlamentaria*, IV, 35.
- ⁴²Chamber of Deputies, session of November 23, 1827, El Aquila, V (December 22, 1827), 1.
- ⁴³ibid., V (December 9, 1827), 3.
- ⁴⁴Chamber of Deputies, session of November 25, 1827, ibid., V (November 30, 1827), 3-4.
- ⁴⁵Senate, session of November 26, 1827, ibid., p. 1.
- ⁴⁶Senate, session of November 27, 1827, ibid., V (December 20, 1827), 1.
- ⁴⁷Chamber of Deputies, session of December 5, 1827, ibid., V (December 7, 1827), 2-3.
- ⁴⁸Chamber of Deputies, session of December 6, 1827, ibid., VI (January 7, 1828), 1-2; El Sol (January 18, 1828), pp. 3897-98.
- ⁴⁹"Noticias Nacionales," El Aquila, V (December 7, 1827), 2-3.
- ⁵⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of December 7, 1827, ibid., VI (January 7, 1828), 2.

⁵¹ibid., VI (January 10, 1828), 2.

⁵²Senate, session of December 17, 1827, ibid., V (December 18, 1827), 4.

⁵³Senate, session of December 18, 1827, ibid.

⁵⁴Chamber of Deputies, session of December 19, 1827, ibid., V (December 19, 1827), 4.

⁵⁵BandQ, December 20, 1827, ibid., V (December 24, 1827), 1-3.

⁵⁶ibid., V (December 19, 1827), 4.

⁵⁷José María Tornel, Breve reseña histórica de los acontecimientos más notables de la Nación Mexicana (México, 1852), p. 171.

⁵⁸ibid.

CHAPTER IX

THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FIRST FEDERAL LAW OF EXPULSION: PART I

The Reaction of the Escoceses: The Revolt of Vice President Bravo

The escoceses had witnessed the decline of their lodges and the defeat of their program of constitutional guarantees for the Spaniards. The passage of the federal law of expulsion, which the escoceses recognized as a threat to their existence, brought the final rupture between the yorkino-dominated government and the moribund escocés lodges. Lacking a legitimate means to participate in the government, the escoceses supported an armed reaction which was supposed to commence in Veracruz, where General Miguel Barragán was governor and commanding general and the majority of the congress was inclined toward the escocés cause.¹ But Barragán's attempt to seize the plaza of Veracruz was frustrated by General Manuel Rincón who had been sent by Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza for that purpose.

General Barragán was deprived of his command and replaced by General Vicente Guerrero, the grand master of the yorkino society. The escoceses lost Veracruz, which was their last stronghold, in this exchange. In the meantime, an alternative plan was being put into effect by the escocés leaders in the capital. Pedraza asserted in his New Orleans manifesto that he had foreseen the December revolt as early

as October when the vice president, General Nicolás Bravo, began holding conferences with other escocés leaders in the Federal District.² Bravo was titular head of the escocés rite. General Bravo had been profoundly disturbed by the arrest and lengthy imprisonment of generals Pedro Celestino Negrete, José Antonio Echavarri and Gregorio Arana. Pedraza claims credit for having attempted to dissuade the vice president from heading the armed movement. The government was powerless to move against the conspirators until the eve of the revolt, according to the minister of war, because of Bravo's position within the government.

The escoceses attempted to achieve their ends by means of a revolt initiated by an old insurgent, Lt. Colonel Manuel Montano, in the Llanos de Apam at Otumba.³ The plan of Montano was published on December 23, the day following the publication of the federal law of expulsion.⁴ The plan called for an end to all secret societies; the renovation of the ministry; the expulsion of the United States plenipotentiary, Joel R. Poinsett; and the "exact and religious fulfillment of the constitution and the laws."

The final provision of the plan led some writers to assert that Montano's plan called for the expulsion of the Spaniards.¹ For example, Lorenzo Zavala recognized the aims of the revolt but in describing the content of its manifesto, he reported the final clause as "compliance with the law for the expulsion of the Spaniards."⁵ Luis G. Cuevas reported the final article accurately, but noted that it was included in order to partake of the popularity of the federal expulsion law.⁶

Zavala considered the clause an attempt:

. . . to cover the subversive projects that existed. No further proofs were needed than the fact that the Spaniards paid all the expenses of this conspiracy, the leaders of which were their most zealous partisans.⁷

In his manifesto from exile, Zavala portrayed the events surrounding the Montano revolt as a confrontation of masonic societies in arms for mutual destruction.⁸ The escoceses hoped to achieve a change in the ministry, through the removal of Pedraza, which would have enabled them to resist the fulfillment of the yorkino program by the government. The calculated attack on "secret societies" was an attempt to remove the government from its position of dependency upon the yorkino lodges. The plan might have worked, had Pedraza and Guerrero responded less energetically. Miguel Ramos Arizpe, the minister of justice, did not consider the plan unjust, according to Carlos Marfa Bustamante.⁹ Pedraza stated that the escoceses' purpose was to bring down the ministry, calm the revolts themselves, then destroy the yorkinos.¹⁰

Minister of War Pedraza provided the most complete account of the events at Tulancingo.¹¹ Government correspondence with the revolutionists following their capture revealed little concerning the plan of the revolt itself.¹² General Bravo departed from the capital for his regional base, Tulancingo, where he had operated during the early years of the independence movement and where his family had owned haciendas. A number of generals and officials accompanied the vice president to Tulancingo. While en route, Bravo proclaimed his support for the plan of Montano.¹³

Pedraza dispatched General Guerrero to Tulancingo where he arrived prior to General Bravo. When the vice president appeared in Tulancingo with 300 men, General Guerrero was waiting, only five leagues distant, with 2,000 men.¹⁴ General Antonio López de Santa Anna had, "according to the escoceses to whose rite he pertained," ventured as far as Huamantla on his way to join Bravo in Tulancingo.¹⁵ Juan Suárez y Navarro, however, argued that Santa Anna had been unjustly complicated in the plan.¹⁶ His purpose in marching toward Tulancingo, according to Suárez, was to carry out an offer he had made, in a letter to Pedraza, to crush the revolt. Bravo lacked time to prepare at Tulancingo. Hostilities commenced and ended on January 7, 1828, with only eight killed and a few wounded.¹⁷ Pedraza noted that General Bravo had the poor judgment to attend a ball in his honor on the night of his arrival in Tulancingo with the forces of Guerrero near the city.¹⁸ Lucas Alamán's version of the events at Tulancingo differ in that an eight-hour armistice is said to have been arranged for talks between Bravo and Guerrero, which the latter violated in attacking the vice president.¹⁹

General Barragán, still governor of Veracruz though he had been deprived of his military command, joined the state legislature on January 8, in seconding the plan of Montano.²⁰ The civil leaders of Jalapa also supported the pronunciamiento. Barragán was unable to hold out against the forces of General Manuel Rincón and the colonels Juan Azcárate and Crisanto Castro.²¹ The Veracruz legislature was forced to recant "in a fashion damaging to their honor."²² Revolts

sprang up in other areas but they were quickly suppressed and, by the end of January, the movement was brought to an end.²³

Alamán noted General Guerrero's response to the victory in the following passage:

General Guerrero, in a letter to the Yorkist lodges of the United States, written by himself as Grand Master of the yorkinos, and by Mejía, who . . . had become secretary of the grand yorkino lodge, referred to his triumph, not as that of the government forces against sedition, but as that of a masonry against its rival.²⁴

Manuel Gómez Pedraza noted the reaction of the yorkinos to the government's victory in his New Orleans manifesto:

The yorkinos celebrated the defeat of the escoceses, and attributing to me in great part, they praised my name to the Heavens; and I received their praises with the calm that comes from the study of human volubility . . .²⁵

The officers captured at Tulancingo numbered, at least, seventy-one. The list below includes thirty-five of the major members of the projected revolt, indicating those who were exiled on June 12, 1828.

The remarkable fact that only two officials among those arrested appear to have been a Spaniard may partly be explained as a result of the law of May 10, 1827, which had succeeded in removing the Spaniards from their commands in the army. It is also possible that for political reasons General Bravo intentionally avoided including Spaniards in his alliance. Two prominent supporters who remained in the capital were, according to Pedraza, José Morán, the recently dismissed chief of the general staff, and Colonel José Antonio Facio, both escoceses.²⁶ Pedraza reported that they remained hidden in the house of General Morán for several days.

Rank	Name	Exiled
General	Nicolás Bravo ^a	X
	José Ignacio Gutiérrez	
	Félix Trespalacios	
	Joaquín Correa	
	Miguel Olavarrieta ^b	X
	Mariano Rea	
	Manuel Hernández	
	Alvaro Muñoz	
	José María Garmendia	
Lt. Col.	José Manuel Montano	
	José Campillo	
General	Francisco Vidaurre ^c	
	Miguel Vallejo	X
	Antonio Ayala	X
	Miguel Portal	X
Colonel	Joaquín Rea (Spaniard) ^d	X
	Mariano Urrea	X
	José Francisco Pérez	X
Colonel	Fernando Franco ^e	X
General	Miguel Barragán ^f	X
General	Francisco Berdejo	
General	José Gabriel Armijo ^g	
Colonel	Antonio Castro ^h	X
Colonel	Marcos Moreno	X
	Cristóbal Tagle	X
	Francisco Portilla	X
	Francisco Pérez	X
	Mariano Vega	X
	Manuel Linarte	X
	José Zaldívar	X
Lt. Col.	Manuel Santa Anna ⁱ	X
	General Bravo's only son ^j	X
Colonel	Pedro Landero	
Captain	Luis Antepara	
Ist. Adj.	José Junquito (Spaniard)	

Note: Only a few of the military ranks were listed in the reports.

^aVice president of the republic and Grand Master of escocés masonry.

^bBrother-in-law of General Negrete.

^cSecretary to General Bravo.

^dBrother-in-law of General Bravo.

^eLater, governor and commanding general of Zacatecas.

^fGovernor of Veracruz.

^gCommanding general of San Luis Potosí.

^hVice governor of Veracruz.

ⁱBrother of General Santa Anna who died aboard ship en route to exile.

^jDied aboard ship en route to exile.

Sources: Suárez y Navarro, I, 96; Cuevas, p. 285; Alamán, V, 775; El Águila, VI (June 21, 1828), 4; AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 21, exp. 39, fol. 8.

Figure 9. A Partial List of the Officers Involved in the Montano Revolt.

General Bravo was conducted to the capital while a heated debate ensued in the congress over the fate of the conspirators. The yorkino majorities in a number of state congresses demanded the maximum penalty for the conspirators. Among the more outspoken of the yorkino petitioners was the leader of the Mexico state congressional majority, Lic. Juan Francisco Azcárate, formerly a marquis under Iturbide and actually the father-in-law of Minister of War Pedraza.²⁷ The amnesty plan introduced by Senator Florencio Martí-nez was strongly opposed by Pedraza and numerous state legislatures. Pedraza's stance on the amnesty question in this case differed markedly from his position regarding the anti-Spanish uprisings of 1827, when he had appeared before the congress to appeal for an amnesty provision. Suárez y Navarro cites this inconsistency as proof of Pedraza's partiality and cooperation with the yorkino party.²⁸

The federal congress took a middle course, expatriating many of those involved in the conspiracy. Pedraza had suggested this compromise solution, which avoided the martyrdom of the escoceses, while removing their leaders from the country. At least twenty of the conspirators were exiled for a period of six years to Chile, Valparaíso, Guayaquil and Lima. The exiles were embarked from the port of San Blas with six months pay in advance on the Mexican brigantine Riesgo on June 12.²⁹ The escocés party was destroyed by this blow, noted Alamán, but it was also the cause of the ruin of the yorkinos who divided into two camps as soon as they found themselves without opposition.³⁰

The end of the *escocés* party also terminated all potential opposition, at the government level, to the enforcement of the federal expulsion law. The ensuing conflict between the adherents of Minister of War Pedraza and General Guerrero contributed to the production of the second expulsion law on March 20, 1829, which was passed following the successful revolt of the Guerrero camp after Pedraza had won the presidential election of November, 1828. The fact that the more radical American creoles would demand a second expulsion law suggests that something had gone wrong with the first such law, presumably in its enforcement. A close look at the process of enforcement from the law's passage on December 20, 1827, until its tentative expiration on June 30, 1828, is now in order.

The Enforcement during the First Three Months

Luis G. Cuevas' comments on the early enforcement of the law of expulsion outline rather closely the general trend:

The law of December 20, 1827, revealed in the exceptions which it established all the difficulties which had presented themselves to the congress while it was being dictated. The congress opened the door very wide for the president to soften this measure which lacked the extension desired by those who had promoted it. The government during the first few months of execution, conducted itself less generously than was hoped, at the same time that the governors of the states and other subordinate authorities presented it with the opportunity to judge the cases in a manner . . . more convenient for the country.³¹

Cuevas viewed the documents in the 1840's which today constitute the Ramo de expulsión. His inspection of these papers led him to conclude that:

. . . they do not leave any doubt about the magnanimous sentiments of a multitude of persons who, interposing their official intervention or their private respects, exerted themselves in diminishing the number of proscribed persons in a truly noteworthy manner. But the most notable fact in all the voluminous pieces of the expedient which was compiled, is that, almost without exception, the pacific conduct of the Spaniards was honored; and this testimony in those circumstances was incontestable.³²

Lucas Alamán described the result of the law briefly in his Historia de Méjico:

There appeared then the mournful spectacle of the departure of a multitude of expeditionary soldiers, which had remained in the country by virtue of the capitulations which had assured them that right, . . . almost all of these unfortunates had married, and had children which they drag along in their misery, the greater part of whom were to fill the cemeteries of New Orleans, where they were conducted at the expense of the government, becoming victims there of the rigors of climate and of the privations of all kinds to which they were reduced. Another spectacle, no less disturbing, was presented by the missionaries of California, religious from the convent of Propaganda fide of San Fernando in Mexico City . . . the inflexible Ramos Arizpe, who had a special dislike for Spanish regulars, did not hesitate . . . to give the order for the missionaries to leave . . . and the secularized missions fell into the power of the provincial deputation whose members made ample spoliation of [the missions] properties.³³

Alamán detected no leniency in the enforcement of the expulsion law.

The instructions issued by the federal government at the time of the law's publication reveal the method whereby the state governors, in cooperation with the federal authorities, were to carry out the complex provisions of the law. The twenty provisions issued by the ministry of relations on December 20, 1827, are listed below.³⁴

The complexity of the law, with its numerous qualifying phrases and less apparent escape clauses, caused the Ministry of Relations to be besieged with inquiries from the states concerning individual cases. The general disagreement among the state governments over certain

A SUMMARY OF THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF
RELATIONS ON DECEMBER 20, 1827, FOR THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL EXPULSION LAW

1. The governors of the states are to arrange for the departure within 15 to 30 days of all Spaniards to be expelled.
2. Governors must inform persons departing concerning routes and times granted for departure. Officials along such routes must also be notified of departures.
3. The Supreme Government shall receive reports of departures, with routes and time granted, plus monthly listings of departures, indicating compliance with the decree.
4. Port commanders and officials along departure routes shall notify both the state and Supreme Government of all departures.
5. State governments shall inform the Supreme Government within 15 days, as well as the Spaniards involved, of the individuals covered in the exceptions.
6. A special report shall be prepared on each person considered worthy of the exception provided by article 7.
7. State governments shall remit a report of all Spaniards remaining to the Supreme Government within one month.
8. State governments shall send to the Supreme Government within one month a report on the Spaniards covered in article 9.
9. State governments shall determine, with the local federal commissaries, the amount of aid to be granted to indigent secular clergy for their departure.
10. Departing Spaniards may be granted from two reales to one peso per league, according to their class and rank.
11. Former employees whose salaries do not exceed 1,500 pesos annually shall also be aided.
12. The government of the port states and the Supreme Government shall be informed of the aid requirements of Spaniards by state governors.
13. The governments of port states, in agreement with local federal commissaries, shall pay transportation costs of indigent Spaniards, observing the strictest economy.

14. Religious clergy whose convents cannot pay their transportation, shall receive 20 reales per day's journey of 10 leagues from their local federal commissaries.
 15. Former employees shall receive their salaries, payable in the Republic, as long as they reside in a friendly country.
 16. Remaining Spaniards shall pledge their loyalty anew as soon as possible and a record of this must be remitted to the Supreme Government.
 17. State governments shall be encharged with the enforcement of article 17 of the decree.
 18. Amnesty shall be granted to all persons everywhere who lay down arms within three days of the decree's publication in their locality.
 19. A departing Spaniard with an established commercial house, who cannot arrange the liquidation of his accounts and responsibilities within one month, may appeal for an extension not to exceed the six month limit established by the decree.
 20. Governors of the Federal District and of the territories shall also proceed according to these provisions.
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Source: Basilio José Arrillaga (ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandos, reglamentos, circulares y providencias de los supremos poderes y otras autoridades de la República Mexicana, 1828-1839, 1849-April, 1850 (17 vols.; México, 1834-50), I, 103-07.

provisions of the law of December 20 led to the circulation of a number of administrative decrees, or circulars, directing the state governments to alter practices or establish new policies. On December 20, 1827, when the law went into effect, the ministry of relations post was still vacant, with Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros serving as official in charge. Senator Juan de Dios Cañedo would assume the ministry on March 8, 1828, and Espinosa de los Monteros would become minister of justice. Pedraza remained in the ministry of war. José Ignacio Esteva resigned from the governorship of the Federal District in mid-April, becoming, once again, minister of the treasury on March 8.

The difficulty of complying with the federal expulsion law within the time permitted was raised in the correspondence between Miguel Ramos Arizpe and Ignacio Esteva early in January.³⁵ The question at issue was the fate of the Spanish Carmelites of the Federal District. The governor of the Federal District, Esteva, protested to the minister of justice, Ramos Arizpe, the impossibility of enforcing the law and complying with the regulatory provisions issued by the ministry within the period specified in the instructions. Questions were also raised concerning the procedure to be followed in the correspondence between the governor of the Federal District and the cabinet. The minister of justice had been communicating directly with the governor of the Federal District in cases involving clergy. Esteva felt that since his responsibility was to the ministry of relations, his correspondence should pass through that channel, rather than passing directly to the remaining ministries.

The provisions requiring the governors to inform the federal government concerning cases which might be decided by the president in council of ministers, led the governor of Oaxaca, Ramón Ramírez de Aguilar, to express his negative opinion of the Spaniards who might be excepted as well as those who might be expelled under these provisions in a confidential letter to Espinosa de los Monteros on January 4.³⁶ Ramírez felt that they were all dangerous. His evidence for this charge was the participation of all the Spaniards in what he called "the revolution of Alemán of 1823," and the fact that they had been "arming against Federalism." Exceptions were unacceptable to the new rulers of Oaxaca who had succeeded the former officials following the successful revolt of Colonel Santiago García. The plan of Colonel García had expelled the capitulados, allowing no exceptions.

Since the passage of the law of government posts on May 10, 1827, the federal government had experienced difficulty in replacing prominent Spaniards in technical posts. On January 16, the minister of war informed the chamber of deputies of the difficulty which he was encountering in his unsuccessful attempts to replace the two directors of the nautical academies established in Tepic and Córdoba both of whom had been removed by the law.³⁷

Spaniards fleeing from the states often made their way to the Federal District where they might escape the zealous eye of local officials and find protection among the large Spanish population of the capital. The governor of the Federal District knew of this trend, having received reports of Spaniards entering the city from the

captains of the guards at the city gates. Governor Esteva published a bando on January 17 in an attempt to deal with the problem.³⁸ Within eight days all Spaniards in the Federal District were to appear in the secretariat of the administrative offices of the district, bearing signed statements listing their "name, age, nation, state, residence, and address in Mexico City," or proof that they had obtained from the governors of their former states legal qualification. Failure to appear as directed would lead to prosecution under the penalties specified in the relevant laws.

In some cases, the Spaniards excepted by the federal law had already been expelled by a state law. Such was the case in Jalisco where, by January 19, according to governor Juan Nepomuceno Cumplido, all the Spaniards who might have been excepted by articles two and four of the federal decree had already been expelled. This included all Spaniards married to Mexicans, supporting American children, over sixty years of age, or physically impeded, as well as those who had entered legally since 1821.³⁹

A persistent problem presented to the federal authorities was the status of the Spanish crew members of the ship Asia, later called Congreso, which had been delivered to the nation by its crew in 1821, following the signing of the treaty of Córdoba. The Asia had brought Viceroy Juan O'Donójú, together with his entourage, to Veracruz. The status of the crew was affected by the fact that they had rendered a significant service to the nation. Zavala reported that a number of the crew members had been expelled from the state of Mexico by the

state law.⁴⁰ Several crew members submitted appeals for exception in the Federal District in mid-January.⁴¹ On February 26 the ministry of relations sent a circular to all of the governors, requesting their opinions concerning whether the remainder of the crew would constitute a danger to the republic.⁴² The president, in council of ministers on May 21, determined that, in view of the governor's stated opinions, the crew members were not dangerous and should therefore be excepted from the expulsion provisions of the federal law.⁴³ The president's decision was reiterated on November 12.⁴⁴ The decision affected approximately 450 Spanish crew members of whom seventeen were naval officers.⁴⁵

Minister of War Pedraza consulted with the senate when questions concerning the interpretation of the federal laws of empleos and expulsion arose prior to March 8, when the office of minister of relations was filled by Senator Juan de Dios Cañedo. The empleos law of May 10 was still in the process of fulfillment in certain cases after the passage of the expulsion law. Pedraza consulted the senate on January 25 concerning the status of José Batres, first adjutant of the general staff, who had been born in Spain of a Guatemalan father.⁴⁶ Pedraza also raised the point concerning officials born in the islands adjacent to the Peninsula. These queries were passed on to the commission of public security. Pedraza also requested a ruling on the fate of Spanish soldiers who had deserted from the Mexican army. This request was forwarded to the senate commission of war. The resolution of these consultations was not reported in the official periodicals of the capital.

A major conflict developed in late January between Governor Zavala of Mexico state and the federal government over the enforcement of the federal law of expulsion. The conflict resulted from the different interpretations of the exemption provision in the law held by Governor Zavala and Governor Esteva of the Federal District. Zavala, who had been opposed to the law from the beginning, interpreted the law in a fashion which would have given the state governors the authority to extend exemptions at will. Esteva favored a strict interpretation which limited the authority to grant exceptions to the president in council of ministers. As Spaniards moved from the state of Mexico to the Federal District bearing exemptions granted by Governor Zavala, a clash was not long in coming.

The conflict began when Zavala informed the ministry of relations on January 30, that it was his understanding that the expulsion of Spaniards must be approved by the president and that they must receive their passports from the federal government.⁴⁷ Espinosa de los Monteros replied that passports were to be issued only by state governments.⁴⁸ Zavala informed Esteva on February 28 that article two of the federal law allowed the state governors to decide whether marriage to a Mexican was just cause for granting exceptions.⁴⁹ Esteva informed Espinosa de los Monteros on March 14 of Zavala's opinion, noting that he himself felt that the article left this determination to the supreme government. The federal government approved Esteva's interpretation, requesting that the governor of Mexico state forward all cases of Spaniards who might be exempted under article two for the

consideration of the president in council of ministers.⁵⁰ The capitulado José María Sánchez, whose case had originated the conflict, was ultimately excepted due to his marriage to a Mexican.⁵¹ As late as July 22, Governor Zavala was still arguing that all capitulados married to Mexicans should be excepted.⁵² The federal government was unwilling to concede the point as a general rule.

Article 16 of the federal law of December 20 had required that all Spaniards excepted from the expulsion be administered an oath of loyalty to the republic. The ministry of relations published a bando on February 11, declaring that all Spaniards who had been allowed to remain in the Federal District should appear in the secretariat of the district government beginning on February 14, to take the required oath.⁵³ By a second order issued on the same day Governor Esteva gave the Spaniards eight additional days in which to appear in the secretariat with documentary proof that they were eligible for one of the exceptions granted by the expulsion law.⁵⁴

The governors of the states had been charged, by provision eight of the instructions issued on December 20, to prepare a report for the use of the federal government in determining the "danger which might accrue to independence" from the remainder of a Spaniard in the republic. Espinosa de los Monteros issued a circular addressed to the governors on February 16, requesting that the governors include in their future reports, for the use of the president and the ministers, information concerning whether a Spaniard was married to a Mexican;

the number of his family; the property he may have possessed, and his age.⁵⁵

Espinosa de los Monteros presented what may have been the first report to congress on the enforcement of the expulsion law on February 20.⁵⁶ By the provisions of article 11 of the law, statements should have been forwarded to the congress every thirty days. A message should have been presented on January 20, but no such account has been preserved in the Ramo de expulsión. Included in the report of February 20 was a list of 396 Spaniards who had received passports for their expulsion from the republic. The information compiled by the ministry was based on the statements submitted by the governors prior to February 20. For this reason, the ministry's message to congress was necessarily incomplete. For example, as noted above, the governor of Jalisco had reported the expulsion of all Spaniards from Jalisco who might have been excepted under the federal law. Since Governor Cumplido submitted no figures, none were listed for Jalisco in the report to congress. The chart below provides a statistical summary of the lists contained in the ministry's statement.

The federal government possessed data on the progress of the expulsion, as of February 20, from only nine of the twenty-four territorial entities within the republic. Only insignificant progress had been reported from Veracruz, where the concentration of Spaniards was heavy. In the Federal District, the Spanish regular clergy of the house of San Fernando and the Carmelites, as well as a number of military officials, had been handed passports. Few Spanish religious

TABLE 18

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY
THE MINISTRY OF RELATIONS ON FEBRUARY 20, 1828
SPANIARDS RECEIVING PASSPORTS
DECEMBER 20, 1827-FEBRUARY 20, 1828

Areas Reported	Military Personnel	Regular Clergy	Others	Totals
Federal District	52	23	135	210
Puebla	0	11	30	41
Veracruz	0	0	9	9
Michoacán	0	1	0	1
Zacatecas	0	1	7	8
Durango	0	0	43	43
Guanajuato	0	0	2	2
Oaxaca	0	0	52	52
México	0	1	29	30
Jalisco	-	-	-	-
Totals	52	37	307	396

Source: Lists found in AGN:RE, leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 10, fols. 1-11.

had been affected outside the Federal District and Puebla.

For the more determined among the supporters of the expulsion, the pace of the Spaniard's exodus was considered much too slow. There was cause to fear a renewal of anti-Spanish violence in the states in February. The new temporary governor of the Federal District, Deputy José María Tornel, reported to Espinosa de los Monteros on February 23, that he had learned of the activities of "agents of General [Isidro] Montesdeoca," who were proclaiming a movement for the "general expulsion of the Spaniards" in the southern part of the state of Mexico.⁵⁷ Governor Zavala reported on February 27 that steps had been taken to halt the activities of Joaquín Galván, the brother of the bookseller of Mexico City, who had been inciting the militias of Tlalnepantla and Cuautitlán against the Spaniards.⁵⁸

In order to enforce the expulsion law in the Federal District, Governor Tornel issued a bando on February 26, containing new provisions designed to end the evasion of the law which, he felt, had become a serious problem.⁵⁹ Tornel had found it difficult to enforce the law of December 20 due to the lack of information on individual Spaniards residing in the Federal District. The bando prohibited the departure of any Spaniard from the city without the knowledge of the alcalde primero of the ayuntamiento. Spaniards entering the city who had emigrated from a state or territory were to show the passport or document which had authorized their journey. Spaniards without documents were to be conducted to the secretariat of the Federal District for investigation. Those who had such documents were to present them in the secretariat within three days. The ayuntamiento of the capital

was to supervise the compilation of a list of all the Spaniards residing in the city, within thirty days. The list was to indicate which of them had valid documents; the date of their entry into the republic; whether they were capitulados; and their state, occupation, office or mode of living. The Spaniard's statements were to be vouched for by Mexicans "known for their honesty and patriotism."

In the course of the census the investigators were to uncover the Spaniards who had not presented themselves before the government of the Federal District as directed on December 24. Any Spaniard found to possess a passport issued for his departure would be forced to comply with its provisions. Should a Spaniard wish to move from his current residence, he was ordered to inform the regidor juez mayor (alderman judge) of both his old quarter (cuartel) and of the quarter of his new residence.

Torne! suspended the bando of February 12, issued by Governor Esteva, which had ordered all excepted Spaniards to report for the administration of oaths of allegiance. The order from Governor Torne! concluded:

. . . and in the future [the oath] will only be administered, until further notice, to those who may have obtained a passport from the supreme government, in the proper form, in order to leave the republic temporarily.⁶⁰

Virtually all of the excepted Spaniards in the capital had appeared at the secretariat to make their pledges between February 14 and February 19, the legal period set aside by Governor Esteva for that purpose.⁶¹

The problem created by Spaniards arriving at the ports, with or without passports extended by the federal government, had been complicated by the lack of a general federal passport law. Each case required a special consultation with the capital. After numerous appeals by the ministry for such a law, the general congress completed a passport law which was published on March 12.⁶² In the future, no foreigner would be allowed entry into the republic unless he possessed a passport issued by the Mexican government. All foreigners who had entered without a passport were ordered to appear within ten days before their local authorities to give an account of their reasons for coming and their present occupations. Those who possessed valid claims would receive passports through their local authorities. Legitimately established foreigners were to enjoy all of the civil rights of Mexicans, except the right to own rural property (*propiedad territorial rústica*), which was forbidden by law. The lands pertaining to silver mines, however, could be owned by foreigners. The law of colonization of August 18, 1824, was declared to be in effect. A qualifying clause permitted foreigners to purchase land in the states or in the federal territories with the permission of the appropriate congress, making foreign ownership of rural property possible. Spaniards were not specifically mentioned in the decree.

Unrest in the capital over the lack of progress in the expulsion of the Spaniards became more noticeable in March. Rumors of new anti-Spanish movements and plans for insurrection circulated. On the night of March 14, a certain Presbiter Jiménez del Rfo was arrested and

charged with planning a conspiracy for the total expulsion of Spaniards.⁶³ On March 20, Governor Tornel informed the new minister of relations, Senator Juan de Dios Cañedo, that Pedraza had learned of "seditious gatherings" in the capital, attended by Colonel Pedro Landero, Captain Luis Antepara and the Spaniard, First Adjutant José Junquito.⁶⁴ The last named had been given his passport but claimed to have an appeal for exception pending with the federal government. Tornel noted that these individuals had been involved in the revolt of Montano in January and were encouraged by "incendiary articles in El Sol."

The president resolved the matter by transferring Colonel Landero to Guadalajara and Captain Antepara to San Luis Potosí.⁶⁵ First Adjutant Junquito of the Fifth Permanent Battalion was expelled under article 9 of the law of December 20, after having unsuccessfully appealed for exception.⁶⁶

Minister of Relations Cañedo made his first report to congress, which may have constituted the third report by the ministry, on the progress which had been made in the expulsion of "some classes" of Spaniards since February 20.⁶⁷ The lists submitted by the ministry were compiled from the governor's reports of the Spaniards given passports in their states. The table below summarizes the lists submitted to congress by Cañedo. Seventeen of the twenty-four entities of the republic reported expulsion during February 21-March 20 period. The total number of Spaniards reported expelled during the past month exceeded the total for the previous two months by a count of 486-396. The states of Veracruz and Michoacán were still rather cautiously

enforcing the law, while Jalisco, which had claimed the expulsion of virtually all its Spaniards, seemed unable to provide any meaningful reports on the process. The two most notably inactive states, in view of the large Spanish community residing there, were Veracruz and Yucatán. By March 20, according to the two ministerial reports, 882 Spaniards had been extended passports for their expulsion from the republic during the three months since the passage of the expulsion law on December 20, 1827.

Canedo received from Guadalajara in late March, a list of seventy-four Spaniards who were said to be "politically dangerous."⁶⁸ Of the seventy-four Spaniards, forty-nine were either active or retired military personnel. The president in council of ministers examined the cases, expelling seven under article 9 of the law of December 20, and excepting sixty-seven.⁶⁹ The news of these exceptions could not have been welcomed by the authorities in Guadalajara.

The question of exceptions from the law of May 10 for federal congressmen had been raised in the chamber of deputies on January 29.⁷⁰ The Spaniard, Cipriano Blanco, a federal deputy from Yucatán, had petitioned the chamber for an exception from the empleos law. Deputy Blanco's request was forwarded at that time to the commission of public security. The senate approved the final proposal on March 21, exempting Spaniards who had served in the federal congress since the adoption of the constitution in 1824 from the effects of the empleos law of May 10, 1827.⁷¹ The measure was opposed by those who had always opposed exemptions from the laws of May 10 and December 20; Valentín

TABLE 19

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY
THE MINISTRY OF RELATIONS ON MARCH 20, 1828
SPANIARDS RECEIVING PASSPORTS
FEBRUARY 21-MARCH 20, 1828

Areas Reported	Military Personnel	Regular Clergy	Others	Totals
Federal District ^a	1	3	199	203
Puebla ^a	52	4	27	83
Veracruz ^a	0	0	1	1
Michoacán ^a	-	-	-	-
Zacatecas ^a	0	1	0	1
Durango ^a	0	0	3	3
Guanajuato ^a	0	7	16	23
Oaxaca ^a	0	1	4	5
Mexico ^a	0	8	13	21
Jalisco ^a	0	1	1	2
San Luis Potosí ^b	38	2	46	86
Tamaulipas ^b	0	1	11	12
Chiapas ^b	1	0	13	14
Yucatán ^b	0	1	13	14
Chihuahua ^b	0	2	3	5
Nuevo León ^b	0	1	3	4
Tabasco ^b	0	0	4	4
Nuevo México, Terr. de ^b	0	3	2	5
Totals	92	35	359	486

^aEarlier expulsions noted in Ministry's report of February 20.

^bAreas reporting for the first time.

Source: Lists found in AGN:RE, leg. 8, Vol. 18, exp. 15, fols. 1-22.

Gómez Farfás, Berduzco, and José María Alpuche. Senator José Manuel Cevallos, who favored the exceptions, noted that there had only been two Spaniards in congress since 1824. The senate forwarded its resolution to the chamber of deputies where it was approved on April 2,⁷² and the exception measure became law on April 6.⁷³

The congress of San Luis Potosí passed a measure on February 14 which attracted the attention of the federal senate in late March.

The San Luis Potosí decree provided for the following:

Article 1. No Spaniard expelled from the state or voluntarily requesting a passport, should he have a wife or children, will be allowed to take them with him, and he will leave for the wife the half of his fortune, if he has no children, and if he has children, he will leave three-quarters of it.

Article 2. To the wives of the expulsos of the state shall be paid two reales daily during their lives, so long as they do not remarry, and if they have children, one-half real for each one, giving always two reales to whoever should take her place in case of death, until the girls marry or until the boys reach the age of fourteen.⁷⁴

The commission of justice recommended that the law be declared unconstitutional.

The debate divided the deputies along lines similar to those on previous Spanish-related measures. Senator Berduzco argued that the law protected the wives of Spaniards from being "obligated by their husbands to leave their country." José Manuel Galván responded that the legislative decree actually divorced husband and wife, a matter which did not fall within the jurisdiction of the legislature. The law, in fact, prohibited women who wished to follow their husbands from doing so. Senator Tomás Vargas reported that, according to heresay, the law had already impeded some women, who wished to accompany their

husbands, from leaving the state of San Luis Potosí. Senator Isidro Huarte supported the opinion of Galván, adding that the financial provisions included in the decree represented a "cruel attack on property." The commission's report was approved "in general."

In this instance, Senator Gómez Farías separated from the federalist camp, opposing the San Luis Potosí law because it clashed with "natural rights," depriving the Spaniards' wives of the liberty which they should have to follow their husbands, and depriving children of their fathers as well as fathers of their children.⁷⁵ Ramos Arizpe also encountered a legal problem raised by the decree: Spaniards' wives had procured passports from the federal government in order to accompany their husbands into exile. Should the state legislature prevent their departure, it would mean that a state could suspend the effects of an act of the federal government. The report qualifying the decree as unconstitutional was approved with only senators Acosta, Berduzco, José María Castillo and Miguel Duque de Estrada opposed.

By the end of March, the machinery of enforcement for the law of December 20 was in full operation. In the Federal District Spaniards who had appealed for exceptions on grounds of physical impediments were appearing before a group of doctors (junta facultativa) to have their ailments verified.⁷⁶ Hundreds of Spaniards had either left the republic, or had appeals pending with the federal government. Hundreds more had already been excepted from the law's expulsion provisions. A number of Spaniards expelled from the states had, evidently, slipped

into the capital where they might hide themselves or make their appeals for exception directly to the federal government.

North American, British and French ships were heading for Veracruz to fill their cabins with Spaniards bound for exile in New Orleans, Havana or Philadelphia. Some of the more affluent Spaniards were embarking for Bordeaux. The first several waves of Spanish exiles were landing in New Orleans, and some of these were departing soon after for Havana. El Pelicano of Campeche reported as early as April 6 that "almost all" of the expelled Spaniards had reembarked at New Orleans for Havana, at the invitation of the Spanish government of the island.⁷⁷ This trend may not have been as prevalent as was supposed at the time. The Spaniards knew that, should they set foot on Cuban soil, their chances of returning to Mexico would have been decreased.

Some Spaniards failed to reach their destinations. The editors of the Veracruzano reported on August 2 that the passengers and crew aboard the French corvette Paquete No. 3, which had departed Veracruz on April 3, had been butchered by the pirate Pajaro verde while en route to Bordeaux.⁷⁸ The list of the victims was summarized as follows:

Spaniards	25
Mexicans, women, children and servants	42
Captain and crew	19

Total	82
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The morbid fact reveals the number of Mexicans who might accompany a group of wealthy Spaniards into European exile. As the summer months approached, the toll would increase due to the annual yellow fever epidemics in the Gulf parts of Veracruz and New Orleans.

Notes

¹Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; Mexico, 1849-52), V, 771-72; Manuel Gómez Pedraza, Manifiesto que . . . c. de la República de Méjico, dedica a sus compatriotas; o sea una reseña de su vida pública (Nueva Orleans, n.d.), pp. 42-43.

²Ibid., pp. 47-48.

³Alamán, V, 772.

⁴The plan was later published by Carlos María Bustamante, Voz de la Patria, II (May 5, 1820), 7.

⁵Ensayo histórico de las revoluciones de Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1830 (2 vols.; Paris, 1831), II, 31-32.

⁶Porvenir de Méjico (2nd ed.; México, 1954), p. 278.

⁷Ensayo histórico, II, 31-32.

⁸Juicio imparcial sobre los acontecimientos de Mexico en 1828 y 1829 (México, 1830), pp. 12-13.

⁹Voz de la Patria, II (May 5, 1830), 7.

¹⁰Manifiesto, pp. 47-48.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 47-51.

¹²México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 2064, exps. 1-106 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG].

¹³Alamán, V, 772.

¹⁴Pedraza, p. 49.

¹⁵Alamán, V, 773.

¹⁶Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; México, 1850-51), I, 94.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Manifiesto, p. 50.

¹⁹Historia de Méjico, V, 773.

²⁰Ibid.; Suárez y Navarro, I, 95.

²¹Ibid.

²²Alamán, V, 773.

²³Suárez y Navarro, I, 95.

²⁴Alamán claimed to have seen the original of the letter. Historia de México, V, 773-74.

²⁵Manifiesto, p. 57.

²⁶Ibid., p. 55.

²⁷Alamán, V, 774.

²⁸Historia de . . . Santa Anna, I, 95.

²⁹El Aquila, VI (June 21, 1828), 4; Pedraza, pp. 54-55.

³⁰Historia de México, V, 775.

³¹Porvenir de México, pp. 277-78.

³²Ibid., p. 277.

³³Historia de México, V, 767.

³⁴Basilio José Arrillaga (ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandos, reglamentos, circulares y providencias de los supremos poderes y otras autoridades de la República Mexicana, 1828-1839, 1849-Abril, 1850 (17 vols.; México, 1834-50), I, 103-07.

³⁵Governor Esteva to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, January 4, 1828, México, in México, Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 8, Vol. 19, exp. 37, fols. 40-41 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

³⁶Governor Ramírez to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, January 4, 1828, Oaxaca, ibid., leg. 2, Vol. 8, exp. 8, fols. 16-17.

³⁷Chamber of Deputies, session of January 16, 1828, El Aquila, VI (February 2, 1828), 1.

³⁸Bando, January 17, 1828, Arrillaga, I, 5-6.

³⁹Governor Cumplido to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, January 19, 1828, Guadalajara, AGN:RE, leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 10, fol. 10.

⁴⁰Ensayo histórico, II, 25.

⁴¹The matter of the crew of the Asia is the subject of a large expedient in the AGN:RE, leg. 8, Vol. 19, exp. 35, fols. 1-72.

⁴²Circular, February 26, 1828, ibid., fol. 49.

⁴³Marginalia, dated May 21, on Governor Esteva to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, January 21, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 1.

⁴⁴Marginalia, dated November 12, on ibid.

⁴⁵A list of the original Spanish crew of the Asia has been preserved in ibid., leg. 18, Vol. 39, exp. 4, fols. 24-32.

⁴⁶Senate, session of January 25, 1828, El Aquila, VI (February 10, 1828), 1.

⁴⁷Governor Zavala to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, January 30, 1828, Tlalpam, AGN:RE, leg. 13, Vol. 29, exp. 28a, fol. 3.

⁴⁸Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, to Governor Zavala, February 2, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 4.

⁴⁹Governor Esteva to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, March 14, 1828, Mexico, ibid., fol. 48.

⁵⁰Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, to Governor Zavala, March 15, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 49.

⁵¹Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, to Governor Zavala, May 21, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 46.

⁵²Governor Zavala to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, July 22, 1828, Tlalpam, ibid., fol. 1.

⁵³Bando, February 12, 1828; Arrillaga, I, 35-36.

⁵⁴ibid., I, 36-37.

⁵⁵Circular, February 16, 1828, AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 6, exp. 72, fol. 1.

⁵⁶AGN:RE, leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 10, fols. 1-11.

⁵⁷Governor Tornel to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, February 23, 1828, México, AGN:RG, leg. 66, exp. 14, fol. 3.

⁵⁸Governor Zavala to Oficial Mayor, Ministry of Relations, February 27, 1828, Tlalpam, ibid., fol. 5.

⁵⁹Bando, February 26, 1828, Arrillaga, I, 38-40.

⁶⁰Arrillaga, I, 40.

⁶¹Luis Lozano to Editors, February 27, 1828, in El Aquila, VI (February 29, 1828), 3.

⁶²Congressional decree, March 12, 1828, ibid., VI (March 20, 1828), 3.

⁶³ibid., VI (March 16, 1828), 4.

⁶⁴Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, March 20, 1828, México, AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 21, exp. 39, fol. 8.

⁶⁵Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, March 21, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 9.

⁶⁶Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 13, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

⁶⁷ibid., leg. 8, Vol. 18, exp. 15, fols. 1-22.

⁶⁸Governor Cumplido to Minister Cañedo, March 21, 1828, Guadalajara, ibid., leg. 10, Vol. 23, exp. 5, fols. 21-32.

⁶⁹Minister Cañedo to Governor Cumplido, June 11, 1828, Mexico City, ibid., fol. 2.

⁷⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of January 29, 1828, El Aquila, VI (February 14, 1828), 1.

⁷¹Senate, session of March 21, 1828, ibid., VI (May 23, 1828), 1.

⁷²Chamber of Deputies, session of April 2, 1828, ibid., VI (May 6, 1828), 1.

⁷³AGN:RG, leg. 75, exp. 12, fol. 1; Congressional decree, April 6, 1828, Arrillaga, I, 81.

⁷⁴Senate, session of March 27, 1828, El Aquila, VI (May 26, 1828), 2.

⁷⁵Senate, session of March 29, 1828, ibid., VI (May 27, 1828), 1.

⁷⁶"Noticias Particulares, Aviso," ibid., VI (March 23, 1828), 4.

⁷⁷"Noticias Nacionales," ibid., VI (May 3, 1828), 3.

⁷⁸ibid., VI (August 12, 1828), 3.

CHAPTER X

THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FIRST FEDERAL LAW OF EXPULSION: PART II

The Enforcement during the Second Three Months

Governor José María Tornel of the Federal District, like Governor Juan Nepomuceno Cumplido of Jalisco, was prone to consider all Spaniards dangerous. On April 10, Tornel forwarded a list of some thirty Spaniards to the ministry of relations for expulsion by the president in council of ministers under the terms of article 9 of the law of December 20.¹ Minister of Relations Juan de Dios Cañedo replied that the government needed additional information in order to decide such cases. Governor Tornel insisted that the information required was difficult to obtain whereas the danger inherent in excepting these men was easily ascertained.² On June 19, Cañedo informed Governor Tornel of the presidential resolution, made in council of ministers, that the government "could not exercise the faculty granted in article 9" in the case of the thirty Spaniards.³

Governor Tornel had provided some evidence for his mistrust of a number of these Spaniards. For example, there were Lt. Colonel José Fernández Aguedo, "for a long time, editor of El Sol"; Francisco Barrena, "a prisoner for his disaffection for independence during the time of Sr. Iturbide"; Colonel Francisco Cos, "compadre of Arredondo"; and Julián Cortázar, who had "treated Sr. Morelos very harshly."⁴

Among the more prominent Spaniards excepted in this instance were the colonels José Antonio Matlauda, Juan González Escalante, Francisco Manuel Hidalgo, Francisco Cos, and the ex-Count of Heras. In June, on the eve of the expiration of article 9 Tornel would try once again to achieve the expulsion of a large number of "politically dangerous" Spaniards.

The fuero militar was a factor to be considered in the enforcement of the expulsion law. The authority extended to the governors to enforce the law enabled them to resolve cases involving military as well as civilian Spaniards. Should the governor be either lax or lenient in his enforcement of the law, with respect to military personnel, the state military commander might attempt to usurp the governor's authority. The state of Puebla was a case in point. In April, the newly appointed commander of Puebla informed the Minister of War that no enforcement action had been taken in Puebla since February 10, when his predecessor had forwarded a list of the Spaniards who enjoyed the fuero de guerra to the governor. In the military commander's view, it was clear that the council of government in Puebla, which had the cases under review, was guilty of "retarding, at the very least, or perhaps of making the compliance with the law illusory."⁵

The commander of Puebla noted that there were a number of "disaffected" Spaniards, including some recently transferred from Veracruz, in the state whose continuance in their military posts would be prejudicial to the federal republic. Evidently, the law of May 10

had not been effectively enforced in Puebla and Veracruz. The commander recommended that he be allowed to enforce the expulsion law with respect to the *aforados* and that those excepted from the expulsion be dispersed about the nation in order to prevent their gaining strength through numbers.

In reply to the commander's charges, Governor Juan González Cabotrano argued that, according to a circular of December 24, 1827, issued by the minister of war, the law was to be enforced with regard to military personnel by the state commanders.⁶ The governor noted that a second circular from the minister of war, dated January 2, had granted the military commanders "all of the rights extended to the governors, respecting those of your *fuero*" for the enforcement of the law. González Cabotrano claimed to have attempted to clarify the situation on two previous occasions in May without receiving a reply from the ministry of relations. The governor felt that, of the forty-eight Spanish *aforados* in the state, twenty-eight should be judged by the federal government under the authority of article 9.

On April 18 the matter was resolved by the president.⁷ The governors of the states were declared to possess sole authority to enforce the expulsion law and Governor González Cabotrano was ordered to do so in Puebla. Cañedo's letter was lost, however, before it could reach the governor. Cañedo informed Minister of War Manuel Gómez Pedraza of the president's decision on April 18.⁸ Governor González Cabotrano repeated his appeal on April 25, after failing to receive Cañedo's resolution of the question.⁹ The presidential instructions

finally reached Puebla on April 30, sixty days prior to the expiration of some of the provisions of the law of December 20.

The congress was active in a number of matters related to the Spanish question in mid-April. The minister of the treasury consulted the chamber of deputies on April 12, concerning appeals received from some Spanish employees who had been dismissed but left with part of their salaries. The Spaniards wished to be allowed to receive dividends or interest on the suspended portion of their salaries.¹⁰ The matter was sent to the first commission of the treasury and the commission of public security for review.

The congress passed the long-awaited citizenship law on April 14, 1828, replacing the enactment of April 25, 1826, with a more complete measure.¹¹ The new law did not terminate the effects of article 18 of the expulsion law of December 20, which prohibited entry to Spaniards. Under the new naturalization law, all foreigners who had lived in the United Mexican States for a period of two years continuously could request a letter of naturalization. This meant that Spaniards who were excepted from the expulsion could apply for naturalization. In order to obtain the document, a "foreigner" would be required to present "legal information" demonstrating that he was an "apostolic roman Catholic," that he possessed a "line of business, useful industry or income with which to maintain himself," and that he was of "good conduct." Article 17 of the naturalization law apparently closed the door to Spanish subjects:

Letters of naturalization shall not be conceded to subjects or citizens of the nation with which the United Mexican States may find themselves at war.

But neither the naturalization law nor the provisions of article 18 of the expulsion law could prevent the entry of a Spaniard with influence into the republic. On April 18, 1828, the congress conceded an exception from the provisions of article 18 to the Spaniard Bernabé Sánchez and his son.¹²

An attempt was made by deputies Caffedo, Llano, Esnaurrizar and Escandón to rescue the inhabitants of Cuba and Puerto Rico from the classification of "Spaniards," should any of these immigrate to Mexico.¹³ The proposition introduced into the chamber by these deputies on April 18, stated:

The natives of the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico who, emigrating from them, may arrive at the ports of the republic and may swear their loyalty to independence and the form of government, upon presenting proof of their birth, shall no longer be considered subjects of the Spanish government.

The proposal was forwarded to the commissions of public security and government for review.

On the following day, Senator Berduzco presented a proposition to the senate intended to invoke stiff penalties for Spaniards who violated the law of December 20.¹⁴ Berduzco's proposal was made in the following terms:

The Spaniards expelled by virtue of the law of December 20 . . . , who do not depart from the point of their residence and from . . . the republic within the period designated in the passport given them by the government, shall be penalized with six months in a presidio, and afterwards embarked. Those who return to the republic prior to the termination of the period specified in the law shall suffer the same penalty and shall be reembarked after serving their sentences.

No immediate action was reported on Berduzco's proposal.

The fact that Governor Lorenzo Zavala and Minister of War Pedraza were, in the words of the former, "mortal enemies," may have contributed to the lack of support and enforcement which the expulsion law received in the state of Mexico. Pedraza received complaints against the governor from local militias whose officers felt that the governor was protecting and excepting the Spaniards of the state of Mexico. Pedraza informed Cañedo on April 24, that the military commander of Cuernavaca, Captain Angel Pérez Palacios, had forwarded an appeal from the civil militia of Miacatlán in which the militia had complained of a lack of enforcement of the expulsion law in their region.¹⁵ The militia of Miacatlán lamented the fact that, when the law was put into effect locally, "some Spaniards had no sooner left than they returned."

Governor Zavala communicated his version of events in Mexico to Cañedo on April 22, setting forth the provisions he had made for the enforcement of the expulsion law.¹⁶ Zavala had ordered the ayuntamientos and "two or three vecinos of known probity and honor from the proprietor class," to inform the state government concerning the Spaniards who should be expelled under article 9 "in order to request the required passports from the President." Regarding the other Spaniards of the state, Zavala insisted that he had proceeded in conformity with the law. Governor Zavala admitted having "always inclined toward leniency when treating cases of individuals who, besides having Mexican families, had never given cause to interpret their political conduct in an evil sense." Zavala attributed the rebellious posture

of the civil militia of Miacatlán to "some persons known for their exaltation." The governor insisted that the remainder of "twenty-five Spanish proprietors with their families in a territory of 100,000 souls and . . . 800 square leagues" could hardly be considered dangerous. What was at the root of the matter, according to Zavala, was a plan headed by Captain Pérez Palacios at Cuernavaca and the commander of Cuaútla, José la Piedra to "assassinate the few Spaniards who reside legally in those towns." When informed of Zavala's observations, Pedraza replied that if the governor would provide evidence for his charges against Pérez Palacios and Piedra, legal action would be taken.¹⁷

The chamber of deputies approved a report from the commissions of public security and government on April 28, which would exempt "all persons born in any part of America dependent upon the Spanish government," from the dispositions of the law of December 20.¹⁸ The measure was passed in response to the proposition submitted by Deputy Cañedo and others on April 18, and was designed to protect Cubans and Puerto Ricans born of Spanish parents, who might wish to immigrate to Mexico or who were already residing in the republic.

The governor of Veracruz, General Antonio López de Santa Anna, who had replaced General Miguel Barragán in that office following the January revolt, had been cautious in his enforcement of the expulsion law, if his reports to the federal government were correct. It would appear that Santa Anna was hesitant to expel persons enjoying the *fuero* militar or Spaniards whom he held in esteem, such as his father-in-law

or his personal physician. Santa Anna consulted the federal government on April 24 concerning the fate of pensioned former military men of Spanish birth and merchants who were said to be the object of popular wrath.¹⁹ Among the Spaniards who were supposed to leave Veracruz were some who enjoyed a military pension, as well as a certain Manuel Rodríguez, who owed money to the federal treasury. Santa Anna thought that the president should decide on the fate of persons who, by the terms of the law of December 20, were to enjoy their salaries or pensions while residing in a friendly country. The law had conceded time extensions to merchants who required them in order to liquidate their accounts, but the authorities in Jalapa believed that "the inquietude of the public" resulted from the presence of the merchants. Santa Anna requested a definitive ruling by the president on these matters.

Cañedo replied on April 30 that the president believed the governor's questions had already been resolved by the Minister of the Treasury and that Governor Santa Anna should abide by those rulings.²⁰ The president added:

. . . you should see to the effective departure of the individuals referred to, if they are covered in the law, keeping in mind the circular of this date ordering the departure of the Spaniards by the ports of the South.

The circular of April 30, noted above, was the second of two circulars sent out by the ministry of relations on that day. The first of these ordered the governors to remove all Spaniards residing on the coast a distance of at least twenty leagues into the interior,

due to the reported arrival of a Spanish squadron off the Mexican coast.²¹ The order was given on the authority of part two, article 19, of the law of December 20, which had authorized the government to move the Spaniards from the coast should an enemy invasion appear imminent. The Spaniards were given three days in which to move, unless their condition was absolutely prohibitive, in which case they were allowed to remain in their homes until they were able to travel.

The second circular issued on April 30 forbade the departure of Spaniards from the ports of the northern coast,²² and prohibited the departure of any Spaniard through the ports of Mexico without the express permission of the federal government. Should this permission be granted, the departures were to be made through the Pacific ports only. Spaniards who had not yet verified their departure, were to place themselves at the disposition of the governments of the southern states. A Spaniard who had obtained a passport for a temporary absence from the republic but had not verified his departure as yet, was to return his passport to the issuing authority. When circumstances were changed, these persons might apply once again for permission to leave the republic temporarily.

Instructions issued by the ministry of relations on May 7, when the circular was published as a bando, clarified the desired application of the new policy.²³ Spaniards from the Federal District or the territories, who should leave in conformity with the law of December 20, were to make their departure through the port of San Blas in the

state of Jalisco. While there were no opportunities to embark, these Spaniards would be kept under vigilance by the state government. Spaniards from the Federal District who had previously obtained passports for departure through northern ports and had not yet departed were to present these documents to the secretariat within three days in order to obtain a new route. Spaniards arriving in Mexico City, expelled from a state or territory, en route to a southern port were to remain in the city no more than eight days, presenting themselves daily before the *alcalde primero* of the *ayuntamiento* during their stay. The provision for the departure of Spaniards from the Federal District through the Pacific port of San Blas would be the subject of a number of appeals by Spaniards who, understandably, did not relish the thought of rounding Cape Horn in order to reach New Orleans.

The provisions of the circular of April 30 would make a further contribution to the decline of Tampico which, prior to that date, had already suffered economically as a result of the expulsion and voluntary exodus of the local Spaniards. El Aquila had reported on April 25:

In Tampico the Spaniards have had less serenity and calm, many have realized or maltreated their properties and have left for New Orleans, a fact which has been a fatal blow to the commerce of that port . . .²⁴

On April 28, Governor Santa Anna ordered the Spaniards of Jalapa, Tuxtla, Acayúcam, and Huimanguillo, to move twenty leagues from the coast until the Spanish squadron had departed from the Mexican coast.²⁵

The federal government decreed on May 1, a new set of passport regulations for the use of the customs authorities of the ports.²⁶

Article four, part one, of the new regulations stated that:

No Spaniard or subject of the Spanish government could enter the republic, due to the prohibitions contained in article one of the law of April 25, 1826, and repeated in article 18 of the law of December 20, 1827.

But part two of article four succeeded in restoring the status quo ante-bellum: "Any foreigner may disembark with a passport of the federal government." A Spaniard with a passport issued by the federal government would not be refused entry to Mexico.

Cañedo noticed a list of 205 Spaniards extended passports by the governor of Veracruz on April 28, published in the Noticioso comercial y científico of Veracruz City on May 2.²⁷ The minister of relations informed Santa Anna on May 6 that since the latter had not informed the federal government concerning these expulsions, the president wished to know whether they were covered in articles 1, 3 and 6, or whether they should have been judged under article 9. If they had been given passports because they were dangerous, the president insisted that the passports should be collected immediately and the cases sent to the ministry of relations, since the faculty of article 9 rested with the federal government. Cañedo reminded Santa Anna that provision 8 of the instructions had called for a report on each of these individuals.

Governor Santa Anna defended his actions by stating that the majority of these Spaniards were "covered in the law."²⁸ Their cases had been reviewed by the junta established at Jalapa in accordance with state decree no. 86, the expulsion law of Veracruz, following

which he "did not hesitate" to give them passports. Furthermore, there was reason for haste because of the threat of invasion and the fact that so many Spaniards resided near the coast. The people of Veracruz were "in an exalted state" and the Spaniards were in personal danger. Santa Anna protested that the report requested in the instructions would be impossible to compile in such a short time. If the Spaniards could not leave the nation, they would have to leave the state. "This government will not respond to their appeals," Santa Anna concluded, "because they constitute a danger here."

The governor had evidently failed to conform to the instructions issued earlier and, caught short by the appearance of the Spanish squadron off the coast and by the commensurate rise in anti-Spanish feeling, he had taken the politic step of expelling 205 "suspicious" Spaniards. Cañedo replied, on behalf of the president, that the provisions of the law of December 20, regarding the reports required concerning Spaniards expelled from the states as well as the individual reports required for the use of the federal government in deciding cases under article 9, must not be disregarded.²⁹ President Victoria had insisted that Santa Anna forwarded these reports "in the briefest possible time." The president refused to surrender the faculty granted to the federal government under article 9.

Invasion threatened and the enforcement of the expulsion law was slowed by the provisions placed in effect to reduce the threat such an invasion would have represented. Cañedo asked the chamber of deputies on May 7, to pass a law declaring any Spaniard who might return from

exile "outside the law."³⁰ According to the Minister of Relations, the president was convinced that the law of December 20 could not be properly enforced without the passage of a decree "determining the penalty which should be imposed" in such cases. Without this decree, the Spanish government could have sent its agents into the republic. Canedo recommended that the penalty be made applicable to any Spaniard who might return "without the express permission of the government." Neither the reported debates nor the collections of decrees compiled by Basilio José Arrillaga or Mariano Galván Rivera provide any indication that the law desired by the ministry was passed.

The congress completed a measure on May 17, clarifying the law of employees of May 10, 1827.³¹ By the provisions of the new law, only the employees who had been removed from their positions by the law of May 10 were eligible to receive their full salaries and to receive full credit for the time of their suspension toward their careers. Spaniards removed from their posts by the laws of February 9, September 21 and November 16, 1824, were to enjoy two-thirds of their final salaries or the pension they might have anticipated in retirement, whichever was greater. Salaries not exceeding 300 pesos per year would suffer no diminution, since no Spaniard should receive less than 300 pesos per year.

The chamber of deputies passed a measure on May 19 which was designed to prevent the acquisition of "property or rights in the nation by either corporations or individual subjects of any other [nation]

which might be an enemy."³² The decree noted that the reverse would be "incompatible with the state of war." The implication of this measure for the Spaniards was that in order to possess property in Mexico, a Spaniard would have to acquire citizenship through naturalization, after having first been excepted from the expulsion provisions of the law of December 20.

The minister of relations presented his monthly report on the progress of the expulsion to the congress on May 20.³³ Either Cañedo had failed to present a report on April 20, as article 11 of the expulsion law required, which seems unlikely, or else the report was not preserved in the Ramo de expulsión. Assuming that the latter was the case, the lists of Spaniards excepted or given passports included in the report of May 20, would reveal the progress of the enforcement during the preceding month only. Table 20 summarizes the lists submitted to congress on May 20 by Cañedo.

The Ramo de expulsión contains no report for June 20, ten days prior to the expiration of the faculties conceded to the government by the law. The three reports contained in the ramo may be summarized below, providing a picture of the enforcement of the law which approximates that received by congress.

If Senator José María Alpuche's estimate, that in 1827 there were 6,000 Spaniards in Mexico, was accurate, and provided that the government's lists were up to date, it could be asserted that, with one month remaining in the life of article 9 of the expulsion law, only about

TABLE 20

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
BY THE MINISTRY OF RELATIONS ON MAY 20, 1828
SPANIARDS GIVEN PASSPORTS AND EXCEPTED
APRIL 20-MAY 20, 1828

Areas Reporting	Spaniards Given Passports			Spaniards Excepted
	Military	Regulars	Total	
Federal District	0	1	9	20
Chihuahua	0	1	1	2
Durango	0	0	3	-
Guanajuato	0	1	1	-
México	0	0	1	1
Nuevo León	0	0	2	-
Oaxaca	0	0	3	2
Puebla	0	0	37	-
Veracruz	2	0	2	-
Yucatán	0	1	3	-
Occidente* (Sonora y Sinaloa)	0	2	27	-
Tlaxcala, Terr. de*	0	0	1	1
Totals	2	6	90	26

*Areas reporting for the first time.

Source: Ramo de expulsión, leg. 5, Vol. 12, exp. 23, fols. 1-5.

TABLE 21

A SUMMARY OF THE LISTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
BY THE MINISTRY OF RELATIONS IN 1828
BASED ON THE THREE LISTS FOUND
IN THE RAMO DE ESPULSION

Areas Reporting	Passports Reported in the Reports			Total Passports Reported
	Feb. 20 ^a	Mar. 20 ^b	May 20 ^c	
Federal District	210	203	9	422
Puebla	41	83	37	161
Veracruz	9	1	2	12
Michoacán	1	-	-	1
Zacatecas	8	1	-	9
Durango	43	3	3	49
Guanajuato	2	23	1	26
Oaxaca	52	5	3	60
México	30	21	1	52
Jalisco	-	2	-	2
San Luis Potosí	-	86	-	86
Tamaulipas	-	12	-	12
Chiapas	-	14	-	14
Yucatán	-	14	3	17
Chihuahua	-	5	1	6
Nuevo León	-	4	2	6
Tabasco	-	4	-	4
Nuevo México, Terr. de.	-	5	-	5
Occidente (Sonora y Sinaloa)	-	-	27	27
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	-	-	1	1
Totals	396	486	90	972

^aleg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 10, fols. 1-11.

^bleg. 8, Vol. 18, exp. 15, fols. 1-22.

^cleg. 5, Vol. 12, exp. 23, fols. 1-5.

Source: Lists found in Ramo de espulsión.

one-sixth of the Spaniards had received passports. A considerably smaller number had actually departed from Mexico. Two factors intervened to make these figures inaccurate. First, the number of state governments failed to file reports on their enforcement of the law as directed in the law itself and in the initial instructions. This means that the number of Spaniards receiving passports was actually much higher than the lists given to congress would indicate. Second, a number of the passports issued in the states and in the Federal District were ordered collected by the federal government following appeals by the Spaniards concerned or following a presidential review of the lists remitted to the federal government by the governors. This means that the actual number of Spaniards departing was far fewer than the number of passports issued.

The prominent Spanish military officials among the expulsos arriving in New Orleans must have provided a ready source of recruitment for the officials in Havana charged with planning an invasion of Mexico. While the exiled officers were threatened with the loss of their pay should they visit Havana, the former expeditionary soldiers lacked a similar motive to prevent them from doing so. A Mexican writing from New Orleans on April 26 reported that shortly after their arrival, over 200 Spanish troops had submitted a representation to the captain general at Havana through the Spanish consul in New Orleans, soliciting an amnesty.³⁴ A Captain Sánchez, who had been a lieutenant in the expeditionary battalion of Castille, arrived shortly in New

Orleans and secured a barracks for them while arranging for their transportation to Havana. The exiled Spanish soldiers received two reales per day while awaiting transportation. Captain Sánchez remained in New Orleans to await the arrival of additional capitulados.

The suspension placed on the departure of Spaniards on April 30 was lifted by a circular of May 24, which was published as a bando on May 31.³⁵ Cañedo issued the order circular after Minister of the Treasury José Ignacio Esteva had reported that the financial losses accruing to the Spaniards and their families, who were to embark through the southern ports in accordance with the order of April 30, would have been severe. The government had decided that the danger of Spanish invasion was not so great as had previously been supposed. The circular of April 30 was suspended for all residents of the Federal District except Spanish military personnel:

. . . for the present and while circumstances do not vary, Spaniards who voluntarily, or by virtue of the law of December 20, should leave the republic, may verify their embarkation through the port which they may select . . . , bonded by (caucionando con) a Mexican, to the satisfaction of the government of the respective state, that they will not go to any of the Antilles dependent upon Spain; and it has likewise been disposed that the passports of those who may have permission to embark from a port anywhere along the Mexican coast, shall not be collected, and those [passports] which have been collected shall be returned

The provisions of this circular were extended on June 28, to cover military personnel as well.

José Ignacio Esteva had also persuaded the federal government that the orders issued on April 30 for the removal of Spanish residents from the coast twenty leagues into the interior were working undue hardships on the Spaniards and their families. Minister Cañedo informed

Governor Santa Anna of Veracruz on May 24, that, according to Esteva's report, the Spaniards and their families who resided along the coasts of Veracruz were suffering "losses to their interests" due to the order of April 30.³⁶ In view of the decreasing danger of a Spanish invasion, the president had decided that Spaniards who, in the opinion of the Veracruz government, "may be of a pacific conduct," should not be obliged to move into the interior. Only "suspicious" Spaniards were to be forced to move from the coast of Veracruz. Santa Anna was authorized to reinstate the effects of the circular of April 30, should the Spanish squadron reappear off the Mexican coast. Cañedo forwarded the same message to the governor of Yucatán on June 20, but limiting its application to "only the Spaniards of Campeche."³⁷

Minister of Relations Cañedo, recognizing that the expulsion law of December 20 was not being enforced with equal rigor in all quarters, issued a circular on May 28 to all but the governors of Chihuahua, Yucatán and México, demanding the fulfillment of the third, seventh and eighth provisions of the initial instructions.³⁸ Reports had not been submitted on Spaniards who were expelled, excepted, or not covered in the law, nor had the required lists of Spaniards considered dangerous to the republic been remitted to the federal government by most state governments. In the circular of May 28, the president reminded the twenty-one governors who were remiss in their compliance, that the law would expire within one month and, in order to complete its enforcement, the governors should forward their reports "by the next return mail."

Governor Tornel of the Federal District published a bando on May 30, establishing a new period during which excepted Spaniards might make the formal pledge required in article 16 of the expulsion law.³⁹ The pledges were to be made before the alcalde primero of the ayuntamiento in the consistorial houses of the Federal District between June 2 and July 19. Should any Spaniard residing in the Federal District fail to perform the act by July 20, without reasonable cause, he would be expelled under article 17 of the expulsion law. The bando also lifted the prohibition of February 26, so that Spaniards might depart through the city gates without the prior knowledge of the alcalde primero. The provision requiring Spaniards to notify local authorities when they wished to change their residence was also suspended.

The federal government found it necessary to emit a new circular on June 3, by extraordinary mail, ordering the governors once again to comply with article 7 of the initial instructions, which had called for lists of the Spaniards excepted from the law to be submitted within thirty days of its publication.⁴⁰ The lists of "suspicious" Spaniards were still missing for some states, making it impossible for the federal government to comply with the provision of article 9. Canedo remonstrated with the governors who were remiss:

. . . by virtue of what has been said, it would be inexcusable for your excellency to fail to remit immediately and by extraordinary mail a list or census of the Spaniards actually in your state and, in addition, a report of the opinion you may have of each of them . . . , your excellency will be responsible if you should not comply with your part, whereas the federal government will have complied by means of this final interpolation and reminder.

Governor Tornel responded to the federal appeal on June 14 with a list of forty-four "disaffected" Spaniards to be judged by the supreme government under article 9.⁴¹ Tornel's list consisted of names only, without data for the use of the president in council of ministers in determining "the nature of the danger" inherent in their remaining in the republic. Cañedo replied that this list was identical to the inadequate list submitted earlier.⁴² Tornel's appeal was returned accompanied by orders to comply with the circular of February 16.⁴³ Tornel returned the list on June 17, protesting that:

This government has been unable to acquire these notices, nor would it be possible to do so without revealing the secret, and if this government recommends their expulsion, it is because it has formed a just opinion [rather than] an unjust opinion concerning these individuals.⁴⁴

The government reiterated its position, insisting that the president could not resolve these cases in council without data.⁴⁵ Tornel responded on June 30, the final day of the life of the law, by acknowledging simply that the president in council of ministers had not granted his petition.⁴⁶ The Spaniards listed by Tornel were among the most prominent men of the Federal District, including Antonio Terán and the ex-Count of Basoco; Brigadier Juan Díaz, the colonels Joaquín de Elizalde, Lorenzo Angulo Guardamino, Justo Huidobro, and Deputy Cipriano Blanco of Yucatán.

The original list, which had been compiled for Governor Tornel by "some gentlemen" of the ayuntamiento, on June 10, contained the names of 130 Spaniards.⁴⁷ The ayuntamiento and the governor of the Federal District were hesitant to investigate the prominent Spaniards

of the Federal District for fear of "revealing the secret." The rumor of the "secret list" having been sent by Governor Tornel was sufficient to elicit three appeals to the federal government by Spaniards who feared that their names might be on the list.

Article 10 of the expulsion law had provided for the expiration of articles 7 and 9 at the end of six months. Tornel inquired whether the articles expired on the 20th or on the 22nd of June.⁴⁸ Cañedo replied on June 21 that the law would expire in the Federal District on June 22, "at the hour of its publication."⁴⁹ Tornel stated his concern about the public resentment caused by some exceptions. He felt that the law should be extended. On June 23 Tornel repeated again that the data required by the government could not be provided within a short time.⁵⁰ Tornel warned that, if the Spaniards "who should have been expelled under faculty 9" were excepted, public opinion would be deeply stirred.

The governor of the Federal District feared that many Spaniards would be left in the republic "because of the government's refusal to overlook normal procedures in these cases." He charged that "for other Spaniards, your excellency did not request such instructions of either my predecessor or of me." The collection of information about the many Spaniards in the Federal District had proved an impossible task. Tornel pleaded for three more days in which to attempt to gather data on the more dangerous Spaniards of the Federal District.

The president replied through the ministry of relations on June 23, that the time allotted for the use of the faculty conceded by article 9 had expired on the previous day.⁵¹ President Victoria assured

Tornel that no resolutions taken in council would be altered since they were made "with all circumspection and impartiality." Tornel acknowledged the president's refusal to grant him "three days to spell out the dangers which would result from the remainder of these Spaniards in the republic."⁵²

Cañedo issued a circular on June 25, clarifying the extent to which the provisions of the expulsion law had expired.⁵³ Articles 7 and 9 had ceased, but since articles 1 through 6 were not specifically terminated by a provision of the law, the president had decided to keep them in force in order to resolve the cases still pending. The government reserved the right to continue to resolve the cases of Spaniards who came under the expulsion provisions of articles 1, 3, 5 and 6. That is, the cases of capitulados, of Spaniards who had entered the republic after 1821, of regular clergy, vagrants, and homeless Spaniards, would still be resolved by the federal government, resulting in additional exceptions or expulsions. The government also extended its right to grant exemptions for reasons of age, illness or for any of the other reasons listed in articles 2, 4 and 5. In short, all of the articles which "were related to the compliance with articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6" were declared to be in force until further notice.

The government revoked on June 27 the prohibition against the embarkation of Spanish military personnel through the northern ports.⁵⁴ The same provisions were to apply to military personnel as had been

decreed for civilians. They were to be "bonded by a Mexican to the satisfaction of the respective state government, that they will not go to any of the Antilles dependent upon Spain."⁵⁵

The presidential order of April 30, which had called for the removal of all Spaniards from the coasts of Mexico in view of the imminent danger of a Spanish invasion, was definitively revoked by an order sent to the governors of the gulf coast states on July 19.⁵⁶ The government reserved the right to renew the measure in case the Spanish squadron reappeared off the Mexican coast.

The president attempted on July 26 to provide a consistent basis for regulating the deposits of bonds required of Spaniards departing from the Gulf coast of Mexico.⁵⁷ The circulars of May 24 and June 28 had called for the posting of a bond as a guarantee that the Spaniard would not stop at a port in the Spanish Antilles. In the future a list of Spaniards posting bonds should be remitted to the capital and the fact should be noted in the respective passports. No Spaniard was to be permitted to depart from a port of the Mexican coast without posting such a bond in the future. Any Spaniard who refused to do so, should be obliged to depart from one of the southern ports in Jalisco or Oaxaca.

These circulars indicate that the federal government was indeed resolving the cases which had been pending on June 20. The pace of enforcement had slowed considerably from that of February and March. The result of the expulsion law was not what its proponents, such as Berduzco, Alpuche and Tornel, had envisioned. An English merchant,

who had travelled through five states of Mexico in June and July of 1828, reported to his associate in Veracruz on July 15 that the rumors they had heard about the "evil effects" of the expulsion were unfounded: "The law of expulsion has not caused the miseries and insecurity which our colleague N . . . announced to us."⁵⁸ To the English merchant the law had produced no harmful effects because it had been:

. . . limited to capitulados and those introduced since the year 1821; that is to say, to those who possessed nothing, or who used to possess very little.

Since the expulsos were generally not persons of wealth, the English traveler felt that little harm had been done to the country.

The Cases of Six Prominent Spaniards

The cases of generals Pedro Celestino Negrete and José Antonio Echavarri were complicated by the fact that the generals had been imprisoned for their alleged involvement in the Arenas affair. Governor Tornel feared that, since article 9 of the law would expire in June and the trials of Negrete and Echavarri might not be concluded by that time, these "dangerous" Spaniards might escape prescription. Tornel recommended to the federal government on March 4 the immediate expulsion of Negrete, Echavarri and the other Spanish prisoners.⁵⁹ Cañedo informed Tornel on May 23 that, after serving their sentences, Negrete and Echavarri could be expelled under article 9.⁶⁰

Tornel extended passports to Negrete and Echavarri on May 28, following their acquittal by a military tribunal.⁶¹ Governor Tornel reported on June 23 that he had given passports to all of the "Arenas

conspirators" under article 9 of the expulsion law.⁶² General of Division Echavarri was allowed on July 28 to select the port from which he wished to depart, but his request to depart in a ship of war was ignored.⁶³ The general was guaranteed his salary as long as he did not reside in "an enemy country."⁶⁴ On September 5, Echavarri solicited an extension of one month in order to restore his health. President Guadalupe Victoria ordered him examined by physicians to determine the necessity of the delay.⁶⁵ Minister of War Pedraza argued that the Spanish general's appeal should be denied since "it granted him recognition unknown among the Generals of the Army."⁶⁶

The president ordered the departure of Negrete and Echavarri on September 6, noting that "one month had passed since they were set at liberty."⁶⁷ General Negrete was to depart at once, while General Echavarri could await the resolution of his appeal for a time extension. President Victoria allotted Echavarri the remainder of the month of September to verify his departure.⁶⁸ Generals Negrete and Echavarri arrived in Puebla on September 17, where they halted with presidential permission, "until the road between Puebla and Veracruz could be placed in a state of security,"⁶⁹ since General Manuel Rincón was besieging General Santa Anna at Perote in mid-September. Governor Joaquín Haro y Tamariz of Puebla reported the departure of generals Negrete and Echavarri for Veracruz with an escort on December 9.⁷⁰

In the words of Lucas Alamán:

Spain then was clearly avenged at the hands of the Mexicans themselves for the injuries which those two chiefs had caused her by means of the grand part they had played in the making of independence.⁷¹

The case of Martín Rafael de Michelena illustrates the disagreement between Governor Tornel and Governor Zavala concerning the type of Spaniard which should have been expelled. The lengthy and influence-laden case of Michelena was forwarded to Juan J. Espinosa de los Monteros on February 22.⁷² Michelena had been a member of the "Junta of creditors to the possessions of the deceased Pedro Ramón Romero de Terreros" since June, 1819. Tornel pushed for his expulsion over references in his favor from Governor Zavala, Colonel Juan Amador, José Ramón Malo, the secretary of state in Mexico state, and Deputy Anastasio Zerecero of Mexico state. Governor Tornel summarized his opinion of such recommendations on February 22:

Certifications are granted with facility, so that not only this Spaniard but all of them can find Mexicans who will vouch for their conduct; . . . it is necessary to close one's ears to compassion . . . Michelena's solicitude should not be granted.⁷³

President Victoria rejected Michelena's appeal on March 24, granting him time to render his accounts in connection with the Romero de Terreros estate prior to his departure.

The case of Mateo Rubio, a wealthy Spanish merchant of the capital, was singular in that Rubio attempted to bribe Governor Tornel in order to have his passport withdrawn. On April 1, the president had ordered the expulsion of Rubio within 30 days.⁷⁴ When Rubio protested that his financial affairs could not be satisfactorily arranged within a month, Cañedo returned his appeal, noting that his affairs could be handled by a proxy.⁷⁵ Governor Tornel reported on April 16, that Rubio:

. . . resorted to the extreme of offering me 2,000 pesos if I would withdraw the passport which I had given him . . .⁷⁶

Rubio was granted a three-month extension on April 18 to adjust his affairs.⁷⁷ This concession expired on July 14, at which time Cañedo reminded Tornel that the merchant must depart.⁷⁸ But a new appeal from Rubio appeared on July 21, in which he noted that he owed money to the federal treasury. Cañedo requested a report from Minister of the Treasury José Ignacio Pavón on the matter. Pavón reported on August 5, that Rubio owed the treasury over 8,000 pesos.⁷⁹ In the interest of the national treasury, Rubio was excepted from the expulsion in September and forgiven for his attempt to bribe Governor Tornel.⁸⁰

The case of General Miguel González Saravia was affected by Governor Tornel's suspicion that the general had been involved in the revolt begun by Lt. Colonel Manuel Montano in December. Cañedo turned the case over to Tornel for resolution on June 14, since General Saravia had resided in the capital for a number of years.⁸¹ Tornel informed the government of June 18 that General Saravia was "connected with those who took part in the plan of Montano," recommending the use of article 9 in the case.⁸² President Victoria agreed, ordering Saravia expelled under article 9, but only:

. . . after the trial which should be formed for his having obtained command outside the republic and when he has executed the penalty, to which he may be sentenced.⁸³

The standard charge against those suspected of implication in the Montano revolt was "having accepted command outside the republic," in other words, from Spain. On June 23, Tornel reported expediting General Saravia's passport "to be effective following his trial and after his sentence is served."⁸⁴

The case of Brigadier Juan Orbegozo reveals how a Spaniard with excellent military recommendations and a past free of suspicion could obtain repeated extensions without obtaining an exception from the expulsion of 1828. Brigadier Orbegozo appealed directly to the president on January 20, noting that he had married a Mexican on November 21, 1827, with the permission of the army.⁸⁵ Orbegozo was a capitulado, having joined Agustín Iturbide in August 1821. Iturbide had attached him to Captain General Juan O'Donojú and, later, he had been a member of the Provisional Governing Junta and a deputy in the first constitutional congress. At the time of his appeal, Brigadier Orbegozo was a professor of mathematics and geography, having been removed from the army by the law of May 10, 1827.

General Manuel Rincón recommended Orbegozo as "singularly faithful to independence in the present circumstances."⁸⁶ In order to resolve the appeal, President Victoria wished to know whether Orbegozo was a capitulado. Pedraza replied on April 18:

According to popular rumor, General Juan Orbegozo capitulated in Jalapa, and subsequently, in Puebla where he was the commissioner who signed the capitulations.⁸⁷

At this time also, Brigadier Orbegozo was actively attempting with the support of the governor of Veracruz, to obtain the contract for the repair of the roads between Jalapa and Córdoba. His attempt was refused by the president on April 18.⁸⁸

On April 22 the president ordered the expulsion of Brigadier Orbegozo within thirty days on a Veracruz passport.⁸⁹ Governor Santa Anna extended a passport to Brigadier Orbegozo on April 27. Santa

Anna reported on May 1, that he had been thinking of giving Orbegozo "a commission concerning roads which I was going to entrust to his scientific knowledge."⁹⁰ Santa Anna forwarded Orbegozo's appeal for a three-month extension "in order to arrange his affairs in the country." Governor Santa Anna added his recommendation to Orbegozo's appeal. The three-month extension was granted.⁹¹

Santa Anna forwarded a new appeal from Brigadier Orbegozo on July 6, petitioning the president for another time extension and for permission to come to Mexico City where he might sell his books and instruments.⁹² President Victoria extended his permission on July 12 to the maximum of six months permitted by the law of December 20.⁹³ On October 22, Vice Governor Manuel Argüelles of Veracruz remitted a new appeal from Orbegozo for a further extension of time, which was returned to the vice governor for additional information. Argüelles was serving as Orbegozo's attorney in the case. On November 2, General Ignacio Mora, military commander of the state of Veracruz, reviewed the existing file on Orbegozo in a letter to Canedo.⁹⁴ General Mora recommended Orbegozo as "a patriotic, useful and wise liberal." On November 11, Brigadier Manuel de Mier y Terán added his own to Orbegozo's growing file of recommendations.

Tornei forwarded a new appeal from Brigadier Orbegozo, who was now in the Federal District, on December 16, requesting a passport to Orizaba in order to prepare for his departure.⁹⁵ Orbegozo asked that his salary be paid by the commissary at Veracruz. On December 17 the government acceded to his requests.⁹⁶ At this point, the expedient on Brigadier Orbegozo ends abruptly. Perhaps he departed for New Orleans

in December or, if he received a further extension, he was surely expelled by the more inflexible expulsion law of March 20, 1829.

The final results of the law of December 20 can best be shown in statistics, which will be the task of the final chapter. To a degree, Lucas Alamán was correct: Mexico avenged Spain by virtue of the law of December 20. The law was a first attempt by republican Mexico to shake off Spanish influence. She would try again with the law of March 20, 1829,⁹⁷ and yet a third time when the congress of 1833 revived the law of March 20 by a decree of January 16, 1833.⁹⁸ The first expulsion law had provided the pattern which would be modified for use in 1829 and 1833.

Notes

¹Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, April 10, 1828, México, in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 70, fols. 15, 16, 22 [cited hereafter as AGN:RE].

²Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, May 24, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 14.

³Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 19, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 3.

⁴Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, April 11, 1828, Mexico, ibid., fols. 15, 16.

⁵Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, April 11, 1828, México, ibid., leg. 5, Vol. 12, exp. 18, fol. 43.

⁶Governor González Cabotrano to Minister Cañedo, April 16, 1828, Puebla, ibid., fols. 40, 48.

⁷Minister Cañedo to Governor González Cabotrano, April 18, 1828, Mexico, ibid., fol. 41.

⁸Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza, April 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 42.

⁹Governor González Cabotrano to Minister Cañedo, April 25, 1928, Puebla, ibid., fols. 49, 51, 55.

¹⁰Chamber of Deputies, session of April 12, 1828, El Aquila, VI (May 12, 1828), 1.

¹¹Congressional decree, April 14, 1828. Basilio José Arrillaga (ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandos, reglamentos, circulares y providencias de los supremos poderes y otras autoridades de la República Mexicana. 1828-1839, 1849-abril, 1850 (17 vols.; México, 1834-50), III, 491-95; El Aquila, VI (April 26, 1828), 2.

¹²Congressional decree, April 18, 1828; Arrillaga, I, 87.

¹³Chamber of Deputies, session of April 18, 1828, El Aquila, VI (May 15, 1828), 1-2.

¹⁴Senate, session of April 19, 1828, ibid., VI (June 15, 1828), 1.

¹⁵Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, April 24, 1828, México, AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 6, exp. 71, fols. 1, 2.

¹⁶Governor Zavala to Minister Cañedo, Reservado, April 22, 1828, Tlalpam, ibid., fols. 4, 8.

¹⁷Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, April 29, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 5.

¹⁸Chamber of Deputies, session of April 28, 1828, El Aquila, VI (May 18, 1828), 2.

¹⁹Governor Santa Anna to Minister Cañedo, April 24, 1828, Jalapa, AGN:RE, leg. 5, Vol. 11, exp. 16, fols. 7, 10.

²⁰Minister Cañedo to Governor Santa Anna, April 30, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 8.

²¹Circular, April 30, 1828. México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de gobernación, leg. 75, exp. 12, fol. 2 [cited hereafter as AGN:RG]; Arrillaga, I, 97-98.

²²That is to say, the ports of the Gulf of Mexico. Circular, April 30, 1828, AGN:RG, leg. 75, exp. 17, fol. 1; Arrillaga, I, 98-99.

²³Bando, May 7, 1828, ibid., I, 99.

²⁴"Noticias Estrangeras," El Aquila, VI (April 25, 1828), 2.

²⁵Governor Santa Anna to Commanding General of Veracruz, April 28, 1828, Jalapa, ibid., VI (May 6, 1828), 3.

²⁶"Reglamento para el ramo de pasaportes," May 1, 1828, Arrillaga, II, 476.

²⁷Minister Cañedo to Governor Santa Anna, May 6, 1828, México, AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 6, exp. 76, fol. 4.

²⁸Governor Santa Anna to Minister Cañedo, May 12, 1828, Jalapa, ibid., fols. 1, 3.

²⁹Minister Cañedo to Governor Santa Anna, May 21, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

³⁰Minister Cañedo to Secretaries of the Chamber of Deputies, May 7, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 67, fol. 2.

³¹"Aclaración de la ley de cesación de empleados españoles," May 17, 1828. Mariano Galván Rivera (ed.), Colección de ordenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa y soberanos congresos generales de la Nación Mexicana (8 vols.; México, 1829-40), IV, 170; Bando, May 17, 1828, El Aquila, VI (June 13, 1828), 3.

³²Chamber of Deputies, session of May 19, 1828, ibid., VI (July 2, 1828), 1.

³³AGN:RE, leg. 5, Vol. 12, exp. 23, fols. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

³⁴"México, 23 de mayo," El Aquila, VI (May 23, 1828), 4.

³⁵Circular, May 24, 1828, Arrillaga, I, 194-95.

³⁶Minister Cañedo to Governor Santa Anna, May 24, 1828, México AGN:RG, leg. 75, exp. 11, fol. 1.

³⁷Minister Cañedo to Governor José Tiburcio López, June 20, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

³⁸Circular, May 28, 1828, AGN:RE, leg. 2, Vol. 6, exp. 72, fol. 1; "Noticias Nacionales," El Aquila, VI (June 7, 1828), 3.

³⁹Bando, May 30, 1828; Arrillaga, I, 197-98.

⁴⁰Circular, June 3, 1828, El Aquila, VI (June 7, 1828), 4.

⁴¹Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 14, 1828, México, AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 67, fol. 5, 16.

⁴²ibid., exp. 66, fol. 7, undated.

⁴³Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 14, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 67, fol. 6.

⁴⁴Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 17, 1828, México, ibid., fols. 3, 16.

⁴⁵Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 19, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 4.

⁴⁶Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 30, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

⁴⁷ibid., exp. 66, fols. 2, 3.

⁴⁸Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 22, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 63, fol. 1.

⁴⁹Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 21, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

⁵⁰Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 23, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 56, fol. 1.

⁵¹Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 23, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 3.

⁵²Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 30, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

⁵³Circular, June 25, 1828, ibid., Vol. 6, exp. 73, fols. 1, 2, 3; Arrillaga, I, 204-06.

⁵⁴Circular, June 27, 1828, AGN:RG, leg. 75, exp. 13, fol. 1.

⁵⁵Circular, June 28, 1828, ibid., fol. 2; Arrillaga, I, 208-09.

⁵⁶Circular, July 19, 1828, AGN:RG, leg. 75, exp. 9, fol. 18.

⁵⁷Circular, July 26, 1828, ibid., exp. 14, fol. 2.

⁵⁸"Párrafo traducido de una carta escrita en Méjico en 15 de julio por un negociante inglés a su socio residente en Veracruz," El Aquila, VI (September 12, 1828), 1-2.

⁵⁹Governor Tornel to Minister Espinosa de los Monteros, Reservado, March 4, 1828, México, AGN:RE, leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 54, fol. 1.

⁶⁰Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, May 23, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 124.

⁶¹Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, May 28, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 122.

⁶²Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 23, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 109.

⁶³Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, July 28, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 98..

⁶⁴Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza, August 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 91.

⁶⁵Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza, September 5, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 86.

⁶⁶Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, September 6, 1828, Mexico, ibid., fol. 83.

⁶⁷Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, September 6, 1828, Mexico, ibid., fol. 81.

⁶⁸Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza and Governor Joaquín de Haro y Tamarfz, September 19, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 85.

⁶⁹Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza and Governor Haro y Tamarfz, September 19, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 79.

⁷⁰Governor Haro y Tamarfz to Minister Cañedo, December 9, 1828, Puebla, ibid., fol. 66.

⁷¹Historia de Méjico (5 vols.; México, 1849-52), V, 768-69.

⁷²Summary, compiled by Ministry of Relations, February 22, 1828, AGN:RE, leg. 8, Vol. 18, exp. 16, fol. 1.

⁷³Quoted in the summary, ibid.

⁷⁴Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, April 1, 1828, México, ibid., leg. 9, Vol. 21, exp. 46, fol. 29.

⁷⁵Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, April 12, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 30.

⁷⁶Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, April 16, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 45.

⁷⁷Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, April 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 46.

⁷⁸Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, July 14, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 14.

⁷⁹Minister Pavón to Minister Cañedo, August 5, 1828, México, ibid., fols. 2, 5.

⁸⁰Minister Cañedo to Minister Esteva, September 22, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 4.

⁸¹Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 14, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 38, fols. 5, 6.

⁸²Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, Reservado, June 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 3.

⁸³Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, June 19, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 4.

⁸⁴Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, June 23, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 2.

⁸⁵General Orbegoza to President Victoria, January 20, 1828, Veracruz, ibid., leg. 23, Vol. 56, exp. 33, fol. 8.

⁸⁶Reported in Minister Pedraza to Minister Espinosa de los Monteros, January 22, 1828, México, ibid., exp. 22, fol. 6.

⁸⁷Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, April 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 11.

⁸⁸Minister Pedraza to Minister Cañedo, April 18, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 10.

⁸⁹Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza and Governor Santa Anna, April 22, 1828, Mexico, ibid., exp. 33, fol. 12.

⁹⁰Governor Santa Anna to Minister Cañedo, May 1, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 14.

⁹¹Minister Cañedo to Governor Santa Anna, May 9, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 15.

⁹²Governor Santa Anna to Minister Cañedo, July 6, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 17.

⁹³Minister Cañedo to Minister Pedraza and Governor Santa Anna, July 12, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 20.

⁹⁴General Mora to Minister Cañedo, November 2, 1828, Veracruz, ibid., fol. 24.

⁹⁵Governor Tornel to Minister Cañedo, December 16, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 30.

⁹⁶Minister Cañedo to Governor Tornel, December 17, 1828, México, ibid., fol. 31.

⁹⁷Decree, March 20, 1829. Manuel Dublán y Manuel Lozano (eds.), Legislación mexicana. Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República (34 vols.; Mexico, 1876-1904), II, 98-99.

⁹⁸Decree, January 16, 1833, Arrillaga, V, 276-78.

CHAPTER XI

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST GENERAL EXPULSION OF SPANIARDS

By their choice of the term "expulsion," the creoles clearly implied two things; first, that the movement was justified on moral and economic grounds and, secondly, that the process was to be extensive and as nearly complete as possible. On both counts, the Mexicans were to suffer disappointments. The matter of moral justification for the expulsion will not be treated here, since it lies outside our competence. The present chapter will focus on the economic questions involved in the first expulsion and, particularly, on the extent of Spanish emigration. An attempt will be made to assess the effect on Mexico of the first expulsion in the light of data on the occupations of the Spaniards who were actually expelled. Long range results are, of course, more difficult to discern. Some hypotheses will be presented, however, though no conclusive analysis could be made without adequate treatment of the history of Mexico during the years subsequent to the first expulsion.

The Extent of the Expulsion

The distinction between Spaniards issued passports and peninsulares departing from the ports should be kept in mind. As can be seen from Tables 22 and 23, more Spaniards departed than the governors' reported passports would indicate. A count of all the reports of passports

TABLE 22

SPANIARDS ISSUED PASSPORTS BY THE GOVERNORS OF
STATES, TERRITORIES AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
DECEMBER 1827-JANUARY 1829

(Derived from reports and lists submitted by the governors to the Secretary of Relations.)

Region	Spaniards
Californias, Terr. de	-
Chiapas	26
Chihuahua	87
Coahuila y Tejas	-
Colima, Terr. de	3
Distrito Federal	262
Durango	79
Guanajuato	-
Jalisco	46
México	-
Michoacán	23
Nuevo León	10
Nuevo México, Terr. de	-
Oaxaca	107
Occidente	48
Puebla	136
Querétaro	33
San Luis Potosí	119
Tabasco	7
Tamaulipas	39
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	4
Veracruz	7
Yucatán	60
Zacatecas	8
Total	1,104

Note: The blank spaces indicate the absence of reports rather than the lack of expulsions. The figures for Veracruz, the Federal District and even Jalisco are too low as a result of missing reports.

Source: Reports and lists submitted by the governors to the Ministry of Relations. México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10.

Sources: The reports from the port commanders to the Secretary of Relations were found in Mexico. Archivo General de la Nación. Remo de expulsión, legs. 3, 5, 8, 9. Departures of Spaniards were reported in "Noticias de las entradas y salidas de buques habidas en este puerto," El Aquila Mexicana, VI (January 1 through September 12, 1828). Renewed reports of Spaniards departing appeared in "Entradas y salidas de embarcaciones," Correo de la Federación, VII (January 1 through March 20, 1829).

TABLE 23

DEPARTURES BY SPANIARDS, THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN
AS A RESULT OF THE LAW OF DECEMBER 20, 1827

Month	Year	Reported by the port commanders ^a	Departures through Veracruz as reported by <u>Aguila</u> & <u>Correo</u> ^b				
			Men	Wives	Children	Servants	Employees
December	1827	112	46	0	0	0	0
January	1828	285	107	4	6	0	0
February	1828	571	114	22	23	8	1
March	1828	107	158	7	8	2	0
April	1828	467	0	0	0	0	0
May	1828	98	0	0	0	0	0
June	1828	39	34	8	20	2	0
July	1828	9	0	0	0	0	0
August	1828	74	66	9	2	2	0
September	1828	0	0	0	0	0	0
October	1828	0	0	0	0	0	0
November	1828	3	0	0	0	0	0
December	1828	2	0	0	0	0	0
January	1829	2	52	8	19	4	0
February	1829	2	152	42	46	24	1
March 1-20, 1829		0	47	20	26	6	0
Totals		1,771	776	120	150	48	2
Grand Totals		1,771					1,096

^aThe reports submitted by the port commanders reflect departures from all the ports of México. The Ministry of Relations urged the port officials to report all departures, but whether all the reports have been preserved in the Ramo de espulsión cannot be ascertained. Since the final total is less than the number of Spaniards expelled, we may speculate that the yellow fever was indeed as devastating at Veracruz during the summer of 1828 as contemporaries have insisted.

^bThe departures reported by El Aguila Mexicana and the Correo de la Federación apply only to the port of Veracruz. This may explain the fact that the departures reported by these sources are usually fewer than the total reported by all the port commanders. The periodicals reveal the impact of the renewed anti-Spanish movement of early 1829 on the exodus of Spaniards from Mexico. The new emigration occurred immediately prior to the passage of the second expulsion law, that of March 20, 1829.

issued by the governors resulted in a total of only 1,104 Spaniards, while the port commanders reported 1,771 Spaniards departing. The absence of reports from major states such as Guanajuato and Mexico was a factor in the understatement of the passports total. The explanation for this data problem, and many others encountered in the course of this study, was the incomplete state of the Ramo de expulsión. In spite of its seventy-one volumes of documents relevant to the topic (plus one volume of irrelevant documents), the ramo contained some gaps.

Table 23 compares Mexico City periodical reports of departing Spaniards with the lists submitted by the port commanders. While the periodicals listed the wives, children, servants and employees who departed with the Spaniards, the commanders' reports did not. El Aguila and Correo were incomplete sources, however, since they reported departures from Veracruz only. But the periodical reports of departures by Spaniards in March 1828 and in early 1829 are more accurate than those of the port commanders. This may indicate, once again, that relevant reports are missing from the Ramo de expulsión. The reports published by El Aguila and the Correo reveal a sizeable exodus of wealthy Spaniards immediately prior to the passage of the second expulsion law on March 20, 1829. Their departures were marked by an increase in the number of servants accompanying Spanish exiles. These Spaniards were possibly merchants who had escaped the first round of prescriptions.

The overwhelming preponderance of departures through the Gulf ports and particularly through the port of Veracruz is demonstrated in Table 24. The same may be said of departures by the dependents of Spaniards, illustrated in Table 25. It seems clear that few Spaniards were able to take their families with them into exile. The generally accepted belief that Spanish recognition would soon make their return possible may have been a factor in the thinking of some.

An area in which the reports in the Ramo de expulsión are notably incomplete is that of financial aid to the expelled Spaniards (*viáticos*). Table 26 summarizes the existing reports, which listed 451 Spaniards who were aided with over 12,437 pesos from various branches of the national treasury. The governors' correspondence reveals that many more received assistance but financial statements were seldom remitted to the Ministry of Relations. A list of *expulsos* frequently included a note to the effect that all or most of the Spaniards mentioned had been provided with aid at varying rates, depending upon their social rank, but the totals were frequently absent from the reports.

Most of the exiles went to New Orleans. Any attempt to determine the exact number would be aided by debarkation records in New Orleans, if such exist. Table 27 summarizes the evidence contained in the reports of the port commanders, using the final destination of the vessels carrying Spaniards as a rather unreliable indicator. It is worthy of note that roughly 50 per cent of the Spaniards departed on ships

TABLE 24

DEPARTURES BY SPANIARDS FROM MEXICAN PORTS
DECEMBER 1827-FEBRUARY 1829

(Based upon reports submitted by the port commanders to the Secretary of Relations following passage of the law of December 20, 1827.)

Months	PORTS				
	Campeche	Guaimas	Mazatlán	Tampico	Veracruz
December 1827	0	0	0	0	112
January 1828	0	0	0	58	227
February 1828	0	0	0	108	463
March 1828	0	0	0	0	107
April 1828	7	0	0	21	439 ^a
May 1828	10	0	0	14	74
June 1828	0	14	0	12	13 ^b
July 1828	0	0	8	0	1
August 1828	0	0	0	28	46
September 1828	0	0	0	0	0
October 1828	0	0	0	0	0
November 1828	0	0	0	3	0
December 1828	0	0	0	2	0
January 1829	0	0	0	2	0
February 1829	0	0	0	2	0
Totals	17	14	8	250	1,482
					GRAND TOTAL 1,771

^aIncludes 219 Spanish prisoners of war who were being shipped to Havana.

^bThirteen Spaniards were reported in June but the date of their departure was not specified in the report.

Source: Reports from port commanders to the Ministry of Relations were found in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 3, 5, 8, 9.

TABLE 25

DEPARTURES BY DEPENDENTS OF SPANIARDS
FROM MEXICAN PORTS
DECEMBER 1827-FEBRUARY 1829

Campeche	1 ^a
Guaimas	0
Mazatlán	0
Tampico	44 ^a
Veracruz	320 ^b
Total	365

^aMéxico. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 3, 5, 8, 9.

^b"Noticias de las entradas y salidas de buques habidas en este puerto," El Aquila Mexicana, VI (January 1-September 12, 1828), and "Entradas y salidas de embarcaciones," Correo de la Federación, VII (January 1-March 20, 1829).

Source: Reports from port commanders found in the above sources.

Source: Lists of Spaniards often contained data on the amount of money disbursed to departing peninsulares who could not pay their transportation costs. Reports containing travel expense data were found in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exps. 1, 16; leg. 3, Vol. 7, exp. 1; leg. 3, Vol. 8, exp. 10; leg. 8, Vol. 18, exp. 34; leg. 8, Vol. 19.

TABLE 26

TRAVEL EXPENSES REPORTED EXTENDED TO SPANIARDS EXPELLED, 1827-1828

Spaniards	Origin	Destination	Date	Pesos/Reales	Sources of Funds
153	Distrito Federal	New Orleans	Feb., Mar. 1828	3,875.00	Comisario General de Hacienda
106	Jalapa	Veracruz	Jan., Feb. 1828	1,841.02	Comisario de Jalapa Comisario Sub-Alternas de Veracruz
60	Veracruz	New Orleans	Jan., 1828	1,200.00	Comisario General de Veracruz
43	Puebla	Veracruz	Jan., Feb. 1828	610.00	*
30	Chihuahua	[Refugio]	Mar., June 1828	2,882.02	*
26	Oaxaca	Veracruz	Feb. 1828	574.03	Comisario General de Oaxaca
19	Durango	Refugio	Feb. 1828	1,000.00	Comisario General de Durango
14	Querétaro	Veracruz	Feb. 1828	455.00	Comisario de Querétaro
451				12,437.07	

*The source of these funds is unknown.

Note: All figures were derived from available reports and are probably incomplete.

TABLE 27

THE DESTINATIONS OF SHIPS BEARING EXPELLED SPANIARDS
DECEMBER 1827-FEBRUARY 1829

Destination	Dec. 1827	Jan. 1828	Feb. 1828	Mar. 1828	Apr. 1828	May 1828	June 1828	July 1828	Aug. 1828	Sept. 1828	Oct. 1828	Nov. 1828	Dec. 1828	Jan. 1829	Feb. 1829	Totals
Baltimore	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Burdeos	10	8	78	0	15	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	116
Charleston	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Falmouth	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Gibraltar	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Hamburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18
Havana	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	442
London	0	0	0	0	333	74	0	0	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
New Orleans	98	269	298	107	42	13	5	1	26	0	0	3	0	0	2	865
New Providence	0	0	34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	34
New York	1	0	8	0	0	5	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	22
San Tomas	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Port unknown	0	0	153	0	53	0	27	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	247
Total	112	285	571	107	467	98	39	9	74	0	0	0	3	2	2	1,771

*This figure includes 219 Spanish prisoners of war sent to Havana in April 1828.

Note: Dependents of Spaniards were not included in the figures. All Mexican ports are represented. The ship's final destination is a poor indicator of the passenger's actual destination. Most of the Spaniards probably disembarked at New Orleans.

Source: Reports from the port commanders submitted to the Secretary of Relations. México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 3, 5, 8, 9.

bound solely for New Orleans. Any number of the vessels bound for other ports may have made for New Orleans first. The table also reveals that during the heaviest months of emigration, December 1827 through March 1828, roughly 90 per cent of the Spaniards boarded ships whose final destination was New Orleans.

The reports compiled by the governors which have been preserved in the Ramo de expulsión list 2,768 Spaniards who were excepted from the law's expulsion provisions. Table 28 reveals the distribution of these exceptions, while noting the absence of reports from Guanajuato, Tabasco, San Luis Potosí and the territories of Tlaxcala, New Mexico and the Californias. Puebla, Yucatán and Oaxaca reported the largest number of exceptions, while the Federal District reported only thirty-one, although the capital may have contained more excepted Spaniards than any other area. The figure for Spaniards excepted, like the figure for peninsulares expelled, is probably lower than it should be in reality. The sum of these two figures would mean that there were only 3,782 Spaniards in Mexico in December 1828.

The Effect of the Expulsion on the Clergy

The regular clergy of Mexico were under attack during the First Federal Republic, because of their landholdings and the fact that they were a corporation in which the Spaniards possessed considerable influence. This assault virtually destroyed the traditional system of hospitals and schools, which had been operated by them. The law of December 20, 1827, contributed to the roughly 17 per cent reduction in the number of religious clergy occurring between 1826-28, according

TABLE 28
DISTRIBUTION OF SPANIARDS EXCEPTED FROM
THE LAW OF DECEMBER 20, 1827

(Compiled from reports submitted by the governors of the states and territories to the Secretary of Relations, from January 23 to December 2, 1828.)

Political Divisions	Reported	Excepted
Californias, Terr. de.		- ^a
Chiapas	43	
Chihuahua	89	
Coahuila y Tejas	34	
Colima, Terr. de	5	
Distrito Federal	31	
Durango	161	
Guanajuato	-	
Jalisco	165	
México	118	
Michoacán	93	
Nuevo León	69	
Nuevo México, Terr. de	-	
Oaxaca	319	
Occidente (Sonora y Sinaloa)	149	
Puebla	454 ^b	
Querétaro	178	
San Luis Potosí	166	
Tabasco	-	
Tamaulipas	79	
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	8	
Veracruz	-	
Yucatán	389	
Zacatecas	218	
Total	2,768	

^aBlank spaces indicate that reports from these states and territories were not located.

^bIncludes 59 cases reported as undecided.

Source: Reports found in México. Archivo General de la Nación.
Ramo de expulsión, legs. 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10.

TABLE 29
ESTADO DE CHIHUAHUA

Relación de los españoles residentes en dicho Estado, que conforme al Soberano Decreto del Congreso general de 20 de Diciembre del año próximo pasado, han sido comprendidos en los diversos artículos de la misma ley, según manifiestan las notas individuales

	Comprendidos en el art. 1º										Ydem. en el 3º	Ydem. en el 5º	Ydem. en el 6º	Ydem. en el 9º	Ydem. en el 16º	Totales	Pesos/ reales	X
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX									
De Chihuahua	12	10	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	2	23	59	789.06
Cosihuiriachi	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	185.04
Parral	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	7	18	159.00
Allende	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	11	15	000.00
Paso del Norte	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	5	112.06
Concepción	2	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	16	24	439.00
Aldama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	000.00
Tepacolmes	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	7	82.06
San Buena-ventura	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	10	509.06
Tepahuanes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	000.00
Batopilas	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	6	9	97.06
Total	22	13	1	2	2	7	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	29	2	75	157	2,375.04

TABLE 29 (cont.)

		Comprobación
Han salido del Estado con pasaporte para puertas del Norte		33
Pendientes de resolución del Supremo Gobierno General		49
Juramentadas para no considerarse peligrosa su permanencia en la República		<u>75</u>
		157
Chihuahua, Marzo 10 de 1828 - José Antonio José Pascual García Secretario		Es copia, Chih. ^a Junio 18 de 1828
Explanation:		
I.	Sin excepción que les favorezca	
II.	Con la excepción 1 ^a y 2 ^a del art. 2 ^o	
III.	En dho. art. 1 ^o y adición 19 de las prebenciones	
IV.	En dicho artículo sin excepción	
V.	Ydem. en el 5 ^o sin excepción	
VI.	Ydem. en el 5 ^o sin excepción	
VII.	Ydem. con la excepción 4 ^a del artículo 2 ^o	
VIII.	En dicho artículo	
IX.	En la parte 2 ^a del artículo 1 ^o y en el 9 ^o	
X.	Cantidades con que han sido auxiliadas por via de viáticos.	
Note: The report was a final summation of the application of the law of December 20, 1827, in the state of Chihuahua. Additional cases were resolved later but the report covered the period during which the law was in effect.		
Source: Mexico. Archivo General de la Nación. <u>Ramo de expulsión</u> , leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 1, fol. 1.		

to the reports of the ministry of justice. Table 30 demonstrates the distribution of the loss which amounted to 325 friars among the various religious houses. The Franciscans, who were numerically the largest religious brotherhood, suffered the greatest absolute decline, losing 159 friars during the period. But the Carmelites, who were in their majority Spanish, suffered a relatively greater blow, losing more than 57 per cent of their membership.

In order to determine the percentages of the Mexican and Spanish membership of the religious orders, Table 31 combines data from Justice Minister Miguel Ramos Arizpe's reports to congress in 1827 and 1828. Prior to the expulsion, approximately 21.8 per cent of the regulars were Spaniards, while 78.2 per cent were Mexican-born. Among the least "Spanish," were the Agustinians who were 92.5 per cent Mexican, and the Mercedarians whose ranks included only one Spaniard. The Franciscan order possessed the largest number of Spanish regulars.

The government's figures on the expulsion and exception of Spanish regular clergy may be seen in Table 32. The figures provided by the Ministry of Justice on the expulsion of regulars are, in the case of the Franciscans and Carmelites, lower than the absolute declines listed in Table 30 for these two orders. It should be noted that eighty-three Spaniards of the Colegios Apostólicos were reported expelled. This must have represented a serious blow to the Church in Mexico. An undetermined part of the numerical loss suffered by the regular orders during the 1826-28 period occurred as a part of the

TABLE 30

THE CHANGES OCCURRING IN THE NUMBER OF
REGULAR CLERGY IN MEXICO, 1826-1828

Orders	1826 ^a	1827 ^b	1828 ^c	Numerical Change, 1826-1828 (+ or -)	Per Cent Change (+ or -)
Franciscanos	1,008	985	849	-159	-15.8
Dominicos	259	260	234*	- 25	- 9.7
Agustinos	235	240	226	- 9	- 3.8
Carmelitas	224	*	96	-128	-57.1
Mercedarios	192	194	187	- 5	- 2.6
De San Camilo (D.F.)	9	9	10	1	11.1
Dieguinos	*	*	*	*	*
Colegios Apostólicos	*	*	*	*	*
Hospitalarios	*	*	*	*	*
Totals	1,927	1,688	1,602	-325	-16.9

*Figures were either suspicious or unknown to the ministry.

Sources: The yearly Memorias prepared for congress by the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs included, in 1826 through 1833, data concerning the gradual exodus of ecclesiastics from Mexico. The Memoria of 1827 reported the number of clerics present in 1826.

^aSecretaría de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos. Memoria (México, 1827), Cuadro No. 10.

^bIbid. (México, 1828), Cuadro No. 11.

^cIbid. (México, 1829), Cuadro No. 17.

TABLE 31

THE SPANISH REGULAR CLERGY OF MEXICO, 1827

Orders of Regular Clergy	Regular Clergy in Mexico, 1827 ^a	Spanish Regular Clergy in Mexico, 1827 ^b	Mexican-born Regular Clergy, 1827	Spanish-born Per Cent	Mexican-born Per Cent
Agustinos	240	18	222	7.5	92.5
Carmelitas	-	100	-	-	-
Colegios Apostólicos	-	96	-	-	-
Dieguinos	-	29	-	-	-
Dominicos	260	45	215	17.3	82.7
Franciscanos	985	121	864	12.3	87.7
Hospitalarios	-	4	-	-	-
Mercedarios	194	1	193	0.5	99.5
San Camilo (D.F.)	9	4	5	44.5	55.5
Totals	1,688*	418	1,499	21.8	78.2

*This does not include all of the Spanish regular clergy due to the incomplete information possessed by the ministry of justice, as indicated by the blanks above. A minimum figure of 1,917, the total of columns two and three, would be more accurate.

Sources: ^aSecretaría de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos. Memoria (México, 1828), Cuadro No. 11.
^bThese data were compiled by totalling the figures in Cuadro No. 21 of the Memoria presented by the ministry of justice for 1829.

trend toward secularization which characterized the early nineteenth century in Mexico.

The secular clergy suffered a loss of only roughly 8 per cent during the 1826-28 period. Table 32 reveals that while six of Mexico's bishoprics suffered a decline in their numbers, four others gained additional members. Guadalajara, Oaxaca, Yucatán and Sonora experienced an increase in the number of secular clergy within their bishoprics. The greatest numerical loss was suffered by the bishopric of Puebla where seventy-six priests disappeared from the rolls. According to a ministerial report contained in Table 33, only eleven Spanish secular clergy were expelled under article 9 of the law of December 20. By the terms of the law, secular clergy were not included in the expulsion. If the ministry report was accurate, the loss of 289 during the 1826-28 period cannot be attributed to the expulsion of the Spaniards.

The Results of the Expulsion

An attempt to arrive at a sound statistical evaluation of the effect of the law of December 20 on the Spaniards requires a critical approach to the lists of Spaniards contained in the Ramo de expulsión. Table 34 represents a final summary, based upon the lists which have been preserved. The figures in Table 34 may be compared with the calculations of the Ministry of Relations completed in December, 1828, contained in Table 35.

A brief comparison of the two tables quickly reveals their great differences. Table 34 indicates that a minimum of 6,015 Spaniards resided in Mexico in 1827. By adding the totals of Table 35 only 2,749

TABLE 32
THE CHANGES OCCURRING IN THE NUMBER OF
SECULAR CLERGY IN MEXICO, 1826-1828

Obispos (Bishops)	1826 ^a	1827 ^b	1828 ^c	Numerical Change, (1826-1828) (+ or -)	Per Cent Change (+ or -)
Puebla	907	919	831	-76	-8.4
Guadalajara	611	597	618	+7	+1.1
Valladolid	500	470	489	-11	-2.2
México	482	499	480	- 2	-0.4
Oaxaca	364	374	380	+16	+4.4
Yucatán	357	377	374	+17	+5.6
Durango	184	177	*	- 7	-3.8 ^d
Monterrey	145	142	140	- 5	-3.4
Chiapa	73	66	*	- 7	-9.6 ^d
Sonora	54	58	74	+22	+0.7
Totals	3,677	3,679	3,388	-289	-7.9%

*Figures were either suspicious or unknown to the ministry.

Sources: Data found in the following Memorias:

^aSecretaría de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos. Memoria
(México, 1827), Cuadro No. 8.

^bibid. (México, 1828), Cuadro No. 6.

^cibid. (México, 1829), Cuadro No. 9.

^dCalculations for these percentiles were based on changes
during the 1826-27 period.

TABLE 33

1828: ESTADO QUE MANIFIESTA LOS ESPAÑOLES ECLESIASTICOS DEL CLERO REGULAR Y SECULAR

(Que en virtud de la ley de 20 de Diciembre de 1827 han sido espulsos, exceptuados, o se hallan detenidos por enfermedad o por responsabilidad o pendientes de declaración de excepción.)

Clero Regular	Espulsos	Exceptuados	Id. por responsabilidad	Detenidos por enfermedad	Pendientes de declaración de excepción
San Camilo	0	1	0	0	3
Dominicos	28	13	1	2	1
Franciscanos	60	35	3	2	21
Dieguinos	14	11	0	0	4
Agustinos	11	6	0	1	0
Carmelitas	67	21	1	1	10
Mercedarios	0	1	0	0	0
De los Colegios					
Apostólicos	83	9	0	0	4
Hospitalarios	4	0	0	0	0
Suma	267	97	5	6	43

CLERO SECULAR

Se han espulsado por haberse calificado comprendidos en el artículo 9 de la citada ley, once individuos, de los cuales uno se halla detenido por haber presentado documentos de buena conducta, cuya calificación está pendiente. Además se ha reservado a la resolución del Congreso general la excepción que ha promovido en favor de un eclesiástico secular el gobierno de Yucatán.

Source: Secretaría de Justicia y Negocios Eclesiásticos. Memoria (México, 1829), Cuadro No. 21.

TABLE 34

THE EXPULSION LAW OF DECEMBER 20, 1827: A SUMMARY OF
REPORTS FROM THE STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS

Political Divisions	Expelled ^a	Excepted ^b	Pending ^c	Total Spaniards ^d
Californias, Terr. de	-	-	-	-
Chiapas	26	43	-	69
Chihuahua	87	91	-	178
Coahuila y Tejas	4	35	-	39
Colima, Terr. de	3	5	-	8
Distrito Federal	1,137	(114) ^e	86 ^f	1,337
Durango	79	161	-	240
Guanajuato	(1)	(89)	-	(90)
Jalisco	46	186	5	237
Mexico	30	142	15	187
Michoacán	91	(102)	26	219
Nuevo León	10	73	-	83
Nuevo Mexico, Terr. de	(7)	(5)	-	(12)
Oaxaca	107	403	105	615
Occidente (Sonora y Sinaloa)	48	200	-	248
Puebla	136	434	156	726
Querétaro	34	33	188	255
San Luis Potosí	119	166	1	286
Tabasco	7	70	-	77
Tamaulipas	39	82	6	127
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	4	9	2	15
Veracruz	(210)	(3) ^g	8	221 ^h
Yucatán	60	394	-	454
Zacatecas	8	248	36	292
Totals	2,293	3,088	634	6,015

Note: The governors of the states and territories submitted reports to the Secretary of Relations on the enforcement of the law of December 20, 1827. Reports reached Mexico City throughout 1828. The staff of the ministry also prepared a series of reports to be submitted to the congress based upon the information received from the governors. The Ramo de expulsión and the Ramo de go-bernación contain the majority of these reports. The data summarized in the chart above was derived from the reports. While gaps in the information are unfortunately present, the resultant

data are not without a sound basis. By counting the lists of Spaniards contained in the reports, cross-checking carefully to avoid repetition, and comparing results with the summary presented to the congress by the Minister of Relations, I was able to improve on the information available to the government officials in 1828. The absence of reports from Veracruz and Guanajuato seriously weaken my attempted calculation of the total Spaniards in each category. The missing reports contributed to the understatement of the final totals: there must have been more than 6,015 Spaniards in Mexico in 1827, but probably not more than 7,000.

^aTotal number of Spaniards residing in each state who were ordered expelled from that state by either the state government or the federal government.

^bTotal number of Spaniards residing in each state who were exempted from the effects of the law by either the state or federal government.

^cTotal number of Spaniards residing in each state whose cases were still pending following the expiration of the effects of the expulsion law plus those Spaniards who were not discovered within the state until the law had expired.

^dMinimum number of Spaniards who were residing within each state as of December 20, 1827.

^eWhen the figure cited by the minister of relations in his report to congress was higher than the figure derived from my own count, the official figure was cited in parentheses. A probable explanation for this difference lies in the fact that all of the reports were not present in the ramos cited above.

^fIncludes 73 Spaniards whose requests for passports were pending.

^gThough the minister's report mentions only three exceptions in Veracruz, it is probable that the actual exceptions outnumbered the expulsions. This is born out by the fact that during the expulsion of 1829 Veracruz was found to be one of the principal regions of Spanish residence in Mexico.

^hMy count of the lists from Yucatán resulted in perfect agreement with the minister's reports. All the reports from Yucatán seem to have been preserved in the Ramo de expulsión.

Source: Lists were located in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10.

TABLE 35

THE FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE MINISTRY OF RELATIONS ON
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST GENERAL EXPULSION OF SPANIARDS

(Estado que manifiesta el número de españoles que se han espelido de la república, y de los que se han declarado poder permanecer en ella conforme a la ley de 20 de diciembre de 1827.)

Estados	Expulsados por hallarse comprendidos en la ley	Idem. por la facultad del art. 9 ^o	Declarados por los gobiernos de los estados no comprendidos en la ley	Exceptuados de la ley por el gobierno general
Chiapas	26	0	37	6
Chihuahua	42	18	89	13
Coahuila y Tejas	0	0	0	1
Durango	56	6	127	14
Guanajuato	0	1	0	89
México	0	17	0	24
Michoacán	12	15	95	7
Nuevo León	8	1	50	4
Oajaca	53	0	224	84
Puebla	0	7	0	39
Querétaro	24	2	145	10
San Luis Potosí	86	32	147	19
Sonora y Sinaloa	37	7	65	51
Tabasco	6	0	69	0
Tamaulipas	0	1	0	3
Veracruz	0	210	0	3
Jalisco	0	2	0	6
Yucatán	54	6	388	5
Zacatecas	0	0	0	30
Distrito Federal	0	27	0	114
Territorio de Colima	3	0	5	0
Id. de Nuevo México	7	0	5	0
Id. de Tlaxcala	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>
	420	352	1,454	523

NOTAS

- 1a Los huecos que aparecen en las columnas 2a y 4 a respectivas a los espulsados por la facultad del art. 9º y a los esceptuados de la ley por el gobierno general, indican que no hay individuo alguno de los pertenecientes a dichas columnas.
- 2a Los huecos que aparecen en las columnas 1a y 3a indican que no se tienen aun las noticias correspondientes de los individuos comprendidos en ellas, que se esperan de los gobiernos particulares, conforme a las prevenciones del gobierno supremo impresas al pie de la ley de la materia y circuladas con la misma.
- 3a De los territorios de las Californias no se ha recibido noticia alguna sobre este asunto.

Mexico 31 de diciembre de 1828.

Canedo

Note: This final summary was prepared by the "Primera Secretaría de Estado, Departamento del Interior, Sección Primera," for presentation to congress on December 31, 1828. It was published as Cuadro No. 1 in the Memoria submitted by Minister of Relations Juan de Dios Canedo in 1829. The Original copy was located by the author in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de espulsión, leg. 2, Vol. 4, exp. 2, fol. 1.

Spaniards can be accounted for. The ministry reported only 772 expulsions and 1,977 exceptions. Table 34 suggests that there was a minimum of 2,293 expulsions and 3,088 exceptions, with approximately 634 cases still unresolved in late 1828. The differences between the two charts in terms of what occurred at the local level are as marked as they are at the national level. For example, Table 34 accounts for 1,337 Spaniards in the Federal District, Table 35 only 141.

The Ministry of Relations was in no position to calculate the full effects of the expulsion or the total number of Spaniards residing in the republic. Information on those expelled or excepted by the governors of Coahuila y Tejas, Guanajuato, Mexico, Puebla, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Jalisco, Zacatecas and the Federal District had not been received by December 31, 1828, when the final report was compiled. No notice of any kind from the territory of the Californias had been received by December 31. All but the states of Veracruz and Guanajuato eventually submitted some useful reports. Additional reports may yet be located in the documentation of the relations ministry preserved in the Ramo de gobernación.

Table 34 was compiled from the reports extant in the Ramo de expulsión. When the figure cited in the ministry's final report was higher than the number resulting from the count of the existing lists, the ministry's figure was used in the chart and cited in parentheses. This procedure was based on the assumption that the ministry saw additional lists which have not been preserved in the Ramo de expulsión.

The statistics contained in Table 34 reveal that the minimum number of Spaniards residing in Mexico in 1827 was very close to the estimate of 6,000 made by Senator José María Alpuche in congress on November 2, 1827. Perhaps the yorkinos had investigated the matter more carefully than had the Victoria government. Since the reports of departures contained in El Aquila and the Correo demonstrate that the figures derived from a count of the port commanders' lists are too low for certain months, the estimate of 2,293 expulsions found in Table 34 would seem preferable to the total of 1,771 noted earlier. In order to arrive at an idea of the number of Spaniards who managed to avoid the effects of the law, the total of the cases pending must be added to the total excepted, resulting in a new figure of 3,772 Spaniards remaining in late 1828, or roughly 60 per cent of the pre-expulsion Spanish population.

The number of Spaniards present in each entity of the federal republic may be estimated by adding the figures under "Excepted" and "Pending" for each state and territory. Table 36 presents minimum estimates of the Spanish population before and after the expulsion of 1827-28, which were derived from the figures in Table 34. The reports were probably misleading for the Federal District where the ministry softened the hard line enforced by Governor Tornel. Guana-juato's Spaniards appear to have escaped the effects of the law almost completely, a startling fact when one recalls the Hidalgo revolt. In Jalisco also, the number of expulsos appears very small considering the role of the state in giving impetus to the expulsion movement.

TABLE 36

THE FATE OF SPANIARDS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
DECEMBER 1827-JANUARY 1829

Spaniards departing:	
Issued passports by the governor	844 ^a
Issued passports by the federal government	293 ^b
Passports requested voluntarily	73 ^c
Total Spaniards departing	1,210
Spaniards remaining:	
Excepted by the federal government	52 ^d
Employees of the federal government	13 ^e
Total Spaniards remaining	65
Minimum number of Spaniards present in the Federal District, December 1827-January 1829	1,275

Note. Since Spaniards expelled from the states and territories often entered the Federal District, the population of the capital was not stable. Spaniards were often found hiding in the capital. By late 1828, the Federal District was the home of large numbers of Spaniards who had not lived there prior to the passage of the law of December 20, 1827.

Sources: ^aCalculations derived from reports in "Suplemento," El Aguila Mexicana, VI (March 9, 1828), 1-3; VI (April 5, 1828), 3; VI (April 30, 1828), 3; VI (May 2, 1828), 2; VI (June 30, 1828), 4.
^bCalculations based on lists found in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, leg. 8, Vol. 18, exps. 20, 21, 22, 23; leg. 9, Vol. 22, exp. 71.
^cCalculations based on a list published in Correo de la Federación, VII (January 1, 1829), 3-4.
^dCalculations based on a list published in El Aguila Mexicana, VI (March 28, 1828), 3-4.
^eList located in Ramo de expulsión, leg. 8, Vol. 19, exp. 37.

Governor Zavala's remarks about "twenty-five Spanish families" remaining in Mexico state appear curious when one notes that 157 Spaniards were excepted from the law there.

The largest remaining Spanish populations appear to have been concentrated in Puebla and Oaxaca but, if the truth were known, they would probably be found to have resided in the Federal District and Veracruz. The confusion caused by the expulsion in the capital and the refusal of Governor Santa Anna of Veracruz to reveal his enforcement actions have obscured the results in these important areas. The states least affected seem to have been Zacatecas, where only 3 per cent of the Spaniards departed, and Guanajuato, where only one Spaniard was reported to have left the state. It would seem that a number of state governments were more flexible on the Spanish question than they might have cared to admit.

Conclusions

In order to assess the effect of the first general expulsion of Spaniards on the course of Mexican history, it will be necessary to ascertain which Spaniards departed Mexico and which remained. Since the law of December 20, 1827, was not enforced evenly in all regions of the republic, one cannot assume that the same group of Spaniards suffered exile from each state and locality. The fact that, to a large degree, the law was enforced by governors with differing attitudes toward the Spaniards, created an ambiente in which uniformity was an impossibility. The old colonial maxim of obedezco pero no cumpla (I obey but I do not comply) had not ceased to be applied entirely under

the republican regime.

In order to answer the question of who was expelled, two alternative methods of compiling occupational data on the departing Spaniards were utilized. First, the lists of peninsulares receiving passports were examined for occupations, resulting in the data presented in Table 38 below. Since not all Spaniards receiving passports actually departed, these lists may not be considered valid indicators of departures. A more adequate source was the reports remitted by the port commanders of Spaniards actually departing the republic. Table 34 was compiled from these lists. In this attempt, as in the first, the evidence was considerably weakened by the incomplete state of the occupational data included in the reports. The port commander at Veracruz--the major point of departure--failed to record the occupations of embarkees, except for clergy and military personnel.

While Table 38 reveals the occupations of 39.9 per cent of the peninsulares reportedly given passports, Table 39 presents similar data for 34.2 per cent of the Spaniards who embarked at Mexican ports between December 1827 and December 1828. It would appear that the failure of the port commander at Veracruz to report the occupations of 1,134 of the 1,482 peninsulares who embarked there has effectively eliminated all possibility of reconstructing the occupational picture of more than one-half the Spanish exiles.

In order to overcome these weaknesses, data for departures from ports other than Veracruz have been compiled in Table 40. Almost 90 per cent of the occupations of Spaniards departing through the ports

TABLE 37

ESTIMATED CHANGES IN THE SPANISH POPULATION
OF MEXICO, 1827-1828

Political Divisions	Spaniards Dec. 1827	Spaniards Dec. 1828	Approximate Decrease
Californias, Terr. de	-	-	-
Chiapas	69	43	38 %
Chihuahua	178	91	50
Coahuila y Tejas	39	35	10
Colima, Terr. de	8	5	38
Distrito Federal	1,337	200	85
Durango	240	161	33
Guanajuato	90	89	1
Jalisco	237	191	20
México	187	157	16
Michoacán	219	128	42
Nuevo León	83	73	12
Nuevo México, Terr. de	12	5	58
Oaxaca	615	508	17
Occidente (Sonora y Sinaloa)	248	200	20
Puebla	726	590	19
Querétaro	255	221	13
San Luis Potosí	286	167	40
Tabasco	77	70	9
Tamaulipas	127	88	37
Tlaxcala, Terr. de	15	11	27
Veracruz	221	11	95
Yucatán	454	394	13
Zacatecas	292	284	3
Totals	6,015	3,772	37 %

TABLE 38

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS GIVEN PASSPORTS
1827-1828

(Derived from reports of Spaniards given passports submitted by the governors to the Secretary of Relations in compliance with the law of December 20, 1827.)

Military Personnel:		
Generales		3
Militares		<u>463</u> ^a
	Sub-Total	466
Ecclesiastics:		
Religiosos		128
Seculares		7
Lego		<u>1</u>
	Sub-Total	136
Commercial Occupations:		
Comerciantes		89
Pulperos		5
Mercaderos		3
Tenderos		2
Carniceros		2
Panaderos		2
Dependientes de comercio		2
Importador		1
Tratante		<u>1</u>
	Sub-Total	107
Paisanos^b		
Laboradores		84
		34
Servants:		
Sirvientes domésticos		9
Sirvientes mineros		5
Sirvientes rurales		<u>4</u>
	Sub-Total	18
Other Occupations:		
Marineros		6
Mineros		3
Sastres		3
Hacendados		2
Dependientes mineros		2

TABLE 38 (cont.)

Dependientes rurales		2
Corredores		2
Barbero		1
Castrero		1
Boticario		1
Guarda de almacén		1
Contador de rentas		1
Plastero		1
Carpintero		1
Refinero de azúcar		1
Piloto		1
Sigarrero		1
Partón de cerdos		1
	Sub-Total	31
Unemployed Persons:		
Vagos		29
Tornilleros		11
	Sub-Total	40
Grand Total		916

Estimated number of passports	2,293	
Occupations reported	916	(39.9 per cent)
Unknown occupations	1,377	(60.1 per cent)

^aIncluded in this category were 219 Spanish prisoners of war who were deported to Havana in April, 1828.

^bIn the context of the reports, paisano seems to connote "civilian" rather than "peasant" or "farmer." Due to the large number of military personnel in some of the reports, non-military Spaniards in the same lists were designated "paisanos."

Source: The reports were located in México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 2, 3, 5, 8.

TABLE 39

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS DEPARTING FROM
THE PORTS OF MEXICO, 1827-1828(Derived from departure reports submitted by the port commanders to
the Secretary of Relations.)*

Military Personnel:		
Mexican Army		6
Spanish prisoners of war		<u>219</u>
	Sub-Total	225
Ecclesiastics:		
Regulares		167
Seculares		8
Misioneros		7
Legos		<u>2</u>
	Sub-Total	184
Commercial Occupations:		
Comerciantes		94
Negociantes		38
Mercaderos		11
Carnicero		<u>1</u>
	Sub-Total	144
Land Owners:		
Laboradores		12
Mineros		<u>10</u>
	Sub-Total	22
Servants:		
Sirvientes		4
Criados		4
Cocineros		<u>2</u>
	Sub-Total	10
Other Occupations:		
Carpinteros		4
Zapateros		3
Farmacéuticos		3
Campesinos		3
Hortelanos		2
Corredores		2
Sastres		2
Escribiente		<u>1</u>
	Sub-Total	20

TABLE 39 (cont.)

Grand Total		605
<hr/>		
Spaniards reported departing	1,771	
Occupations	605	(34.2 per cent)
Unknown	1,166	(65.8 per cent)

*The departure reports from the military commander at Veracruz failed to note the occupations of the majority of the departing Spaniards. Moreover, it is quite possible that some of the reports have not been preserved in the Ramo de expulsión. Veracruz was the port of embarkation for the great majority of the Spaniards. Any attempt to ascertain the occupational distribution of the expelled Spaniards based on the data contained in the departure reports will be only partially successful. The large number of clerics, for example, may be out of proportion to their numerical importance in the Spanish community. Clerics were always identified in the reports by the use of their titles. In fact, clerics were virtually the only group identified by the military commander at Veracruz. This can be seen from the following count of occupations mentioned in reports from Veracruz:

Regulars	123
Seculars	2
Military	1
Prisoners of war	<u>219</u>
	345

Source: México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión, legs. 3, 5, 8, 9.

TABLE 40

OCCUPATIONS OF SPANIARDS DEPARTING FROM THE PORTS
OF CAMPECHE, GUAIMAS, MAZATLAN AND TAMPICO(Derived from departure reports submitted by the port commanders to
the Secretary of Relations.)

Commercial Occupations:

Comerciantes	94
Negociantes	38
Mercaderos	11
Carnicero	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	144

Ecclesiastics:

Regulares	44
Seculares	6
Misioneros	7
Legos	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	59

Land Owners:

Laboradores	12
Mineros	10
Campesinos	<u>3</u>
Sub-Total	25

Servants:

Sirvientes	4
Criados	4
Cocineros	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	10

Military Personnel

6

Other Occupations:

Carpinteros	4
Zapateros	3
Farmacéuticos	3
Hortelanos	2
Corredores	2
Sastres	2
Escribiente	<u>1</u>
Sub-Total	17

TABLE 40 (cont.)

Grand Total		260
<hr/>		
Spaniards reported departing	289	
Occupations	260	(89.6 per cent)
Unknown	29	(10.4 per cent)

Source: México. Archivo General de la Nación. Ramo de expulsión,
legs. 3, 5, 8, 9.

of Campeche, Guaimas, Mazatlán and Tampico were reported to the ministry. These data provide a close look at the occupational structure of the Spanish community on the frontiers of the republic in 1827, as well as revealing the impact of the selectively enforced expulsion law in these regions.

In terms of occupational categories, Spaniards engaged in commercial occupations were hardest hit by the first general expulsion, according to Table 40. Roughly 50 per cent of departing peninsulares fell into this economic sector. Spanish ecclesiastics fared little better, constituting roughly 20 per cent of those expelled. In particular, European-born regular clergy were hard hit. At the opposite extreme were artisans and military personnel who composed less than 7 per cent of the Spaniards noted in Table 40. It would not be unreasonable to project the occupational structure revealed in this table to the Spanish exile community at large which departed Mexico in 1828, provided that the departures through the port of Veracruz did not differ radically from those at Campeche, Guaimas, Mazatlán and Tampico.

If Table 40 may be accepted as representative of Spanish departures in 1828, one can quickly recognize the groups primarily affected by the first general expulsion: merchants, regular clergy and owners of rural property, in that order. Spanish military officers were hard hit, of course, but they were not a major numerical component of Spanish society. The image of the Spaniard as a *pulpero*--

a peddler of oil and vinegar--reflected his prominence in commercial activities throughout the republic. The fact was repeatedly demonstrated in Tables 5-16. The evidence indicates conclusively that commerce, as the liberals had warned, and the regular clergy, as the conservatives had feared, were the principal corporations of Mexican society to be damaged by the expulsion. Needless to say, these were also the prominent sectors of Spanish society which were severely reduced by the purge of 1828.

The repercussions for Mexico, particularly in the economic and fiscal spheres, were reflected in the changes which occurred between 1826 and 1829 in three vital areas:

1. Revenue and expenses of the Federal Government (Table 41).
2. Customs receipts (Table 42).
3. Imports and exports (Tables 43 and 44).

An examination of each of these in turn will facilitate our analysis.

On the eve of the first expulsion, the income of the Federal Government was higher than at any time since the last year of the colony (Table 41). The treasury contained a surplus of over 650,000 pesos. During the fiscal year covered by the expulsion, government revenues and expenses each fell off by roughly 3,350,000 pesos. The decline in government income reflected a severe reduction in custom receipts during the same period (Table 42). Between June 1826 and June 1828, this source provided approximately 45.5 per cent of the revenues of the Federal Government. They began a precipitous decline during the second half of 1826, while the anti-Spanish movement reached

TABLE 41
REVENUE AND EXPENSES OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, 1822-1828

(\$ = pesos)

Fiscal Period	Revenue	Expenses
1822, Independence period	\$ 9,328,740.00	\$13,455,377.00
1823	5,249,858.96	3,030.878.50
1824	15,254,601.03	15,165,876.05
1825 to September 1st	7,903,163.42	13,110,187.24
Sept. 1, 1825 to June 30, 1826	14,770,733.30	13,112,200.65
1826-27	17,017,016.59	16,364,218.36
1827-28	13,644,974.69	12,982,092.86
Totals	\$83,169,087.99	\$87,220,830.66

Source: Matías Romero, Mexico and the United States. A Study of Subjects Affecting their Political, Commercial and Social Relations, Made with a View to their Promotion (New York & London, 1898), p. 139.

TABLE 42
 CUSTOMS RECEIPTS FROM 1823 TO THE
 FISCAL YEAR ENDING 1828
 (\$ = pesos)

1823	From April 1st to September 30 the receipts were \$971,345.77, which for a year of 12 months would be	\$1,942,691.54
1825	From the 1st of January to the 1st of August, 1825, the receipts were \$4,472,069.37, which for a year of 12 months would be	7,666,404.63
1825-1826	From the 1st of September, 1825, to June, 1826, \$6,414,383.26, which for a year of 12 months would be	9,621,574.89
1826-27		7,828,208.44
1827-28		5,692,026.70

Source: Matías Romero, México and the United States. A Study of Subjects Affecting Their Political, Commercial and Social Relations, Made with View to Their Promotion (New York and London, 1898), p. 145.

Source: Matias Romero, Mexico and the United States. A Study of Subjects Affecting Their Political, Commercial and Social Relations, Made with a View to Their Promotion (New York and London, 1898), p. 155.

TABLE 43

MEXICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM 1826 THROUGH 1828
(\$ = pesos)

Merchandise	1826	1827	1828
<u>Imports</u>			
Linen	\$ 2,384,715	\$ 2,180,191	\$ 1,711,051
Wool	934,295	493,760	245,901
Silk	1,432,578	844,732	398,003
Cotton	5,017,700	6,913,126	3,417,766
Mixed	122,968	107,108	38,654
Wines, liquors, groceries	2,888,066	2,867,320	3,244,498
Haberdashery	728,236	489,402	306,614
Medicines, drugs, and perfumeries	90,779	55,100	20,260
Books, blank and printed paper	1,430,039	495,743	130,638
China, fine and ordinary, crystal and glass	264,424	311,074	332,819
Furniture, of wood and metal	91,910	103,047	57,187
Machines and instruments for mining, science and the arts	63,499	22,810	44,128
Furs	912	4,517	318
Gold and silver	444	1,080	
Total imports	\$15,450,565	\$14,889,016	\$ 9,947,832
Total imports in 1825:			\$19,093,716
<u>Exports</u>			
Gold and silver	\$ 5,847,795	\$ 9,669,428	\$12,387,288
Cochineal	1,356,730	912,049	1,483,746
Indigo, Vanilla, jalap, and sarsaparilla	76,440	1,076,528	448,747
Other articles of Indi- genous products	367,164	513,769	169,005
Total exports	\$ 7,648,129	\$12,171,774	\$14,488,786
Total exports in 1825:			\$ 5,085,235

TABLE 44

THE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES FROM 1826 THROUGH 1828
(\$ = pesos)

Year	Exports from Mexico into the United States	Exports from the United States into Mexico	Total Trade between the two Countries
1826	\$ 3,916,000	\$ 6,281,000	\$ 10,197,000
1827	5,232,000	4,163,000	9,395,000
1828	4,814,000	2,886,000	7,700,000
Totals	\$ 13,962,000	\$ 13,330,000	\$ 27,292,000

Source: A statement taken from the United States Treasury reports by Matfas Romero, México and the United States. A Study of Subjects Affecting Their Political, Commercial and Social Relations, Made with a View to Their Promotion (New York and London, 1898), p. 173.

violent proportions, and continued to plummet during the expulsion of 1828. The peso difference between government revenues for the fiscal years 1826-27 and 1827-28 was roughly double the peso difference in custom receipts during the same periods.

A decline of nearly 42 per cent in customs receipts from June 1826 to June 1828 reflected a radical decline in commercial activity which had accompanied the anti-Spanish movement. The shrinkage in this revenue, of course, was occasioned by a drastic reduction in imports of manufactured goods from abroad during the 1826-28 period (Table 43). Imports declined by roughly one-third in 1828 from their 1827 level. But if imports are compared for 1825 and 1828, the latter barely exceeded one-half of the former. Imports had been falling prior to the anti-Spanish movements of 1826.

The decline in demand for manufactured items may have reflected a shrinking population of affluent European-oriented consumers. Drastic reductions in luxury imports were recorded for the period 1827-28. The most severe were noted in wool, silk, medicine, drugs, perfumeries, books (blank and printed) and paper, while some luxury items, such as China, actually made gains.

The export picture was much less conclusive during the period 1826-28. Radical fluctuations generally characterized activity, except in one category: gold and silver. A sharp rise of approximately 112 per cent occurred in the reported export of gold and silver between 1826 and 1828. Apparently, the Spaniards were taking their specie with them into exile, further depleting the Mexican supply in circulation.

This trend would affect the economy in subsequent years as the production of precious metals from Mexican mines dwindled and foreign capital failed to revive ore production significantly in the 1820's and 1830's. In 1828 gold and silver constituted roughly 85.5 per cent of the total exports recorded. An undetermined portion of this, of course, was exported by foreign capitalists who controlled a number of Mexican mines.

Trade between Mexico and the United States was affected adversely during the same period (Table 44). While exports from Mexico to the United States vacillated uncertainly, Mexican imports from the North declined by approximately 63.5 per cent. Total trade between the two countries declined by nearly 25 per cent between 1826 and 1828. It can be seen, therefore, that the Spaniard, as both a merchant and a consumer in Mexican society, would, through his departure, bring about a severe decline in commercial activity throughout the republic. The export economy, which had already experienced a severe decline with independence, would be less drastically affected than the import sector by the expulsion of the Spaniards.

The political and social results of the expulsion are less apparent than the economic consequences. The Spaniard was not dispossessed of his racially based aloofness in any sense, though he was effectively removed from the offices of a public nature which had provided him with a visible sign of grace. The European creole who had supported him for reasons of tradition and self interest, was cut off, temporarily, from Spanish connections and forced to regroup under

the banner of Church and fueros, which would soon emerge as a militant conservative movement, devoted to ending the influence of Jacobin tendencies in Mexican society. The revival of monarchist inclinations among Mexican gente decente, such as Lucas Alamán, quite possibly owed something to their aversion to the excesses which the American creoles proved capable of endorsing.

More immediate political consequences were felt in late 1828 and early 1829, when the alleged lack of enforcement of the first expulsion law led militant American creoles to reject the election of Manuel Gómez Pedraza to the presidency and to break with constitutional precedent by imposing their candidate, Vicente Guerrero, by force. Calls for a new round of expulsions were heard in late 1828 and the cry was seconded by Antonio López de Santa Anna. His plan of Jalapa found support from Governor Lorenzo Zavala in Mexico State and General José María Lobato in Mexico City. At last, General Vicente Guerrero had received the call of the leaders of his party with favor. General Nicolás Bravo, who with Guerrero had calmed anti-Spanish revolts in 1824 and again in 1826, was now in exile, having led the conspiracy of December 1827. The Spaniards' traditional defenders were no longer in a position to come to their aid. Even Pedraza, who had enforced the anti-Spanish measures of 1827-28 in response to the wishes of the yorkino lodges, was viewed as the defender of traditional interests in late 1828. European creoles rallied to his support during the presidential campaign.

The second general expulsion law was passed on March 20, 1829, during the brief presidency of Vicente Guerrero. As early as January, when General Guerrero assumed effective but illegal control over the presidential office, Spaniards began departing once again (Table 24). Those who had escaped the first expulsion recognized the threat posed to their welfare by the new regime which during the revolt of December 1828 (La acordada) had committed itself to the passage of a new expulsion law. The Spanish question endured in Mexican politics until Spain recognized Mexico's independence following the death of Ferdinand VII in 1835.

The social consequences of the first general expulsion of Spaniards were to be found in the realm of social ideas as well as in the actual Mexican society itself. Gente decente, persons of position and property, throughout Mexico must have experienced uneasiness as a result of the entry of new and formerly inferior groups of persons into the social elite. The traditional, prestigious and wealthy, white families of Mexico viewed the departure of the Spaniards as a temporary phenomenon. Eventually, it was hoped, the Europeans would be able to return and reclaim their proper place in the social order. The emergence of a mestizo such as Guerrero, or any of the men of obscure origins who had sponsored the expulsion measure in the Federal Congress, was viewed as a temporary dislocation of Mexican society. The liberals had never intended that social guarantees be set aside. They recognized the importance of the Spaniard and his capital for the construction of a new society.

The attempted return of the Spaniards was a foregone conclusion. The second expulsion, carried out in 1829, would shock the gente decente into revolutionary action. The Jacobin element in Mexican society would be purged, in order to make Mexico safe for the traditional families to pursue their interests in commerce and the Church. The government of General Anastasio Bustamante, led by Minister of Relations Lucas Alamán, in 1830 represented a first attempt by the gente decente to restore the republic to a path characterized by order and stability. Under the guidance of Minister Alamán, Spanish exiles and their families began gradually to return to their adopted country. Strong and vocal opposition to these developments was not lacking, however, and the Spanish question was revived by anti-clerical creoles who would have their turn in office. The reform government of 1833-34 included in its program, as a part of the attack on the clergy and Church property, the law of January 16, 1833, which revived the expulsion law of March 20, 1829. The measure was aimed at Spanish friars in particular who, in many cases, were the last guardians of landed monastic houses.

The expulsion movement in 1827-28 failed, both in its original goal of removing all Spaniards from Mexico and, secondly, as a defensive measure to protect Mexican independence. In fact, it jeopardized national independence by furnishing both officers and men for the Spanish invasion which originated in Havana in the summer of 1829. The movement failed to strengthen the nation economically. On the contrary, Mexico was seriously weakened in her commerce and international trade. But, more important than economic changes, gente

decente witnessed the destruction of social guarantees with profound misgivings. The prelacy found the Church unable to perform its role as traditional guardian of social guarantees. The American creoles had, in effect, declared war on the traditional social elite and the remnants of the latter would soon accept the challenge. Those who rose to the defense of traditional fueros and ecclesiastical property in the 1830's were resolved to forestall all future attacks on traditional rights and privileges.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
PLAN DE LOBATO

En la ciudad de México, el 24 de Enero de 1824,

"Reunidos los señores generales, jefes y comandantes de los cuerpos en el cuartel del regimiento infantería de línea núm. 5, para tratar acerca de la intimación que hizo el soberano congreso de que depusiesen las armas y se sometiesen bajo los auspicios del actual poder ejecutivo, y prescindiesen del pronunciamiento que han hecho sobre que se remueva este, se quiten los empleos que ocupan los españoles europeos, americanos coludidos con estos o sospechosos, y se les garantice su libertad, que ya ha sido atentada; resolvieron a pluralidad absoluta de votos:

1. Que no dejarán las armas sin que el soberano congreso constituyente renueva al actual poder ejecutivo en americanos de acreditados sentimientos patrióticos.
2. Que todos los españoles europeos en general, y americanos poco adictos al sistema de libertad, sean retirados de los empleos que ocupan, en tanto la nación española desiste de sus prevenciones hostiles contra los Estados libres de América y reconoce su independencia.
3. Que allanados los artículos antecedentes se les garantizara por la asamblea representativa su seguridad personal; por cuyas resoluciones, si en el término regular no se les contestare de conformidad, saldrán de esta capital a ocupar los puntos, que el general en jefe C. José María Lobato tuviere por conveniente, dejándola expuesta a las convulsiones y movimientos del pueblo, de cuyos resultados no se hacen responsables.

Lo acordado se dirá al soberano congreso para su debido conocimiento.

Por los granaderos de la caballería, José Staboli
Por el regimiento primero de caballería, Pedro María Gil
Teniente coronel del mismo, Feliciano Rodríguez
Por el regimiento cuarto de caballería, Antonio Castro
Por el quinto de caballería, Esteban Moctezuma
Por el regimiento provincial de Miacatlán, Angel Pérez Palacios
Por el sexto de caballería, Juan Patiño
Antonio López de Santa Anna
Juan José Minón
Juan José Velazquez
Mayor general, Pedro Miguel Monzón
General en jefe, José María Lobato

Source: José María Bocanegra, Memorias para la historia de México independiente (2 vols.; México, 1892, 1897), I, 337-38.

APPENDIX B

THE PLAN OF THE ARENAS CONSPIRACY OF JANUARY 1827

Bases fundamentales que han de servir para verificar el grito general por la religión y España

Art. 1. La religión de Jesucristo, según la santa Iglesia católica apostólica romana, sin mezcla de otra pública o privada.

Art. 2. Para sostener el artículo anterior volverá este país a la soberanía del Sr. D. Fernando VII (Q. D. G.) y legítimos sucesores, proclamándole y jurándole de nuevo y como se acostumbra en semejantes actos.

Art. 3. En todo lugar en donde se proclame este plan, se restablecerán inmediatamente los ayuntamientos, y arreglará todo como estaba en el año de 808.

Art. 4. Los indios volverán a gozar de todas las gracias y privilegios concedidos, y pondrán sus repúblicas como en el año de 808.

Art. 5. Cesan las funciones de los enviados por las potencias extranjeras; pero se les guardarán los fueros y consideraciones acostumbradas entre potencias amigas, si no lo desmereciere su conducta.

Art. 6. A los extranjeros eclesiásticos en el reino se les garantizan sus vidas y propiedades, siendo árbitros a permanecer o salir del reino hasta la resolución del soberano.

Art. 7. Se conceda la vida a todos los que tuvieren delito de muerte por motivos de opinión desde el grito de Iguala, tomando partido activo en este plan.

Art. 8. Es llamado a tomar las armas todo militar que sirvió en el año de 20 para sostener los artículos anteriores.

Art. 9. También todos los españoles eclesiásticos en el reino, y los dignos americanos amantes de su religión y rey.

Art. 10. Todo individuo español o del país, eclesiástico o secular que por imposibilidad física no pudiere unirse a las filas, tomará sin embargo parte activa para defender la religión y el trono, con sus instrucciones, y se recompensará a todos los que comprende este artículo y anteriores.

Art. 11. Todo militar será considerado por el empleo que obtenga al presente, y para los ascensos se atenderá a servicios que haga.

Art. 12. Los militares que por no haber tomado parte en el plan de Iguala hayan sufrido atrasos, serán remunerados al instante que se presenten para defender este.

Art. 13. A los empleados civiles se les guardará la misma proporción.

Art. 14. Los soldados, sargentos y cabos que sirvieron en el año de 20, y sirven actualmente presentándose a la primera llamada, se les abonará todo el servicio y el que no quiera servir en lo sucesivo después de arreglado el gobierno, se le dará su retiro o licencia correspondiente sin detenerlo.

Art. 15. El ejército se titulará: "El Restaurador de la fe," y se sostendrá de las rentas públicas sin alterarlas, y de los donativos o préstamos que hagan los amantes de ella, que se les bonificará luego que haya fondos para ello.

Art. 16. El jefe del ejército lo será yo por orden de S. M. con el título de comisionado regio.

Art. 17. Al ¿quién vive? se responderá: "La fé."

Art. 18. Todo el que se oponga a lo arriba dispuesto, será tenido como reo de lesa-magestad divina y humana.

Dado en México, a 12 de Enero de 27.

--Juan Clímaco Velasco.

Operaciones ocultas del plan que antecede

Antes que un miembro se dirija a otro ecsamine despacio si reúne las cualidades siguientes:

1a Intimo amigo de quién le ha de hablar.

2a Adicto a la causa de Fernando, y que a su favor se espresará con él dos o mas veces.

3a Muy reservado, que no sea fácil en manifestar sus arcanos, ni tenga algun vicio como la embriaguez, por el que arriesgue el secreto.

4a Nada voluble en sus resoluciones.

5a Solícito en llenar sus cargos y cuidar principalmente papeles.

6a Que esté en pie en alguna ciudad a lo menos por cuatro meses.

7a Que tenga otro amigo a quien poderse dirigir.

Vistas estas cualidades en algún sugeto, observe si las voces de religión o patria, el verse postergado u otra causa, o ya hable en público o secreto del proyecto: que lea bien las notas y pase a examinar a quien otro se dirige.

Obligaciones de los miembros

1a Conseguir a un compañero.

2a No descubrir, aun a costa de la vida, cosa relativa al asunto, ni decir al que se comuniqué quien lo hizo con él, o al contrario.

3a No formar junta ni aun franquear las casas de los dos miembros que conoce.

4a Denunciar al que hable directa o indirectamente del proyecto, aunque no le conozca por miembro de la causa, poniendo las palabras materiales que profirió, su nombre y apellido supuesto, o el propio si por otro no lo conoce, y el de los sugetos antes quienes habló, el día en que lo ha verificado, y cuanto además juzgue conveniente.

5a Noticiarán dentro de ocho días los puntos siguientes:

1o Con cuanto se suscribió o prestó con réditos o sin ellos, y si de esto quiere poner parte o todo a disposición de la causa para los gastos que se ofrezcan.

2o Las graduaciones, empleos, o estado de cada uno en general, v.g., un gefe capitán retirado o efectivo, un eclesiástico, &c., y la población en que se halla, con los rumbos y leguas a que queda dicha población de la de México.

3o El día mismo que entra cada uno, y el nombre y apellido supuesto que eligió en la firma.

4o Las juntas o reuniones de que tenga noticia, sus fines, y si conoce a alguno de la causa en ellas.

5o Si tiene varios de confianza a quienes poder invitar y quiere hacerlo, me comunicará la población en que se hallan, sus graduaciones, &c., conforme a lo dicho arriba, ocultando siempre sus nombres y apellidos, y no verificando la invitación (si se hallan en otra ciudad) hasta que le mande instrucciones de cómo ha de remitir los papeles sin riesgo.

6o Que número de tropas mantiene aquella población, espresando las veteranas y nuevamente sacadas.

7o Que esperanzas funda del pueblo y tropa, según el descontento o entusiasmo que advierta.

8o Que armas y cosas útiles al fin, tiene en su poder, repetirá esta noticia cada diez armas, cinco libras de pólvora, y cinco de municiones que aumente.

6a Obligación: obedecer las órdenes que se le comunique respectivas a si o comunes a todos.

7a Captarse la voluntad del pueblo bajo y tropa con favores, acomodos, buen porte, &c., cuidadno por lo menos de atraer los que en estas clases tengan algun predominio y ocultándoles el fin.

8a Elegir nombre y apellido supuesto.

9a Decirse mutuamente maestro y discípulo, los nombres que eligieron para comunicarse con ellos cuando se pueda ofrecer.

10. No escribir con nombre ni letra propia, si no es desfigurado, cosa del asunto, ni en el caso de hacerlo a mi.

11. No salir de la población en que se halla, sin avisarme con bastante tiempo para unir la cadena, y no siéndole posible dejará instruidos a los dos que conoce donde deban entregar los papeles que circulen.

12. Escribir asuntos indiferentes a su maestro y discípulo (si se hallan en otra población) cada quince días de no haber tenido noticias de ellos, para si fallecen o se ausentan unir la cadena.

13. Ecsaminar los ánimos especialmente de la tropa, y mandarme notas circunstanciadas cuando las ecsija, de los que estén por la causa.

14. Investigar por medios estraviados y desconocidos donde hay armas, dinero del comun, &c., añadiendo los medios más fáciles para que estos renglones queden a beneficio de la causa.

15. Copiar dos planes cuando se previene en la advertencia general.

16. Otras obligaciones propias de algunos cargos, se comunicarán en carta separada a quienes los obtengan.

Advertencias generales

1a Ninguna sacará copia de este plan, sino que admitido, le pasará al que consiga, éste al suyo, &c.

2a Todo aguardarán un segundo ejemplar de que sacarán dos copias, una para su uso (si no pudiere encomendarle a la memoria) y otra que (no pidiéndola el inventor) pasarán a sus discípulos, para que estos, quedándose con el ejemplar necesario para la copia, pasen los sobrantes a los suyos.

3a Todas las suscripciones y préstamos quedarán en poder del que suscriba, y los empleará por sí mismo en armas, soborno de tropa, u otros objetos que se le comuniquen útiles al fin, y no queriendo hacerlo por sí mismo avisará.

4a El que tenga intimidad con gefes acaudalados, eclesiásticos y otras personas de influjo e interés, deberá preferirlas en la elección a las menos útiles.

5a El que por su estado u otra cosa no pueda unirse a las filas al dar el grito, me lo avisará con tiempo para prevenirle sus ulteriores ocultos encargos.

6a El que tenga conocimiento con correos, arrieros o viajeros, espero me lo comunique.

7a Si alguno tiene conducto seguro para dirigir cartas y entregar en mano propia al capitán general de la Habana, hará gran servicio poniéndole a disposición de la causa, y se le ofrece toda seguridad de que quedará antes de dar paso, convencido.

8a El que quiera mandar papeles al gobierno español directamente, la causa le ofrece conducto seguro, como no traiga letra ni firma propia, y los dirija a mf.

--Juan Címaco Velasco

Source: Juan Suárez y Navarro, Historia de México y del General Antonio López de Santa Anna (2 vols.; México, 1850-51), I, 390-94.

APPENDIX C

THE LAW OF MAY 10, 1827

Los españoles no podrán tener empleo de nombramiento de los supremos poderes.

Art. 1) Ningún individuo que sea español por nacimiento podrá ejercer cargo ni empleo alguno de nombramiento de los poderes generales en cualquier ramo de la administración pública, civil y militar, hasta que la España reconozca la independencia de la nación.

Art. 2) Se extiende lo prevenido en el artículo anterior a los cargos y empleos eclesiásticos del clero secular y regular, en cuanto al ejercicio de sus atribuciones económicas, gubernativas y judiciales. Esta disposición no comprende a los reverendos obispos.

Art. 3) El gobierno queda autorizado para separar hasta por el tiempo de que habla el artículo 1 a los curas, a los misioneros y doctri-
neros del distrito y territorio de la federación.

Art. 4) Tampoco se comprenden en los artículos anteriores los hijos de mexicanos que casualmente nacieron en la península y se hallan en la República.

Art. 5) Los empleados que se separen del servicio en virtud de esta ley, gozarán todos sus sueldos, y se les abonará el tiempo en sus carreras respectivas.

Art. 6) Los empleos vacantes por las disposiciones que contiene esta ley, se desempeñarán provisionalmente conforme a las leyes.

Art. 7) Los curas que separare el gobierno en uso de las facultades que le concede el artículo 3, continuarán percibiendo todos sus emolumentos en los mismos términos que antes de su separación: y los coadjutores o sustitutos serán pagados de la hacienda pública.

Carlos García, presidente de la cámara de diputados.

Tomás Vargas, presidente del senado.

Vicente Guido de Guido, diputado secretario.

José Antonio Quintero, senador secretario.

México, 10 de Mayo de 1827.

A D. Tomás Salgado

Source: Manuel Dublán y José María Lozano (eds.), Legislación mexicana. Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República (34 vols.; México, 1876-1904), II, 12.

APPENDIX D

THE LAW OF DECEMBER 20, 1827, WITH THE INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT

Art. 1º Los españoles capitulados y los demás españoles de que habla el artículo 16 de los tratados de Córdoba, saldrán del territorio de la república en el término que les señale el gobierno no pudiendo pasar este de seis meses.

Art. 2º El gobierno podrá exceptuar de la disposición anterior: primero, a los casados con mexicana que hagan vida marital: segundo, a los que tengan hijos que no sean españoles: tercero, a los que sean mayores de sesenta años: cuarto, a los que estén impedidos físicamente con impedimento perpetuo.

Art. 3º Los españoles que se hayan introducido en el territorio de la república después del año de 1821 con pasaporte o sin él, saldrán igualmente en el término prescrito por el gobierno no pasando tampoco de seis meses.

Art. 4º Las excepciones que contiene el artículo 2º tendrán lugar para los que hayan entrado legítimamente después del año de 21.

Art. 5º Los españoles del clero regular saldrán también de la república, pudiendo exceptuar el gobierno a los que estén comprendidos en la tercera y cuarta parte del artículo 2º.

Art. 6º Los solteros que no tienen hogar conocido, por lo menos de dos años a esta parte lo mismo que los que fueren calificados de vagos conforme a las leyes de la parte del territorio de la república

donde residan, quedan sujetos a lo dispuesto en los artículos 1º, 3º y 5º.

Art. 7º El gobierno podrá exceptuar de las clases de españoles que conforma esta ley deban salir del territorio de la república, a los que hayan prestado servicios distinguidos a la independencia y hayan acreditado su afección a nuestras instituciones, y a los hijos de estos que no hayan desmentido la conducta patriótica de sus padres, y residan en el territorio de la república, y a los profesores de alguna ciencia o arte, industria útil en ella que no sean sospechosos al mismo gobierno.

Art. 8º El presidente en consejo de ministros, y previo informe del gobernador del estado respectivo, hará la escención del artículo anterior.

Art. 9º En la misma forma calificará el peligro que pueda importar la permanencia en el país de los demás españoles que no están comprendidos en los artículos anteriores, y dispondrá la salida de aquellos que tenga por conveniente.

Art. 10º Las atribuciones que se conceden al gobierno en los artículos 7º y 9º cesarán dentro de seis meses contados desde el día de la publicación de la presente ley.

Art. 11º El gobierno dará cada mes parte al congreso sobre el cumplimiento de esta ley, y este en su vista podrá estrechar el término que señala el artículo anterior.

Art. 12º Los españoles empleados cuyo sueldo no llegue a mil quinientos pesos, y a los que a juicio del gobierno no puedan costear

su viage y transporte, se les costeará por cuenta de la hacienda pública de la federación hasta el primer puerto de la nación española o de los Estados Unidos del Norte, según elijan los interesados, procediendo el gobierno con la más estrecha economía según la clase y rango de cada individuo.

Art. 13^o En los mismos términos se costeará por la hacienda pública el viage y transporte de los religiosos a quienes no pueda costearse por falta de fondos, la provincia o conventos a que pertenezcan.

Art. 14^o Los empleados que salgan a virtud de esta ley y elijan para su residencia un país que no sea enemigo, disfrutarán de su sueldo pagadero en el punto de la república que señale el gobierno.

Art. 15^o La separación de los españoles del territorio de la república, solo durará mientras la España no reconozca nuestra independencia.

Art. 16^o Los españoles que conforme a esta ley pudieren permanecer en el territorio de la república, prestarán juramento con las solemnidades que el gobierno estimare convenientes, de sostener la independencia de la nación mexicana, su forma de gobierno popular representativa federal, la constitución y leyes generales, y la constitución y leyes del estado, distrito y territorios en que residan.

Art. 17^o Los españoles que reusaren prestar el juramento prevenido en el artículo anterior, saldrán del territorio de la república.

Art. 18^o Se derogan los artículos 2^o y 3^o de la ley de 25 de abril de 1826, quedando en todo su vigor el 1^o en que se prohíbe la

introducción por los puertos de la república de los nacidos en España o súbditos de su gobierno.

Art. 19^o Los españoles que hayan de permanecer en la república, no podrán fijar en lo sucesivo su residencia en las costas, y a los que actualmente residen en ellas, podrá el gobierno obligarlos a que se internen en caso de que tema una invasión próxima de tropas enemigas.

Art. 20^o Se concede amnistía a los que hayan tomado parte en los movimientos sobre expulsión de españoles, por lo respectivo al conocimiento de los tribunales de la federación, dejando a salvo el derecho de los estados.

Art. 21^o La amnistía concedida a los individuos que han tomado parte en los movimientos sobre expulsión de españoles, no comprende a los que también hayan procurado un cambio en la forma de gobierno representativa popular federal que adoptó la nación mexicana.

Se circuló en el mismo día por la secretaría de relaciones, con las providencias siguientes:

1^a Los gobiernos de los estados dispondrán que salgan de su respectivo territorio todos los españoles de que hablan los artículos 1^o 3^o 5^o y 6^o del precedente decreto y que no se hallen en alguno de los casos de excepción de los artículos 2^o, 4^o, 5^o y 7^o en el término que los mismos gobiernos tuvieren a bien señalar a cada individuo, dentro de un mes contado desde el día de la publicación del espresado decreto en cada estado, y que solo por particulares circunstancias podrán prorogar a quince días mas.

2ª Los mismos gobiernos senalarán a los individuos que salgan de su respectivo territorio en virtud de la anterior disposición, el término proporcionado según las distancias para su salida del territorio de la república, y el derrotero que deban seguir, dando los avisos oportunos a los gobiernos del tránsito y del puerto por donde hayan de embarcarse, para que estén a la mira de la efectiva salida.

3ª Iguales avisos darán al supremo gobierno, publicándolos por la imprenta; y sin perjuicio de ellos a la conclusión del término señalado en la primera de estas prevenciones, le pasarán una nota circunstanciada de todos los individuos que hayan salido de su respectivo territorio y de sus clases, con espresion de quedar en él entera y exactamente cumplidas las disposiciones de los citados artículos 1º, 3º, 5º y 6º.

4ª Los gobiernos del tránsito y del puerto por donde se verifique la salida, darán los avisos oportunos al gobierno del estado de donde hayan salido los individuos que deben caminar a embarcarse, y los comunicarán asimismo al supremo gobierno general.

5ª Remitirán a este, además los de cada estado, dentro de quince días, contados desde la publicación del precedente decreto, una nota circunstanciada de los individuos que se hallen en algun caso de las excepciones de los artículos ya citados 2º, 4º y 5º, informando las personas que en su concepto sean dignas de que se les conceda a excepción por su afecto a la independenciam y forma actual de gobierno, por su conducta pacífica y otras circunstancias que los hagan recomendables en la sociedad.

6ª Igual nota pasarán de los individuos a quienes favorezca la excepción del citado artículo 7º dando por cada persona que en su concepto la merezca el informe que previene el 8º.

7ª Dentro del término de un mes contado desde la publicación de la ley en cada estado, remitirán los gobiernos de ellos una nota individual y circunstanciada de los españoles que por las disposiciones contenidas en los artículos 2º, 4º, 5º y 7º del antecedente decreto hayan de permanecer en el territorio de la república, y de los demás que continúen en los mismos estados.

8ª Dentro del mismo término y tan luego como parezca necesario a cada gobierno, harán al supremo general, bajo su más estrecha responsabilidad, el informe que estimen, justo respecto de los individuos a que se contrahe el art. 9º del espresado decreto, teniendo muy presente que él mismo ha encomendado a su celo y justificación el apoyo que deben tener en sus informes las providencias del supremo gobierno general, conducentes a alejar todo peligro funesto a la nación.

9ª Los gobiernos de los estados, de acuerdo con los comisarios generales o sub-comisarios, harán la calificación correspondiente de la imposibilidad que tengan algunos individuos seculares, de los que deban salir del territorio de cada estado para costear su viage y transporte.

10ª Del mismo modo calificarán la cantidad que con la más estrecha economía deba ministrarles la hacienda pública de la federación para hacer su viage hasta el puerto, según las distancias y la clase y rango de cada individuo, disponiendo que con efecto se les ministre,

no excediendo la asignación que hicieren desde dos reales por legua hasta un peso.

11^a Entre estos dos extremos harán del mismo modo la asignación correspondiente a los empleados cuyo sueldo no llegue a mil quinientos pesos anuales.

12^a De las calificaciones que hagan los gobiernos de cada estado en la forma esplicada, sobre la imposibilidad de algunos individuos para costear su viage y transporte, darán aviso a los gobiernos de los estados a que correspondan los puertos por donde deben embarcarse y a este supremo gobierno.

13^a Los gobiernos a que correspondan los puertos, de acuerdo con los comisarios generales o sub-comisarios dispondrán que se costee el transporte de cada individuo de los que se ha hablado, bajo las consideraciones y con la más estrecha economía que previene el art. 12 del espresado decreto.

14^a Precediendo constancia formal de que la provincia o convento a que pertenezcan los religiosos de que habla el art. 13 no tienen fondos para costearles el viage y transporte, dispondrán los gobiernos de los estados, de acuerdo con los comisarios, que se les costee de cuenta de la hacienda de la federación, abonándoles lo que corresponda a razón de 20 rs. por jornada de diez leguas, según las distancias hasta el puerto en que deban embarcarse; y para su transporte por mar se observará lo prevenido en la prevención anterior.

15^a A los empleados de que habla el art. 14 del precedente decreto, siempre que acrediten su residencia en país que no sea enemigo con la certificación correspondiente, se les pagarán sus sueldos en los puntos en que actualmente los cobran.

16^a Dispondrán los gobiernos de cada estado que el juramento que prescribe el art. 16 del precedente decreto lo otorguen en forma pública, y a la mayor brevedad los espanoles de que habla, ante la primera autoridad política de su residencia respectiva, y un escribano o dos testigos de asistencia, estendiéndose la diligencia correspondiente por cada individuo, y remitiendo consecutivamente testimonio de todas al supremo gobierno.

17^a Se encarga al celo de los gobiernos el más puntual y pronto cumplimiento del art. 17 de dicho decreto.

18^a Para los efectos de la amnistía de que habla el art. 20, la publicación del precedente decreto se hará extensiva a todos los pueblos y lugares de cada estado, a fin de que precisamente dentro de tres días de verificada en cada uno de los mismos pueblos y lugares, depongan las armas los que las hayan tomado y se retiren a sus casas, en la inteligencia de que por cualquier acto posterior contrario a la tranquilidad no serán comprendidos en la amnistía.

19^o Si entre los individuos que deben salir del territorio de la república conforme a los artículos 1^o y 3^o del antecedente decreto, sin poder gozar excepciones por alguno de los artículos 2^o, 4^o y 7^o hubiere algunos con casa de comercio establecida, o que estén encargados de su giro, los cuales no puedan evacuar las liquidaciones de sus cuentas y responsabilidades en el término que senala la primera de estas prevenciones, informarán los gobiernos de los estados el que en su concepto deba ampliarseles dentro de los seis meses a que puede

estenderlo el supremo gobierno general, para que en el que se les concediere salgan indefectiblemente.

20^a El gobernador del distrito y los gefes políticos de los territorios, procederán en ellos con arreglo a todas las anteriores prevenciones.

Source: Basilio José Arrillaga (ed.), Recopilación de leyes, decretos, bandos, reglamentos, circulares y providencias de los supremos poderes y otras autoridades de la República Mexicana, 1828-1839, 1849-abril, 1850 (17 vols.; México, 1834-50), I, 100-08; Manuel Dublán y José María Lozano (eds.), Legislación mexicana. Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República (34 vols.; Mexico, 1876-1904), II, 42-48.

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Introduction

The present study was based principally upon research conducted in the Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City and in the Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin. The two most valuable sources located in the Archivo were the Ramo de expulsión and the Ramo de gobernación. The former consisted of the papers of the Ministry of Relations concerning the Spanish question from December 1827 through 1834. The latter contained the papers of the Ministry of Relations which have been preserved for the entire nineteenth century, or roughly 1821-1910. Neither of these ramos was indexed. While the Ramo de expulsión was bound in 72 volumes, the last of which should not pertain to that collection, it was organized without regard to subject, time period, or geographical consistency. One was confronted with individual case histories, for example, which were located in several distinct volumes. The materials for the three expulsion periods were intermingled throughout the ramo. The gobernación papers consisted of several ex-ramos, such as Independencia, Tranquilidad pública, Españoles and Decretos, among others. A number of the cases pertaining to the expulsion of 1829 are to be found there, as well as details concerning the preparations of various Mexican governments against the Spanish attempts to reconquer Mexico during the period. The Ramo de gobernación also lacks organization at present.

The data on the Spaniards of Mexico in 1827 and on the results of their attempted expulsion in 1828 was obtained by the arduous process of counting all of the lists present in the Ramo de expulsión pertaining to the 1827 law. It was necessary to cross check the reports in order to avoid counting the name of the same Spaniard twice. Where lists of Spaniards were not available, a count of individual cases for those states would have helped to fill the gap. Due to limitations of time, the author found this to be impossible during his stay in Mexico City. As a result of the incomplete state of the ramo, he was never certain that he had seen all of the original lists and case histories. Documents relevant to the expulsions still exist in the Ramo de gobernación. Since the author was able to inspect only random boxes from the latter, the possibility exists that more data may yet be found in that source.

In the bibliography below the histories written by contemporaries of the events described under the heading "Historical Accounts and Memoires by Protagonists," have been set apart in order to emphasize their value as eye-witness accounts rather than as historical narratives. The bibliography below includes sources in addition to those cited in the notes. For example, the works listed under "State and Local Histories" were not utilized in the present study, but they would be relevant for more detailed regional studies than those attempted here. In addition, the pamphlets in the Sutro Collection, San Francisco State Library, might be used more extensively. Since the author has used

only those reproduced in the Catalogue, other pamphlets of equal relevance were not listed separately, though more than a hundred useful pamphlets might have been listed in a more extensive bibliography.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Harold Dana Sims was born October 19, 1935, at Fort Myers, Florida. In June, 1953, he was graduated from St. Petersburg Senior High School. From 1954 until 1957 he served in the United States Air Force. Following his discharge from the Air Force, he enrolled at Stetson University where he received the Bachelor of Arts degree, with a major in History, in February, 1962. In 1962 he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida. He worked as a graduate assistant in the Department of History until June, 1963, when he received the degree of Master of Arts. From September, 1963, until June, 1964, he pursued his work toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy under a Graduate Council Fellowship. In June, 1964, he was awarded a Foreign Area Fellowship by the Ford Foundation which was renewed in June, 1965, and continued until August, 1966. Under the Foreign Area Fellowship he conducted research at the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Texas, Austin, and in Mexico City, Mexico. In September, 1966, he became an Instructor in the History Department, University of Pittsburgh, where he is presently teaching.

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This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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